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NASA’s SLS Moon rocket almost aces vital prelaunch test on 7th try
Following several incomplete attempts in April, June, August, and September, NASA’s first Space Launch System (SLS) Moon rocket has almost aced a vital prelaunch test on the seventh try.
NASA says that “all objectives were met” during the ten-hour test, which wrapped up around 4:30 pm EDT (20:30 UTC) on Wednesday, September 21st. Despite the rocket running into multiple additional issues, some old and others new, the agency was confident enough in the preliminary results of the wet dress rehearsal (WDR) – deemed a “cryogenic demonstration test” – to reaffirm that it’s still working towards a third launch attempt as early as September 27th.
That launch date is not set in stone, but NASA also hasn’t ruled out the window after the latest round of SLS testing. The agency will host a press conference on Friday, September 23rd, to provide its final decision and offer more details about the seventh wet dress rehearsal.
Despite NASA’s apparent confidence after the test, which was admittedly smoother than most previous SLS tests at the launch pad, it was far from smooth. The immediate story of the “cryogenic demonstration test” dates back to the SLS Artemis I rocket’s second so-called “launch attempt” on September 3rd. During that attempt, the launch was aborted well before SLS was ready when NASA detected a major hydrogen fuel leak around one of the quick-disconnect umbilical panels that fuels and drains the rocket. Remote troubleshooting was unable to solve the problem, forcing NASA to stand down.
Over the last few weeks, teams inspected, tested, and repaired the faulty Tail Service Mast Umbilical (TSMU), preparing for a cryogenic proof test meant to verify that the issue was fixed. During that September 21st test, the TSMU still leaked significantly for the whole duration, but it did so more predictably and – unlike prior leaks – never violated the limits that would trigger a launch abort.
But near the end, a different umbilical panel developed a significant hydrogen leak that did violate those launch constraints, meaning that NASA would have likely had to stand down yet again if it had attempted to launch before completing additional testing. The test was completed successfully, but its goals and constraints were not the same as those facing a launch.
A NASA-developed rocket leaking hydrogen is unfortunately a tale as old as time. That the agency that struggled with hydrogen leaks throughout the 30-year career of the Space Shuttle appears to be just as flabbergasted by nearly identical problems on a new rocket – SLS – that has Shuttle ‘heritage’ on almost every square inch is not surprising, even if it is somewhat embarassing.
Liquid hydrogen fuel always has been and likely always will be a massive pain to manage in any rocket, but especially in a large rocket. As the smallest element in the universe, it is fundamentally leak-prone. Combined with the fact that it only remains liquid below the extraordinarily low temperature of -253°C (-423°F), generates ultra-flammable hydrogen gas as it continually attempts to warm to a more stable temperature, and naturally embrittles most metals, it’s an engineering nightmare by almost every measure.
For all that pain, hydrogen does provide rocket engineers exceptional efficiency when properly exploited, but even that positive aspect is often diminished by hydrogen’s ultra-low density. For rocket stages that have already reached orbit, hydrogen-oxygen propellant offers unbeatable efficiency. But for a rocket stage that will never be used in orbit, like the SLS core stage, hydrogen fuel is rarely worth the tradeoffs – a reality that SLS is unfortunately providing a strong reminder of.
Demonstrating the Groundhog Day-esque nature of NASA rockets and hydrogen leaks, the same leaky TSMU panel that aborted SLS’ September 3rd launch attempt (sixth WDR) and had to be fixed and retested on September 21st also caused a hydrogen leak that partially aborted the rocket’s third wet dress rehearsal attempt in April 2022. NASA then rolled the rocket back to the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB), where workers spent almost two months inspecting and reworking the fuel TSMU and fixing other issues. During its first test (WDR #4) after rolling back to the pad in June, the same fuel TSMU leaked and NASA had to return the rocket to the VAB again to fix the problem.
The fuel TSMU then leaked on the SLS rocket’s first launch attempt (really WDR #5), but the problem was resolved and was not what caused NASA to stand down. It was, however, a primary reason behind NASA’s second aborted launch attempt (WDR #6). With any luck, the eighth time will be the charm.
Elon Musk flew under the radar with his recent purchase of a $1 billion energy company, according to Federal Trade Commission (FTC) documents.
Transaction number 202612350 listed Tesla and SpaceX frontman Elon Musk as the acquiring party and CF APR Super Holdings LLC as the seller, with New APR Energy, LLC as the acquired entity. The deal, which closed without public announcement, came to light on May 14.
BREAKING: Elon Musk acquires Jacksonville power company APR Energy in a deal valued at more than $1,000,000,000.00.
— Polymarket Money (@PolymarketMoney) July 15, 2026
Analysts inferred the deal’s scale from minority stakeholder disclosures, including one report of a 5 percent interest sold for approximately $50.4 million. Fortress Investment Group had purchased APR’s assets in late 2024, rebranded the operation as New APR Energy, and subsequently transferred ownership to Musk.
APR Energy specializes in rapidly deployable power infrastructure. The company maintains one of the world’s largest fleets of mobile gas and diesel turbines, with more than 1.1 gigawatts of generation capacity. Its modular units, which are often trailer-mounted, enable turnkey installations ranging from 20 MW to over 500 MW.
APR provides full engineering, procurement, construction, operation, and maintenance services for behind-the-meter power plants, serving everything from data centers, utilities, and industrial clients.
