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SpaceX’s Starbase environmental review suffers third delay
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has announced that the completion of a crucial ‘environmental assessment’ SpaceX needs to begin orbital-class Starship launch attempts out of South Texas has been delayed for the third time.
Official known as a programmatic environmental assessment or PEA, the FAA says it started the process in late June 2021 with the goal of verifying that SpaceX’s Starbase orbital launch site (OLS) was mostly benign before the end of 2021. Compared to a regular EA, the programmatic nature of SpaceX’s Starbase review would theoretically allow the company to start small and gradually expand and add new facilities and capabilities without having to restart the arduous review process for each change.
Along those lines, SpaceX’s first draft PEA requested permission for no more than five full-stack Starship launches per year compared to the maximum of 12 Falcon 9 launches or nine Falcon 9 and three Falcon Heavy launches out of Boca Chica that SpaceX had already received permission for from the FAA in 2014.
Unfortunately, even at the time that the start of the process was announced, completing a full PEA in half a year was already unbelievably optimistic. No comparable review, of which there are effectively none, has been completed anywhere close to that quickly. In the face of substantial local opposition, like in the case of Georgia’s Camden Spaceport, even an FAA environmental review for a relatively small rocket launch facility can make little progress after years of tooth-and-nail fighting.
However, the best possible comparison has always been SpaceX’s own environmental assessment for an almost identical orbital-class Starship launch site at Florida’s Kennedy Space Center. Despite the fact that no untouched ground would be broken and even with the apparent might of NASA behind it, it took the FAA and SpaceX about a full year to complete a Pad 39A EA for up to 24 Starship launches per year. As such, the idea that the FAA would be able to complete a PEA for Boca Chica Starship launches in six months was always almost unimaginable.
It should come as no surprise, then, that nine months after SpaceX and the FAA began their Starbase PEA, they appear to be only marginally closer to completing the review. Days before the original December 31st, 2021 deadline, the FAA announced a delay to February 28th, 2022. On February 14th, the FAA announced a second delay to March 28th. Most recently, on March 25th, the FAA announced a third delay to April 29th.
Put simply, the FAA is effectively saying that it is actually further away from completing SpaceX’s South Texas Starship PEA than it was in December 2021. The extraordinarily opaque nature of the process also means that anyone outside of the loop or without internal sources is left to simply guess what is causing those delays or why the FAA keeps pushing the goalposts back just one or two months at a time when it’s unclear that anyone can actually predict when the process will be completed.
Without journalists filing Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, the full extent of public knowledge about what is causing those delays would be the FAA’s scant few statements on the process. The most valuable information provided thus far is that the FAA is “reviewing the Final PEA,” which does seem to imply some degree of progress. Nonetheless, the agency still included a boilerplate statement noting that it’s “completing consultation and coordination with agencies at the local, State, and Federal level,” making it hard to actually say if any progress has been made. In February 2022, the FAA said it was “continuing consultation and coordination with other agencies.”
In December 2021, the FAA stated that it was “continuing consultation and coordination with other agencies at the local, State, and Federal level” while “SpaceX continues to prepare the Final PEA for…FAA review and acceptance.” By using such vague and unspecific language, the FAA makes what little it does say virtually impossible to parse and barely better than nothing. Solely thanks to documents secured through FOIA, we know that the FAA itself may not actually be to blame for most or all of the PEA’s four months of delays.
Instead, the US Department of the Interior (DOI), Fish and Wildlife Services (FWS), and National Park Services (NPS) may be partially responsible through their required coordination with the FAA, which they appear to be taking full advantage of to exert some form of control over the outcome. Bureaucrats are being bureaucratic, in other words.
Outside of email chains and boardrooms, however, it’s no longer clear that completing the PEA and securing an FAA launch license are the limiting factor for the first orbital Starship test flights. SpaceX CEO Elon Musk recently announced that SpaceX is changing the prototypes assigned to the first full-stack launch – likely to Booster 7 and Ship 24. Super Heavy B7 has yet to begin any kind of testing and Starship S24 is still in several pieces, so it’s safe to say that SpaceX’s new pair are months of concerted testing away from launch readiness.
If anything goes wrong during those tests, any significant design issues are discovered, or any damage is caused, it’s entirely possible that what Elon Musk says could take as few as two months will actually take more like four to six. Only time will tell. For now, the FAA likely has a few months before Starship’s South Texas PEA and full-stack launch license truly become the limiting factor for the rocket’s first orbital launch attempt.
Elon Musk flew under the radar with his recent purchase of a $1 billion energy company, according to Federal Trade Commission (FTC) documents.
Transaction number 202612350 listed Tesla and SpaceX frontman Elon Musk as the acquiring party and CF APR Super Holdings LLC as the seller, with New APR Energy, LLC as the acquired entity. The deal, which closed without public announcement, came to light on May 14.
BREAKING: Elon Musk acquires Jacksonville power company APR Energy in a deal valued at more than $1,000,000,000.00.
— Polymarket Money (@PolymarketMoney) July 15, 2026
Analysts inferred the deal’s scale from minority stakeholder disclosures, including one report of a 5 percent interest sold for approximately $50.4 million. Fortress Investment Group had purchased APR’s assets in late 2024, rebranded the operation as New APR Energy, and subsequently transferred ownership to Musk.
APR Energy specializes in rapidly deployable power infrastructure. The company maintains one of the world’s largest fleets of mobile gas and diesel turbines, with more than 1.1 gigawatts of generation capacity. Its modular units, which are often trailer-mounted, enable turnkey installations ranging from 20 MW to over 500 MW.
