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SpaceX awarded three more NASA astronaut launch contracts
Three months after announcing its intent, NASA has procured three more Crew Dragon astronaut launches from SpaceX, raising the total number of operational missions the company is contracted to perform from six to nine.
NASA announced its plans to award additional contracts in December 2021 after releasing a half-hearted Request For Information (RFI) in October. That RFI, which seemingly lacked any real NASA support for an attempt to develop one or more additional crew transport vehicles, unsurprisingly produced the conclusion that the space agency should buy more flights from its existing providers.
Short of a second Commercial Crew Program (CCP), Boeing and SpaceX were thus the only options. Boeing, whose Starliner spacecraft has yet to successfully complete even an uncrewed test flight and remains years behind schedule, was apparently ruled out of this contract add-on. SpaceX, on the other hand, aced uncrewed and crewed Crew Dragon test flights in March 2019 and May 2020 and ultimately began operational astronaut transport missions in November 2020, making it the only logical option.
As such, NASA announced that it would award three more transport contracts to SpaceX, raising the total value of its Commercial Crew Transportation Capability (CCtCap) contract from about $2.6 billion to $3.49B. As of August 2019, NASA’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) reported that of the original $2.6 billion SpaceX was awarded, the company planned to spend $1.2 billion on development and test flights and $1.4 billion on up to six operational Crew Dragon missions.
At the time, that meant that NASA intended to pay a total of ~$230 million for each of the first six Crew Dragon transport missions, each of which would carry four astronauts to and from the International Space Station and serve as a lifeboat in the six months between launch and landing. For NASA’s contract modification, the space agency will now pay the company no more than $890 million – up to $297 million apiece – for three more transport missions, each likely carrying four astronauts.
For missions seven through nine, NASA will thus pay an average of up to ~$74 million per seat – substantially more expensive than the ~$55 million per seat SpaceX’s first six Crew Dragon missions will cost the space agency. To be clear, there’s a chance that a significant fraction of the $890 million contract value increase actually came before the addition of three more missions, in which case NASA might instead be paying around $700-800 million or around $60-70M per seat for three more Dragon launches. Regardless, that’s cheaper than the ~$90 million per seat Boeing’s Starliner is expected to cost. At the end of NASA’s Soyuz ridesharing efforts, the agency was also being gouged for about ~$90 million per seat to launch its astronauts on Russian Soyuz missions.
Update: There is evidence that SpaceX’s total CCtCap contract value was about $2.74 billion before the addition of three more missions, meaning that NASA is likely paying SpaceX around $755 million or ~$63 million per seat – a more reasonable 15% increase over earlier pricing.
SpaceX remains on track to launch Crew-4 no earlier than (NET) 15 April 2022, Crew-5 NET October 2022, and Crew-6 NET February 2023. The company is now expected to complete all six of its first operational crew transport missions before Boeing’s Starliner spacecraft completes a single one. In fact, it’s increasingly plausible that SpaceX will launch all six of its original Crew missions before Starliner attempts its first crewed test flight – a milestone Crew Dragon passed in May 2020.
It remains to be seen when Starliner will finally become operational. If Boeing manages that feat by mid-2023, there’s at least a chance that Starliner and Crew Dragon will finally be able to start alternating launches, in which case NASA’s three extra Dragon launches might last until 2027. Starliner would then have three more missions remaining, allowing NASA to stretch its 15 existing Commercial Crew transport contracts as far as H2 2028.
Elon Musk flew under the radar with his recent purchase of a $1 billion energy company, according to Federal Trade Commission (FTC) documents.
Transaction number 202612350 listed Tesla and SpaceX frontman Elon Musk as the acquiring party and CF APR Super Holdings LLC as the seller, with New APR Energy, LLC as the acquired entity. The deal, which closed without public announcement, came to light on May 14.
BREAKING: Elon Musk acquires Jacksonville power company APR Energy in a deal valued at more than $1,000,000,000.00.
— Polymarket Money (@PolymarketMoney) July 15, 2026
Analysts inferred the deal’s scale from minority stakeholder disclosures, including one report of a 5 percent interest sold for approximately $50.4 million. Fortress Investment Group had purchased APR’s assets in late 2024, rebranded the operation as New APR Energy, and subsequently transferred ownership to Musk.
APR Energy specializes in rapidly deployable power infrastructure. The company maintains one of the world’s largest fleets of mobile gas and diesel turbines, with more than 1.1 gigawatts of generation capacity. Its modular units, which are often trailer-mounted, enable turnkey installations ranging from 20 MW to over 500 MW.
APR provides full engineering, procurement, construction, operation, and maintenance services for behind-the-meter power plants, serving everything from data centers, utilities, and industrial clients.
The firm has expanded aggressively to meet surging demand, recently adding turbines and deploying over 100 MW for a major AI hyperscaler. Its solutions bridge critical gaps where grid interconnections face delays of two to five years, according to Yahoo.
The acquisition means something more for Musk. As he continues to expand projects in artificial intelligence, especially xAI, his AI venture, there is a greater need to supply energy-intensive supercomputing clusters, including the Colossus project, with what they need: reliable and high-capacity power.
