SpaceX
DeepSpace: A critical juncture for SpaceX, Blue Origin, ULA, other players
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A high-pressure competition between all four major US launch providers – SpaceX, ULA, Blue Origin, and Orbital ATK (now NGIS) – is about to head into its most critical stage, a period of 60 days allotted for interested parties to submit their completed proposals. According to the US Air Force (USAF), the final request for proposals (RFP) could come as early as March 29th, giving the four aforementioned companies until May 28th to complete their proposals.
All things considered, the growing pressure and some of the USAF’s strategy behind the program – known as Launch Service Procurement (LSP) Phase 2 – has raised significant questions that remain largely unanswered and lead to a few mild bouts of strife or unhappiness from contract competitors. Most notably, Blue Origin – having just won a USAF development contract worth $500M – has repeatedly requested that the USAF and Department of Defense (DoD) delay the RFP and contract awards until 2021, according to Space News’ Sandra Erwin. Meanwhile, a lack of clarification from the USAF means that it’s unclear whether the strategy behind launch contract awards (LSP) will end up contradicting or undermining a partially connected development program known as Launch Service Agreements (LSA) that saw the USAF award ~$2B to three providers (excluding SpaceX) between 2018 and 2024.
Battle of the Acronyms: LSP vs. LSA
- Recently rebranded by the US military as the National Security Space Launch (NSSL) program, LSP Phase 1 and 2 and LSA are the latest major procurement initiatives begun under the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program, spun up in the 1990s to provide a firmer foundation for the commercial launch of military spacecraft after the 1986 Shuttle Challenger disaster pushed most satellites off of the platform.
- Phase 2 of the EELV program has been ongoing for several years and will culminate with the procurement of 25+ launch contracts (LSP) from two providers no earlier than 2020. The USAF’s Launch Service Agreements are also a major strategic feature of Phase 2, nominally seeing the military branch contribute major funding to assist in the development of three separate launch vehicles (New Glenn, Vulcan, and Omega) with the intention of ultimately certifying those rockets for EELV (now NSSL) launches.
- LSA also saw the USAF award several tens of millions to SpaceX, Blue Origin, and Aerojet Rocketdyne to develop capabilities centered around advanced, new rocket engines (BE-4, AR-1, and Raptor), but the latest phase of LSA is valued at least several times higher than its earlier engine-specific awards.
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- Oddly, the purpose of LSA was – at least on the cover – to effectively ensure that the Air Force had multiple (more than two) providers and thus preserve a healthy, competitive military launch market. A senior leader specifically stated that “the goal of [LSA] is to make sure [the US military has] a competitive industrial base.”
- Aside from an initial $181M awarded to Blue Origin, ULA, and Orbital ATK (now Northrop Grumman Innovation Systems, NGIS) in 2018 and 2019, the remaining funding – up to $320M for Blue Origin’s New Glenn, $610M for NGIS’ Omega, and $785M for ULA’s Vulcan – would be dispersed to each provider between 2020 and 2024.
- However, an odd and controversial bit of language behind the coming five-year launch services procurement (LSP) initiative would completely cut off funding to LSA awardees in the event that they fail to be awarded launches from the latest LSP.
- Additionally, the LSP awards are strictly meant – apparently very intentionally – to be distrubuted among two launch providers, despite a minimum at least four being able (SpaceX) or required (ULA, Blue, NGIS) to enter a bid.
- In other words, this guarantees that either one or two of the three LSA awardees would have the vast majority of their supposedly awarded development funding cut off after FY2020, four years early.
- Oddly, the purpose of LSA was – at least on the cover – to effectively ensure that the Air Force had multiple (more than two) providers and thus preserve a healthy, competitive military launch market. A senior leader specifically stated that “the goal of [LSA] is to make sure [the US military has] a competitive industrial base.”
- Despite continued protests from a number of stakeholders, the USAF has refused to budge from its decision to simultaneously A) create a duopoly, B) defeat the purpose of LSA awards, and C) mass-award ~25 launch contracts to two providers in 2020, anywhere from 12-24 months prior to the planned inaugural launches of all three LSA-funded rockets.