The firm has expanded aggressively to meet surging demand, recently adding turbines and deploying over 100 MW for a major AI hyperscaler. Its solutions bridge critical gaps where grid interconnections face delays of two to five years, according to Yahoo.
The acquisition means something more for Musk. As he continues to expand projects in artificial intelligence, especially xAI, his AI venture, there is a greater need to supply energy-intensive supercomputing clusters, including the Colossus project, with what they need: reliable and high-capacity power.
Ownership of APR provides immediate access to flexible generation assets that can be deployed adjacent to data centers, reducing dependence on a strained infrastructure. It also complements Tesla’s energy storage business, so Musk will be able to pull from his own entities to address the rapid scaling demands of AI training and compute.
Tesla had a petition protesting a recall to fix a potential issue with 2017-2023 Model Y and Model 3 vehicles’ headlights was denied, as the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) disagreed with the company’s opinion of things.
The recall covers approximately 19,917 Model Y and Model 3 vehicles built from 2017 to 2023. Tesla initially submitted a noncompliance report for the headlights on these vehicles on March 15, 2024. Tesla then petitioned for an exemption from the fix, which violated FMVSS No. 108 (40 CFR 571.108), arguing that the “noncompliance is inconsequential as it relates to motor vehicle safety.
🚨 Tesla was denied a petition by the NHTSA to avoid a recall of 19,900 2017-2023 Model 3 and Model Y vehicles.
The NHTSA found that the vehicles’ headlights may exceed maximum lighting levels. Tesla argued it was inconsequential and did not require a recall. pic.twitter.com/m8Jmm1teLL
— TESLARATI (@Teslarati) July 16, 2026
The NHTSA disagreed, stating that Tesla’s conclusion that the headlights do not increase any risk was not an opinion it shared. The agency said it disagreed with Tesla’s assumption that glare is not increased to surrounding traffic. This issue could be highlighted even more in certain weather conditions.
Tesla will be required to remedy the issue, the NHTSA ruled:
“In consideration of the foregoing, NHTSA has decided that Tesla has not met its burden of persuasion that the subject FMVSS No. 108 noncompliance is inconsequential to motor vehicle safety. Accordingly, Tesla’s petition is hereby denied, and Tesla is consequently obligated to provide notification of and free remedy for that noncompliance under 49 U.S.C. 30118 and 30120.”
The issue here appears to be the angle of the headlights and the brightness they emit during operation. The NHTSA report states that:
“Tesla’s headlamp supplier, Marelli Automotive Lighting, tested 25 right-hand and 25 left-hand lamps, and for this sample, found the maximum photometric intensity measured in the 10°U to 90°U and 90°L to 90°R zone was between 136.2 cd and 230.1 cd for the right-hand lamps and between 117.5 cd and 160.3 cd for the left-hand lamps. According to Tesla, these tests revealed that the photometric intensity of the right-hand and left-hand headlamp lower beam on the subject vehicles may measure as much as 230.1 cd in the 10°U to 90°U and 90°L to 90°R zone, exceeding the maximum photometric intensity by 105.1 cd. Additionally, Tesla states that a left-hand lamp tested by a Transport Canada recognized laboratory measured a maximum of 171.27 cd in the 10°U to 90°U and 90°L to 90°R zone. Despite these measurements exceeding the allowed photometric maximum of 125 cd, Tesla believes that the subject noncompliance is inconsequential to motor vehicle safety.”
Tesla also argued at some points that the headlights had not been deemed responsible for any complaints, accidents, or injuries related to the noncompliance.
Lifestyle
NTSB findings on fatal Tesla crash tell a very different story
The NTSB confirmed the driver, not Tesla’s FSD, caused the fatal Texas house crash.
The National Transportation Safety Board released preliminary findings Wednesday confirming that a Tesla driver, not the vehicle’s software, caused a fatal crash in Katy, Texas in June. The driver, 44-year-old Michael Butler, had engaged Full Self-Driving Supervised mode on Rose Hollow Lane, a residential street with a 30 mph speed limit, before manually overriding the system by pressing the accelerator pedal all the way to 100%. Data recovered from the 2025 Tesla Model 3 showed the vehicle was traveling over 70 miles per hour when it struck a home and killed 76-year-old Martha Avila, who was inside. Weather was clear, the road was dry, and it was daylight.
Texas man charged in fatal Tesla crash where he blamed Autopilot
Butler told authorities he had passed out at the wheel. But security camera footage obtained by the NTSB told a different story, and showed the car accelerating through an intersection before leaving the road entirely. Police also found that Butler’s phone had Google searches including the terms “Tesla FSD not aggressive enough 2026” and “Tesla FSD too timid,” raising serious questions about how he was using the system before the crash. Butler has since been charged with manslaughter. The victim’s family has filed a lawsuit against both Butler and Tesla, alleging negligence.
The NTSB findings aligned directly with what Tesla VP of AI Software Ashok Elluswamy had already stated publicly on X in the weeks after the crash, writing that “the driver manually overrode self-driving by pressing the accelerator all the way to 100%.” The data confirmed his account.
Yup. In this case, the driver manually overrode self-driving by pressing the accelerator all the way to 100% of the accel pedal in this residential area. They reached a speed of 73 mph during the crash, and had the accelerator pressed even after the crash.
— Ashok Elluswamy (@aelluswamy) June 22, 2026
Elon Musk secretly acquires $1B energy company to power the AI future
Tesla has to fix a big problem with its old headlights, NHTSA says
