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SpaceX teases extreme Falcon 9 launch cadence goals in Starship planning doc
Published as part of an August 2019 environmental assessment (EA) draft for Starship’s prospective Pad 39A launch facilities, SpaceX revealed plans for a truly mindboggling number of annual Falcon 9 and Falcon Heavy launches by 2024.
As environmental planning documents, the figures should be taken with a large grain of salt and be treated as near-absolute ceilings rather than practical goals. Nevertheless, SpaceX revealed plans for its two Florida launch sites (LC-40 and LC-39A) to ultimately support as many as 70 annual launches of Falcon 9 and Heavy by 2024, less than five years from now.
Simply put, even the most dogmatic fan would have to balk at least a little bit at the numbers SpaceX suggested in its Starship EA draft. More specifically, SpaceX apparently has plans to support as many as 20 annual Falcon 9/Heavy launches from Pad 39A and an incredible 50 annual Falcon 9 launches from LC-40 as early as 2024.
“SpaceX plans to increase the Falcon launch frequency to 20 launches per year from LC-39A and up to 50 launches per year from LC-40 by the year 2024. However, as Starship/Super Heavy launches gradually increase to 24 launches per year, the number of launches of the Falcon would decrease.“
–SpaceX, Starship Environmental Assessment Draft, August 2019
Two obvious options
Given just how significant of an increase a 70-launch annual cadence would be for SpaceX relative to their current record of 21 launches, it’s entirely possible that these numbers are really just a pipe dream included in a pending environmental assessment to hedge bets just in case a similar launch frequency is achieved over the next five years.
On the other hand, it’s possible that SpaceX – just now coming into the ability to reliably achieve a much higher cadence – has coincidentally become payload-constrained at almost the same time, meaning that the company’s customers’ payloads just aren’t ready for launch. This would explain, for example, why SpaceX has only launched 10 times this year when the company had already completed 15 launches by August 2018.
Additionally, it can be almost unequivocally assumed that all but 15-20 of those supposed 70 annual launches would come from SpaceX’s own internal demand for Starlink launch capacity. Assuming no improvements between now and 2024, 50 Falcon 9 launches could place as many as 3000 Starlink satellites in orbit in a single year, equivalent to more than 25% of the entire proposed ~11,800-satellite constellation.
Barring regulatory changes to US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and International Telecommunication Union (ITU) requirements, SpaceX must launch at least half of all Starlink satellites (~5900) by November 2024 and finish launching the remaining ~5900 by November 2027. If SpaceX fails to reach those deployment milestones, the company runs the risk of losing Starlink’s domestic and international licenses to operate.
This would help to explain why SpaceX says that it’s planning to reach a maximum cadence of 70 annual launches “by 2024”, given that 2024 will be a pivotal year in the eyes of regulations currently in effect for Starlink.
Starship confusion
As noted in the quote above, SpaceX plans to eventually phase out Falcon 9 and Heavy launches as the company’s next-generation Starship and Super Heavy launch vehicle gradually comes online, proves itself reliable, and begins operational launch activities. According to SpaceX, given just how much mass Starship can nominally launch relative to both Falcon 9 and Heavy, far fewer launches will be needed to accomplish the tasks that would otherwise require several times more launches of SpaceX’s smaller vehicles.
SpaceX’s initial Environmental Assessment for Starship launches from Pad 39A caps the rocket’s maximum cadence at 24 annual launches. Oddly, this directly contradicts the goals set for Starship (formerly BFR) by CEO Elon Musk and SpaceX more generally. By building a launch vehicle that is fully and rapidly reusable, the goal has long been to deliver cheap, aircraft-like access to orbit at a completely unprecedented scale.
This would technically mean that SpaceX could actually dramatically increase its launch cadence without increasing costs, allowing the company to perform currently nonsensical missions where Starship might launch payloads weighing just 5-10% of its total payload capacity. Airline operations routinely do things of a similar nature, sometimes flying just a fraction of their maximum passenger load to destinations for a variety of reasons.
