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Blue Origin rocket launch fails after engine catches fire

Blue Origin's 23rd New Shepard launch has ended in failure. (Blue Origin)

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Blue Origin’s suborbital New Shepard rocket suffered a catastrophic engine failure during its 23rd launch attempt, ending a seven-year streak of 21 successes.

Following a handful of mostly weather-related delays that pushed New Shepard’s 23rd launch about two weeks past its original August 31st target, the single-stage vehicle lifted off from Blue Origin’s Van Horn, Texas launch site around 10:25 am CDT (14:25 UTC) on September 12th. Measuring about 15 meters (49 ft) tall, 3.7 meters (12.1 ft) wide, and capable of producing about 50 tons (~110,000 lbf) of thrust with its lone BE-3 engine at full throttle, New Shepard only made it about halfway through its nominal powered ascent before catastrophe struck.

The first signs of trouble appeared about 62 seconds after liftoff in the form of flickers and flashes in New Shepard’s exhaust, which is normally almost transparent. Less than two seconds after the first seemingly harmless flash, flames unintentionally burst from New Shepard’s engine section and quickly surrounded its BE-3PM engine. Less than a second after that, the rocket’s aft and began shedding pieces and stopped producing thrust, triggering a solid rocket motor stored inside its deployable capsule.

About a second after the incident began, the capsule’s abort motor ignited and carried the suborbital spacecraft safely away from the failing New Shepard booster. The capsule ultimately coasted to an apogee of 11.4 kilometers (7.1 miles) – almost ten times lower than nominal – before descending back to Earth, deploying its parachute system, and safely touching down in the Texas desert scrub. Thankfully, NS-23 was only carrying experiments, and no humans were at risk. Had a crew of suborbital tourists been aboard, they would have likely been a little battered but otherwise completely unharmed.

While any failure of a rocket is unfortunate, the failure of a rocket nominally designed to launch humans can have even worse repercussions. However, thanks to the seemingly flawless unplanned performance of New Shepard’s abort system, it’s safe to say that the day could have gone much worse for Blue Origin.

The failure is still not going to do the reputation of Blue Origin or New Shepard any favors. It also invites less than favorable comparisons with SpaceX, a different spaceflight startup also funded and founded by a tech tycoon in the early 2000s.

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Founded a year and a half after Blue Origin, SpaceX, in comparison, reached orbit with Falcon 1 in 2008. In June 2010, it successfully debuted Falcon 9, an orbital-class rocket roughly 20 times larger. In 2012, Falcon 9 successfully launched an orbital Dragon spacecraft which became the first private vehicle to dock to the International Space Station. In January 2015, it attempted to recover a Falcon 9 booster for the first time. In December 2015, one month after Blue Origin’s first successful New Shepard landing, SpaceX aced its first Falcon 9 booster landing.

Nine months later, Falcon 9 suffered a catastrophic failure during prelaunch testing in September 2016 and didn’t return to flight until January 2017. That is where, for the most part, the paths of Blue Origin and SpaceX almost entirely diverged – but not in any obvious way. Instead, after a successful suborbital launch in October 2016, New Shepard didn’t fly again until December 2017. In the roughly six years between October 2016 and September 2022, New Shepard completed 10 uncrewed suborbital launches, 6 suborbital tourist launches, and suffered one failure during another uncrewed mission – 18 total launches.

Despite suffering a catastrophic failure that destroyed a customer’s multimillion-dollar satellite in September 2016, SpaceX returned to flight four months later, completed 150 orbital Falcon launches without fail in the same period; debuted the world’s largest operational rocket, Falcon Heavy, and completed two additional launches with it; debuted Crew Dragon and Cargo Dragon 2 on Falcon 9; launched its first astronauts into orbit, launched its first operational astronaut transport mission for NASA, launched its first two Starlink internet satellite prototypes, launched another 60 refined Starlink prototypes, began operational Falcon 9 Starlink launches, built and launched more than 3000 Starlink satellites total; landed 130+ Falcon boosters, and reuse Falcon boosters 117 times.

(SpaceX)
Completed on September 11th, Falcon 9’s latest mission was its 173rd successful orbital launch. (Richard Angle)

The differences could not be more stark or strange, given that both companies have been operating more or less side by side and working towards similar goals for as long as they’ve existed. To Blue Origin’s credit, the company managed a record six New Shepard launches – three carrying tourists – in 2021. NS-23 was its fourth planned launch in 2022, suggesting that it could have achieved a similar cadence this year if the mission had had a different fate. Instead, the launch failure has triggered an anomaly investigation that will search for the root cause and try to uncover shortcomings that will then need to be rectified before New Shepard can return to flight. Given that Blue Origin once went 15 months between successful New Shepard launches, it’s impossible to say how long that process will take.

In the meantime, the apparent failure of New Shepard’s BE-3PM engine could trigger investigations into Blue Origin’s other engine programs. While substantially different, BE-3U, a variant optimized for the upper stage of New Glenn, Blue Origin’s first orbital rocket, likely shares the most in common with New Shepard’s BE-3PM. BE-7, a small engine meant to power a Moon lander, could also be impacted.

