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SpaceX’s next Falcon 9 launch delayed until November as lull drags on
For unknown reasons, SpaceX’s next Falcon 9 rocket launch has slipped from October to November, extending an already record-breaking lull in commercial US launch activity.
Depending on when SpaceX finally returns to flight, the company could have easily spent more than a quarter of 2019 between launches.
On August 7th, SpaceX successfully completed its most recent launch – orbiting Spacecom’s AMOS-17 communications satellite – and the company’s tenth orbital launch of 2019. Aside from two spectacular back-to-back Falcon Heavy launches in April and June and SpaceX’s first dedicated Starlink launch in May, 2019 has be a relatively normal year for SpaceX’s commercial launch business.
Shifting satellite sands
A comment made in September by SpaceX COO and President Gwynne Shotwell was nevertheless spot-on – 2019 has been a bit quieter than 2017 and 2018 and a large chunk of that slowdown can be reportedly explained by the lack of customer readiness. The satellites SpaceX’s paying customers have contracted launches for simply aren’t ready for flight.
In short, after finding its stride over the last two and a half years, SpaceX’s orbital launch capacity has grown to the point that it’s nearly outpacing the world’s commercial satellite manufacturing capabilities: SpaceX can launch them faster than the established industry can build them.
Although SpaceX’s unexpected 2019 launch lull is likely more of a perfect storm and coincidence than anything, it may still be a sign of things to come in the next decade and beyond. Annual orders for large geostationary communications satellites – representing a substantial share of the global launch market – reached their lowest levels ever in 2017 and 2018, a trend that appears likely to continue almost indefinitely.
Those often massive satellites tend to cost nine figures ($100M+), weigh at least several metric tons, and are designed with a failure-is-not-an-option attitude that has inflated their complexity and price tags to dysfunctional levels.
The Small-ening
SpaceX is undeniably aware of this trend, caused in large part by the growing commercial aversion (at least for new entrants) of putting all one’s eggs in an incredibly large and expensive satellite basket. Smaller satellites – be it in low Earth orbit, geostationary orbits, or even interplanetary space – are now largely viewed as the way forward for companies interested in commercializing spaceflight. Large spacecraft certainly still have their place and many industry stalwarts are extremely reluctant to part ways with the established standard of big communications satellites, but small is almost unequivocally the future.
SpaceX is clearly onboard and has become the only launch services company in history to pursue plans to build, launch, and operate its own satellite constellation, known as Starlink. In a beta test at an unprecedented scale, SpaceX launched its first 60 Starlink satellite prototypes in May and has since been working to finalize designs and aggressively ramp up production.
SpaceX’s current plans for Starlink involve a constellation of nearly 12,000 satellites, potentially growing to 40,000+ well down the road. SpaceX much launch approximately half of those satellites by November 2023 and all of them by November 2027, a feat that will require the company to build and launch spacecraft at a rate unprecedented in the history of commercial space.
Shotwell indicated at the same September 2019 conference that SpaceX’s goal was to launch as many Starlink missions as possible while attempting to avoid disrupting the schedules of its commercial launch customers. In fact, the launch expected to end SpaceX’s 2019 launch lull was and still is a Starlink mission, the first flight of 60 finalized ‘v1.0’ satellites.
For unknown reasons probably related SpaceX’s relatively recent entrance into satellite manufacturing, that ‘Starlink-1’ launch (and 1-3 more expected to occur in quick succession) has slipped from a relatively firm October 17th planning date to late-October, and now has a tentative launch target sometime in November. Pending mission success, a second launch (‘Starlink-2’) could follow as early as November or December, while SpaceX also plans to launch Crew Dragon’s In-Flight Abort (IFA) as early as late-November, Cargo Dragon’s CRS-19 mission NET December 4th, and the Kacific-1 communications satellite in mid-December.
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Elon Musk flew under the radar with his recent purchase of a $1 billion energy company, according to Federal Trade Commission (FTC) documents.
Transaction number 202612350 listed Tesla and SpaceX frontman Elon Musk as the acquiring party and CF APR Super Holdings LLC as the seller, with New APR Energy, LLC as the acquired entity. The deal, which closed without public announcement, came to light on May 14.
BREAKING: Elon Musk acquires Jacksonville power company APR Energy in a deal valued at more than $1,000,000,000.00.
— Polymarket Money (@PolymarketMoney) July 15, 2026
Analysts inferred the deal’s scale from minority stakeholder disclosures, including one report of a 5 percent interest sold for approximately $50.4 million. Fortress Investment Group had purchased APR’s assets in late 2024, rebranded the operation as New APR Energy, and subsequently transferred ownership to Musk.
APR Energy specializes in rapidly deployable power infrastructure. The company maintains one of the world’s largest fleets of mobile gas and diesel turbines, with more than 1.1 gigawatts of generation capacity. Its modular units, which are often trailer-mounted, enable turnkey installations ranging from 20 MW to over 500 MW.
APR provides full engineering, procurement, construction, operation, and maintenance services for behind-the-meter power plants, serving everything from data centers, utilities, and industrial clients.
The firm has expanded aggressively to meet surging demand, recently adding turbines and deploying over 100 MW for a major AI hyperscaler. Its solutions bridge critical gaps where grid interconnections face delays of two to five years, according to Yahoo.
