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SpaceX to in-house mass production of Starlink internet satellite hardware
SpaceX is rapidly expanding it’s Starlink internet constellation development to prepare for full-scale production and aims to bring nearly every major piece of satellite and network hardware and software in-house, according to details revealed in dozens of job postings.
While not explicit, this appears to indicate a significant convergence of multiple possible paths to an operational constellation. Put simply, SpaceX now intends to build every single major component of its 4400+ satellite network in-house. It’s almost easier to list the things SpaceX does not mean to build themselves, but here’s a stab at the components to be built in-house: satellite structures, laser (optical) data interlinks, on-orbit phased array antennae, digital signal processor (DSPs) software and hardware to aim those antennae, solar arrays, battery systems, power electronics, custom integrated circuitry and systems on a chip (SoCs), user terminals and larger gateways, network operations, production automation, autonomous satellite constellation management, and much, much more.
Remote camera has been retrieved, wet with morning dew…and WITH images! Awesome launch by SpaceX. @teslarati #SpaceX #Paz #Starlink pic.twitter.com/tDTXxZErN4
— Pauline Acalin (@w00ki33) February 22, 2018
While entire articles could be spent describing the complexities of every single one of the above subsystems, the point is that SpaceX appears to have gone all-in on building its own satellite constellation, departing from stances in the past that appeared to leave room for subcontracting and outsourcing the production of major parts of the network, particularly with respect to ground terminals and gateways. Postings for ground station and user terminal engineers describe a goal of medium to high volume in-house production of the critical network and customer-facing hardware, and an entry into the production of high volume consumer technology would be a truly eclectic and unprecedented step for a company theoretically focused on launch vehicle development and production and sustainable Mars colonization.
If anything, they speak to the truly vertical nature of SpaceX. Many technology development production companies would simply accede and accept the best subcontractor/outsourcing bid when entering into new territory truly outside of their internal expertise. SpaceX engineers and managers, however, seem to have concluded that the vast majority of hardware and corporate expertise they could co-opt is just not satisfactory for the purpose of building a paradigm-shifting satellite constellation; or as CEO Elon Musk noted in 2015, to “revolutionize the satellite side of things, just as we’ve done with the rocket side of things.”
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- SpaceX’s first Starlink prototypes launched in late February aboard a flight-proven Falcon 9 booster. (Pauline Acalin)
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- SpaceX’s first two Starlink prototype satellites are pictured here before their inaugural Feb. 2018 launch, showing off a utilitarian design. (SpaceX)
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- Falcon 9 roars into the dark California sky with PAZ and Starlink. (Pauline Acalin)
This new (and, in retrospect, unsurprising) trailblazing attitude also helps to explain the marginal delay to Musk’s original 2015 schedule, which estimated initial constellation operations (i.e. a few hundred satellites launched) would begin around 2020. Approximately a year later, SpaceX had built rough prototypes in the form of the original Microsat 1A and 1B twins. This initial foray into independent, long-term communications smallsats was shuttered fairly quickly, and neither of the demo satellites were launched. Instead, SpaceX dove back into prototype design and development, culminating roughly two years later with the March 2018 launch of two dramatically improved prototypes, known as Tintin A and B (or Microsats 2A and 2B in FCC licenses).
It seems probable that the source of this delay lay in an internal decision to dramatically reconfigure the internet constellation for far more in-house development, whereas the original Microsats were likely pieced together from a range of components derived from SpaceX’s Cargo Dragon program or more simply from commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) offerings. Instead, SpaceX’s Starlink development offices in Redmond, Washington and throughout California are staffed with as many as 400 to 500 employees dedicated in large part to the nascent program, similar (if not larger) in scale to OneWeb, the only noteworthy satellite internet competitor at present.
