News
Astra ‘Rocket 3’ nosecone dooms first Florida launch attempt
On Thursday, February 10th, Astra Space’s Rocket 3.3 launch vehicle took off from Cape Canaveral Space Force Station (CCSFS) Launch Complex 46 (LC-46).
Unfortunately, while liftoff and booster ascent appeared to be more or less perfect, Rocket 3’s payload fairing failed to separate, triggering a series of events that caused its upper stage to enter an uncontrolled and unrecoverable spin after burning for just a few seconds. Astra was unable to salvage the spinning rocket, resulting in a mission failure well short of orbit.
“Unfortunately we heard that an issue has been experienced during flight that prevented the delivery of our customer payloads to orbit today. We are deeply sorry to our customers NASA, University of Alabama, the University of Mexico and the University of California Berkeley,” said Astra Space Director of Product Management Carolina Grossman. “More information will be provided as we complete the data review.”
Today’s launch comes after two previous aborted launch attempts. The first attempt on February 5th was delayed due to a CCSFS radar system malfunction. The second launch delay came on February 7th, after the rocket aborted briefly after ignition because of a minor telemetry issue.
The Mission
NASA’s first mission under the agency’s Venture Class Launch Services (VCLS) Demonstration 2 contract hoped to launch four CubeSats to space as early as February 5th, 2022. The satellites, which made up the agency’s 41st Educational Launch of Nano-satellites (ELaNa) mission, were the first VCLS payloads launched – albeit unsuccessfully – from Cape Canaveral’s LC-46 pad, which last supported NASA’s Orion spacecraft Ascent Abort 2 (AA-2) test flight in July 2019.
The satellites onboard the flight were developed by three universities and one NASA center:
- BAMA 1 (University of Alabama, Tusscolusa)
- INCA (New Mexico State University, Las Cruces)
- QubeSat (University of California, Berkeley)
- R5-S1 (NASA’s Johnson Space Center, Houston)
The ELaNa 41 mission CubeSats were selected through NASA’s CubeSat Launch Initiative (CSLI) and were assigned to the mission by NASA’s Launch Services Program based at Kennedy. CSLI provides launch opportunities for small satellite payloads built by universities, high schools, NASA Centers, and non-profit organizations.
About Astra
Founded in 2016, Astra Space is an American launch vehicle company based in Alameda, California. Astra’s official vision “is to Improve Life on Earth from Space by creating a healthier and more connected planet.” The company hopes to secure a large portion of the small satellite launch market, stating that it “offers the lowest cost-per-launch dedicated orbital launch service of any operational launch provider in the world.”
As of November 2021, Astra charges around $2.5-3.5M for a dedicated Rocket 3 launch, which can deliver up to 150 kg (330 lb) to low Earth orbit (LEO). In comparison, for a dedicated Electron launch, Rocket Lab charges about $7.5M for 300 kg (660 lb) to LEO. For customers willing to accept a one-size-fits-all rideshare solution, SpaceX charges $1M for 200 kg (440 lb) to LEO or higher sun-synchronous orbits (SSOs).
While the aerospace company is based out of California, its frequent orbital and suborbital test flights have all been conducted at the Pacific Spaceport Complex in Kodiak, Alaska. Prior test flights used Rocket 1, Rocket 2, and Rocket 3 prototypes as Astra refined its design and embraced a hardware-rich development style that didn’t shy away from failure.
Rocket 3.3 reached orbit for the first time – carrying an instrumented boilerplate payload for the United States Space Force – on November 21st, 2021. Less than two months later, Rocket 3.3 (serial number LV08) attempted to carry several NASA-sponsored cubesats into orbit on February 10th, 2022 – also the rocket’s first East Coast launch. Like Rocket 3.3’s predecessors, the two-stage vehicle was fueled with liquid oxygen (LOx) and refined kerosene (RP-1). Powered by five Delphin engines, the first stage produces up to ~145 kilonewtons (32,500 lbf) of thrust at liftoff. The second stage is powered by one pressure-fed Aether engine that delivers about 3.3 kN (740 lbf) of thrust in the vacuum of space.
The unsuccessful launch attempt occurred just three months after Astra applied for their Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) launch license and less than one day after receiving that license.
Elon Musk flew under the radar with his recent purchase of a $1 billion energy company, according to Federal Trade Commission (FTC) documents.
Transaction number 202612350 listed Tesla and SpaceX frontman Elon Musk as the acquiring party and CF APR Super Holdings LLC as the seller, with New APR Energy, LLC as the acquired entity. The deal, which closed without public announcement, came to light on May 14.
BREAKING: Elon Musk acquires Jacksonville power company APR Energy in a deal valued at more than $1,000,000,000.00.
— Polymarket Money (@PolymarketMoney) July 15, 2026
Analysts inferred the deal’s scale from minority stakeholder disclosures, including one report of a 5 percent interest sold for approximately $50.4 million. Fortress Investment Group had purchased APR’s assets in late 2024, rebranded the operation as New APR Energy, and subsequently transferred ownership to Musk.
APR Energy specializes in rapidly deployable power infrastructure. The company maintains one of the world’s largest fleets of mobile gas and diesel turbines, with more than 1.1 gigawatts of generation capacity. Its modular units, which are often trailer-mounted, enable turnkey installations ranging from 20 MW to over 500 MW.
APR provides full engineering, procurement, construction, operation, and maintenance services for behind-the-meter power plants, serving everything from data centers, utilities, and industrial clients.
