SpaceX
SpaceX job posts hint at building satellite constellations for US military
Published within the last week, unusual SpaceX job postings have begun to combine a range of topics unusual for the company, indicating some level of internal interest in entering into an entirely new industry and mode of operations.
Judging from the job descriptions, SpaceX is looking to hire engineers familiar with integrating third-party payloads onto in-house satellite buses, and they are primarily interested in engineers with Top Secret security clearances.
https://twitter.com/collinkrum/status/1002425606401736704
Given the subtlety of the relevant job postings and the apparent need for high-level security clearances to become involved, it’s extremely difficult to figure out what exactly SpaceX’s goals are. Still, they contain just enough detail to point in the direction of several obvious explanations. These revolve around one industry in particular: satellite operations and sales to or for third parties.
To some extent, these job listings are to be expected: SpaceX has extensive experience building spacecraft (Falcon 9 upper stages and Dragon) explicitly intended for internal use and operations only. Instead, what is surprising about these job listings is the presence of repeated references to “customer payload[s]” in the context of “satellite mission design”, “SpaceX-developed satellite constellations and payload missions”, the “simulation of remote sensing payloads and constellations”, and a need for “on-orbit commissioning” or “activation”.
Put simply, there is no obvious explanation for why SpaceX would need any of those things, at least in the context of the company’s publicly-known activities and business interests. Taken individually, they might be explained by – as described in the same listings – “[SpaceX’s expanding] classified mission manifest”, as it’s well-known that SpaceX is in the process of certifying Falcon 9 and Falcon Heavy to launch all practicable Air Force (USAF) and National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) payloads. Those payloads often need to be placed in high-energy orbits that rely on extended upper stage coasts between orbit-raising maneuvers, essentially requiring modifications to Falcon 9’s upper stage such that it becomes a sort of ad-hoc, short-lived satellite.
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- SpaceX’s first Falcon Heavy launch also happened to be a strategic and successful test of Falcon upper stage coast capabilities. (SpaceX)
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- SpaceX’s first two Starlink prototype satellites are pictured here before their inaugural launch, showing off a thoroughly utilitarian bus and several advanced components. (SpaceX)
Starlink spinoffs
However, in all (conceivable) cases where SpaceX might launch a highly-classified payload for a government customer, the dynamic is still precisely that – launch provider (SpaceX) and customer (NRO/USAF/etc). Just like FedEx or UPS have no ownership of or relationship with the goods they transport, satellite launch providers are simply delivering a (very expensive, fragile, and irreplaceable) payload from Point A (the ground) to Point B (orbit). When UPS ships a new smartphone from the manufacturer to the customer, they most certainly do not perform an “in-house commissioning” – if the customer needs help setting up their new phone, they go to the manufacturer or service provider (cell carrier).
In the same way, satellite commissioning is a generally necessary process where the satellite manufacturer – rarely the actual operator or service provider – raises or fine-tunes the expensive spacecraft’s orbit and verifies that all systems and payloads are functioning as intended – only after that process is complete does the manufacturer finally ‘hand off’ the satellite to the customer that paid for it. In some cases, the manufacturer continues to maintain or at least monitor the satellite in the background as the owner serves its own customers, much like how military airplane manufacturers are typically contracted to maintain or support those planes even after final delivery.
Judging from the need for top-secret security clearance in nearly all of these new job postings, SpaceX clearly has a very particular sort of customer in mind. Be it DARPA, NRO, the USAF, or some totally unknown government actor, one or several of the above entities have expressed explicit interest in coopting SpaceX’s newfound status as a prospective dirt-cheap-satellite manufacturer. If that were not the case, SpaceX would not be keen to publish 5+ engineering job postings with top-secret clearance as an explicit prerequisite.
Project Blackjack
Ultimately, it’s undeniable that the prospect of a completed vertically-integrated launch and satellite service provider could be so alluring that entities like the NRO, USAF, or DARPA simply could not pass up the opportunity to at least give it a try. From a purely speculative perspective, the services and processes SpaceX seems to be in the middle of developing are an almost perfect fit with DARPA’s (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) brand new Blackjack program. Perfectly summarized in September by Space News reporter Sandra Erwin,
“[DARPA] wants to buy small satellites from commercial vendors, equip them with military sensor payloads and deploy a small constellation in low-Earth orbit to see how they perform in real military operations.”
