SpaceX
SpaceX competitor Arianespace criticized for lackluster response to Falcon 9’s success
Best known for the commercial success of its Ariane 5 workhorse rocket, European aerospace cooperative Arianespace was heavily critiqued in the latest annual report from France’s Cour des comptes (Court of Auditors) for what is perceived as an unsustainable and overly cautious response to the swift rise of SpaceX’s affordable and reusable Falcon 9 rocket.
The Ariane 6 rocket is at least a year from launch, but already French auditors are asking how it's going to compete with SpaceX.https://t.co/7jCpGBrSXx
— Eric Berger (@SciGuySpace) February 6, 2019
First spotted and discussed by Ars Technica’s Eric Berger, the French auditor’s 2019 report featured a full volume – 1 of 30 – dedicated to Ariane 6, a prospective next-gen Arianespace rocket selected for development by the EU in 2014. Despite the fact that Ariane 6 is at least a full year away from its first launch, Cour des comptes is already questioning the rocket’s ability to successfully make headway into an increasingly competitive market, competition that has already had a direct and tangible impact on Arianespace’s Ariane 5 launch vehicle.
“More than 50% of Falcon 9’s lifetime launches occurred in the last ~12% (24 months) of the rocket’s operational career.”
While other competitors certainly do exist, the fact remains that that said increase in launch market competition can be almost singlehandedly attributed to the rapid entrance of SpaceX’s Falcon 9 rocket onto the commercial launch scene. Despite major stumbles in 2015 and 2016 as a result of Falcon 9’s CRS-7 and Amos-6 failures, SpaceX appears to have dealt with the organizational faults that allowed them to occur, culminating in an auspicious launch cadence over the course of 2017 and 2018. While Falcon 9 has technically been flying since mid-2010, a full 38 of the rocket’s 64 successful launches were completed in the last 24 months, meaning that more than 50% of Falcon 9’s launches have occurred in the last ~12% of the rocket’s operational life.
Critically, a number of European nations settled on Ariane 6 as the successor to Ariane 5 in 2014, at which point Falcon 9 had launched just 13 times (7 times commercially) and SpaceX was more than 12 months away from its first successful rocket recovery and ~30 months from its first commercial reuse. To the credit of Arianespace and the EU nations that supported the prospective Ariane 5 successor, Ariane 6 may have actually been able to reliably compete with Falcon 9’s pricing if it had begun launching within 12-24 months of the 2014 decision to build it and if SpaceX had simply sat on its laurels and ended development programs.
“This new launcher does not constitute a sustainable response in order to be competitive in a commercial market in stagnation,” the auditor’s report states. The Ariane 6 rocket design is too “cautious,” according to the report, relying on mostly traditional technologies.
— Eric Berger (@SciGuySpace) February 6, 2019
Coasting on the race track
Of course, neither of those prerequisites to Ariane 6’s success occurred. SpaceX successfully reused the same Falcon 9 booster three times in just six months by the end of 2018, while Falcon Heavy is set to attempt its first two operational launches just a few months from now. Ariane 6 is still targeting a launch debut no earlier than (NET) 2020, while a handful of extremely limited reusable rocket R&D programs continue to limp towards nebulous targets with minimal funding. Meanwhile, thanks to Arianespace’s French heritage and the major financial support of French space agency CNES, Cour des comptes is in the right to be highly critical of a ~$3.9B rocket development program likely to cost France at least $600M before the first launch.
- SpaceX has now been routinely reusing Falcon 9 rockets on commercial missions for nearly two years. (SpaceX)
- As of January 2019, flight-proven Falcon 9 boosters have performed 19 commercial launches since March 2017. (SpaceX)
- Nearly 60% of SpaceX’s 2018 launches were flown on flight-proven Falcon 9 boosters. (SpaceX)
- Falcon 9 B1046 became the first SpaceX booster to launch three separate times in early-December 2018. (Pauline Acalin)
Once Ariane 6 is ready to launch, it’s aspirational pricing will all but guarantee an inability to compete on an even global playing field. Divided into two versions, A62 and A64, Ariane 6 will cost at least 75 million Euros (~$85M) for performance equivalent to SpaceX’s Falcon 9 in its reusable configuration (base price: $62M), while the heavier A64 variant – capable of placing two heavy satellites (11,500 kg) into geostationary transfer orbit – will cost at least 90 million Euros (~$102M) per launch. Admittedly, $102M to launch a duo of large geostationary satellites would be easily competitive with Falcon 9 with per-customer costs around $50M, but this only holds true if the imminent commercial introduction of Falcon Heavy (list price: $90M) is ignored.