APR provides full engineering, procurement, construction, operation, and maintenance services for behind-the-meter power plants, serving everything from data centers, utilities, and industrial clients.
The firm has expanded aggressively to meet surging demand, recently adding turbines and deploying over 100 MW for a major AI hyperscaler. Its solutions bridge critical gaps where grid interconnections face delays of two to five years, according to Yahoo.
The acquisition means something more for Musk. As he continues to expand projects in artificial intelligence, especially xAI, his AI venture, there is a greater need to supply energy-intensive supercomputing clusters, including the Colossus project, with what they need: reliable and high-capacity power.
Ownership of APR provides immediate access to flexible generation assets that can be deployed adjacent to data centers, reducing dependence on a strained infrastructure. It also complements Tesla’s energy storage business, so Musk will be able to pull from his own entities to address the rapid scaling demands of AI training and compute.
Tesla had a petition protesting a recall to fix a potential issue with 2017-2023 Model Y and Model 3 vehicles’ headlights was denied, as the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) disagreed with the company’s opinion of things.
The recall covers approximately 19,917 Model Y and Model 3 vehicles built from 2017 to 2023. Tesla initially submitted a noncompliance report for the headlights on these vehicles on March 15, 2024. Tesla then petitioned for an exemption from the fix, which violated FMVSS No. 108 (40 CFR 571.108), arguing that the “noncompliance is inconsequential as it relates to motor vehicle safety.
🚨 Tesla was denied a petition by the NHTSA to avoid a recall of 19,900 2017-2023 Model 3 and Model Y vehicles.
The NHTSA found that the vehicles’ headlights may exceed maximum lighting levels. Tesla argued it was inconsequential and did not require a recall. pic.twitter.com/m8Jmm1teLL
— TESLARATI (@Teslarati) July 16, 2026
The NHTSA disagreed, stating that Tesla’s conclusion that the headlights do not increase any risk was not an opinion it shared. The agency said it disagreed with Tesla’s assumption that glare is not increased to surrounding traffic. This issue could be highlighted even more in certain weather conditions.
Tesla will be required to remedy the issue, the NHTSA ruled:
“In consideration of the foregoing, NHTSA has decided that Tesla has not met its burden of persuasion that the subject FMVSS No. 108 noncompliance is inconsequential to motor vehicle safety. Accordingly, Tesla’s petition is hereby denied, and Tesla is consequently obligated to provide notification of and free remedy for that noncompliance under 49 U.S.C. 30118 and 30120.”
The issue here appears to be the angle of the headlights and the brightness they emit during operation. The NHTSA report states that:
“Tesla’s headlamp supplier, Marelli Automotive Lighting, tested 25 right-hand and 25 left-hand lamps, and for this sample, found the maximum photometric intensity measured in the 10°U to 90°U and 90°L to 90°R zone was between 136.2 cd and 230.1 cd for the right-hand lamps and between 117.5 cd and 160.3 cd for the left-hand lamps. According to Tesla, these tests revealed that the photometric intensity of the right-hand and left-hand headlamp lower beam on the subject vehicles may measure as much as 230.1 cd in the 10°U to 90°U and 90°L to 90°R zone, exceeding the maximum photometric intensity by 105.1 cd. Additionally, Tesla states that a left-hand lamp tested by a Transport Canada recognized laboratory measured a maximum of 171.27 cd in the 10°U to 90°U and 90°L to 90°R zone. Despite these measurements exceeding the allowed photometric maximum of 125 cd, Tesla believes that the subject noncompliance is inconsequential to motor vehicle safety.”
Tesla also argued at some points that the headlights had not been deemed responsible for any complaints, accidents, or injuries related to the noncompliance.
Lifestyle
NTSB findings on fatal Tesla crash tell a very different story
The NTSB confirmed the driver, not Tesla’s FSD, caused the fatal Texas house crash.
The National Transportation Safety Board released preliminary findings Wednesday confirming that a Tesla driver, not the vehicle’s software, caused a fatal crash in Katy, Texas in June. The driver, 44-year-old Michael Butler, had engaged Full Self-Driving Supervised mode on Rose Hollow Lane, a residential street with a 30 mph speed limit, before manually overriding the system by pressing the accelerator pedal all the way to 100%. Data recovered from the 2025 Tesla Model 3 showed the vehicle was traveling over 70 miles per hour when it struck a home and killed 76-year-old Martha Avila, who was inside. Weather was clear, the road was dry, and it was daylight.
Texas man charged in fatal Tesla crash where he blamed Autopilot
Butler told authorities he had passed out at the wheel. But security camera footage obtained by the NTSB told a different story, and showed the car accelerating through an intersection before leaving the road entirely. Police also found that Butler’s phone had Google searches including the terms “Tesla FSD not aggressive enough 2026” and “Tesla FSD too timid,” raising serious questions about how he was using the system before the crash. Butler has since been charged with manslaughter. The victim’s family has filed a lawsuit against both Butler and Tesla, alleging negligence.
The NTSB findings aligned directly with what Tesla VP of AI Software Ashok Elluswamy had already stated publicly on X in the weeks after the crash, writing that “the driver manually overrode self-driving by pressing the accelerator all the way to 100%.” The data confirmed his account.
Yup. In this case, the driver manually overrode self-driving by pressing the accelerator all the way to 100% of the accel pedal in this residential area. They reached a speed of 73 mph during the crash, and had the accelerator pressed even after the crash.
— Ashok Elluswamy (@aelluswamy) June 22, 2026
Elon Musk secretly acquires $1B energy company to power the AI future
Tesla has to fix a big problem with its old headlights, NHTSA says