- Without cost-sharing development funds from the USAF and a chance of winning more than a handful of US military launch contracts between now and the late 2020s, it can be all but guaranteed that an LSA funding cutoff will either indefinitely pause or slow to a crawl a given provider’s development of their proposed launch vehicle.

A rocket and a hard place
- This sticky situation thus offers up a few potential ways that this badly-designed (or entirely dishonest) military launch development and procurement strategy will end up by the end of 2020. One way or another, the current strategy as it stands will end up providing two (or one, given that SpaceX will not receive LSA funding) companies with several years of development funding and at least five years of bountiful, guaranteed launch contracts.
- The four providers and two LSP slots available offer a set range of possible alternate realities, limited by political barriers that would, say, almost invariably prevent the USAF from severely harming ULA by cutting off the vast majority of the company’s only real source of income for 5+ years.
- ULA and SpaceX win: This maintains the status quo, wholly invalidating the point of using LSA funds to ensure “a competitive industrial base.” NGIS likely cancels/freezes all Omega development with no chance of competing in commercial markets. Blue Origin owner Jeff Bezos could significantly delay New Glenn’s readiness for military missions if he fails to invest an additional $500M in infrastructure. Likeliest result: a marginally competitive duopoly.
- ULA wins, SpaceX loses: Having just certified Falcon 9 – and nearly Falcon Heavy – for high-value military launches and awarded SpaceX a total of 10 launch contracts (9 yet to be completed), the USAF could effectively spit in SpaceX’s face and award ULA and Blue Origin or NGIS LSP’s 25+ launch contracts.
- It’s hard to exaggerate just how much of a slight this would be perceived as by SpaceX and its executives, CEO Elon Musk in particular. The USAF would be risking the creation of a major political enemy, one which has already demonstrated a willingness to take the federal government to court and win. The USAF/DoD would effectively be hedging their bets against an assumption that SpaceX’s nine present military launch contracts will sate the company and ensure that SpaceX indefinitely remains a certified EELV/NSSL provider.
- In this eventuality, either Blue Origin or NGIS would lose LSA funding and the prospect of almost any military launch contracts until the late 2020s. For NGIS, this would likely kill Omega.
- At the end of the day, it’s sadly conceivable that the USAF/DoD may end up awarding LSP contracts to ULA (effectively a politically-forced hand) and NGIS, the latter assuring Omega’s survival. The military would thus be assuming that the political fallout created with SpaceX and Blue Origin would not be enough to severely harm their relationships, while also assuming that their much stronger commercial prospects and independent funding sources would ensure that each provider remains certified and willing to compete for future NSSL/EELV launches.
Regardless of what happens, the contradictory ways the USAF/DoD have structured their LSA and LSP programs seems bizarrely intent on creating major headaches and potential problems where that could easily be avoided with extraordinarily simple changes, namely removing the inexplicable cap and allowing three or more companies to win some of the ~25 LSP launch contracts).
Mission Updates
- The second launch of Falcon Heavy – the rocket’s commercial debut – is still scheduled to occur as early as April 7th.
- After Falcon Heavy, Cargo Dragon’s CRS-17 resupply mission is firmly scheduled for April (April 25th), while the first dedicated Starlink launch is now NET May 2019.
Photo of the Week:

SpaceX CEO Elon Musk offered a glimpse of a 1650 Kelvin (2500ºF/1400ºC) test of Starship’s metallic heat shield, simulating mid-range temperatures such a shield’s windward side might experience during an orbital-velocity reentry.(c. Elon Musk/SpaceX)
News
SpaceX tells the FCC that Starship Flight 14 is going to orbit
SpaceX filed with the FCC for Starship Flight 14, its first true orbital launch attempt.
SpaceX has asked the Federal Communications Commission for permission to fly Starlink terminals during Starship’s fourteenth flight test, and the filing lays out a genuine trip to orbit, something the program has never attempted.