DARPA awarded a $1.5M contract to smallsat manufacturer and operator Blue Canyon on in October 2018, small relative to the program’s roughly $118M budget. DARPA has made clear that it plans to finalize multiple contracts with different prospective satellite designers and operators in order to ensure a competitive environment, fuel growth in a fairly new industry, and pave the way for the final procurement of an experimental constellation of 20 satellites by 2021. If successful, it could completely change the way the entire US government procures national security-related satellites, offering a far faster, cheaper, and more flexible route to set up unique capabilities.
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News
SpaceX tells the FCC that Starship Flight 14 is going to orbit
SpaceX filed with the FCC for Starship Flight 14, its first true orbital launch attempt.
SpaceX has asked the Federal Communications Commission for permission to fly Starlink terminals during Starship’s fourteenth flight test, and the filing lays out a genuine trip to orbit, something the program has never attempted.
Every Starship flight so far, including Flight 13’s successful splashdown in the Indian Ocean on July 24, has flown a suborbital arc that ends with the ship reentering the atmosphere within the same hour it launches. The FCC paperwork describes a mission profile built around an actual orbital insertion instead.
The payload is the other half of the story. Flight 13 carried 20 production Starlink V3 satellites, but because that mission never reached orbit, the satellites reentered along with the ship rather than joining the constellation, something Teslarati covered in detail after SpaceX released footage shot from one of those satellites as it drifted away from Starship in space. Flight 14 is designed to close that gap. If the orbital insertion holds, the roughly 20 V3 satellites onboard would separate into an operational orbit and could eventually go into service, each one rated for about 1 terabit per second of downlink capacity by SpaceX’s own account.
SpaceX announces new Starbase for ‘thousands of Starship launches annually’
Elon Musk first flagged the orbital attempt during SpaceX’s August 4 earnings call, the company’s first as a public entity following its June IPO under the ticker SPCX. He also floated catching the ship with the Starbase tower on the same flight, an idea he walked back on August 20, saying the catch attempt would more likely come “in a few months,” as Teslarati reported at the time. Flight 14 will instead target a splashdown for the ship in the Indian Ocean, the same recovery method used since Flight 12.
Hardware has been catching up to the ambition. Booster 21 completed a full 33-engine static fire on August 28, and Ship 41 finished its own six-engine test the week before. An airspace briefing circulated to pilots on August 20 listed September 15 as the target date, later than the end of August window Musk mentioned on the earnings call, though SpaceX has not confirmed a launch date publicly and Starship schedules routinely slip while hardware and FAA paperwork line up.
The FCC filing itself does not guarantee a launch date. It covers communications authority, and not flight readiness, considering SpaceX still needs Ship 41 fully stacked and cleared by the FAA before Flight 14 can fly. But the filing is a real marker of intent and it puts a specific regulatory process behind what had so far only been Musk’s word on the earnings call.
Elon Musk recently restated a fact that still defines SpaceX’s origin story: if Falcon 1’s fourth launch had failed, the company would not exist. The comment answered a reminder that after three consecutive losses, SpaceX had money for only one more attempt.
On X, Peter Diamandis said that the present-day acknowledgement of SpaceX’s success does not discount the rough start the company had. “Almost nobody remembers that Elon’s first rocket failed three times, and there was money for exactly only one more attempt.”
Musk said, “If the 4th launch had failed, SpaceX would not exist.”
If the 4th launch had failed, SpaceX would not exist
— Elon Musk (@elonmusk) August 30, 2026
In late 2008, the firm was nearly out of cash. Another failure would have ended payroll, closed the Hawthorne factory, and left the Falcon 9 and Dragon programs as unfinished drawings.
The first flight lifted off from Omelek Island on 24 March 2006. Thirty-three seconds later, a corroded aluminum fitting on a fuel line leaked. Kerosene ignited around the Merlin engine, control was lost, and the vehicle came apart. The small DARPA payload, FalconSAT-2, survived the short flight only to land on a storage shed near the pad. Investigators later traced the fitting to a materials mix-up that should never have reached the rocket.
Flight 2, on 21 March 2007, looked far better at first. The first stage burned cleanly and handed off to the Kestrel-powered upper stage. The vehicle crossed 100 kilometers and reached a peak of about 289 kilometers. Then propellant slosh in the second-stage tank started a circular coning motion that grew until the engine shut down. Telemetry faded as the stage tumbled, and SpaceX had reached space but not orbit. Over the next year, the team redesigned everything from the ground up, including tanks, baffles, and the new regeneratively cooled Merlin 1C.
