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NASA scrubs first SLS Moon rocket launch attempt
NASA has scrubbed the first attempted launch of its Space Launch System (SLS) Moon rocket after running into multiple issues, one of which could not be solved in time.
The delay is bad news for the tens to hundreds of thousands of tourists who traveled to Cape Canaveral, Florida to witness the launch in person. Worse, by NASA’s own implicit admission, there’s a good chance the main problem SLS encountered could have already been dealt with and rectified in advance of the launch attempt if the space agency had finished testing the rocket earlier this summer.
Ultimately, that omission turned the first SLS launch attempt into more of a continuation of the rocket’s first four wet dress rehearsal (WDR) attempts, none of which ended as expected. NASA engineers will now have to decide how to proceed and whether the SLS rocket can be made ready in time for another launch attempt on September 2nd or 5th. If not, the next opportunity could be weeks away.
As far as SLS test operations go, the August 28/29th launch attempt was fairly ordinary, with the rocket running into multiple issues – a few minor, a few significant, and one identical to a previous problem. The first problem – a hydrogen leak near the SLS rocket’s base – came after a risk of lightning delayed the start of propellant loading by more than an hour. A very similar, if not identical, hydrogen fuel leak had already occurred during official wet dress rehearsal testing in April and July.
That leak was fixed on the fly by properly chilling all related systems, and propellant loading was eventually completed – albeit a few hours late thanks to inclement weather. Shortly after, there were reports of a crack that needed careful analysis. Only later did NASA specify that the suspected crack was in the rocket’s foam insulation rather than its structures, the latter of which could have been a catastrophic problem.
Around the same time, the true showstopper of the day occurred when NASA attempted to chill the SLS Core Stage’s four RS-25 engines, all of which flew several times aboard reusable Space Shuttle orbiters. Three engines performed (mostly) as expected, flowing a bit of liquid hydrogen fuel to cool themselves down, but one – engine #3 – was never able to make progress toward the optimal temperature needed for ignition (~5°C/~41°F). After hours of remote troubleshooting attempts, no progress had been made, and NASA ultimately decided to scrub the launch attempt at T-40 minutes to liftoff.
Over the course of four separate wet dress rehearsal attempts in April and June 2022, NASA was never able to test the core stage’s engine chill capabilities. In a post-scrub press conference, Jim Free – NASA’s Associate Administrator of the Exploration Systems Development Division – revealed that all four engines were warmer than intended, further confirming that skipping a fully nominal wet dress rehearsal was likely a mistake. Clear and present evidence aside, Free stated that he and other executives still believed skipping that test was the right decision, claiming that ending explicit WDR testing reduced the number of times the rocket needed to be moved on its transporter.
Making the situation even harder to explain, Artemis I Mission Manager Mike Sarafin revealed in the conference Q&A that Boeing had changed the design of parts of the SLS engine chill (bleed) system after the Core Stage finally conducted a nominal static fire test at Mississippi’s Stennis Space Center. Completed in March 2021, the SLS rocket then sat inside NASA’s Kennedy Space Center, Florida Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) for a full year before attempting its first wet dress rehearsal tests at the launch pad.
The first round of three WDRs were not as smooth as NASA expected and instead uncovered three relatively small issues: a hydrogen leak, a single faulty upper stage valve, and problems with a ground supply of nitrogen gas. Those small issues led NASA to roll SLS back to the VAB for repairs, incurring a minimum multi-week delay that stretched into two months. SLS also failed to complete a fourth WDR attempt in July 2022, but NASA decided to overlook the rocket parts and phases of preflight operations that were never actually tested as planned, one of which was the engine chill system.
If NASA cannot fix the RS-25 chill system within the next few days, it will be forced to roll the entire rocket and mobile launch platform back to the VAB to – at a minimum – replace its flight termination system (FTS). The US Eastern Range requires that all rocket FTS systems be tested no more than 15 days before launch, and NASA was able to secure special permission for a gap of up to 25 days. However, because Boeing’s Core Stage design places the FTS system in a location that is reportedly inaccessible at the pad, the entire SLS rocket will need to roll back to the VAB to have its FTS systems “retested” after that period.
As a result, NASA’s SLS launch debut will be delayed by several weeks (at best) if it can’t recycle for another attempt on September 2nd or 5th. The next window runs from September 20th to October 4th, but the SLS rocket took 10 days to go from its latest rollout to first launch attempt – a figure that doesn’t include the time required to remove the rocket from the pad, roll it back to the VAB, and conduct any necessary repairs or tests while back in the bay. If NASA can’t fix the engine problem at the pad by September 3rd or 4th, the true delay could be more like 4-6 weeks.
With any luck, that won’t happen, but it’s clear that a lot of stress and discomfort could have been avoided if NASA had gone into its first launch attempt knowing that its SLS rocket was truly ready.
