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SpaceX nears big US govt. missions as ULA handwaves about risks of competition
Speaking at the 2018 Von Braun Symposium in Huntsville, Alabama, ULA COO John Elbon expressed worries that the US National Security Space (NSS) apparatus could be put at significant risk if it comes to rely too heavily on the commercial launch industry to assure access to space.
Given that the US military’s launch capabilities rest solely on SpaceX and ULA and will remain that way for at least three more years, Elbon’s comment was effectively an odd barb tossed in the direction of SpaceX and – to a lesser extent – Blue Origin, two disruptive and commercially-oriented launch providers.
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- The history of ULA and its Delta IV rocket is far wilder than most would expect. (Tom Cross)
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- The first stage of Parker Solar Probe’s Delta IV Heavy rocket prepares to be lifted vertical. (ULA)
Reading between the lines
For the most part, Elbon’s brief presentation centered around a reasonable discussion of ULA’s track record and future vehicle development, emphasizing the respectable reliability of its current Atlas V and Delta IV rockets and the ‘heritage’ they share with ULA’s next-generation Vulcan vehicle. However, the COO twice brought up an intriguing concern that the US military launch apparatus could suffer if it ends up relying too heavily on ‘commercially-sustained’ launch vehicles like Falcon 9/Heavy or New Glenn.
To provide historical context and evidence favorable to his position, Elbon brought up a now-obscure event in the history of the launch industry, where – 20 years ago – companies Lockheed Martin and Boeing reportedly “set out to develop … Atlas V and Delta IV” primarily to support the launch of several large satellite constellations. The reality and causes of the US launch industry’s instability in the late ’90s and early ’00s is almost indistinguishable from this narrative, however.
Despite the many veils of aerospace and military secrecy surrounding the events that occurred afterward, the facts show that – in 1999 – Boeing (per acquisition of McDonnell Douglas) and Lockheed Martin (LM) both received awards of $500M to develop the Delta IV and Atlas V rockets, and the military further committed to buying a full 28 launches for $2B between 2002 and 2006. Combined, the US military effectively placed $3B ($4.5B in 2018 dollars) on the table for its Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program with the goal of ensuring uninterrupted access to space for national security purposes.
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- Crew Dragon arrives at ISS. (SpaceX)
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- Boeing’s Starliner spacecraft. (Boeing)
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- A mockup of Boeing’s Starliner capsule is explored by one of NASA’s Commercial Crew astronauts, clad in a Boeing spacesuit. (Boeing)
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- SpaceX’s Commercial Crew pressure suit seen on NASA astronauts during testing. (SpaceX)
Rocketing into corporate espionage
“The robust commercial market forecast led the Air Force to reconsider its acquisition strategy. The EELV acquisition strategy changed from a planned down-select to a single contractor and a standard Air Force development program [where the USAF funds vehicle development in its entirety] to a dual commercialized approach that leveraged commercial market share and contractor investment.” – USAF EELV Fact Sheet, March 2017
The above quote demonstrates that there is at least an inkling of truth in Elbon’s spin. However, perhaps the single biggest reason that the EELV program and its two awardees stumbled was gross, inexcusable conduct on the part of Boeing. In essence, the company’s space executives conspired to use corporate espionage to gain an upper-hand over Lockheed Martin, knowledge which ultimately allowed Boeing to severely low-ball the prices of its Delta IV rocket, securing 19 of 28 available USAF launch contracts.
Ultimately, Lockheed Martin caught wind of Boeing’s suspect behavior and filed a lawsuit that began several years of USAF investigations and highly unpleasant revelations, while Boeing also had at least 10 future launch contracts withdrawn to the tune of ~$1B (1999). USAF investigations discovered that Boeing had lied extensively to the Air Force for more than four years – the actual volume of information stolen would balloon wildly from Boeing’s initial reports of “seven pages of harmless data” to 10+ boxes containing more than 42,000 pages of extremely detailed technical and proprietary information about Lockheed Martin’s Atlas V rocket proposal.