If SpaceX’s decision to push back Starlink’s operational debut by a few years in order to bring in-house almost every single critical subcomponent of Starlink pays off, the company could begin launching finalized satellites en masse as early as late 2019/early 2020, with a goal of offering limited service by 2021 per comments made by CEO Elon Musk. Starlink is likely being brought almost entirely in-house because Musk or other high-level executives and engineers see major room for improvement, improvements that could lower the cost of and improve the performance of lightweight communications satellites by an order of magnitude.
A flight-proven Falcon 9 prepares for launch in May 2018. SpaceX will likely launch at least one more pair of Starlink demo satellites from the West coast later this year (Pauline Acalin)
It will likely take a bit longer than initially expected, but SpaceX may yet still pave their path to Mars colonization with profits derived from a wildly successful and disruptive entrance into the broadband market.
Elon Musk
SpaceX Starship Flight 13 aborted at Zero and Musk just told us what broke
Four Raptor engines failed to ignite at T-zero, forcing SpaceX to scrub Starship Flight 13 Thursday.
SpaceX scrubbed the Starship Flight 13 launch attempt Thursday evening at the last possible moment, after four of the Super Heavy booster’s 33 Raptor 3 engines failed to ignite during the startup sequence. The 90-minute window had opened at 6:45 p.m. EDT from Starbase in Boca Chica, Texas, and the countdown had proceeded without issue all day, with more than 11.5 million pounds of liquid methane and liquid oxygen being fully loaded into the rocket before the automated abort triggered. SpaceX’s launch directors posted on X, “Standing down from today’s flight test attempt,” and shut down the livestream shortly after.
Musk confirmed the root cause within hours. “Some of the engines didn’t start, triggering an automatic launch abort,” he wrote on X. “To be confident of a good flight, 2 Raptors will be removed and replaced. Most probable launch timing is early next week.” SpaceX engineers began draining propellant tanks immediately and Booster 20 was rolled back to its hangar for inspection.
The timing adds a layer of significance that did not exist during any of the previous 12 Starship flights. This is the first time SpaceX has attempted to launch Starship since the company made its stock market debut in June, listing under ticker SPCX at $135 per share. Public investors are now watching every Starship outcome in real time, and a last-second abort carries more visibility than it would have six months ago.
Flight 13 was designed to be one of the most consequential tests in the program’s history. It was set to carry 20 Starlink V3 satellites, the first operational payload Starship has ever attempted to deploy. Six of those satellites carried external cameras to photograph Starship’s heat shield from the outside during flight, which would act as a self-inspection approach SpaceX has never attempted before. The mission also needed to complete a Raptor engine relight in space, a step SpaceX skipped on Flight 12 in May after losing an engine during ascent. That Flight 12 booster also flipped 90 degrees off course during its boostback burn when five engines failed to reignite.
SpaceX has not announced an official next launch date. Musk’s “early next week” window points to July 21 or 22 at the earliest, pending the engine swap and a return to the pad.
Elon Musk flew under the radar with his recent purchase of a $1 billion energy company, according to Federal Trade Commission (FTC) documents.
Transaction number 202612350 listed Tesla and SpaceX frontman Elon Musk as the acquiring party and CF APR Super Holdings LLC as the seller, with New APR Energy, LLC as the acquired entity. The deal, which closed without public announcement, came to light on May 14.
BREAKING: Elon Musk acquires Jacksonville power company APR Energy in a deal valued at more than $1,000,000,000.00.
— Polymarket Money (@PolymarketMoney) July 15, 2026
Analysts inferred the deal’s scale from minority stakeholder disclosures, including one report of a 5 percent interest sold for approximately $50.4 million. Fortress Investment Group had purchased APR’s assets in late 2024, rebranded the operation as New APR Energy, and subsequently transferred ownership to Musk.
APR Energy specializes in rapidly deployable power infrastructure. The company maintains one of the world’s largest fleets of mobile gas and diesel turbines, with more than 1.1 gigawatts of generation capacity. Its modular units, which are often trailer-mounted, enable turnkey installations ranging from 20 MW to over 500 MW.
