SpaceX
SpaceX’s Starlink satellite lawyers refute latest “flawed” OneWeb critique
After years of relentless legal badgering from internet satellite constellation competitor OneWeb, SpaceX’s regulatory and legal affairs team appears to have begun to (in a professional manner) lose patience with the constant barrage.
On February 21st, SpaceX published a withering refutation of 
SpaceX’s Starlink modification request
In late 2018, SpaceX filed a request with the FCC (Federal Communications Commission) that would allow the company to significantly modify parts of its Starlink satellite constellation license, cutting 16 spacecraft from the original total of 4425 and moving Phase 1’s now-1584 satellites from an operating altitude of ~1100-1300 km (680-810 mi) to just 550 km (340 mi). Aside from further reducing the latency of communications, SpaceX also argues that “the principal reason” behind lowering the operational altitude of the first ~37% of Starlink satellites was “to [further] enhance the already considerable space safety attributes of [the] constellation.”

The safety benefits of a significantly lower orbit come into play when the potential dangers of space debris come into play. Put simply, satellites in lower orbits – particularly orbits below ~1000 km – end up experiencing far more drag from the upper vestiges of the Earth’s atmosphere, drag that acts like an automatic switch in the event that a given LEO satellite loses control. At 500 km and below, even small spacecraft with enough surface area will automatically reenter Earth’s atmosphere within just a few years (~5), while orbits around 1000-1500 km can stretch the time to reentry by a factor of 5-10, often taking decades. In other words, SpaceX’s desire to lower the initial operating orbit of ~1600 Starlink satellites would end up dramatically reducing the consequences the failure of one or several satellites would have on other spacecraft operating in the same orbital regions
“Rather than base its critiques on facts in SpaceX’s application or evidence in the record, OneWeb relies entirely on a collection of flawed assumptions cobbled together into an equally-flawed fictional scenario.
Overall, OneWeb rested its interference analysis entirely on incorrect assumptions and overlooked basic operational distinctions in the actual effect of the proposed SpaceX modification.”
A step further, there is a great deal more irony to be found in
SpaceX never explicitly says as much but it becomes eminently clear that the authors behind this latest response are rapidly losing patience with OneWeb’s years of shoddy attempts at legally suppressing competition. Given that lowering the orbits of almost 40% of SpaceX’s first round of Starlink satellites would end up working in
“OneWeb is now challenging SpaceX’s plan to reduce altitude to further enhance the space safety attributes of its system. Considering OneWeb’s frequent request that SpaceX take this exact step of moving farther away from OneWeb’s proposed constellation, one is left to wonder whether OneWeb would be satisfied with SpaceX operating at any altitude whatsoever.“
SpaceX, 02/21/2019

SpaceX takes a different approach
Aside from seemingly hollow concerns about the “safety” of SpaceX’s request to lower Starlink satellite orbits, OneWeb further criticized SpaceX for what it perceived to be “operational setbacks” after launching a duo of prototype Starlink spacecraft, known as Tintin A and B. In essence, it appears that OneWeb made the bizarre decision to cite officially-unconfirmed and often-disputed reports that SpaceX’s prototypes were unable to reach their originally planned operational orbits of ~1125 km, effectively trapped at the ~515 km orbit they were dropped off in as a result of their shared launch.
“SpaceX originally expected to operate these satellites at approximately 515 km and then raise them to an altitude of 1,125 km for further testing, but chose not to do so. From this, OneWeb leaps to an unsupported conclusion that SpaceX’s experimental satellites faced “operational setbacks.” To the contrary, SpaceX made a conscious decision to remain at this optimal altitude for further experimentation.
Far from facing setbacks, the experimental program has validated SpaceX technology – including the Hall-effect thruster propulsion system and the capabilities of the communications payload. Thus, unlike OneWeb, SpaceX has successfully tested its spacecraft design in advance of initiating deployment of its commercial constellation.”
SpaceX, 02/21/2019
While there was, in fact, some plausible evidence in mid-2018 that at least tentatively suggested that the spacecraft may have had issues with their first-generation ion thruster prototypes, it soon became clear that SpaceX and several major investors were sticking to the narrative that the Tintin twins were operating in fine health in orbit. It’s possible that SpaceX’s legal team and government relations executives are trying to aggressively spin on-orbit difficulties with the prototypes into good news, and the fact that SpaceX is requesting a modification to 550 km instead of Tintin A and B’s ~520 km orbits remains more than a little odd. However, including such brazen and open-faced lies in official legal/regulatory documents would be a deathwish SpaceX’s Starlink license in its entirety, while also begging for major SpaceX-aimed lawsuits and a general black cloud forming over the company.