“If you rewind the clock 20 years, there were folks on a panel like this having dialogue about commercial launch, and there were envisioned several constellations that were going to require significant commercial launch. Lockheed Martin and Boeing set out to develop launch vehicles that were focused on that very robust commercial market – in the case of McDonald Douglas at the time, which later became Boeing, the factory in Decatur was…sized to crank out 40 [rocket boosters] a year, a couple of ships were bought to transport those…significant infrastructure put in place to address that envisioned launch market.” – John Elbon, COO, United Launch Alliance (ULA)
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- ULA’s Decatur, Alabama factory now produces both Delta IV and Atlas 5. (ULA)
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- ULA’s Atlas 5 launched AEHF-4 for the USAF earlier this month. (ULA)
In reality, Boeing was so desperate to secure USAF launches – despite the fact that it knew full well that Delta IV was too expensive to be sustainably competitive – that dozens of employees were eventually roped into a systematic, years-long, highly-illegal program of corporate espionage specifically designed to beat out government launch competitor Lockheed Martin. Humorously, Delta IV was not even Boeing’s design – rather, Boeing acquired designer McDonnell Douglas in late 1996, five days before the USAF announced the decision to reject Boeing and another company’s EELV proposals, narrowing down to two finalists (McDonnell Douglas and Lockheed Martin).
Seven years after the original lawsuit snowballed, Boeing settled with Lockheed Martin for a payment of more than $600M in 2006, accepting responsibility for its employees’ actions but admitting no corporate wrongdoing. Five years after that settlement, John Elbon became Vice President of Boeing’s Space Exploration division. This is by no means to suggest that Elbon is in any way complicit, having spent much of his 30+ years at Boeing managing the company’s involvement in the International Space Station, but more serves as an example of how recent these events are and why their consequences almost certainly continue to reverberate loudly within the US space industry.
SpaceX forces change
Worsened significantly by the consequences of Boeing’s lies about the actual operational costs of its Delta IV rocket (it had planned to secretly write off a loss on each rocket in order to steal USAF market share from LockMart), the commercial market for the extremely expensive rocket was and still is functionally nonexistent. 35 out of the family’s 36 launches have been contracted by the US military (30), NOAA (3), or NASA (2); the rocket’s first launch, likely sold at a major discount to Eutelsat, remains its one and only commercial mission.
Atlas V, typically priced around 30% less than comparable Delta IV variants, has had a far more productive career, albeit with very few commercial launches since the Dec. 2006 formation of the United Launch Alliance. Since 2007, just 5 of Atlas V’s 70 launches have been for commercial customers. Frankly, although Atlas V was appreciably more affordable than Delta IV, neither rocket was ever able to sustainably compete with Europe’s Ariane 5 workhorse – Ariane 5 cost more per launch, but superior payload performance often let Arianespace manifest two large satellites on a single launch, approximately halving the cost for each customer. Russia’s affordable (but only moderately reliable) Proton rockets also played an important role in the commercial launch industry prior to SpaceX’s arrival.
After fighting tooth and nail for years to break ULA’s US governmental launch monopoly, SpaceX’s first dedicated National Security Space launch finally occurred less than a year and a half ago, in May 2017. SpaceX has since placed a USAF spaceplane and a classified NSS-related satellite into orbit and been awarded launch contracts for critical USAF payloads, most notably winning five of five competed GPS III satellite launches, to begin as early as mid-December. Falcon 9 will cost the USAF roughly 30% less than a comparable Atlas 5 contract, $97M to ULA’s ~$135M.
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- The aft connection mechanisms on Falcon Heavy Flight 1 and Flight 2 appear to be quite similar. It’s possible that SpaceX has chosen to reuse aspects of the hardware recovered on Flight 1’s two side boosters. (SpaceX)
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- Falcon 9 Block 5 booster B1046 seen during both of its post-launch landings. (SpaceX/SpaceX)
A bit more than two decades after Boeing bought McDonnell Douglas and began a calculated effort to steal trade secrets from Lockheed Martin, Elbon – now COO of the Boeing/Lockheed Martin-cooperative ULA – seems to fervently believe that the most critical mistake made in the late 1990s and early 2000s was the USAF’s decision to partially support the development of two separate rockets. Elbon concluded his remarks on the topic with one impressively unambiguous summary of ULA’s position:
“We have to make sure that we don’t get too much supply and not enough demand so that the [launch] providers can’t survive in a robust business environment, and then we lose the capability as a country to do the launches we need to do … [That’s] the perspective we have at ULA and it’s based on the experience that we’ve been through in the past.”
In his sole Delta IV vs. Atlas V case-study, what ULA now seems to think might have been “too much supply” under the USAF’s EELV program appears to literally be the fundamental minimum conditions needed for competition to exist at all – two companies offering two competing products. Short of directly stating as much, it’s difficult to imagine a more concise method of revealing the apparent belief that competition – at all – is intrinsically undesirable or risky.
The Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan (OTPP) stands to reap one of the most extraordinary returns in pension fund history thanks to a bold 2019 investment in SpaceX.
According to a recent report from The Globe and Mail, the Toronto-based fund invested roughly $300 million CAD (~$220 million USD at the time) in Elon Musk’s space company as its inaugural deal through the Teachers’ Innovation Platform.
At SpaceX’s anticipated $1.75 trillion IPO valuation, set for a mid-June debut on Nasdaq under ticker $SPCX, that stake could now be worth up to $11.6 billion USD. This would represent a roughly 50x return and easily become OTPP’s most successful single investment ever.
The fund manages $279 billion in assets for approximately 346,000 working and retired teachers in Ontario, potentially delivering an average boost of around $33,500 per member if fully realized.
SpaceX has filed its S-1 and plans to price shares at $135 each, aiming to raise a record $75 billion in what would be the largest IPO in history, surpassing Saudi Aramco. The company reported $18.67 billion in revenue for 2025, driven primarily by Starlink satellite internet growth and NASA contracts, though it continues to post significant losses tied to ambitious R&D in Starship and AI initiatives.
Important pieces moving forward include:
- Starlink Expansion: The satellite broadband service is scaling rapidly, targeting global connectivity, especially in underserved rural and remote areas. This segment offers massive recurring revenue potential as numbers climb.
- Starship and Reusability Leadership: SpaceX’s fully reusable Starship aims to slash launch costs dramatically, enabling frequent missions, Mars ambitions, and lucrative government/defense contracts. Success here could unlock exponential growth.
- AI and Diversification: Recent moves, including ties to xAI, position SpaceX in high-growth AI infrastructure, broadening beyond traditional aerospace.
- Validation Scrutiny: While the $1.75 trillion target excites investors, analysts like Morningstar value the company closer to $780 billion, citing high multiples (around 90x trailing revenue) and execution risks. A 180-day lockup period will prevent early investors like OTPP from selling immediately post-IPO.
The irony has not been lost on observers. Ontario’s government previously canceled a Starlink rural internet contract amid political tensions involving Musk, yet the pension fund’s savvy investment, made when SpaceX was valued around $33-36 billion, and Starlink was nascent, delivers outsized gains independent of politics.
For OTPP, this windfall strengthens its already solid 111 percent funding ratio and underscores the value of patient, innovation-focused capital allocation.
For SpaceX, the IPO marks a new chapter: greater transparency, access to public markets for talent retention and growth capital, and heightened pressure to deliver on its multi-planetary vision.
All eyes are fixed on whether SpaceX can justify its lofty valuation through sustained execution. For Ontario teachers, the returns are already stellar, but SpaceX, like other Musk companies in the past, has plenty of things to prove. Perhaps the most ideal person for the job is at the helm, hoping to bring the company to a massive valuation.
In a notable shift for electric vehicle perceptions, Tesla has emerged as a standout performer in the latest iSeeCars longevity study, which analyzed over 174 million used vehicles.
The data reveals that Tesla models have a 4.6 percent chance of reaching 250,000 miles, matching the industry average of 4.8 percent and tying for sixth place among 32 brands. This positions Tesla ahead of many established names, including Subaru (2.3 percent, roughly half of Tesla’s rate), Nissan (2.4 percent), Mazda, BMW, Mercedes-Benz, and Porsche.
Toyota leads with an impressive 17.8 percent likelihood, followed by Lexus (12.8 percent), Honda, and Acura. Yet Tesla’s result stands out for a relatively young EV brand. Experts attribute this to the inherent simplicity of electric powertrains: fewer moving parts mean no oil changes, timing belts, or complex engine components that typically fail in internal combustion vehicles.
Fewer things to maintain means fewer things to break, and ultimately, fewer things to go wrong.
A Tesla is twice as likely to reach 250,000 miles as a Subaru⁰⁰“No engine, no oil changes, no timing chains, no fuel injectors, and far fewer moving parts overall”⁰⁰https://t.co/k8iJwbzrrp
— Tesla North America (@tesla_na) June 8, 2026
This design advantage helps Teslas defy unfounded skepticism about battery longevity and overall durability, two things that have plagued the company from outsider perspectives without much proof.
The iSeeCars reliability ratings further bolster Tesla’s case. The Tesla Model S earns a strong 7.9/10 reliability score, ranking No. 1 out of 35 most reliable electric cars. It boasts a predicted average lifespan of about 154,419 miles (around 16.9 years) and a 21.9 percent chance of hitting 200,000 miles.