That engine flew on Flight 3 on 2 August 2008. The first stage performed almost perfectly and reached 217 kilometers. After main-engine cutoff, leftover fuel in the cooling channels produced a faint residual thrust, roughly 10 pounds per square inch of chamber pressure. On a Texas test stand, the effect was invisible beneath ambient air pressure. In vacuum it was enough to push the spent first stage back into the second stage after separation. The stages collided, the upper stage spun, and the mission was lost. Musk later said a slightly longer delay before staging would have saved the flight.
Six weeks later, the team assembled Flight 4 from remaining parts and flew it on 28 September 2008 at 23:15 UTC. The payload was Ratsat, a 165-kilogram aluminum mass simulator built in-house. Staging was delayed so residual thrust could decay. The Kestrel ignited, the fairing split away, and nine and a half minutes after liftoff the vehicle was in orbit. After a coast, the second stage restarted, settling into a 621-by-643-kilometer path at 9.35 degrees inclination. Falcon 1 became the first privately developed liquid-fueled rocket to reach Earth orbit. Musk called the insertion “middle of the bull’s-eye.”
SpaceX restores a Falcon 1 rocket for 10th anniversary of first launch success
That success unlocked NASA’s Commercial Resupply Services award later that year. Without it, there would have been no Falcon 9, no reusable first stages, and no Dragon cargo or crew flights to the International Space Station. Launch prices would have remained far higher. Starlink’s constellation would not exist; broadband from low Earth orbit would still be a paper concept.
Ride-share markets, high launch cadence, and the current pace of lunar and Mars hardware would be years behind. Communications, Earth observation, and the cost of putting anything into space would look more like the 2000s than the 2020s.
One extra second of residual thrust in August 2008 would have written a different decade.
Elon Musk
OpenAI cites distrust of SpaceX in decision to drop Cursor partnership
OpenAI will cut SpaceX-owned Cursor’s model access in November, citing Musk’s history of broken contracts.
OpenAI, the company behind ChatGPT, announced late Friday that it is ending its partnership with Cursor, cutting off the coding tool’s access to its models on November 12. The move comes two weeks after SpaceX completed its $60 billion acquisition of Cursor’s parent company, Anysphere, folding the popular AI coding assistant into Elon Musk’s growing SpaceXAI division.
In a post on its website, OpenAI said the decision came down to trust, not technology. “We cannot be confident that SpaceX will use our technology within our terms of service, based on our experience with Elon Musk’s companies violating contracts,” the company wrote. OpenAI pointed to two specific incidents: X, now part of SpaceX, allegedly breaking the terms of an existing OpenAI contract after Musk bought Twitter.
That lawsuit is the backdrop for all of this. Musk cofounded OpenAI in 2015, left the board in 2018, and sued Sam Altman and Greg Brockman in 2024, arguing they abandoned the company’s nonprofit mission for profit. A federal jury sided with OpenAI in May, finding Musk waited too long to sue rather than ruling on the merits of his claims. Musk said at the time he would appeal to the Ninth Circuit, calling the outcome a “calendar technicality” rather than a real judgment.
SpaceX’s interest in Cursor predates that verdict by weeks. The company first struck a deal with Cursor in April, securing an option to acquire it for $60 billion or pay $10 billion for joint development work instead. As Teslarati reported at the time, the logic was straightforward: Cursor was paying retail prices to Anthropic and OpenAI, two of its most direct competitors, every time a developer used its product, while SpaceX had idle capacity on its Colossus supercomputer, roughly the equivalent of a million Nvidia H100 GPUs, that Cursor could use to train its own models instead. SpaceX exercised the option in June, days after its own IPO, and the deal closed in mid-August.
Once it closed, Musk moved fast. On an all-hands call with more than 1,000 Cursor employees, he reportedly told staff that SpaceXAI’s Grok was playing catchup in the AI race, unlike Tesla and SpaceX in their own markets, and singled out Anthropic as the company to catch. Cursor CEO Michael Truell now reports directly to Musk inside SpaceXAI.
Losing OpenAI’s models leaves Cursor leaning harder on Anthropic’s Claude, which has its own compute agreement with SpaceX, and on Cursor’s in-house Composer model, the one SpaceX’s compute was supposed to accelerate in the first place. OpenAI framed the November deadline as maximum notice under its contract, and said it wants to “go above and beyond” to help developers through the transition. Whether Anthropic makes the same call is now the open question in AI coding.
Tesla Cybercab launch catches NHTSA’s attention who wants to know more
Tesla Cybercab is coming to Asia this month as US service officially begins
