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SpaceX schedules first East Coast Starlink launch in half a year
In just a few days, SpaceX’s next Starlink mission has gone from a complete mystery to a firm launch date.
Set to be SpaceX’s first Starlink launch in almost two months and first East Coast Starlink mission in almost half a year, the launch effectively came out of nowhere with a single week’s warning. For mostly unknown reasons, after completing an unprecedented 13 Starlink launches carrying almost 1000 satellites into orbit in the first five months of 2021, SpaceX has launched just one more batch of Starlink satellites in the last five months. Initially, mid-year, a brief delay of a month or two was expected as SpaceX prepared to debut the next generation of Starlink satellites on the West Coast.
Without explanation, that pause soon ballooned to four months and Starlink launches from Florida unexpectedly ceased in the meantime. Finally, on September 14th, SpaceX completed its first dedicated West Coast Starlink launch, delivering the first 51 new laser-linked Starlink V1.5 satellites to orbit. Again, oddities continued to abound in October as a second West Coast Starlink launch initially scheduled mid-month was delayed indefinitely – and remains so almost a month later.
As of just a few days ago, SpaceX still had no Starlink missions with firm launch dates. However, on November 4th, a sooty Falcon 9 booster (B1062) with a shiny new second stage attached was spotted rolling down Kennedy Space Center (KSC) road on its way to SpaceX’s other Cape Canaveral LC-40 pad. Given that Pad 39A was already occupied with a Falcon 9 rocket and Crew Dragon spacecraft scheduled to launch four astronauts as early as November 10th and that the next mission clearly on SpaceX’s East Coast manifest was more than a month away, a surprise Starlink mission was the only obvious explanation.
Indeed, just a day after that surprise rocket transport, hazard areas published by the Cape Canaveral’s 45th Space Wing confirmed that SpaceX had scheduled a Starlink launch no earlier than (NET) 7-8am EST (12-13:00 UTC) on Friday, November 12th. Oddly, instead of the polar “Starlink 2-2” launch most observers were expecting, the range hazard area announcement was for a mission called “Starlink 4-1,” raising further questions about SpaceX’s new naming scheme.
In simple terms, the first ~4400-satellite phase of SpaceX’s Starlink constellation is split into five groups of satellites – known as shells – with different orbital altitudes and inclinations (the orbit’s tilt). In May, SpaceX’s most recent East Coast Starlink launch effectively completed the first of those five shells. With Starlink V1.5’s September debut, SpaceX also debuted a new naming scheme, deeming the mission Starlink 2-1 – the first launch of the second shell. Based on the inclination implied in Starlink 4-1’s hazard warning, Shell 4 refers to a second group of 1584 satellites almost identical to Shell 1, while Shell 2 is a semi-polar group of 720 satellites. That means that Shells 3 and 5 are sets of either 340 or 158 satellites at slightly different altitudes in polar orbit and will likely be the last Phase 1 Starlink satellites SpaceX launches.
Unlike Shell 1’s Starlink V1.0 satellites, Shell 4 is expected to use Starlink V1.5 satellites with laser interlinks that will eventually allow the constellation to route communications entirely in orbit, limiting the need for ground stations that are both expensive and a bureaucratic nightmare to construct and operate.
Serving as a final confirmation of the imminent Starlink launch, SpaceX service ship Bob departed Port Canaveral with drone ship A Shortfall of Gravitas (ASOG) under tow on November 7th, joining drone ship Just Read The Instructions – already at sea for Crew-3 booster recovery.
Elon Musk flew under the radar with his recent purchase of a $1 billion energy company, according to Federal Trade Commission (FTC) documents.
Transaction number 202612350 listed Tesla and SpaceX frontman Elon Musk as the acquiring party and CF APR Super Holdings LLC as the seller, with New APR Energy, LLC as the acquired entity. The deal, which closed without public announcement, came to light on May 14.
BREAKING: Elon Musk acquires Jacksonville power company APR Energy in a deal valued at more than $1,000,000,000.00.
— Polymarket Money (@PolymarketMoney) July 15, 2026
Analysts inferred the deal’s scale from minority stakeholder disclosures, including one report of a 5 percent interest sold for approximately $50.4 million. Fortress Investment Group had purchased APR’s assets in late 2024, rebranded the operation as New APR Energy, and subsequently transferred ownership to Musk.
APR Energy specializes in rapidly deployable power infrastructure. The company maintains one of the world’s largest fleets of mobile gas and diesel turbines, with more than 1.1 gigawatts of generation capacity. Its modular units, which are often trailer-mounted, enable turnkey installations ranging from 20 MW to over 500 MW.
APR provides full engineering, procurement, construction, operation, and maintenance services for behind-the-meter power plants, serving everything from data centers, utilities, and industrial clients.
The firm has expanded aggressively to meet surging demand, recently adding turbines and deploying over 100 MW for a major AI hyperscaler. Its solutions bridge critical gaps where grid interconnections face delays of two to five years, according to Yahoo.
The acquisition means something more for Musk. As he continues to expand projects in artificial intelligence, especially xAI, his AI venture, there is a greater need to supply energy-intensive supercomputing clusters, including the Colossus project, with what they need: reliable and high-capacity power.
