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NASA contracts SpaceX for a second crewed Starship Moon landing
NASA says it exercised a contract option to purchase a second crewed Starship Moon landing from SpaceX.
Aside from its general existence, though, very little else is known about the new contract. NASA has yet to discuss when it will launch or which Artemis mission it will be attached to. A step further, it’s not actually clear why two crewed “demonstrations” are needed or what the difference between those two missions is. But more importantly, a broader Artemis Program manifest overview published days later revealed that NASA has plans for a truly unusual gap in crewed Moon landings in the mid-2020s.
Mere days after the announcement, an official NASA schedule showing the agency’s plans for the Moon and Mars over the next ten years explicitly contradicted it, showing only two Starship HLS demonstrations: one uncrewed and one crewed. Assuming that was simply a matter of poor coordination, the graphic reveals another bizarre reality: NASA appears to be explicitly planning for a three-year gap between SpaceX’s first crewed Starship landing in 2025 and the next crewed Moon landing, which the graphic suggested might occur in 2028.
Every single crewed Apollo Program mission to the Moon – including one aborted circumlunar mission, two missions to lunar orbit, and six successful landings – happened in less than four years. As published, NASA’s current Artemis plan would be akin to completing Apollo 11 – the first crewed Moon landing – in 1969 and then sitting around and waiting until 1972 for the next landing attempt. It’s difficult to properly convey just how bizarre such a huge gap would be.
There are only two obvious possible explanations. First, NASA might prefer a multi-year delay between crewed Moon landings to building and launching another SLS Block 1 rocket, in which case the three-year landing gap is explicitly the fault of years of SLS Block 1B delays – specifically NASA and Boeing’s work on the rocket’s larger Exploration Upper Stage (EUS). Second, it could be the case that NASA and/or SpaceX expects Starship’s first crewed landing to be delayed by one or several years. In 2018, SLS Block 1B was expected to debut as early as 2024. In 2022, NASA now says Block 1B will debut no earlier than 2027, while the last Block 1 launch is NET 2025.
The first explanation is arguably much likelier given that structuring schedules based on the assumption of delays would make very little logistical sense. If SpaceX were to be ready on or close to the original schedule, that would leave NASA’s Moon landing program sitting on its hands for a third of a decade. In an alternative scenario, if NASA was planning to take full advantage of every year it has and SpaceX’s Starship demonstration was still delayed, the space agency would simply end up with more SLS and Orion hardware on hand than it planned for – only a problem if the rocket is literally incapable of launching more than once every year or two. There are few conceivable scenarios where having a mission waiting on a rocket would be preferable to having a rocket waiting for a mission
In other words, NASA probably doesn’t want to plan for a three-year gap between crewed Moon landings. Rather, the anchor NASA has chained the Artemis Program to – SLS and Orion – is likely giving it no choice in the matter. Worse, if SLS Block 1B and EUS development are as poorly managed as SLS Block 1, it’s possible – if not likely – that Artemis IV and V will slip another year or two. As a result, even in the likely scenario that SpaceX’s crewed HLS demonstration runs into a year or so of delays, there could still be a three or even four-year gap between crewed NASA Moon landings right when the program should be getting up to speed.
SpaceX, meanwhile, is privately developing Starship with the ultimate intent of landing humans on Mars. Without NASA’s interest and support, the Moon is a distraction from SpaceX’s real goals. Additionally, through NASA’s Human Landing System (HLS) program, SpaceX will be providing Starship as a service, meaning that the company will retain full rights to and ownership of any system that results. Put simply, there’s a real possibility that NASA’s seemingly extraordinary lack of motivation will create a scenario in which SpaceX could outgrow the space agency’s usefulness in the mid-2020s.
If, for example, SpaceX privately human-rates Starship for launches and entry, descent, and landing; it could use the Starship HLS lander it’s developed with NASA to land its own astronauts on the Moon without the need for SLS, Orion, or NASA. Given that the full extent of NASA’s Artemis Program ambitions appears to be one Moon landing per year, there would be plenty of room for SpaceX to perform multiple additional landings independent of NASA while the space agency’s contractors struggle to build and launch a single SLS rocket in the same time-frame.
