News
SpaceX’s Falcon 9 and Heavy manifest grows lopsided as launches align for Q4
For a variety of reasons both clear or otherwise, a significant number of SpaceX’s Falcon 9 and Falcon Heavy launches initially scheduled near the beginning or middle of the second half of 2018 are all slipping right into October, November, and December.
While communications satellite Telstar 18V’s two-week slip to NET September 8 and SAOCOM-1A’s own several-week tumble to October 7th appear to have their own respective and discernible reasons, namely some sort of range or payload issue (Telstar) and difficulties with the Falcon 9 rocket (SAOCOM), it’s much harder to know why multiple other payloads have slipped into late 2018.
Although the multiple slips and slides of several payloads and much of SpaceX’s H2 2018 launch manifest may be hard to parse alongside the year’s milestone first half, at least two reliable launch manifest sources (SpaceflightNow and one other) more or less independently corroborate the apparent realignment. Explanations, however, are far harder to find – to be expected in the business of space launch. Still, multiple launch delays can be traced to either payload or rocket issues.
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- SpaceX technicians wrench on Merlin 1D and Merlin Vacuum engines. Raptor was apparently dramatically larger in person. (SpaceX)
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- SpaceX technicians wrench on Merlin 1D and Merlin Vacuum engines. (SpaceX)
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- SpaceX technicians wrench on Merlin 1D and Merlin Vacuum engines. (SpaceX)
Payload-side delays aplenty but rocket-slips, too
Iridium CEO Matt Desch, for example, noted that his company’s Iridium NEXT-8 launch of the constellation’s final 10 satellites is slipping from its original launch date target because of delays preparing the satellites for launch, rather than any issue with SpaceX rocket availability. While not official, the Falcon 9 launch of communications satellite Es’hail-2 has also rapidly jumped from the end of August or early September into Q4 2018 (likely NET October or November), hinting heavily at payload processing delays or technical issues with the complex satellite, as multi-month rocket-side delays would likely preclude interim September and October launches.
Still trying to nail the date down (satellite completion is gating, not rocket availability), but definitely won't be in September.
— Matt Desch (@IridiumBoss) August 13, 2018
Meanwhile, at least two of those prospective Q4 2018 SpaceX launches happen to be rideshare-dedicated, meaning that the payload consists of dozens of smaller satellites manifested and organized by a middleman company or agency. These two launches are Spaceflight’s SSO-A launch (~70 satellites) – currently NET November 2018 – and the US Air Force-led STP-2 mission, designed primarily to help SpaceX certify Falcon Heavy for Air Force launches while also placing roughly two dozen smaller satellites into orbit. STP-2 was delayed for multiple years as SpaceX gradually paced towards Falcon Heavy’s first real launch debut (February 2018), but launch delays (currently NET November 30 2018, probably 2019) will likely be caused by some combination of rocket, payload, and pad delays as SpaceX readies for what is essentially the second debut of much different Falcon Heavy.
While likely less a payload-side delay than a mountain-of-tedious-paperwork-and-bureaucracy delay, SpaceX’s NET November 2018 inaugural (uncrewed) demonstration launch of Crew Dragon, NASA scheduling documents published alongside an August 27 Advisory Council presentation suggest that the spacecraft will be ready for launch as early as September, whereas independent sources and visual observations have confirmed that the new Falcon 9 Block 5 booster (B1051) is either near the end or fully done with its McGregor, Texas acceptance testing. One certainly cannot blame SpaceX or NASA for caution at this stage, but the consequently uncertain launch debut of Crew Dragon almost certainly precludes any Falcon Heavy launches from Pad 39A in the interim, including STP-2’s theoretical NET November 30 launch date, which is literally inside Crew Dragon’s “November 2018” launch target.