However, the market for large geostationary satellites has plummeted into the ground in the last two years, over the course of which just 12 have been ordered. Arianespace thus faces a conundrum where its cheaper Ariane 62 rocket is already too expensive to compete commercially and the potentially competitive Ariane 64 variant is only competitive for a commercial launch market that has withered to barely a third of its nominal demand in just two years time. Acknowledged by France’s auditors (and noted by Mr. Berger), the most probable outcome for Ariane 6 is one in which the very existence of the rocket will be predicated upon continual annual subsidies from the European Space Agency (ESA) in order to make up for the rocket’s inability to sustain commercial orders beyond a handful of discounted shoo-in contracts.
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News
SpaceX tells the FCC that Starship Flight 14 is going to orbit
SpaceX filed with the FCC for Starship Flight 14, its first true orbital launch attempt.
SpaceX has asked the Federal Communications Commission for permission to fly Starlink terminals during Starship’s fourteenth flight test, and the filing lays out a genuine trip to orbit, something the program has never attempted.
Every Starship flight so far, including Flight 13’s successful splashdown in the Indian Ocean on July 24, has flown a suborbital arc that ends with the ship reentering the atmosphere within the same hour it launches. The FCC paperwork describes a mission profile built around an actual orbital insertion instead.
The payload is the other half of the story. Flight 13 carried 20 production Starlink V3 satellites, but because that mission never reached orbit, the satellites reentered along with the ship rather than joining the constellation, something Teslarati covered in detail after SpaceX released footage shot from one of those satellites as it drifted away from Starship in space. Flight 14 is designed to close that gap. If the orbital insertion holds, the roughly 20 V3 satellites onboard would separate into an operational orbit and could eventually go into service, each one rated for about 1 terabit per second of downlink capacity by SpaceX’s own account.
SpaceX announces new Starbase for ‘thousands of Starship launches annually’
Elon Musk first flagged the orbital attempt during SpaceX’s August 4 earnings call, the company’s first as a public entity following its June IPO under the ticker SPCX. He also floated catching the ship with the Starbase tower on the same flight, an idea he walked back on August 20, saying the catch attempt would more likely come “in a few months,” as Teslarati reported at the time. Flight 14 will instead target a splashdown for the ship in the Indian Ocean, the same recovery method used since Flight 12.
Hardware has been catching up to the ambition. Booster 21 completed a full 33-engine static fire on August 28, and Ship 41 finished its own six-engine test the week before. An airspace briefing circulated to pilots on August 20 listed September 15 as the target date, later than the end of August window Musk mentioned on the earnings call, though SpaceX has not confirmed a launch date publicly and Starship schedules routinely slip while hardware and FAA paperwork line up.
The FCC filing itself does not guarantee a launch date. It covers communications authority, and not flight readiness, considering SpaceX still needs Ship 41 fully stacked and cleared by the FAA before Flight 14 can fly. But the filing is a real marker of intent and it puts a specific regulatory process behind what had so far only been Musk’s word on the earnings call.
Elon Musk
SpaceX would not exist if this crucial early launch failed, Musk says
Elon Musk recently restated a fact that still defines SpaceX’s origin story: if Falcon 1’s fourth launch had failed, the company would not exist. The comment answered a reminder that after three consecutive losses, SpaceX had money for only one more attempt.
On X, Peter Diamandis said that the present-day acknowledgement of SpaceX’s success does not discount the rough start the company had. “Almost nobody remembers that Elon’s first rocket failed three times, and there was money for exactly only one more attempt.”
Musk said, “If the 4th launch had failed, SpaceX would not exist.”
If the 4th launch had failed, SpaceX would not exist
— Elon Musk (@elonmusk) August 30, 2026
In late 2008, the firm was nearly out of cash. Another failure would have ended payroll, closed the Hawthorne factory, and left the Falcon 9 and Dragon programs as unfinished drawings.
The first flight lifted off from Omelek Island on 24 March 2006. Thirty-three seconds later, a corroded aluminum fitting on a fuel line leaked. Kerosene ignited around the Merlin engine, control was lost, and the vehicle came apart. The small DARPA payload, FalconSAT-2, survived the short flight only to land on a storage shed near the pad. Investigators later traced the fitting to a materials mix-up that should never have reached the rocket.
Flight 2, on 21 March 2007, looked far better at first. The first stage burned cleanly and handed off to the Kestrel-powered upper stage. The vehicle crossed 100 kilometers and reached a peak of about 289 kilometers. Then propellant slosh in the second-stage tank started a circular coning motion that grew until the engine shut down. Telemetry faded as the stage tumbled, and SpaceX had reached space but not orbit. Over the next year, the team redesigned everything from the ground up, including tanks, baffles, and the new regeneratively cooled Merlin 1C.
