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SpaceX and NASA accidentally set the stage for a new race to the Moon
Almost entirely driven by chance, SpaceX and NASA may soon find themselves in an unintentional race to return humans to the Moon for the first time in half a century.
Both entities – SpaceX with its next-generation BFR and NASA with its Shuttle-derived SLS – are tentatively targeting 2023 for their similar circumlunar voyages, in which NASA astronauts and private individuals could theoretically travel around the Moon within just months of each other, showcasing two utterly dissimilar approaches to space exploration.
Over the course of no fewer than seven years of development, NASA’s SLS rocket and Orion spacecraft have run into an unrelenting barrage of issues, effectively delaying the system’s launch debut at a rate equivalent to or even faster than the passage of time itself. In other words, every month recently spent working on the vehicle seems to have reliably corresponded with at least an additional month of delays for the launch system.
Why these incessant delays continue to occur is an entire story in itself and demands the acknowledgment of some uncomfortable and inconvenient realities about the state of NASA’s human spaceflight program in the 21st century, but that is a story is for another time.
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- SLS. (NASA)
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- NASA’s Orion spacecraft, European Service Module, and ICPS upper stage. (NASA)
A different kind of paper rocket
Returning to SLS, a brief overview is in order to properly contextualize what exactly the rocket and spacecraft are and what exactly their development has cost up to now. SLS is comprised of four major hardware segments.
- The Core Stage: A massive liquid hydrogen/liquid oxygen rocket booster, this section is essentially a lengthened version of the retired Space Shuttle’s familiar orange propellant tank, while the stage’s four engines are quite literally taken from stores of mothballed Space Shuttle hardware and will be ingloriously expended after each launch (SLS is 100% expendable).
- Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs): Minimally modified copies of the SRBs used during the Space Shuttle program, SLS’ SRBs have slightly more solid propellant and have had all hints of reusability removed, whereas Space Shuttle boosters deployed parachutes and were reused after landing in the Atlantic Ocean.
- The Upper Stage (Interim Cryogenic Propulsion System, ICPS): ICPS is a slightly modified version of ULA’s off-the-shelf Delta IV upper stage.
- The Orion spacecraft and European Service Module: Borrowing heavily from the Apollo Command and Service Modules that took humanity to the Moon in the 1960s and 70s, Orion has been in funded development in one form or another for more than 12 years, with just one partial flight-test to call its own. Orion’s development has cost the U.S. approximately $16 billion since 2006, with another $4-6 billion expected between now and 2023, a sum that doesn’t account for the costs of production and operations once development is complete.
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- The Orion spacecraft and ESM. (NASA)
For the SLS core stage and SRBs, a generous bottom-rung estimate indicates that $14 billion has been spent on the rocket itself between 2011 and 2018, not including many billions more spent refurbishing and modifying the rocket’s aging Saturn and Shuttle-derived launch infrastructure at Kennedy Space Center. Of the many distressing patterns that appear in the above descriptions of SLS hardware, most notable is a near-obsessive dependence upon “heritage” hardware that has already been designed and tested – in some cases even manufactured.
Despite cobbling together or reusing as many mature components, facilities, and workforces as possible and relying on slightly-modified commercial hardware at every turn, SLS and Orion will somehow end up costing the United States more than $30 billion dollars before it has completed a single full launch; potentially rising beyond $40 billion by the time the system is ready to launch NASA astronauts.
Moonward bound
SLS’ first crewed mission, known as Exploratory Mission-2 (EM-2), brings us to the title – NASA’s mission planning has settled on sending a crew of four astronauts on what is known as a Free Lunar Return trajectory in the Orion spacecraft, essentially a single flyby of the Moon. Official NASA statements appear to be sending mixed messages on the schedule for EM-2’s launch, with September 2018 presentations indicating 2022 while a late-August blog post suggests that the crewed circumlunar mission is targeting launch in 2023.
As it happens, SpaceX announced its own plans for a (private) crewed circumlunar voyage less than two weeks ago. Funded in large part by Japanese billionaire Yasuka Maezawa, SpaceX’s hopes to send 10+ people to the Moon on its next-generation BFR launch vehicle, comprised of a fully-reusable booster and spaceship. Deemed Dear Moon by Maezawa, SpaceX is targeting an extremely ambitious launch deadline sometime in 2023, although CEO Elon Musk frankly noted that hitting that 2023 window would require all aspects of BFR booster and spaceship development to proceed flawlessly over the next several years.