The acquisition means something more for Musk. As he continues to expand projects in artificial intelligence, especially xAI, his AI venture, there is a greater need to supply energy-intensive supercomputing clusters, including the Colossus project, with what they need: reliable and high-capacity power.
Ownership of APR provides immediate access to flexible generation assets that can be deployed adjacent to data centers, reducing dependence on a strained infrastructure. It also complements Tesla’s energy storage business, so Musk will be able to pull from his own entities to address the rapid scaling demands of AI training and compute.
Tesla had a petition protesting a recall to fix a potential issue with 2017-2023 Model Y and Model 3 vehicles’ headlights was denied, as the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) disagreed with the company’s opinion of things.
The recall covers approximately 19,917 Model Y and Model 3 vehicles built from 2017 to 2023. Tesla initially submitted a noncompliance report for the headlights on these vehicles on March 15, 2024. Tesla then petitioned for an exemption from the fix, which violated FMVSS No. 108 (40 CFR 571.108), arguing that the “noncompliance is inconsequential as it relates to motor vehicle safety.
🚨 Tesla was denied a petition by the NHTSA to avoid a recall of 19,900 2017-2023 Model 3 and Model Y vehicles.
The NHTSA found that the vehicles’ headlights may exceed maximum lighting levels. Tesla argued it was inconsequential and did not require a recall. pic.twitter.com/m8Jmm1teLL
— TESLARATI (@Teslarati) July 16, 2026
The NHTSA disagreed, stating that Tesla’s conclusion that the headlights do not increase any risk was not an opinion it shared. The agency said it disagreed with Tesla’s assumption that glare is not increased to surrounding traffic. This issue could be highlighted even more in certain weather conditions.
Tesla will be required to remedy the issue, the NHTSA ruled:
“In consideration of the foregoing, NHTSA has decided that Tesla has not met its burden of persuasion that the subject FMVSS No. 108 noncompliance is inconsequential to motor vehicle safety. Accordingly, Tesla’s petition is hereby denied, and Tesla is consequently obligated to provide notification of and free remedy for that noncompliance under 49 U.S.C. 30118 and 30120.”
The issue here appears to be the angle of the headlights and the brightness they emit during operation. The NHTSA report states that:
“Tesla’s headlamp supplier, Marelli Automotive Lighting, tested 25 right-hand and 25 left-hand lamps, and for this sample, found the maximum photometric intensity measured in the 10°U to 90°U and 90°L to 90°R zone was between 136.2 cd and 230.1 cd for the right-hand lamps and between 117.5 cd and 160.3 cd for the left-hand lamps. According to Tesla, these tests revealed that the photometric intensity of the right-hand and left-hand headlamp lower beam on the subject vehicles may measure as much as 230.1 cd in the 10°U to 90°U and 90°L to 90°R zone, exceeding the maximum photometric intensity by 105.1 cd. Additionally, Tesla states that a left-hand lamp tested by a Transport Canada recognized laboratory measured a maximum of 171.27 cd in the 10°U to 90°U and 90°L to 90°R zone. Despite these measurements exceeding the allowed photometric maximum of 125 cd, Tesla believes that the subject noncompliance is inconsequential to motor vehicle safety.”
Tesla also argued at some points that the headlights had not been deemed responsible for any complaints, accidents, or injuries related to the noncompliance.
Lifestyle
NTSB findings on fatal Tesla crash tell a very different story
The NTSB confirmed the driver, not Tesla’s FSD, caused the fatal Texas house crash.
The National Transportation Safety Board released preliminary findings Wednesday confirming that a Tesla driver, not the vehicle’s software, caused a fatal crash in Katy, Texas in June. The driver, 44-year-old Michael Butler, had engaged Full Self-Driving Supervised mode on Rose Hollow Lane, a residential street with a 30 mph speed limit, before manually overriding the system by pressing the accelerator pedal all the way to 100%. Data recovered from the 2025 Tesla Model 3 showed the vehicle was traveling over 70 miles per hour when it struck a home and killed 76-year-old Martha Avila, who was inside. Weather was clear, the road was dry, and it was daylight.
Texas man charged in fatal Tesla crash where he blamed Autopilot
Butler told authorities he had passed out at the wheel. But security camera footage obtained by the NTSB told a different story, and showed the car accelerating through an intersection before leaving the road entirely. Police also found that Butler’s phone had Google searches including the terms “Tesla FSD not aggressive enough 2026” and “Tesla FSD too timid,” raising serious questions about how he was using the system before the crash. Butler has since been charged with manslaughter. The victim’s family has filed a lawsuit against both Butler and Tesla, alleging negligence.
The NTSB findings aligned directly with what Tesla VP of AI Software Ashok Elluswamy had already stated publicly on X in the weeks after the crash, writing that “the driver manually overrode self-driving by pressing the accelerator all the way to 100%.” The data confirmed his account.
Yup. In this case, the driver manually overrode self-driving by pressing the accelerator all the way to 100% of the accel pedal in this residential area. They reached a speed of 73 mph during the crash, and had the accelerator pressed even after the crash.
— Ashok Elluswamy (@aelluswamy) June 22, 2026
Elon Musk secretly acquires $1B energy company to power the AI future
Tesla has to fix a big problem with its old headlights, NHTSA says