If the FCC ultimately chooses to permit SpaceX’s Starlink license modification, the company’s first more or less operational Starlink launch – likely carrying anywhere from 10 to 30 satellites – could occur as early as late April or early May.
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SpaceX tells the FCC that Starship Flight 14 is going to orbit
SpaceX filed with the FCC for Starship Flight 14, its first true orbital launch attempt.
SpaceX has asked the Federal Communications Commission for permission to fly Starlink terminals during Starship’s fourteenth flight test, and the filing lays out a genuine trip to orbit, something the program has never attempted.
Every Starship flight so far, including Flight 13’s successful splashdown in the Indian Ocean on July 24, has flown a suborbital arc that ends with the ship reentering the atmosphere within the same hour it launches. The FCC paperwork describes a mission profile built around an actual orbital insertion instead.
The payload is the other half of the story. Flight 13 carried 20 production Starlink V3 satellites, but because that mission never reached orbit, the satellites reentered along with the ship rather than joining the constellation, something Teslarati covered in detail after SpaceX released footage shot from one of those satellites as it drifted away from Starship in space. Flight 14 is designed to close that gap. If the orbital insertion holds, the roughly 20 V3 satellites onboard would separate into an operational orbit and could eventually go into service, each one rated for about 1 terabit per second of downlink capacity by SpaceX’s own account.
SpaceX announces new Starbase for ‘thousands of Starship launches annually’
Elon Musk first flagged the orbital attempt during SpaceX’s August 4 earnings call, the company’s first as a public entity following its June IPO under the ticker SPCX. He also floated catching the ship with the Starbase tower on the same flight, an idea he walked back on August 20, saying the catch attempt would more likely come “in a few months,” as Teslarati reported at the time. Flight 14 will instead target a splashdown for the ship in the Indian Ocean, the same recovery method used since Flight 12.
Hardware has been catching up to the ambition. Booster 21 completed a full 33-engine static fire on August 28, and Ship 41 finished its own six-engine test the week before. An airspace briefing circulated to pilots on August 20 listed September 15 as the target date, later than the end of August window Musk mentioned on the earnings call, though SpaceX has not confirmed a launch date publicly and Starship schedules routinely slip while hardware and FAA paperwork line up.
The FCC filing itself does not guarantee a launch date. It covers communications authority, and not flight readiness, considering SpaceX still needs Ship 41 fully stacked and cleared by the FAA before Flight 14 can fly. But the filing is a real marker of intent and it puts a specific regulatory process behind what had so far only been Musk’s word on the earnings call.
Elon Musk
SpaceX would not exist if this crucial early launch failed, Musk says
Elon Musk recently restated a fact that still defines SpaceX’s origin story: if Falcon 1’s fourth launch had failed, the company would not exist. The comment answered a reminder that after three consecutive losses, SpaceX had money for only one more attempt.
On X, Peter Diamandis said that the present-day acknowledgement of SpaceX’s success does not discount the rough start the company had. “Almost nobody remembers that Elon’s first rocket failed three times, and there was money for exactly only one more attempt.”
Musk said, “If the 4th launch had failed, SpaceX would not exist.”
If the 4th launch had failed, SpaceX would not exist
— Elon Musk (@elonmusk) August 30, 2026
In late 2008, the firm was nearly out of cash. Another failure would have ended payroll, closed the Hawthorne factory, and left the Falcon 9 and Dragon programs as unfinished drawings.
The first flight lifted off from Omelek Island on 24 March 2006. Thirty-three seconds later, a corroded aluminum fitting on a fuel line leaked. Kerosene ignited around the Merlin engine, control was lost, and the vehicle came apart. The small DARPA payload, FalconSAT-2, survived the short flight only to land on a storage shed near the pad. Investigators later traced the fitting to a materials mix-up that should never have reached the rocket.
Flight 2, on 21 March 2007, looked far better at first. The first stage burned cleanly and handed off to the Kestrel-powered upper stage. The vehicle crossed 100 kilometers and reached a peak of about 289 kilometers. Then propellant slosh in the second-stage tank started a circular coning motion that grew until the engine shut down. Telemetry faded as the stage tumbled, and SpaceX had reached space but not orbit. Over the next year, the team redesigned everything from the ground up, including tanks, baffles, and the new regeneratively cooled Merlin 1C.