Compared to the 10+ years and $30+ billion of development SLS and Orion will have taken before their first full launch, SpaceX is targeting the first orbital BFR test flights as early as 2020 or 2021, self-admittedly optimistic deadlines that will likely slip. Still, betting against SpaceX completing its first BFR launch sometime in the early to mid-2020s for something approximating Musk’s $2-10 billion development cost seems a risky move in the context of SpaceX’s undeniable track record of proving the old-guard wrong.
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- NASA’s EM-2 circumlunar voyage. (NASA)
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- SpaceX’s own circumlunar trajectory, nearly identical. (SpaceX)
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- SLS Block 1. (NASA)
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- BFR’s spaceship and booster (now Starship and Super Heavy) separate in a mid-2018 render of the vehicle. (SpaceX)
It must be noted that the apparent alignment of both SpaceX and NASA’s first crewed circumlunar missions with new rockets and spacecraft is a fluke of chance, and the fact that it may or may not take the shape of a second race to the Moon – pitting two dramatically different ideologies and organizational approaches against each other – is purely coincidental.
However, despite the undeniable fact that NASA and SpaceX are deeply and cooperatively involved through Crew and Cargo Dragon and despite Musk’s genuine affirmations of support and admiration for the space agency, it can be almost guaranteed that the world will look on in the 2020s with the same underlying emotions and motivations that were globally present during the Apollo Program. Rather than a battle of economic and nationalistic ideologies, the New Space Race of the 2020s will pit two (publicly) amicable private and public entities against each other at the same time as they work hand-in-hand to deliver crew and cargo to the International Space Station.
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- An overview of BFR’s booster and spaceship, now known as Super Heavy and Starship. (SpaceX)
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- SpaceX has already completed the first of many carbon-composite sections of its prototype spaceship. (SpaceX)
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- SLS’ movable launch pad is very slowly being prepared for a 2020/2021 debut. (Tom Cross)
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- SLS undoubtedly has several steps up on BFR in terms of volume of hardware in work, although target launch dates are quite similar for both rockets. (NASA)
Critically, this new “race” will be fairly illusory. Thanks to the fact that the new goal of human spaceflight appears to be the sustainable exploration of the solar system, there will inherently be no Apollo-style finish line for any one company or country or agency to cross. Rather than the Apollo Program’s shortsighted economic motivations and its consequentially abrupt demise, the end-result of this new age of competition will be the establishment of humanity as a (deep) spacefaring species, be it a temporary burst of effort or a permanent human condition.
Buckle up.
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Elon Musk
The Boring Company just doubled its tunneling power in Nashville
The Boring Company’s Prufrock MB2 is commissioned and ready to mine beneath Nashville’s streets.
The Boring Company’s second tunnel boring machine, Prufrock MB2, is officially ready to dig in Nashville. The company confirmed the news on X, posting: “Prufrock-MB2 is ready to mine in Nashville! MB2 commissioning is complete, including the brief 11 rpm rotation shown here. Will MB2 catch up to MB1, who had quite the head start? And Prufrock-MB3 ships in August!”
MB2 arrives with meaningful improvements over its predecessor. Lessons learned from the launch and operation of MB1 have already been applied to MB2 to improve efficiency and prepare the machine for launch.
Traditional tunnel boring machines operate in a stop-and-go cycle, digging roughly five feet, halt, erect precast concrete segments to line the tunnel wall, then resume. That repeated interruption is one of the main reasons conventional tunneling is slow and expensive. Prufrock is designed to install the tunnel liner simultaneously with mining, eliminating the need to stop every five feet. The machine also skips the need for excavated launch pits. Prufrock arrives on a truck, tilts down, and launches into the ground within 24 hours. And when the tunnel is complete, it emerges from the ground and drives to its next launch site on a trailer, eliminating the need for expensive cranes or pit excavation. The machine is also fully electric and runs with zero people in the tunnel during normal operations, controlled remotely from a surface operations center.
Prufrock-MB2 is ready to mine in Nashville! MB2 commissioning is complete, including the brief 11 rpm rotation shown here.
Will MB2 catch up to MB1, who had quite the head start?
And Prufrock-MB3 ships in August! pic.twitter.com/TTrMql2aRg
— The Boring Company (@boringcompany) June 17, 2026
It won’t be long before we hear of another major update on The Boring Company’s Music City Loop project – a planned underground transit network beneath Nashville that would move passengers in electric vehicles through a series of tunnels at highway speeds, and bypassing surface traffic entirely. Nashville was selected in part because of its strong rock conditions that suits the Prufrock machines well, and relatively less regulatory hurdles.