Ownership of APR provides immediate access to flexible generation assets that can be deployed adjacent to data centers, reducing dependence on a strained infrastructure. It also complements Tesla’s energy storage business, so Musk will be able to pull from his own entities to address the rapid scaling demands of AI training and compute.
Tesla had a petition protesting a recall to fix a potential issue with 2017-2023 Model Y and Model 3 vehicles’ headlights was denied, as the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) disagreed with the company’s opinion of things.
The recall covers approximately 19,917 Model Y and Model 3 vehicles built from 2017 to 2023. Tesla initially submitted a noncompliance report for the headlights on these vehicles on March 15, 2024. Tesla then petitioned for an exemption from the fix, which violated FMVSS No. 108 (40 CFR 571.108), arguing that the “noncompliance is inconsequential as it relates to motor vehicle safety.
🚨 Tesla was denied a petition by the NHTSA to avoid a recall of 19,900 2017-2023 Model 3 and Model Y vehicles.
The NHTSA found that the vehicles’ headlights may exceed maximum lighting levels. Tesla argued it was inconsequential and did not require a recall. pic.twitter.com/m8Jmm1teLL
— TESLARATI (@Teslarati) July 16, 2026
The NHTSA disagreed, stating that Tesla’s conclusion that the headlights do not increase any risk was not an opinion it shared. The agency said it disagreed with Tesla’s assumption that glare is not increased to surrounding traffic. This issue could be highlighted even more in certain weather conditions.
Tesla will be required to remedy the issue, the NHTSA ruled:
“In consideration of the foregoing, NHTSA has decided that Tesla has not met its burden of persuasion that the subject FMVSS No. 108 noncompliance is inconsequential to motor vehicle safety. Accordingly, Tesla’s petition is hereby denied, and Tesla is consequently obligated to provide notification of and free remedy for that noncompliance under 49 U.S.C. 30118 and 30120.”
The issue here appears to be the angle of the headlights and the brightness they emit during operation. The NHTSA report states that:
“Tesla’s headlamp supplier, Marelli Automotive Lighting, tested 25 right-hand and 25 left-hand lamps, and for this sample, found the maximum photometric intensity measured in the 10°U to 90°U and 90°L to 90°R zone was between 136.2 cd and 230.1 cd for the right-hand lamps and between 117.5 cd and 160.3 cd for the left-hand lamps. According to Tesla, these tests revealed that the photometric intensity of the right-hand and left-hand headlamp lower beam on the subject vehicles may measure as much as 230.1 cd in the 10°U to 90°U and 90°L to 90°R zone, exceeding the maximum photometric intensity by 105.1 cd. Additionally, Tesla states that a left-hand lamp tested by a Transport Canada recognized laboratory measured a maximum of 171.27 cd in the 10°U to 90°U and 90°L to 90°R zone. Despite these measurements exceeding the allowed photometric maximum of 125 cd, Tesla believes that the subject noncompliance is inconsequential to motor vehicle safety.”
Tesla also argued at some points that the headlights had not been deemed responsible for any complaints, accidents, or injuries related to the noncompliance.
Lifestyle
NTSB findings on fatal Tesla crash tell a very different story
The NTSB confirmed the driver, not Tesla’s FSD, caused the fatal Texas house crash.
The National Transportation Safety Board released preliminary findings Wednesday confirming that a Tesla driver, not the vehicle’s software, caused a fatal crash in Katy, Texas in June. The driver, 44-year-old Michael Butler, had engaged Full Self-Driving Supervised mode on Rose Hollow Lane, a residential street with a 30 mph speed limit, before manually overriding the system by pressing the accelerator pedal all the way to 100%. Data recovered from the 2025 Tesla Model 3 showed the vehicle was traveling over 70 miles per hour when it struck a home and killed 76-year-old Martha Avila, who was inside. Weather was clear, the road was dry, and it was daylight.
Texas man charged in fatal Tesla crash where he blamed Autopilot
Butler told authorities he had passed out at the wheel. But security camera footage obtained by the NTSB told a different story, and showed the car accelerating through an intersection before leaving the road entirely. Police also found that Butler’s phone had Google searches including the terms “Tesla FSD not aggressive enough 2026” and “Tesla FSD too timid,” raising serious questions about how he was using the system before the crash. Butler has since been charged with manslaughter. The victim’s family has filed a lawsuit against both Butler and Tesla, alleging negligence.
The NTSB findings aligned directly with what Tesla VP of AI Software Ashok Elluswamy had already stated publicly on X in the weeks after the crash, writing that “the driver manually overrode self-driving by pressing the accelerator all the way to 100%.” The data confirmed his account.
Yup. In this case, the driver manually overrode self-driving by pressing the accelerator all the way to 100% of the accel pedal in this residential area. They reached a speed of 73 mph during the crash, and had the accelerator pressed even after the crash.
— Ashok Elluswamy (@aelluswamy) June 22, 2026
Elon Musk secretly acquires $1B energy company to power the AI future
Tesla has to fix a big problem with its old headlights, NHTSA says