Most importantly, Blue Origin is also in the midst of finally preparing two much more powerful and far more complex BE-4 engines for customer United Launch Alliance (ULA). Years behind schedule, Blue Origin completed the first two theoretically flightworthy BE-4 engines and began putting them through qualification testing earlier this year. It wants to ship those engines to ULA as soon as possible to avoid delaying the debut of the customer’s new Vulcan Centaur rocket. BE-3PM and BE-4 probably don’t share a single part, but many Blue Origin employees have likely worked on both programs, and the same Blue Origin leadership has certainly overseen both. As long as there’s any form of commonality, no matter how abstract, there’s always a risk that the underlying cause of problems in one program could be present in others.

Ultimately, it’s unlikely that there will be any serious connection. The New Shepard booster that failed on NS-23 was almost five years old and was flying for a record-breaking ninth time. It’s possible that Blue Origin was privately worried about the possibility of failure while pushing the envelope, but it offered no qualifications while discussing the mission. SpaceX CEO Elon Musk, in comparison, has almost always made it clear that failure is a possibility when the company attempts ‘firsts’ of any kind.

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SpaceX recently launched and recovered the same Falcon 9 booster for the 14th time, setting its own internal record. As a result, that lone Falcon 9 booster, B1058, has flown as many times in the last 31 months as all New Shepard boosters combined have flown in the last 45 months.

Finally, while no company should be put in that position, Blue Origin deserves praise for its live coverage of the anomaly. Instead of immediately cutting the feeds, which would be what most providers would be expected to do during an operational launch, Blue Origin continued to broadcast views of the failure and provide live commentary until New Shepard’s capsule touched down well ahead of schedule.

Eric Ralph is Teslarati's senior spaceflight reporter and has been covering the industry in some capacity for almost half a decade, largely spurred in 2016 by a trip to Mexico to watch Elon Musk reveal SpaceX's plans for Mars in person. Aside from spreading interest and excitement about spaceflight far and wide, his primary goal is to cover humanity's ongoing efforts to expand beyond Earth to the Moon, Mars, and elsewhere.

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Tesla’s Cybercab battery design could make robotaxis even cheaper

Tesla built the Cybercab’s battery pack with spare room for a future switch to LFP.

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Tesla built the Cybercab’s battery pack with empty space inside it on purpose, and the reason points to a cheaper robotaxi down the road.

Robert Sumpf, Tesla’s director of mechanical design engineering for battery modules and packs, said the extra room beside and beneath the Cybercab’s modules was left there so the company can move to lithium iron phosphate cells later. “So, we protected this pack to go to an even lower energy dense chemistry as we scale and need to bring LFP into the platform,” Sumpf said in a Cybercab deep dive with Munro Live.

The Cybercab runs on Tesla’s own 4680 cells with a nickel chemistry today. LFP cells store less energy for their size, so a straight swap would cut range. The reserved space lets Tesla add more LFP cells to make up the difference. In return, Tesla would get cells that cost less, run cooler and survive more charge cycles. LFP became the most used EV battery chemistry in the world last year.

Not all of that room was planned for a chemistry change. Lars Moravy, Tesla’s Vice President of Vehicle Engineering, said part of it exists because “we didn’t need as many batteries as we thought we did.” Tesla told Sandy Munro in early 2025 that it was targeting a Cybercab pack under 50 kWh with close to 300 miles of range.

The pack also breaks from the structural design Tesla used in some Model Y and Cybertruck builds. Instead of potting hundreds of cells into one block, the Cybercab uses four separate, individually sealed modules, so a bad module can be replaced without scrapping the whole pack. Sumpf was blunt about the older approach, giving the Model Y structural battery “a grade D” because it was hard to build and nearly impossible to repair. He estimated a fully structural pack gains about 10% more cell volume, but said “the issue is the service cost.”

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That cost matters more for a car that rarely sits parked. Cybercab chief engineer Eric Earley said replacing an entire pack “before half a million miles is a killer on cost,” which is why remanufacturing and serviceability were built into the design from the start.

The same Munro Live tour produced Moravy’s admission that the Cybercab line at Giga Texas is now outpacing Robotaxi deployments, along with a look at the robotaxi’s unorthodox paint process. Tesla is aiming to deliver the first Cybercabs to outside customers by the end of 2026, though Elon Musk has said the vast majority will stay owned by Tesla and run as a transport service.

Sumpf did not give a date for an LFP version, name a cell supplier or say how a chemistry change would affect range. For now, the 4680 cars keep piling up: Texas DMV records from Tuesday list 544 Cybercabs authorized for Tesla’s Robotaxi fleet, more than the 507 Model Ys on the same roster for the first time.

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Starlink is ‘biggest competitive advantage,’ but it’s temporary, United CEO says

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Credit: United Airlines

United Airlines CEO Scott Kirby said that SpaceX’s Starlink satellite internet is its leading competitive advantage in the U.S. airline industry. However, in recent comments, while he described the service as “the biggest competitive advantage” the carrier currently holds, he also acknowledged that the edge is temporary.