Every Starship flight so far, including Flight 13’s successful splashdown in the Indian Ocean on July 24, has flown a suborbital arc that ends with the ship reentering the atmosphere within the same hour it launches. The FCC paperwork describes a mission profile built around an actual orbital insertion instead.
The payload is the other half of the story. Flight 13 carried 20 production Starlink V3 satellites, but because that mission never reached orbit, the satellites reentered along with the ship rather than joining the constellation, something Teslarati covered in detail after SpaceX released footage shot from one of those satellites as it drifted away from Starship in space. Flight 14 is designed to close that gap. If the orbital insertion holds, the roughly 20 V3 satellites onboard would separate into an operational orbit and could eventually go into service, each one rated for about 1 terabit per second of downlink capacity by SpaceX’s own account.
SpaceX announces new Starbase for ‘thousands of Starship launches annually’
Elon Musk first flagged the orbital attempt during SpaceX’s August 4 earnings call, the company’s first as a public entity following its June IPO under the ticker SPCX. He also floated catching the ship with the Starbase tower on the same flight, an idea he walked back on August 20, saying the catch attempt would more likely come “in a few months,” as Teslarati reported at the time. Flight 14 will instead target a splashdown for the ship in the Indian Ocean, the same recovery method used since Flight 12.
Hardware has been catching up to the ambition. Booster 21 completed a full 33-engine static fire on August 28, and Ship 41 finished its own six-engine test the week before. An airspace briefing circulated to pilots on August 20 listed September 15 as the target date, later than the end of August window Musk mentioned on the earnings call, though SpaceX has not confirmed a launch date publicly and Starship schedules routinely slip while hardware and FAA paperwork line up.
The FCC filing itself does not guarantee a launch date. It covers communications authority, and not flight readiness, considering SpaceX still needs Ship 41 fully stacked and cleared by the FAA before Flight 14 can fly. But the filing is a real marker of intent and it puts a specific regulatory process behind what had so far only been Musk’s word on the earnings call.
Elon Musk
SpaceX would not exist if this crucial early launch failed, Musk says
Elon Musk recently restated a fact that still defines SpaceX’s origin story: if Falcon 1’s fourth launch had failed, the company would not exist. The comment answered a reminder that after three consecutive losses, SpaceX had money for only one more attempt.
On X, Peter Diamandis said that the present-day acknowledgement of SpaceX’s success does not discount the rough start the company had. “Almost nobody remembers that Elon’s first rocket failed three times, and there was money for exactly only one more attempt.”
Musk said, “If the 4th launch had failed, SpaceX would not exist.”
If the 4th launch had failed, SpaceX would not exist
— Elon Musk (@elonmusk) August 30, 2026
In late 2008, the firm was nearly out of cash. Another failure would have ended payroll, closed the Hawthorne factory, and left the Falcon 9 and Dragon programs as unfinished drawings.
The first flight lifted off from Omelek Island on 24 March 2006. Thirty-three seconds later, a corroded aluminum fitting on a fuel line leaked. Kerosene ignited around the Merlin engine, control was lost, and the vehicle came apart. The small DARPA payload, FalconSAT-2, survived the short flight only to land on a storage shed near the pad. Investigators later traced the fitting to a materials mix-up that should never have reached the rocket.
Flight 2, on 21 March 2007, looked far better at first. The first stage burned cleanly and handed off to the Kestrel-powered upper stage. The vehicle crossed 100 kilometers and reached a peak of about 289 kilometers. Then propellant slosh in the second-stage tank started a circular coning motion that grew until the engine shut down. Telemetry faded as the stage tumbled, and SpaceX had reached space but not orbit. Over the next year, the team redesigned everything from the ground up, including tanks, baffles, and the new regeneratively cooled Merlin 1C.
That engine flew on Flight 3 on 2 August 2008. The first stage performed almost perfectly and reached 217 kilometers. After main-engine cutoff, leftover fuel in the cooling channels produced a faint residual thrust, roughly 10 pounds per square inch of chamber pressure. On a Texas test stand, the effect was invisible beneath ambient air pressure. In vacuum it was enough to push the spent first stage back into the second stage after separation. The stages collided, the upper stage spun, and the mission was lost. Musk later said a slightly longer delay before staging would have saved the flight.