Progress has been steady on multiple fronts. All 37 permits and approvals required ahead of tunneling have been obtained, out of 45 total. Key wins include a fully executed TDOT tunnel permit authorizing 25 miles of tunnel, unanimous airport authority approval for a Nashville International Airport station, and the city’s first residential station agreement serving downtown tower residents.
With MB1 already tunneling, MB2 now commissioned, and MB3 shipping in August, Nashville is becoming something of a live proving ground for scaled tunnel boring. The broader ambition is not limited to one city. The Boring Company’s stated goal is to make underground transportation a practical alternative to surface roads across major metro areas. Nashville is one of many cities, including a successful Las Vegas tunnel system, where that idea is being put to the test at real speed.
Tesla has launched a direct campaign targeting its customers in New Jersey, sending emails that warn of pending legislation that could effectively block true driverless technology in the state.
The email focuses on Senate Bill S.1677 and Assembly Bill A.3968, measures intended to create a three-year autonomous vehicle pilot program but laden with requirements that Tesla argues make unsupervised Robotaxis impossible.
Tesla is sending out this email to New Jersey Tesla owners, warning them that NJ could block autonomous vehicles, and to take action.
“Proposed legislation moving through Trenton right now would impose restrictions so severe that true driverless deployment would remain illegal.… pic.twitter.com/2bmY646AUL
— Sawyer Merritt (@SawyerMerritt) June 16, 2026
According to the email, the bills impose “restrictions so severe that true driverless deployment would remain illegal.” Specific hurdles include mandates for human safety drivers during operations, multimillion-dollar insurance minimums, reportedly $5 million, and thresholds like 100,000 miles of demonstrated safe autonomous driving before any driverless approval.
Tesla contends these are arbitrary barriers that ignore real-world performance data and favor entrenched competitors over innovative technologies like its Full Self-Driving (FSD) system.
The push comes as Tesla has started expanding Robotaxi operations in states like Texas, where unsupervised vehicles are already providing rides in several cities. New Jersey, by contrast, risks falling behind. The company highlights in the email communication that more than 94 percent of serious crashes result from human error, meaning impairment, distraction, or fatigue. These are all problems that Robotaxis eliminate entirely.
In 2025, New Jersey recorded 582 traffic deaths, underscoring the human cost of delayed adoption.
Tesla’s outreach stresses the transformative potential of robotaxis. For families, they could offer safer school runs without drowsy or distracted drivers. For seniors and people with disabilities, robotaxis promise independence and reliable mobility.
In areas with limited public transit, they could deliver affordable, on-demand transportation, reducing congestion, emissions, and overall transportation costs. Economically, the company warns that restrictive rules could cost New Jersey jobs, innovation investment, and billions in potential growth as autonomous ride-hailing scales elsewhere.
Supporters of the legislation, including Sen. Andrew Zwicker, describe the pilot as a cautious framework with strong safety oversight, including incident reporting, expert task forces, and restrictions in sensitive zones like school areas. They view it as balancing innovation with public protection.
Tesla and pro-AV advocates counter that the bill lacks technology neutrality, creates insurmountable entry barriers for commercial deployment, and prioritizes process over outcomes — effectively functioning as a de facto ban on services like Robotaxi.
This latest clash echoes Tesla’s past battles in New Jersey over direct vehicle sales. The email directs owners to Tesla’s advocacy platform, where they can send customized messages to legislators calling for amendments: outcome-based safety standards, open competition, and clear pathways for fully driverless commercial operations.
As hearings approach, Tesla’s campaign frames the issue as a choice between protecting the status quo and embracing life-saving progress. With robotaxi technology already proving itself in permissive states, New Jersey owners are being asked to ensure their state doesn’t lock out the future of transportation.
Turn-by-turn navigation is not new technology.
For over two decades, drivers have relied on Garmin, TomTom, and later smartphone apps like Google Maps and Waze to receive precise, reliable directions. These systems have guided millions safely through unfamiliar cities, highways, and backroads with remarkable effectiveness. They handle real-time traffic, construction detours, and complex intersections with minimal fuss.
Yet Tesla, the company that promised revolutionary Full Self-Driving (FSD), continues to struggle with this foundational capability. As FSD (Supervised) v14.3.4 has started rolling out to cars this week, navigation remains its glaring Achilles’ heel, undermining the entire autonomous vision.
Tesla Summon got insanely good in FSD v14.3.2 — Navigation? Not so much
Tesla’s FSD excels in many driving behaviors—smooth acceleration, confident lane changes in ideal conditions, and responsive handling of visible obstacles. However, when it comes to following a route accurately, the system falters repeatedly.