That engine flew on Flight 3 on 2 August 2008. The first stage performed almost perfectly and reached 217 kilometers. After main-engine cutoff, leftover fuel in the cooling channels produced a faint residual thrust, roughly 10 pounds per square inch of chamber pressure. On a Texas test stand, the effect was invisible beneath ambient air pressure. In vacuum it was enough to push the spent first stage back into the second stage after separation. The stages collided, the upper stage spun, and the mission was lost. Musk later said a slightly longer delay before staging would have saved the flight.
Six weeks later, the team assembled Flight 4 from remaining parts and flew it on 28 September 2008 at 23:15 UTC. The payload was Ratsat, a 165-kilogram aluminum mass simulator built in-house. Staging was delayed so residual thrust could decay. The Kestrel ignited, the fairing split away, and nine and a half minutes after liftoff the vehicle was in orbit. After a coast, the second stage restarted, settling into a 621-by-643-kilometer path at 9.35 degrees inclination. Falcon 1 became the first privately developed liquid-fueled rocket to reach Earth orbit. Musk called the insertion “middle of the bull’s-eye.”
SpaceX restores a Falcon 1 rocket for 10th anniversary of first launch success
That success unlocked NASA’s Commercial Resupply Services award later that year. Without it, there would have been no Falcon 9, no reusable first stages, and no Dragon cargo or crew flights to the International Space Station. Launch prices would have remained far higher. Starlink’s constellation would not exist; broadband from low Earth orbit would still be a paper concept.
Ride-share markets, high launch cadence, and the current pace of lunar and Mars hardware would be years behind. Communications, Earth observation, and the cost of putting anything into space would look more like the 2000s than the 2020s.
One extra second of residual thrust in August 2008 would have written a different decade.
Elon Musk
OpenAI cites distrust of SpaceX in decision to drop Cursor partnership
OpenAI will cut SpaceX-owned Cursor’s model access in November, citing Musk’s history of broken contracts.
OpenAI, the company behind ChatGPT, announced late Friday that it is ending its partnership with Cursor, cutting off the coding tool’s access to its models on November 12. The move comes two weeks after SpaceX completed its $60 billion acquisition of Cursor’s parent company, Anysphere, folding the popular AI coding assistant into Elon Musk’s growing SpaceXAI division.
In a post on its website, OpenAI said the decision came down to trust, not technology. “We cannot be confident that SpaceX will use our technology within our terms of service, based on our experience with Elon Musk’s companies violating contracts,” the company wrote. OpenAI pointed to two specific incidents: X, now part of SpaceX, allegedly breaking the terms of an existing OpenAI contract after Musk bought Twitter.
That lawsuit is the backdrop for all of this. Musk cofounded OpenAI in 2015, left the board in 2018, and sued Sam Altman and Greg Brockman in 2024, arguing they abandoned the company’s nonprofit mission for profit. A federal jury sided with OpenAI in May, finding Musk waited too long to sue rather than ruling on the merits of his claims. Musk said at the time he would appeal to the Ninth Circuit, calling the outcome a “calendar technicality” rather than a real judgment.
SpaceX’s interest in Cursor predates that verdict by weeks. The company first struck a deal with Cursor in April, securing an option to acquire it for $60 billion or pay $10 billion for joint development work instead. As Teslarati reported at the time, the logic was straightforward: Cursor was paying retail prices to Anthropic and OpenAI, two of its most direct competitors, every time a developer used its product, while SpaceX had idle capacity on its Colossus supercomputer, roughly the equivalent of a million Nvidia H100 GPUs, that Cursor could use to train its own models instead. SpaceX exercised the option in June, days after its own IPO, and the deal closed in mid-August.
Once it closed, Musk moved fast. On an all-hands call with more than 1,000 Cursor employees, he reportedly told staff that SpaceXAI’s Grok was playing catchup in the AI race, unlike Tesla and SpaceX in their own markets, and singled out Anthropic as the company to catch. Cursor CEO Michael Truell now reports directly to Musk inside SpaceXAI.
Losing OpenAI’s models leaves Cursor leaning harder on Anthropic’s Claude, which has its own compute agreement with SpaceX, and on Cursor’s in-house Composer model, the one SpaceX’s compute was supposed to accelerate in the first place. OpenAI framed the November deadline as maximum notice under its contract, and said it wants to “go above and beyond” to help developers through the transition. Whether Anthropic makes the same call is now the open question in AI coding.