Additionally, SpaceX has consistently indicated that Starship will rely heavily on orbital refueling to accomplish its ultimate deep space ambitions. Previous presentations from Elon Musk have shown that launches to the Mars or Moon with significant payload would require no fewer than five separate tanker launches and orbital refuelings, all of which would classify as one of the 24 annual launches SpaceX has described in its August 2019 EA draft. On their own, launching two Starships to Mars with 100 tons of payload each would require no fewer than 10-12 launches.
Ultimately, it’s unwise to draw any substantial conclusions from an Environmental Assessment like the one the above information has been taken from. This 39A-specific EA also ignores the possibility of a similar launch facility being developed in Boca Chica, Texas, which SpaceX explicitly acknowledges.
This particular draft is also the first Starship-related EA ever filed by SpaceX, and the company may thus be treating it more as a bare minimum with the intention of eventually pursuing far more ambitious launch rates once Starship has been established.
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Elon Musk
SpaceX Starship Flight 13 aborted at Zero and Musk just told us what broke
Four Raptor engines failed to ignite at T-zero, forcing SpaceX to scrub Starship Flight 13 Thursday.
SpaceX scrubbed the Starship Flight 13 launch attempt Thursday evening at the last possible moment, after four of the Super Heavy booster’s 33 Raptor 3 engines failed to ignite during the startup sequence. The 90-minute window had opened at 6:45 p.m. EDT from Starbase in Boca Chica, Texas, and the countdown had proceeded without issue all day, with more than 11.5 million pounds of liquid methane and liquid oxygen being fully loaded into the rocket before the automated abort triggered. SpaceX’s launch directors posted on X, “Standing down from today’s flight test attempt,” and shut down the livestream shortly after.
Musk confirmed the root cause within hours. “Some of the engines didn’t start, triggering an automatic launch abort,” he wrote on X. “To be confident of a good flight, 2 Raptors will be removed and replaced. Most probable launch timing is early next week.” SpaceX engineers began draining propellant tanks immediately and Booster 20 was rolled back to its hangar for inspection.
The timing adds a layer of significance that did not exist during any of the previous 12 Starship flights. This is the first time SpaceX has attempted to launch Starship since the company made its stock market debut in June, listing under ticker SPCX at $135 per share. Public investors are now watching every Starship outcome in real time, and a last-second abort carries more visibility than it would have six months ago.
Flight 13 was designed to be one of the most consequential tests in the program’s history. It was set to carry 20 Starlink V3 satellites, the first operational payload Starship has ever attempted to deploy. Six of those satellites carried external cameras to photograph Starship’s heat shield from the outside during flight, which would act as a self-inspection approach SpaceX has never attempted before. The mission also needed to complete a Raptor engine relight in space, a step SpaceX skipped on Flight 12 in May after losing an engine during ascent. That Flight 12 booster also flipped 90 degrees off course during its boostback burn when five engines failed to reignite.
SpaceX has not announced an official next launch date. Musk’s “early next week” window points to July 21 or 22 at the earliest, pending the engine swap and a return to the pad.
Elon Musk flew under the radar with his recent purchase of a $1 billion energy company, according to Federal Trade Commission (FTC) documents.
Transaction number 202612350 listed Tesla and SpaceX frontman Elon Musk as the acquiring party and CF APR Super Holdings LLC as the seller, with New APR Energy, LLC as the acquired entity. The deal, which closed without public announcement, came to light on May 14.
BREAKING: Elon Musk acquires Jacksonville power company APR Energy in a deal valued at more than $1,000,000,000.00.
— Polymarket Money (@PolymarketMoney) July 15, 2026
Analysts inferred the deal’s scale from minority stakeholder disclosures, including one report of a 5 percent interest sold for approximately $50.4 million. Fortress Investment Group had purchased APR’s assets in late 2024, rebranded the operation as New APR Energy, and subsequently transferred ownership to Musk.