The firm has expanded aggressively to meet surging demand, recently adding turbines and deploying over 100 MW for a major AI hyperscaler. Its solutions bridge critical gaps where grid interconnections face delays of two to five years, according to Yahoo.
The acquisition means something more for Musk. As he continues to expand projects in artificial intelligence, especially xAI, his AI venture, there is a greater need to supply energy-intensive supercomputing clusters, including the Colossus project, with what they need: reliable and high-capacity power.
Ownership of APR provides immediate access to flexible generation assets that can be deployed adjacent to data centers, reducing dependence on a strained infrastructure. It also complements Tesla’s energy storage business, so Musk will be able to pull from his own entities to address the rapid scaling demands of AI training and compute.
Tesla had a petition protesting a recall to fix a potential issue with 2017-2023 Model Y and Model 3 vehicles’ headlights was denied, as the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) disagreed with the company’s opinion of things.
The recall covers approximately 19,917 Model Y and Model 3 vehicles built from 2017 to 2023. Tesla initially submitted a noncompliance report for the headlights on these vehicles on March 15, 2024. Tesla then petitioned for an exemption from the fix, which violated FMVSS No. 108 (40 CFR 571.108), arguing that the “noncompliance is inconsequential as it relates to motor vehicle safety.
🚨 Tesla was denied a petition by the NHTSA to avoid a recall of 19,900 2017-2023 Model 3 and Model Y vehicles.
The NHTSA found that the vehicles’ headlights may exceed maximum lighting levels. Tesla argued it was inconsequential and did not require a recall. pic.twitter.com/m8Jmm1teLL
— TESLARATI (@Teslarati) July 16, 2026
The NHTSA disagreed, stating that Tesla’s conclusion that the headlights do not increase any risk was not an opinion it shared. The agency said it disagreed with Tesla’s assumption that glare is not increased to surrounding traffic. This issue could be highlighted even more in certain weather conditions.
Tesla will be required to remedy the issue, the NHTSA ruled:
“In consideration of the foregoing, NHTSA has decided that Tesla has not met its burden of persuasion that the subject FMVSS No. 108 noncompliance is inconsequential to motor vehicle safety. Accordingly, Tesla’s petition is hereby denied, and Tesla is consequently obligated to provide notification of and free remedy for that noncompliance under 49 U.S.C. 30118 and 30120.”
The issue here appears to be the angle of the headlights and the brightness they emit during operation. The NHTSA report states that:
“Tesla’s headlamp supplier, Marelli Automotive Lighting, tested 25 right-hand and 25 left-hand lamps, and for this sample, found the maximum photometric intensity measured in the 10°U to 90°U and 90°L to 90°R zone was between 136.2 cd and 230.1 cd for the right-hand lamps and between 117.5 cd and 160.3 cd for the left-hand lamps. According to Tesla, these tests revealed that the photometric intensity of the right-hand and left-hand headlamp lower beam on the subject vehicles may measure as much as 230.1 cd in the 10°U to 90°U and 90°L to 90°R zone, exceeding the maximum photometric intensity by 105.1 cd. Additionally, Tesla states that a left-hand lamp tested by a Transport Canada recognized laboratory measured a maximum of 171.27 cd in the 10°U to 90°U and 90°L to 90°R zone. Despite these measurements exceeding the allowed photometric maximum of 125 cd, Tesla believes that the subject noncompliance is inconsequential to motor vehicle safety.”
Tesla also argued at some points that the headlights had not been deemed responsible for any complaints, accidents, or injuries related to the noncompliance.
Lifestyle
NTSB findings on fatal Tesla crash tell a very different story
The NTSB confirmed the driver, not Tesla’s FSD, caused the fatal Texas house crash.
The National Transportation Safety Board released preliminary findings Wednesday confirming that a Tesla driver, not the vehicle’s software, caused a fatal crash in Katy, Texas in June. The driver, 44-year-old Michael Butler, had engaged Full Self-Driving Supervised mode on Rose Hollow Lane, a residential street with a 30 mph speed limit, before manually overriding the system by pressing the accelerator pedal all the way to 100%. Data recovered from the 2025 Tesla Model 3 showed the vehicle was traveling over 70 miles per hour when it struck a home and killed 76-year-old Martha Avila, who was inside. Weather was clear, the road was dry, and it was daylight.
Texas man charged in fatal Tesla crash where he blamed Autopilot
Butler told authorities he had passed out at the wheel. But security camera footage obtained by the NTSB told a different story, and showed the car accelerating through an intersection before leaving the road entirely. Police also found that Butler’s phone had Google searches including the terms “Tesla FSD not aggressive enough 2026” and “Tesla FSD too timid,” raising serious questions about how he was using the system before the crash. Butler has since been charged with manslaughter. The victim’s family has filed a lawsuit against both Butler and Tesla, alleging negligence.
The NTSB findings aligned directly with what Tesla VP of AI Software Ashok Elluswamy had already stated publicly on X in the weeks after the crash, writing that “the driver manually overrode self-driving by pressing the accelerator all the way to 100%.” The data confirmed his account.
Yup. In this case, the driver manually overrode self-driving by pressing the accelerator all the way to 100% of the accel pedal in this residential area. They reached a speed of 73 mph during the crash, and had the accelerator pressed even after the crash.
— Ashok Elluswamy (@aelluswamy) June 22, 2026
Elon Musk secretly acquires $1B energy company to power the AI future
Tesla has to fix a big problem with its old headlights, NHTSA says