It is safe to say SpaceX won’t be going for electric rockets anytime soon.
In a characteristically blunt reply on X, SpaceX frontman Elon Musk stated, “Unfortunately, electric rockets are impossible,” following reports that MSCI had assigned SpaceX its lowest possible ESG rating of CCC.
The assessment, issued just this past week, coinciding closely with SpaceX’s public market debut, placed the company on par with nations like Russia in sustainability scoring and cited significant risks in environmental, social, and governance areas.
MSCI flagged SpaceX’s exposure to rocket emissions and other operational impacts, alongside governance concerns such as concentrated control by Musk and limited shareholder protections. Musk’s terse comment directly addressed the environmental pillar, underscoring a core physical constraint that ESG frameworks often overlook when evaluating high-thrust industries.
Unfortunately, electric rockets are impossible
— Elon Musk (@elonmusk) June 21, 2026
Electric propulsion systems do exist and are widely used in space. Ion thrusters and Hall-effect thrusters accelerate ionized propellant, typically xenon or krypton, using electric fields, achieving very high specific impulse, often exceeding 3,000 seconds compared to roughly 300–450 seconds for chemical rockets.
This efficiency makes them ideal for satellite station-keeping, orbit raising, and deep-space missions where low thrust over long durations is sufficient. SpaceX’s own Starlink satellites employ electric propulsion for these purposes.
However, launching from Earth’s surface demands something entirely different: enormous thrust delivered rapidly to overcome gravity and atmospheric drag. A typical orbital-class booster must generate thrust far exceeding its weight, often in the millions of Newtons within seconds.
Chemical rockets achieve this through exothermic combustion of dense propellants, producing high-mass-flow, high-velocity exhaust. Electric systems, by contrast, expel very small amounts of mass at extremely high speeds. Generating equivalent thrust would require impractical onboard power levels, massive energy storage or generation systems, and prohibitive added mass, rendering the approach infeasible with current or near-term technology.
Musk has previously expressed a similar sentiment, noting a desire for electric orbital rockets while acknowledging the inescapable requirements of Newton’s third law and energy delivery. The distinction is clear: electric propulsion excels once a vehicle is already in space; it cannot replace the high-thrust chemical phase required to reach orbit from the ground.
The episode illustrates broader critiques of ESG ratings. Proponents argue they incentivize better risk management and long-term sustainability. Detractors, including Musk—who has previously called ESG a “scam”—contend that such metrics can penalize essential activities when no practical alternative exists, potentially discouraging innovation in sectors like space access.
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SpaceX has sought to mitigate launch-related impacts through reusability: Falcon 9 boosters have flown more than 30 times in some cases, dramatically lowering the manufacturing and emissions burden per kilogram delivered to orbit. Starship’s design further emphasizes rapid reusability and methane propellant, which can theoretically be produced via sustainable pathways.
Ultimately, Musk’s remark serves as a reminder that certain engineering realities persist regardless of scoring systems. As humanity expands its presence in space for communications, science, and exploration, balancing genuine environmental progress with technological necessity remains a central challenge.
ESG frameworks may evolve, but the fundamental limits of electric launch propulsion are unlikely to change soon.
Tesla just trademarked ‘MEGAPOD’ with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), its latest move in what seems to be a hint that the company is incredibly focused on its AI efforts and storage needs as compute increases.
The application carries serial number 99893717 and lists the applicant as Tesla, Inc., located at 1 Tesla Road, Austin, Texas 78725.
The filing remains in ‘live pending’ status, and it is a new application waiting for assignment to an examining attorney. It has not yet been published or registered.
Tesla just trademarked MEGAPOD
Summary:
“Modular data center hardware systems for artificial intelligence computing, comprised of computer servers, computer hardware for artificial intelligence processing, computer networking hardware, electrical power distribution units, and… pic.twitter.com/3l85DsKadl— Robin (@xdNiBoR) June 19, 2026
According to the official goods and services description in the application, Tesla describes ‘MEGAPOD’ as:
“Modular data center hardware systems for artificial intelligence computing, comprised of computer servers, computer hardware for artificial intelligence processing, computer networking hardware, electrical power distribution units, and cooling systems, sold as a unit; self-contained modular computing hardware systems for artificial intelligence workloads; integrated computer hardware platforms for artificial intelligence computing, namely, enclosures containing computer hardware, power distribution hardware, and cooling hardware, sold as a unit; downloadable software for monitoring, managing, optimizing, and regulating modular artificial intelligence computing hardware systems.”
This description specifies complete, self-contained modular units that integrate servers and specialized AI processing hardware with networking components, power distribution, and cooling systems. It also includes associated downloadable software for oversight and optimization of these systems. The language emphasizes hardware sold “as a unit” and enclosures that combine the necessary elements for AI computing workloads.