APR Energy specializes in rapidly deployable power infrastructure. The company maintains one of the world’s largest fleets of mobile gas and diesel turbines, with more than 1.1 gigawatts of generation capacity. Its modular units, which are often trailer-mounted, enable turnkey installations ranging from 20 MW to over 500 MW.
APR provides full engineering, procurement, construction, operation, and maintenance services for behind-the-meter power plants, serving everything from data centers, utilities, and industrial clients.
The firm has expanded aggressively to meet surging demand, recently adding turbines and deploying over 100 MW for a major AI hyperscaler. Its solutions bridge critical gaps where grid interconnections face delays of two to five years, according to Yahoo.
The acquisition means something more for Musk. As he continues to expand projects in artificial intelligence, especially xAI, his AI venture, there is a greater need to supply energy-intensive supercomputing clusters, including the Colossus project, with what they need: reliable and high-capacity power.
Ownership of APR provides immediate access to flexible generation assets that can be deployed adjacent to data centers, reducing dependence on a strained infrastructure. It also complements Tesla’s energy storage business, so Musk will be able to pull from his own entities to address the rapid scaling demands of AI training and compute.
Tesla had a petition protesting a recall to fix a potential issue with 2017-2023 Model Y and Model 3 vehicles’ headlights was denied, as the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) disagreed with the company’s opinion of things.
The recall covers approximately 19,917 Model Y and Model 3 vehicles built from 2017 to 2023. Tesla initially submitted a noncompliance report for the headlights on these vehicles on March 15, 2024. Tesla then petitioned for an exemption from the fix, which violated FMVSS No. 108 (40 CFR 571.108), arguing that the “noncompliance is inconsequential as it relates to motor vehicle safety.
🚨 Tesla was denied a petition by the NHTSA to avoid a recall of 19,900 2017-2023 Model 3 and Model Y vehicles.
The NHTSA found that the vehicles’ headlights may exceed maximum lighting levels. Tesla argued it was inconsequential and did not require a recall. pic.twitter.com/m8Jmm1teLL
— TESLARATI (@Teslarati) July 16, 2026
The NHTSA disagreed, stating that Tesla’s conclusion that the headlights do not increase any risk was not an opinion it shared. The agency said it disagreed with Tesla’s assumption that glare is not increased to surrounding traffic. This issue could be highlighted even more in certain weather conditions.
Tesla will be required to remedy the issue, the NHTSA ruled:
“In consideration of the foregoing, NHTSA has decided that Tesla has not met its burden of persuasion that the subject FMVSS No. 108 noncompliance is inconsequential to motor vehicle safety. Accordingly, Tesla’s petition is hereby denied, and Tesla is consequently obligated to provide notification of and free remedy for that noncompliance under 49 U.S.C. 30118 and 30120.”
The issue here appears to be the angle of the headlights and the brightness they emit during operation. The NHTSA report states that:
“Tesla’s headlamp supplier, Marelli Automotive Lighting, tested 25 right-hand and 25 left-hand lamps, and for this sample, found the maximum photometric intensity measured in the 10°U to 90°U and 90°L to 90°R zone was between 136.2 cd and 230.1 cd for the right-hand lamps and between 117.5 cd and 160.3 cd for the left-hand lamps. According to Tesla, these tests revealed that the photometric intensity of the right-hand and left-hand headlamp lower beam on the subject vehicles may measure as much as 230.1 cd in the 10°U to 90°U and 90°L to 90°R zone, exceeding the maximum photometric intensity by 105.1 cd. Additionally, Tesla states that a left-hand lamp tested by a Transport Canada recognized laboratory measured a maximum of 171.27 cd in the 10°U to 90°U and 90°L to 90°R zone. Despite these measurements exceeding the allowed photometric maximum of 125 cd, Tesla believes that the subject noncompliance is inconsequential to motor vehicle safety.”
Tesla also argued at some points that the headlights had not been deemed responsible for any complaints, accidents, or injuries related to the noncompliance.
SpaceX Starship Flight 13 aborted at Zero and Musk just told us what broke
Elon Musk secretly acquires $1B energy company to power the AI future