Six weeks later, the team assembled Flight 4 from remaining parts and flew it on 28 September 2008 at 23:15 UTC. The payload was Ratsat, a 165-kilogram aluminum mass simulator built in-house. Staging was delayed so residual thrust could decay. The Kestrel ignited, the fairing split away, and nine and a half minutes after liftoff the vehicle was in orbit. After a coast, the second stage restarted, settling into a 621-by-643-kilometer path at 9.35 degrees inclination. Falcon 1 became the first privately developed liquid-fueled rocket to reach Earth orbit. Musk called the insertion “middle of the bull’s-eye.”
SpaceX restores a Falcon 1 rocket for 10th anniversary of first launch success
That success unlocked NASA’s Commercial Resupply Services award later that year. Without it, there would have been no Falcon 9, no reusable first stages, and no Dragon cargo or crew flights to the International Space Station. Launch prices would have remained far higher. Starlink’s constellation would not exist; broadband from low Earth orbit would still be a paper concept.
Ride-share markets, high launch cadence, and the current pace of lunar and Mars hardware would be years behind. Communications, Earth observation, and the cost of putting anything into space would look more like the 2000s than the 2020s.
One extra second of residual thrust in August 2008 would have written a different decade.
Elon Musk
OpenAI cites distrust of SpaceX in decision to drop Cursor partnership
OpenAI will cut SpaceX-owned Cursor’s model access in November, citing Musk’s history of broken contracts.
OpenAI, the company behind ChatGPT, announced late Friday that it is ending its partnership with Cursor, cutting off the coding tool’s access to its models on November 12. The move comes two weeks after SpaceX completed its $60 billion acquisition of Cursor’s parent company, Anysphere, folding the popular AI coding assistant into Elon Musk’s growing SpaceXAI division.
In a post on its website, OpenAI said the decision came down to trust, not technology. “We cannot be confident that SpaceX will use our technology within our terms of service, based on our experience with Elon Musk’s companies violating contracts,” the company wrote. OpenAI pointed to two specific incidents: X, now part of SpaceX, allegedly breaking the terms of an existing OpenAI contract after Musk bought Twitter.
That lawsuit is the backdrop for all of this. Musk cofounded OpenAI in 2015, left the board in 2018, and sued Sam Altman and Greg Brockman in 2024, arguing they abandoned the company’s nonprofit mission for profit. A federal jury sided with OpenAI in May, finding Musk waited too long to sue rather than ruling on the merits of his claims. Musk said at the time he would appeal to the Ninth Circuit, calling the outcome a “calendar technicality” rather than a real judgment.
SpaceX’s interest in Cursor predates that verdict by weeks. The company first struck a deal with Cursor in April, securing an option to acquire it for $60 billion or pay $10 billion for joint development work instead. As Teslarati reported at the time, the logic was straightforward: Cursor was paying retail prices to Anthropic and OpenAI, two of its most direct competitors, every time a developer used its product, while SpaceX had idle capacity on its Colossus supercomputer, roughly the equivalent of a million Nvidia H100 GPUs, that Cursor could use to train its own models instead. SpaceX exercised the option in June, days after its own IPO, and the deal closed in mid-August.
Once it closed, Musk moved fast. On an all-hands call with more than 1,000 Cursor employees, he reportedly told staff that SpaceXAI’s Grok was playing catchup in the AI race, unlike Tesla and SpaceX in their own markets, and singled out Anthropic as the company to catch. Cursor CEO Michael Truell now reports directly to Musk inside SpaceXAI.
Losing OpenAI’s models leaves Cursor leaning harder on Anthropic’s Claude, which has its own compute agreement with SpaceX, and on Cursor’s in-house Composer model, the one SpaceX’s compute was supposed to accelerate in the first place. OpenAI framed the November deadline as maximum notice under its contract, and said it wants to “go above and beyond” to help developers through the transition. Whether Anthropic makes the same call is now the open question in AI coding.