That engine flew on Flight 3 on 2 August 2008. The first stage performed almost perfectly and reached 217 kilometers. After main-engine cutoff, leftover fuel in the cooling channels produced a faint residual thrust, roughly 10 pounds per square inch of chamber pressure. On a Texas test stand, the effect was invisible beneath ambient air pressure. In vacuum it was enough to push the spent first stage back into the second stage after separation. The stages collided, the upper stage spun, and the mission was lost. Musk later said a slightly longer delay before staging would have saved the flight.
Six weeks later, the team assembled Flight 4 from remaining parts and flew it on 28 September 2008 at 23:15 UTC. The payload was Ratsat, a 165-kilogram aluminum mass simulator built in-house. Staging was delayed so residual thrust could decay. The Kestrel ignited, the fairing split away, and nine and a half minutes after liftoff the vehicle was in orbit. After a coast, the second stage restarted, settling into a 621-by-643-kilometer path at 9.35 degrees inclination. Falcon 1 became the first privately developed liquid-fueled rocket to reach Earth orbit. Musk called the insertion “middle of the bull’s-eye.”
SpaceX restores a Falcon 1 rocket for 10th anniversary of first launch success
That success unlocked NASA’s Commercial Resupply Services award later that year. Without it, there would have been no Falcon 9, no reusable first stages, and no Dragon cargo or crew flights to the International Space Station. Launch prices would have remained far higher. Starlink’s constellation would not exist; broadband from low Earth orbit would still be a paper concept.
Ride-share markets, high launch cadence, and the current pace of lunar and Mars hardware would be years behind. Communications, Earth observation, and the cost of putting anything into space would look more like the 2000s than the 2020s.
One extra second of residual thrust in August 2008 would have written a different decade.
Elon Musk
OpenAI cites distrust of SpaceX in decision to drop Cursor partnership
OpenAI will cut SpaceX-owned Cursor’s model access in November, citing Musk’s history of broken contracts.
OpenAI, the company behind ChatGPT, announced late Friday that it is ending its partnership with Cursor, cutting off the coding tool’s access to its models on November 12. The move comes two weeks after SpaceX completed its $60 billion acquisition of Cursor’s parent company, Anysphere, folding the popular AI coding assistant into Elon Musk’s growing SpaceXAI division.
In a post on its website, OpenAI said the decision came down to trust, not technology. “We cannot be confident that SpaceX will use our technology within our terms of service, based on our experience with Elon Musk’s companies violating contracts,” the company wrote. OpenAI pointed to two specific incidents: X, now part of SpaceX, allegedly breaking the terms of an existing OpenAI contract after Musk bought Twitter.
That lawsuit is the backdrop for all of this. Musk cofounded OpenAI in 2015, left the board in 2018, and sued Sam Altman and Greg Brockman in 2024, arguing they abandoned the company’s nonprofit mission for profit. A federal jury sided with OpenAI in May, finding Musk waited too long to sue rather than ruling on the merits of his claims. Musk said at the time he would appeal to the Ninth Circuit, calling the outcome a “calendar technicality” rather than a real judgment.
SpaceX’s interest in Cursor predates that verdict by weeks. The company first struck a deal with Cursor in April, securing an option to acquire it for $60 billion or pay $10 billion for joint development work instead. As Teslarati reported at the time, the logic was straightforward: Cursor was paying retail prices to Anthropic and OpenAI, two of its most direct competitors, every time a developer used its product, while SpaceX had idle capacity on its Colossus supercomputer, roughly the equivalent of a million Nvidia H100 GPUs, that Cursor could use to train its own models instead. SpaceX exercised the option in June, days after its own IPO, and the deal closed in mid-August.
Once it closed, Musk moved fast. On an all-hands call with more than 1,000 Cursor employees, he reportedly told staff that SpaceXAI’s Grok was playing catchup in the AI race, unlike Tesla and SpaceX in their own markets, and singled out Anthropic as the company to catch. Cursor CEO Michael Truell now reports directly to Musk inside SpaceXAI.
Losing OpenAI’s models leaves Cursor leaning harder on Anthropic’s Claude, which has its own compute agreement with SpaceX, and on Cursor’s in-house Composer model, the one SpaceX’s compute was supposed to accelerate in the first place. OpenAI framed the November deadline as maximum notice under its contract, and said it wants to “go above and beyond” to help developers through the transition. Whether Anthropic makes the same call is now the open question in AI coding.