Given the political power behind the SLS/Orion programs, it’s not clear if NASA will ever be willing or able to publicly support or take advantage of that logical and likely inevitable maturation of SpaceX’s Starship HLS capabilities. A crewed Moon mission – and especially a crewed Starship landing – successfully completed without the need for SLS or Orion could put NASA’s unsustainable rocket and spacecraft in a very uncomfortable position. Already, the HLS program has relegated SLS/Orion to the role of an Earth-Moon taxi service that just so happens to cost more than $4 billion per launch.
Above all else, uncertainty continues to reign over NASA’s longer-term human spaceflight plans – helped in no small part by the space agency’s lack of any obvious overarching strategy. NASA officials may religiously repeat phrases about how the Artemis Program aims to “sustainably” return humans to the Moon and pave the way to landing astronauts on Mars, but that doesn’t change the fact that the agency’s tangible, funded plans show virtually no evidence of serious preparations for either goal. Only time will tell where that rudderless ship ends up.
Elon Musk flew under the radar with his recent purchase of a $1 billion energy company, according to Federal Trade Commission (FTC) documents.
Transaction number 202612350 listed Tesla and SpaceX frontman Elon Musk as the acquiring party and CF APR Super Holdings LLC as the seller, with New APR Energy, LLC as the acquired entity. The deal, which closed without public announcement, came to light on May 14.
BREAKING: Elon Musk acquires Jacksonville power company APR Energy in a deal valued at more than $1,000,000,000.00.
— Polymarket Money (@PolymarketMoney) July 15, 2026
Analysts inferred the deal’s scale from minority stakeholder disclosures, including one report of a 5 percent interest sold for approximately $50.4 million. Fortress Investment Group had purchased APR’s assets in late 2024, rebranded the operation as New APR Energy, and subsequently transferred ownership to Musk.
APR Energy specializes in rapidly deployable power infrastructure. The company maintains one of the world’s largest fleets of mobile gas and diesel turbines, with more than 1.1 gigawatts of generation capacity. Its modular units, which are often trailer-mounted, enable turnkey installations ranging from 20 MW to over 500 MW.
APR provides full engineering, procurement, construction, operation, and maintenance services for behind-the-meter power plants, serving everything from data centers, utilities, and industrial clients.
The firm has expanded aggressively to meet surging demand, recently adding turbines and deploying over 100 MW for a major AI hyperscaler. Its solutions bridge critical gaps where grid interconnections face delays of two to five years, according to Yahoo.
The acquisition means something more for Musk. As he continues to expand projects in artificial intelligence, especially xAI, his AI venture, there is a greater need to supply energy-intensive supercomputing clusters, including the Colossus project, with what they need: reliable and high-capacity power.
Ownership of APR provides immediate access to flexible generation assets that can be deployed adjacent to data centers, reducing dependence on a strained infrastructure. It also complements Tesla’s energy storage business, so Musk will be able to pull from his own entities to address the rapid scaling demands of AI training and compute.
Tesla had a petition protesting a recall to fix a potential issue with 2017-2023 Model Y and Model 3 vehicles’ headlights was denied, as the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) disagreed with the company’s opinion of things.
The recall covers approximately 19,917 Model Y and Model 3 vehicles built from 2017 to 2023. Tesla initially submitted a noncompliance report for the headlights on these vehicles on March 15, 2024. Tesla then petitioned for an exemption from the fix, which violated FMVSS No. 108 (40 CFR 571.108), arguing that the “noncompliance is inconsequential as it relates to motor vehicle safety.
🚨 Tesla was denied a petition by the NHTSA to avoid a recall of 19,900 2017-2023 Model 3 and Model Y vehicles.