Ownership of APR provides immediate access to flexible generation assets that can be deployed adjacent to data centers, reducing dependence on a strained infrastructure. It also complements Tesla’s energy storage business, so Musk will be able to pull from his own entities to address the rapid scaling demands of AI training and compute.
Tesla had a petition protesting a recall to fix a potential issue with 2017-2023 Model Y and Model 3 vehicles’ headlights was denied, as the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) disagreed with the company’s opinion of things.
The recall covers approximately 19,917 Model Y and Model 3 vehicles built from 2017 to 2023. Tesla initially submitted a noncompliance report for the headlights on these vehicles on March 15, 2024. Tesla then petitioned for an exemption from the fix, which violated FMVSS No. 108 (40 CFR 571.108), arguing that the “noncompliance is inconsequential as it relates to motor vehicle safety.
🚨 Tesla was denied a petition by the NHTSA to avoid a recall of 19,900 2017-2023 Model 3 and Model Y vehicles.
The NHTSA found that the vehicles’ headlights may exceed maximum lighting levels. Tesla argued it was inconsequential and did not require a recall. pic.twitter.com/m8Jmm1teLL
— TESLARATI (@Teslarati) July 16, 2026
The NHTSA disagreed, stating that Tesla’s conclusion that the headlights do not increase any risk was not an opinion it shared. The agency said it disagreed with Tesla’s assumption that glare is not increased to surrounding traffic. This issue could be highlighted even more in certain weather conditions.
Tesla will be required to remedy the issue, the NHTSA ruled:
“In consideration of the foregoing, NHTSA has decided that Tesla has not met its burden of persuasion that the subject FMVSS No. 108 noncompliance is inconsequential to motor vehicle safety. Accordingly, Tesla’s petition is hereby denied, and Tesla is consequently obligated to provide notification of and free remedy for that noncompliance under 49 U.S.C. 30118 and 30120.”
The issue here appears to be the angle of the headlights and the brightness they emit during operation. The NHTSA report states that:
“Tesla’s headlamp supplier, Marelli Automotive Lighting, tested 25 right-hand and 25 left-hand lamps, and for this sample, found the maximum photometric intensity measured in the 10°U to 90°U and 90°L to 90°R zone was between 136.2 cd and 230.1 cd for the right-hand lamps and between 117.5 cd and 160.3 cd for the left-hand lamps. According to Tesla, these tests revealed that the photometric intensity of the right-hand and left-hand headlamp lower beam on the subject vehicles may measure as much as 230.1 cd in the 10°U to 90°U and 90°L to 90°R zone, exceeding the maximum photometric intensity by 105.1 cd. Additionally, Tesla states that a left-hand lamp tested by a Transport Canada recognized laboratory measured a maximum of 171.27 cd in the 10°U to 90°U and 90°L to 90°R zone. Despite these measurements exceeding the allowed photometric maximum of 125 cd, Tesla believes that the subject noncompliance is inconsequential to motor vehicle safety.”
Tesla also argued at some points that the headlights had not been deemed responsible for any complaints, accidents, or injuries related to the noncompliance.
Lifestyle
NTSB findings on fatal Tesla crash tell a very different story
The NTSB confirmed the driver, not Tesla’s FSD, caused the fatal Texas house crash.
The National Transportation Safety Board released preliminary findings Wednesday confirming that a Tesla driver, not the vehicle’s software, caused a fatal crash in Katy, Texas in June. The driver, 44-year-old Michael Butler, had engaged Full Self-Driving Supervised mode on Rose Hollow Lane, a residential street with a 30 mph speed limit, before manually overriding the system by pressing the accelerator pedal all the way to 100%. Data recovered from the 2025 Tesla Model 3 showed the vehicle was traveling over 70 miles per hour when it struck a home and killed 76-year-old Martha Avila, who was inside. Weather was clear, the road was dry, and it was daylight.
Texas man charged in fatal Tesla crash where he blamed Autopilot
Butler told authorities he had passed out at the wheel. But security camera footage obtained by the NTSB told a different story, and showed the car accelerating through an intersection before leaving the road entirely. Police also found that Butler’s phone had Google searches including the terms “Tesla FSD not aggressive enough 2026” and “Tesla FSD too timid,” raising serious questions about how he was using the system before the crash. Butler has since been charged with manslaughter. The victim’s family has filed a lawsuit against both Butler and Tesla, alleging negligence.
The NTSB findings aligned directly with what Tesla VP of AI Software Ashok Elluswamy had already stated publicly on X in the weeks after the crash, writing that “the driver manually overrode self-driving by pressing the accelerator all the way to 100%.” The data confirmed his account.
Yup. In this case, the driver manually overrode self-driving by pressing the accelerator all the way to 100% of the accel pedal in this residential area. They reached a speed of 73 mph during the crash, and had the accelerator pressed even after the crash.
— Ashok Elluswamy (@aelluswamy) June 22, 2026
Elon Musk secretly acquires $1B energy company to power the AI future
Tesla has to fix a big problem with its old headlights, NHTSA says