Tesla has an established history of developing and commercializing modular hardware systems. Its Megapack product line, for example, consists of utility-scale battery energy storage systems designed as containerized units for grid applications. The MEGAPOD filing follows a similar pattern of protecting a name for modular, integrated hardware platforms, this time focused on artificial intelligence computing infrastructure.
This could be an early move, especially as Tesla did not have trademark rights to the word ‘Cybercab,’ the name of its self-driving, ride-hailing-focused vehicle.
Trademark applications of this type allow companies to secure priority rights to a name for defined categories of goods and services. The USPTO examines applications for compliance with legal requirements, including distinctiveness and absence of conflicts with prior marks. If the application proceeds successfully through examination, publication, and any opposition period, it could result in a federal trademark registration providing nationwide protection. This is what Tesla’s obvious intention is with ‘MEGAPOD.’
Public reports and analysis suggest MEGAPOD could represent modular, container-style AI computing pods designed for easy deployment. These would bundle servers, AI accelerators, power systems, and cooling into self-contained units suitable for distributed AI workloads. This approach aligns with Tesla’s announced AI compute strategy.
In March 2026, Elon Musk outlined plans for “Digital Optimus” (also referred to as Macrohard), a joint Tesla-xAI project for AI agents capable of handling complex digital tasks. The plans include running these agents on Tesla’s AI4 hardware in parked vehicles as well as dedicated compute units installed at Supercharger stations, which collectively offer substantial unused electrical capacity.
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A modular hardware platform like the one described in the ‘MEGAPOD’ filing would support scalable, rapid deployment of such distributed compute resources. It could complement Tesla’s other AI infrastructure efforts, including the Dojo supercomputer used for training models and the development of AI systems for autonomous driving and robotics, by enabling edge or regional AI inference without reliance on traditional centralized data centers.
Investor's Corner
SpaceX is launching a secret spacecraft that could change how things are made in space
SpaceX’s secret disk-shaped Starfall capsule is targeting a market no reentry vehicle has cracked.
SpaceX is targeting Tuesday, June 23 for the first flight of Starfall, a reentry capsule the company has developed almost entirely in private. The Falcon 9 launch window opens at 6:43 a.m. ET from Space Launch Complex 40 at Cape Canaveral Space Force Station, with a backup window available the same time on June 24. SpaceX has made no public announcement about the vehicle, only providing launch details. Everything known about it has come through FAA and FCC regulatory filings.
What makes Starfall different starts with its shape. Rather than the traditional cone used by Dragon and every other cargo return capsule in operation, Starfall is a flat disk that measures roughly 10.2 feet (3.1 meters) wide and just 2.5 feet (0.75 meters) tall, and weighing 4,630 pounds (2,100 kg) and capable of returning up to 2,200 pounds (1,000 kilograms) of payload from orbit. The disk geometry maximizes structural efficiency and payload volume relative to mass, and the heat shield mechanically jettisons just before splashdown, allowing recovery teams to retrieve both the capsule and the shield separately from the Pacific Ocean.
The difference with Starfall from existing competitors, such as Varda Space Industries, which has largely built the orbital manufacturing market and returns heavy payloads per flight is that Starfall’s specification is roughly 30 times more per mission, and is designed to be mass-produced and launched on either Falcon 9 or Starship. That combination of volume and launch access is something no standalone startup can replicate, and it puts SpaceX in direct competition with the companies that currently pay it to reach orbit.
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The intended market is orbital manufacturing: pharmaceuticals, protein crystals, semiconductors, and advanced optical fiber that physically cannot be produced in the presence of gravity. FAA documents describe Starfall’s long-term purpose as building a “self-sustaining commercial in-space manufacturing market” and as a potential successor to the industrial capabilities of the International Space Station, which is set to retire in the late 2020s. Military rapid global cargo delivery is a parallel application under active discussion with the Pentagon.
The reason some industries seek manufacturing in space comes down to gravity. On Earth, gravity causes materials to settle, separate, and deform during production. In microgravity, those constraints disappear.
SpaceX’s already controls launch access, which means it currently functions as the landlord for every competitor in the orbital manufacturing return space. Starfall converts that landlord position into vertical ownership, and it would no longer just carry other companies’ capsules to orbit, but rather operate the capsule, own the return logistics, and capture the service revenue directly. Viewed alongside Starlink, Colossus, and the xAI merger, Starfall fits a consistent pattern: SpaceX identifying infrastructure layers that others depend on and moving to own them outright. Orbital manufacturing return is the next layer on that list.
If Tuesday’s reentry, parachute sequence, and recovery demonstration goes as planned, the second FAA-approved test flight follows. A successful pair of demos would position SpaceX to begin offering Starfall as a commercial service, likely first to pharmaceutical and materials science customers before scaling toward the military and broader manufacturing segments.
Elon Musk responds to SpaceX’s ESG rating and says its rockets won’t go electric
Tesla just trademarked MEGAPOD: here’s what it is