APR provides full engineering, procurement, construction, operation, and maintenance services for behind-the-meter power plants, serving everything from data centers, utilities, and industrial clients.
The firm has expanded aggressively to meet surging demand, recently adding turbines and deploying over 100 MW for a major AI hyperscaler. Its solutions bridge critical gaps where grid interconnections face delays of two to five years, according to Yahoo.
The acquisition means something more for Musk. As he continues to expand projects in artificial intelligence, especially xAI, his AI venture, there is a greater need to supply energy-intensive supercomputing clusters, including the Colossus project, with what they need: reliable and high-capacity power.
Ownership of APR provides immediate access to flexible generation assets that can be deployed adjacent to data centers, reducing dependence on a strained infrastructure. It also complements Tesla’s energy storage business, so Musk will be able to pull from his own entities to address the rapid scaling demands of AI training and compute.
Tesla had a petition protesting a recall to fix a potential issue with 2017-2023 Model Y and Model 3 vehicles’ headlights was denied, as the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) disagreed with the company’s opinion of things.
The recall covers approximately 19,917 Model Y and Model 3 vehicles built from 2017 to 2023. Tesla initially submitted a noncompliance report for the headlights on these vehicles on March 15, 2024. Tesla then petitioned for an exemption from the fix, which violated FMVSS No. 108 (40 CFR 571.108), arguing that the “noncompliance is inconsequential as it relates to motor vehicle safety.
🚨 Tesla was denied a petition by the NHTSA to avoid a recall of 19,900 2017-2023 Model 3 and Model Y vehicles.
The NHTSA found that the vehicles’ headlights may exceed maximum lighting levels. Tesla argued it was inconsequential and did not require a recall. pic.twitter.com/m8Jmm1teLL
— TESLARATI (@Teslarati) July 16, 2026
The NHTSA disagreed, stating that Tesla’s conclusion that the headlights do not increase any risk was not an opinion it shared. The agency said it disagreed with Tesla’s assumption that glare is not increased to surrounding traffic. This issue could be highlighted even more in certain weather conditions.
Tesla will be required to remedy the issue, the NHTSA ruled:
“In consideration of the foregoing, NHTSA has decided that Tesla has not met its burden of persuasion that the subject FMVSS No. 108 noncompliance is inconsequential to motor vehicle safety. Accordingly, Tesla’s petition is hereby denied, and Tesla is consequently obligated to provide notification of and free remedy for that noncompliance under 49 U.S.C. 30118 and 30120.”
The issue here appears to be the angle of the headlights and the brightness they emit during operation. The NHTSA report states that:
“Tesla’s headlamp supplier, Marelli Automotive Lighting, tested 25 right-hand and 25 left-hand lamps, and for this sample, found the maximum photometric intensity measured in the 10°U to 90°U and 90°L to 90°R zone was between 136.2 cd and 230.1 cd for the right-hand lamps and between 117.5 cd and 160.3 cd for the left-hand lamps. According to Tesla, these tests revealed that the photometric intensity of the right-hand and left-hand headlamp lower beam on the subject vehicles may measure as much as 230.1 cd in the 10°U to 90°U and 90°L to 90°R zone, exceeding the maximum photometric intensity by 105.1 cd. Additionally, Tesla states that a left-hand lamp tested by a Transport Canada recognized laboratory measured a maximum of 171.27 cd in the 10°U to 90°U and 90°L to 90°R zone. Despite these measurements exceeding the allowed photometric maximum of 125 cd, Tesla believes that the subject noncompliance is inconsequential to motor vehicle safety.”
Tesla also argued at some points that the headlights had not been deemed responsible for any complaints, accidents, or injuries related to the noncompliance.
SpaceX Starship Flight 13 aborted at Zero and Musk just told us what broke
Elon Musk secretly acquires $1B energy company to power the AI future