The NHTSA found that the vehicles’ headlights may exceed maximum lighting levels. Tesla argued it was inconsequential and did not require a recall. pic.twitter.com/m8Jmm1teLL
— TESLARATI (@Teslarati) July 16, 2026
The NHTSA disagreed, stating that Tesla’s conclusion that the headlights do not increase any risk was not an opinion it shared. The agency said it disagreed with Tesla’s assumption that glare is not increased to surrounding traffic. This issue could be highlighted even more in certain weather conditions.
Tesla will be required to remedy the issue, the NHTSA ruled:
“In consideration of the foregoing, NHTSA has decided that Tesla has not met its burden of persuasion that the subject FMVSS No. 108 noncompliance is inconsequential to motor vehicle safety. Accordingly, Tesla’s petition is hereby denied, and Tesla is consequently obligated to provide notification of and free remedy for that noncompliance under 49 U.S.C. 30118 and 30120.”
The issue here appears to be the angle of the headlights and the brightness they emit during operation. The NHTSA report states that:
“Tesla’s headlamp supplier, Marelli Automotive Lighting, tested 25 right-hand and 25 left-hand lamps, and for this sample, found the maximum photometric intensity measured in the 10°U to 90°U and 90°L to 90°R zone was between 136.2 cd and 230.1 cd for the right-hand lamps and between 117.5 cd and 160.3 cd for the left-hand lamps. According to Tesla, these tests revealed that the photometric intensity of the right-hand and left-hand headlamp lower beam on the subject vehicles may measure as much as 230.1 cd in the 10°U to 90°U and 90°L to 90°R zone, exceeding the maximum photometric intensity by 105.1 cd. Additionally, Tesla states that a left-hand lamp tested by a Transport Canada recognized laboratory measured a maximum of 171.27 cd in the 10°U to 90°U and 90°L to 90°R zone. Despite these measurements exceeding the allowed photometric maximum of 125 cd, Tesla believes that the subject noncompliance is inconsequential to motor vehicle safety.”
Tesla also argued at some points that the headlights had not been deemed responsible for any complaints, accidents, or injuries related to the noncompliance.
Lifestyle
NTSB findings on fatal Tesla crash tell a very different story
The NTSB confirmed the driver, not Tesla’s FSD, caused the fatal Texas house crash.
The National Transportation Safety Board released preliminary findings Wednesday confirming that a Tesla driver, not the vehicle’s software, caused a fatal crash in Katy, Texas in June. The driver, 44-year-old Michael Butler, had engaged Full Self-Driving Supervised mode on Rose Hollow Lane, a residential street with a 30 mph speed limit, before manually overriding the system by pressing the accelerator pedal all the way to 100%. Data recovered from the 2025 Tesla Model 3 showed the vehicle was traveling over 70 miles per hour when it struck a home and killed 76-year-old Martha Avila, who was inside. Weather was clear, the road was dry, and it was daylight.
Texas man charged in fatal Tesla crash where he blamed Autopilot
Butler told authorities he had passed out at the wheel. But security camera footage obtained by the NTSB told a different story, and showed the car accelerating through an intersection before leaving the road entirely. Police also found that Butler’s phone had Google searches including the terms “Tesla FSD not aggressive enough 2026” and “Tesla FSD too timid,” raising serious questions about how he was using the system before the crash. Butler has since been charged with manslaughter. The victim’s family has filed a lawsuit against both Butler and Tesla, alleging negligence.
The NTSB findings aligned directly with what Tesla VP of AI Software Ashok Elluswamy had already stated publicly on X in the weeks after the crash, writing that “the driver manually overrode self-driving by pressing the accelerator all the way to 100%.” The data confirmed his account.
Yup. In this case, the driver manually overrode self-driving by pressing the accelerator all the way to 100% of the accel pedal in this residential area. They reached a speed of 73 mph during the crash, and had the accelerator pressed even after the crash.
— Ashok Elluswamy (@aelluswamy) June 22, 2026
Elon Musk secretly acquires $1B energy company to power the AI future
Tesla has to fix a big problem with its old headlights, NHTSA says