“…everybody eventually is going to have high-speed low earth orbit internet connectivity. It’s going to be a must-have. We are going to have a few years of being the only airline that has it at scale, and that’s our mission,” Kirby said. Until everyone has it, United aims to capitalize on its head start by converting trial users into long-term loyal customers.

United has moved faster than its rivals on Starlink installations. As of mid-to-late October 2026, the system was on roughly 43 percent of its fleet, with plans to reach 61 percent by year-end, 87 percent by June 2027, and full fleet coverage by the end of next year.

The airline already operates more Starlink-equipped flights than the rest of the U.S. industry combined. Los Angeles International Airport is scheduled to become United’s first 100 percent Starlink hub in the first half of 2027, and the carrier’s app will display the likelihood that any given flight has the service.

Kirby has pointed to early evidence that the offering influences booking decisions. Some passengers loyal to other airlines are already switching flights for Starlink connectivity, something the airline, along with American Airlines, has tried to leverage against competing airlines. Both companies used status-match programs, and some of those customers are pursuing company-specific credit cards, which signals an intent to stay.

Once onboard, these customers encounter the airline’s broader investments in aircraft, larger seat-back screens, oversized bins, connection tools, and a mobile app that Kirby says outperforms competitors. Wi-Fi satisfaction scores on Starlink-equipped planes have been reported to be nearly double those on aircraft with other systems.

Competitors are moving slowly to do the same. Southwest Airlines began installations in 2025 and expects to complete them soon. Delta is pursuing Amazon’s Leo system, while American expects to start Starlink work in early 2027 and has not yet detailed regional-fleet plans. This timeline gap gives United a multi-year window in which it remains the only major U.S. carrier offering Starlink at scale.

Kirby has framed the strategy as pressing that advantage while simultaneously widening gaps in other technology areas so that customers who try United for the Wi-Fi remain for the overall experience.

The approach reflects a calculated bet that superior in-flight connectivity can accelerate share gains and support longer-term financial targets, including a 10 percent pre-tax margin goal.

High-speed internet is particularly valued by premium and business travelers who can work or stream reliably. As low-Earth-orbit service becomes ubiquitous, the temporary nature of the pure connectivity edge means United’s retention will depend on whether its other product and operational improvements keep pace.

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Tesla Cybercab’s unorthodox paint process explained

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Credit: Tesla

Tesla Cybercab skips the traditional paint shop entirely, marking an unorthodox process for coloring the fully autonomous vehicle. However, the decision was a smart one, as it slashed factory costs, floor space utilization, and complexity, since Tesla relied on specialized alloys and in-mold coloring.

Munro Live was given the opportunity to do a factory walkthrough with Tesla Vice President of Vehicle Engineering Lars Moravy, who explained and detailed how Cybercab production at Giga Texas eliminates one of the automotive manufacturing industry’s most expensive and space-hungry elements.

A conventional paint line can cost hundreds of millions of dollars and require a million man-hours to build. Moravy framed the choice around Tesla’s core rule: “Question the requirements: why do you need paint?”

The structural answer lies in material selection. The aluminum alloys used in Cybercab’s front and rear castings do not oxidize and lose strength over time, the way many common automotive aluminum alloys do. Only the side modules, built around hot-stamped boron-steel door rings, receive an anti-corrosion e-coat, or dip coat. Front and rear modules skip coating altogether.

Model Y and Model 3 bodies, by contrast, are fully coated and painted.

Exterior colors come from the plastics shop, which Tesla engineers described as “our paint shop” for the Cybercab. Body panels are produced via reaction injection molding, referred to as RIM. Color is then mixed into a polyurethane resin at the mix head immediately before injection, so the panel emerges already colored with a Class-A surface.

Robots trim overflow to control sink marks and flow lines. The process avoids conventional spray-paint defects like orange peel and paint bleed. Scratches can still be repaired with compatible coatings that behave “basically like paint.” Because color is integral rather than a surface layer, shallow scratches do not expose a contrasting undercoat.

The secret behind Tesla’s Cybercab Gold goes well beyond just the color

Tesla has also explored related approaches, including in-mold lamination and painted films on stamped panels.

The manufacturing payoff is substantial because removing the paint shop, combined with the “unboxed” modular process that builds and tests front, rear, side, and center modules in parallel before a short final assembly, cuts factory floor space per vehicle by about 50 percent.

Final assembly itself uses only about 25 automated stations, far fewer than the typical Model Y line, and the overall line runs at about 78 percent automation, Moravy said. The approach also eliminates volatile organic compound emissions associated with traditional spray painting for these panels and shortens the coloring cycle from hours to minutes.

Cybercab’s paint strategy is clearly less about aesthetics than about systematically deleting capital-intensive, energy-heavy, and space-consuming steps once material science and process design make them unnecessary. It is a concrete example of Tesla applying first-principles questioning to one of the auto industry’s most entrenched factory requirements.

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