Owners report wrong turns, missed exits, inefficient routing through local roads instead of highways, phantom speed limit errors, and even directing vehicles to building rear entrances. Interventions for navigation issues often outnumber those for core driving maneuvers. Tesla has begun surveying owners specifically about these errors, acknowledging the problem after years of complaints.
Navigation is perhaps my biggest complaint when it comes to FSD, because sometimes, we do know better. Some of us have been living in our areas for our entire lives, but even those who have not have years or even decades of experience driving on local roads. We might know a little better about routing.
But the navigation mistakes are more than just FSD potentially taking a slightly different route that may or may not save you a few minutes. Sometimes, they’re genuinely mind-boggling.
This isn’t just annoying; it cascades into broader failures. A flawed route plan confuses the AI’s decision-making, leading to hesitant behavior, unnecessary disengagements, or dangerous maneuvers like attempting impossible U-turns or ignoring clear ramps. In a system meant to operate with minimal supervision, unreliable navigation erodes trust.
More often than not, false or plain incorrect navigation is what causes me to interrupt FSD operation. Unfortunately, I believe the latest FSD version is the worst example of it, and it leads me to believe that Tesla might be making some changes; they’ve just made them in the wrong direction.
It makes you wonder: Why is a company that has done so much with the progress of FSD and autonomy struggling so much with navigation, something that is not new and has been around a long time?
Multiple Data Sources
First, Tesla’s navigation relies on a fragile patchwork of multiple data sources—Google Maps, TomTom, OpenStreetMap, Valhalla, and its own fleet-derived data—stitched together rather than a single authoritative map. When these conflict on lane geometry, road status, or turn details, the system hesitates or chooses incorrectly.
Traditional GPS providers maintain centralized, regularly validated databases with professional curation and rapid updates. Tesla’s hybrid approach, while innovative in crowdsourcing, introduces inconsistencies that a purely vision-based or end-to-end AI approach may not easily reconcile in real time.
Persistent Learning
FSD seems to struggle with persistent learning from driver interventions.
Unlike consumer apps that quickly adapt to repeated corrections or user preferences (e.g., avoiding certain routes or remembering habitual detours), Tesla’s FSD often fails to internalize fixes on the same trip or across similar scenarios. Owners note making the same manual override multiple times without the routing engine updating its behavior meaningfully.
This stems from the neural architecture prioritizing real-time perception and control over long-term route memory and personalization, making navigation feel rigid and “opinionated” compared to the adaptive logic in Waze or Google Maps.
I noticed that when I asked Grok to try and get me home a certain way (a way that FSD routinely took in the past because it was the most efficient), it had to place a waypoint between my location at the time and my house. When I went to edit the waypoint out, as Grok had placed it for a way to get FSD to get off the highway at the right exit, it was stumped again, rerouted, and took a longer way home.
The next thing I’ve noticed, and this might be controversial, is that Nav has gotten even worse.
I think that might actually be a good thing; Tesla seems to be adjusting it. They just need to adjust it the opposite way.
The car is taking extremely strange routes to very… https://t.co/UHg3tVfNA2
— TESLARATI (@Teslarati) June 16, 2026
Reasoning, Scaling, and Intuition
Third, scaling navigation for unsupervised or robotaxi ambitions requires not just accuracy but adaptability and user-like reasoning. Current FSD often defaults to single routes that ignore driver preferences or real-world nuances like time-of-day traffic patterns. It fails to match the intuitive, context-aware planning that traditional systems have refined over the years.
Resolving navigation is critical for several reasons. Practically, it is the backbone of any autonomous journey: without trustworthy routing, the car cannot reliably reach destinations, rendering FSD useless for robotaxis or hands-free commutes. Safety depends on it—mismatched plans create hesitation in merges or intersections, increasing accident risk.
Economically, Tesla’s valuation and future hinge on FSD delivering unsupervised driving; persistent navigation flaws delay regulatory approval and erode consumer confidence. For owners who paid premiums for FSD, these issues represent unfulfilled promises. While it is unlikely Tesla will lose too many customers due to bad navigation, some will be frustrated with the constant need for human input.
Tesla has achieved miracles in electric vehicles and battery tech. Mastering turn-by-turn—technology Garmin nailed in the early 2000s—should not be this hard. By investing in tighter data integration, faster learning loops from interventions, and more intuitive routing algorithms, Tesla could close this gap.
Until then, FSD’s navigation struggles highlight a humbling truth: even the most ambitious innovator must sometimes master the basics before conquering the future.
The Boring Company just doubled its tunneling power in Nashville
Tesla urges New Jersey owners to oppose new bill that could block Robotaxi