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- Falcon Heavy explodes off of Pad 39A, February 2018. (SpaceX)
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- Falcon Heavy’s side boosters seconds away from near-simultaneous landings at Landing Zones 1 and 2. (SpaceX)
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- SpaceX technicians wrench on Merlin 1D and Merlin Vacuum engines. Raptor was apparently dramatically larger in person. (SpaceX)
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- It’s currently unclear whether B1046 or B1048 will become the first SpaceX rocket to fly three times. (Tom Cross)
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- Falcon 9 B1048 stands proud after its West Coast launch debut, August 2nd. (Pauline Acalin)
On the other hand, several recent delays of SpaceX’s imminent (-ish) launch of Argentinian Earth observation satellite SAOCOM-1A have been suggested by several employees of the country’s CONAE space agency to be rocket-related, as they understand that the satellite itself is effectively ready to head to orbit at any time. It has yet to be officially confirmed, but it’s understood that Falcon 9 B1048 – previously flown on the launch of Iridium-7 – is being refurbished for SAOCOM-1A, potentially contributing to launch delays as SpaceX cautiously works through the inaugural reuses of some of its very first serial Falcon 9 Block 5 boosters.
Time will soon tell, as launching the roughly 8 to 10 launches tentatively remaining on SpaceX’s 2018 manifest will require extensive reuse of Block 5 boosters if multiple slips into 2019 are to be prevented. Regardless, best of luck to SpaceX’s technicians and engineers as they beat back rocket demons, grapple with uncooperative satellite payloads, and navigate the winding paths of Department of Defense and NASA rocket launch certifications.
For prompt updates, on-the-ground perspectives, and unique glimpses of SpaceX’s rocket recovery fleet check out our brand new LaunchPad and LandingZone newsletters!
Elon Musk flew under the radar with his recent purchase of a $1 billion energy company, according to Federal Trade Commission (FTC) documents.
Transaction number 202612350 listed Tesla and SpaceX frontman Elon Musk as the acquiring party and CF APR Super Holdings LLC as the seller, with New APR Energy, LLC as the acquired entity. The deal, which closed without public announcement, came to light on May 14.
BREAKING: Elon Musk acquires Jacksonville power company APR Energy in a deal valued at more than $1,000,000,000.00.
— Polymarket Money (@PolymarketMoney) July 15, 2026
Analysts inferred the deal’s scale from minority stakeholder disclosures, including one report of a 5 percent interest sold for approximately $50.4 million. Fortress Investment Group had purchased APR’s assets in late 2024, rebranded the operation as New APR Energy, and subsequently transferred ownership to Musk.
APR Energy specializes in rapidly deployable power infrastructure. The company maintains one of the world’s largest fleets of mobile gas and diesel turbines, with more than 1.1 gigawatts of generation capacity. Its modular units, which are often trailer-mounted, enable turnkey installations ranging from 20 MW to over 500 MW.
APR provides full engineering, procurement, construction, operation, and maintenance services for behind-the-meter power plants, serving everything from data centers, utilities, and industrial clients.
The firm has expanded aggressively to meet surging demand, recently adding turbines and deploying over 100 MW for a major AI hyperscaler. Its solutions bridge critical gaps where grid interconnections face delays of two to five years, according to Yahoo.
The acquisition means something more for Musk. As he continues to expand projects in artificial intelligence, especially xAI, his AI venture, there is a greater need to supply energy-intensive supercomputing clusters, including the Colossus project, with what they need: reliable and high-capacity power.
Ownership of APR provides immediate access to flexible generation assets that can be deployed adjacent to data centers, reducing dependence on a strained infrastructure. It also complements Tesla’s energy storage business, so Musk will be able to pull from his own entities to address the rapid scaling demands of AI training and compute.
Tesla had a petition protesting a recall to fix a potential issue with 2017-2023 Model Y and Model 3 vehicles’ headlights was denied, as the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) disagreed with the company’s opinion of things.
The recall covers approximately 19,917 Model Y and Model 3 vehicles built from 2017 to 2023. Tesla initially submitted a noncompliance report for the headlights on these vehicles on March 15, 2024. Tesla then petitioned for an exemption from the fix, which violated FMVSS No. 108 (40 CFR 571.108), arguing that the “noncompliance is inconsequential as it relates to motor vehicle safety.
🚨 Tesla was denied a petition by the NHTSA to avoid a recall of 19,900 2017-2023 Model 3 and Model Y vehicles.