Tesla, as an electric car brand, also scores 7.9/10 overall, securing the top spot among electric vehicle manufacturers in several luxury and segment categories.
Real-world examples reinforce the data. High-mileage Teslas, including Model S vehicles exceeding one million miles, demonstrate that EVs can endure when properly maintained. Owners report minimal mechanical issues beyond typical wear items like tires and brakes, which regenerative braking often extends.
Tesla Model 3 hits quarter million miles with original battery and motor
This performance challenges narratives around EV reliability, especially amid mixed reports from other sources like Consumer Reports or regional inspections. iSeeCars‘ massive dataset emphasizes long-term durability over short-term defect rates, painting Tesla as a leader in sustainable, high-mileage ownership.
For buyers prioritizing longevity and low maintenance, Tesla’s results signal strong value. While no brand is flawless, factors like driving habits, climate, and software updates matter—the numbers suggest Tesla belongs among the elite for those seeking vehicles built to last.
As EV adoption grows, this iSeeCars data underscores Tesla’s engineering edge in creating enduring, future-proof automobiles.
Tesla owners have long griped about the wireless phone charger in the Model Y and other vehicles. It often turns smartphones into miniature ovens rather than reliably topping them up.
Software engineer and Model Y owner Michał Gapiński tackled this issue head-on with a clever DIY upgrade, swapping the cooled wireless charger pad from the China-made Model YL in for the one that came standard in his vehicle.
There are several key differences between the U.S.-built Model Y’s wireless charging pad and the one that Tesla has been installing in the Model YL. The one installed in U.S.-built vehicles lacks active cooling and relies on basic heat dissipation, leading to rapid temperature buildup during charging. In contrast, the Model YL integrates a small fan for active cooling.
Will it fit? Fingers crossed, I want a first YL charger deployed in the regular juniper pic.twitter.com/wWDqSNFVkW
— Michał Gapiński (@mikegapinski) June 2, 2026
This design maintains lower temperatures even in warm ambient conditions, though it does not support faster Qi2 charging on iPhones. The connector matches exactly, making physical swaps feasible on compatible consoles, but coding is required to enable full functionality.
Owners in the U.S. have complained about the wireless charging pad, with many reporting that overheating is fairly common. Within 20 or 30 minutes of placing a phone on the wireless charging pad, many have reported overheating messages on their phones, which halt charging and essentially turn the pad into a fancy place to rest your phone.
Many owners have opted to simply plug their phones into a charging cord. Tesla has acknowledged the problem by releasing several solutions for owners, including a relatively new feature that allows you to simply turn off the charging and simply act as a holder for your phone while driving.
Gapiński said that he sourced the cooled pad affordably from China, and it cost under $200 for the part.
He removed the existing console charger, swapped in the new unit, confirming a perfect connector fit, and handled the trim differences. Since the parameter isn’t fully secured, he enabled it through custom coding outside official Toolbox.
Connector is identical, she fits, now time to code it. https://t.co/Y9idgDrpCq pic.twitter.com/uwwgq6blg7
— Michał Gapiński (@mikegapinski) June 2, 2026
The fan activates quietly, blending with AC and seat cooling. He reported the installation was effective and the wireless charging pad worked perfectly; it even kept the phone cool as it stayed at just 86 degrees Fahrenheit. Many times, the wireless charging pad will bring the phone’s temperature well above 100 degrees, sometimes even being relatively hot to the touch.
The retrofit worked, no issues. First Model Y with a cooled wireless charger! No QI2/faster charging on the iPhone but it does not boil the phone even when it is 30 degrees outside.
The fan kicks in, it is not audible especially with the air conditioning and seat cooling. The… https://t.co/JOyR8Tb1Yo pic.twitter.com/kJcYhQIlYq
— Michał Gapiński (@mikegapinski) June 2, 2026
This retrofit highlighted an elegant, owner-driven solution to a factory shortcoming. It is expected that Tesla will begin installing the cooled charging pads into new cars in the U.S. soon, and hopefully, it will offer some sort of retrofit service or kit to owners here who want to use the charging pad effectively.
For those who love to tinker, it’s an accessible upgrade, proving that innovation thrives beyond the production line.
SpaceX IPO set to provide massive $11.6B windfall for teacher pension plan
Tesla skeptics will hate what this new reliability study says