The NHTSA found that the vehicles’ headlights may exceed maximum lighting levels. Tesla argued it was inconsequential and did not require a recall. pic.twitter.com/m8Jmm1teLL
— TESLARATI (@Teslarati) July 16, 2026
The NHTSA disagreed, stating that Tesla’s conclusion that the headlights do not increase any risk was not an opinion it shared. The agency said it disagreed with Tesla’s assumption that glare is not increased to surrounding traffic. This issue could be highlighted even more in certain weather conditions.
Tesla will be required to remedy the issue, the NHTSA ruled:
“In consideration of the foregoing, NHTSA has decided that Tesla has not met its burden of persuasion that the subject FMVSS No. 108 noncompliance is inconsequential to motor vehicle safety. Accordingly, Tesla’s petition is hereby denied, and Tesla is consequently obligated to provide notification of and free remedy for that noncompliance under 49 U.S.C. 30118 and 30120.”
The issue here appears to be the angle of the headlights and the brightness they emit during operation. The NHTSA report states that:
“Tesla’s headlamp supplier, Marelli Automotive Lighting, tested 25 right-hand and 25 left-hand lamps, and for this sample, found the maximum photometric intensity measured in the 10°U to 90°U and 90°L to 90°R zone was between 136.2 cd and 230.1 cd for the right-hand lamps and between 117.5 cd and 160.3 cd for the left-hand lamps. According to Tesla, these tests revealed that the photometric intensity of the right-hand and left-hand headlamp lower beam on the subject vehicles may measure as much as 230.1 cd in the 10°U to 90°U and 90°L to 90°R zone, exceeding the maximum photometric intensity by 105.1 cd. Additionally, Tesla states that a left-hand lamp tested by a Transport Canada recognized laboratory measured a maximum of 171.27 cd in the 10°U to 90°U and 90°L to 90°R zone. Despite these measurements exceeding the allowed photometric maximum of 125 cd, Tesla believes that the subject noncompliance is inconsequential to motor vehicle safety.”
Tesla also argued at some points that the headlights had not been deemed responsible for any complaints, accidents, or injuries related to the noncompliance.
Lifestyle
NTSB findings on fatal Tesla crash tell a very different story
The NTSB confirmed the driver, not Tesla’s FSD, caused the fatal Texas house crash.
The National Transportation Safety Board released preliminary findings Wednesday confirming that a Tesla driver, not the vehicle’s software, caused a fatal crash in Katy, Texas in June. The driver, 44-year-old Michael Butler, had engaged Full Self-Driving Supervised mode on Rose Hollow Lane, a residential street with a 30 mph speed limit, before manually overriding the system by pressing the accelerator pedal all the way to 100%. Data recovered from the 2025 Tesla Model 3 showed the vehicle was traveling over 70 miles per hour when it struck a home and killed 76-year-old Martha Avila, who was inside. Weather was clear, the road was dry, and it was daylight.
Texas man charged in fatal Tesla crash where he blamed Autopilot
Butler told authorities he had passed out at the wheel. But security camera footage obtained by the NTSB told a different story, and showed the car accelerating through an intersection before leaving the road entirely. Police also found that Butler’s phone had Google searches including the terms “Tesla FSD not aggressive enough 2026” and “Tesla FSD too timid,” raising serious questions about how he was using the system before the crash. Butler has since been charged with manslaughter. The victim’s family has filed a lawsuit against both Butler and Tesla, alleging negligence.
The NTSB findings aligned directly with what Tesla VP of AI Software Ashok Elluswamy had already stated publicly on X in the weeks after the crash, writing that “the driver manually overrode self-driving by pressing the accelerator all the way to 100%.” The data confirmed his account.
Yup. In this case, the driver manually overrode self-driving by pressing the accelerator all the way to 100% of the accel pedal in this residential area. They reached a speed of 73 mph during the crash, and had the accelerator pressed even after the crash.
— Ashok Elluswamy (@aelluswamy) June 22, 2026
Elon Musk secretly acquires $1B energy company to power the AI future
Tesla has to fix a big problem with its old headlights, NHTSA says
