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SpaceX’s next-gen Falcon Heavy closer to reality as side booster leaves factory
A duo of rocket spottings on November 9th and 10th confirm that SpaceX’s next Falcon Heavy rocket – an amalgamation of three Falcon 9 boosters, an upper stage, and extensive modifications – is already in the late stages of manufacturing and is nearing the beginning of integrated structural and static fire testing.
As of now, this Falcon Heavy side booster could end up supporting either or both of two near-term launch contracts in place for the rocket, communications satellite Arabsat 6A or the US Air Force’s second Space Test Program (STP-2) launch
SpaceX's second Falcon Heavy is slowly but surely coming together 😀 https://t.co/AYJsQ8Mld5
— Eric Ralph (@13ericralph31) November 13, 2018
The question of the hour – at least for Falcon Heavy – is which of those two available payloads will be atop the rocket on its first truly commercial launch. While suboptimal, a few general characteristics of each payload, SpaceX’s history of commercial launches, and Falcon Heavy itself can offer a hint or two.
Triple the rocket, triple the trouble
Thanks in large part to the fact that the first integrated Falcon Heavy was composed of two relatively old Falcon 9 booster variants and a center core that was quite literally a one-off rocket, the process of reenginering and building another Falcon Heavy rocket off of the family’s newest Block 5 variant has likely been far harder than simply building another Falcon Heavy. Although all three original Falcon Heavy boosters (B1023, B1025, and B1033) were in the same league as Block 5, their Block 2 and Block 3 hardware was designed for approximately 10% less thrust and are almost entirely different vehicles from the perspective of structures and avionics.
Perhaps even more importantly, it’s unknown whether Falcon Heavy Block 1 (for lack of a better descriptor) was designed with serious reusability in mind, at least in the same sense as Falcon 9 Block 5 was. For instance, a major portion of the rocket’s extreme complexity and difficulties lies in the basic need to transmit three times as much thrust through the center core. To do that and do it without rocket-powered separation mechanisms, SpaceX had to develop structural attachments and connections capable of surviving unbelievable mechanical and thermal stresses for minutes on end.
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- The first Falcon Heavy was a Frankenstein’s monster of sorts. (SpaceX)
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- Falcon Heavy is seen here lifting off during its spectacular launch debut. (SpaceX)
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- A Falcon Heavy side booster was spotted eastbound in Arizona on November 10th. (Reddit – beast-sam)
Clearly, this was an unfathomably difficult problem to solve in such a manner that Falcon Heavy would work at all the first time. Factor in the strategic need for those same components to survive repeated cycles of those stresses with minimal refurbishment in between and the problem at hand likely becomes a magnitude more difficult, at least. In large part, this helps to explain why there will end up being a minimum of 11-12 months between Falcon Heavy’s first and second launches.
Arabsat or STP?
Over the course of SpaceX’s last 2-3 years of commercial launch activity, the company and its customers have demonstrated time and time again a reliable pattern: commercial customers (in the sense of private entities) are far more willing to take risks with new technologies than SpaceX’s government customers. NASA’s Commercial Resupply Services is the exception for the latter group but also has no Falcon Heavy launch contracts. For Falcon Heavy, there are thus main three options at hand.
- Arabsat 6A launches first with 1-2 flight-proven boosters; the Air Force’s STP-2 mission flies on an all-new Falcon Heavy 4-6 months later.
- SpaceX builds entirely new Falcon Heavy rockets for both customers, requiring four new side boosters and two new center cores.
- STP-2 launches first on an all-new Falcon Heavy; Arabsat 6A launches second on the first flight-proven Falcon Heavy after 6+ months of additional delays.
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- The USAF’s STP-2, a combination of a few dozen different satellites. (USAF)
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- The communications satellite Arabsat-6A. (Lockheed Martin)
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- LZ-1 and LZ-2, circa February 2018. (SpaceX)
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- A closeup of one of Falcon Heavy’s side boosters after landing. (SpaceX)
Arabsat is far more likely to accept – for a significant discount – a ride aboard the first flight-proven Falcon Heavy, especially if it means preventing more major launch delays. If the Falcon Heavy side booster spotted eastbound last week is a refurbished Block 5 booster rather than a new rocket, than option 1 is the easy choice for most probable outcome. The real pack leader for Falcon Heavy Flight 2, however, will be the completion of a new Block 5 center core and its shipment to Texas for structural and static fire testing.
Time will tell. For now, a completed Falcon Heavy side booster is the best sign yet that SpaceX may manage the rocket’s second launch in the first quarter of 2019, whichever launch that may be.
Elon Musk flew under the radar with his recent purchase of a $1 billion energy company, according to Federal Trade Commission (FTC) documents.
Transaction number 202612350 listed Tesla and SpaceX frontman Elon Musk as the acquiring party and CF APR Super Holdings LLC as the seller, with New APR Energy, LLC as the acquired entity. The deal, which closed without public announcement, came to light on May 14.
BREAKING: Elon Musk acquires Jacksonville power company APR Energy in a deal valued at more than $1,000,000,000.00.
— Polymarket Money (@PolymarketMoney) July 15, 2026
Analysts inferred the deal’s scale from minority stakeholder disclosures, including one report of a 5 percent interest sold for approximately $50.4 million. Fortress Investment Group had purchased APR’s assets in late 2024, rebranded the operation as New APR Energy, and subsequently transferred ownership to Musk.
APR Energy specializes in rapidly deployable power infrastructure. The company maintains one of the world’s largest fleets of mobile gas and diesel turbines, with more than 1.1 gigawatts of generation capacity. Its modular units, which are often trailer-mounted, enable turnkey installations ranging from 20 MW to over 500 MW.
APR provides full engineering, procurement, construction, operation, and maintenance services for behind-the-meter power plants, serving everything from data centers, utilities, and industrial clients.
The firm has expanded aggressively to meet surging demand, recently adding turbines and deploying over 100 MW for a major AI hyperscaler. Its solutions bridge critical gaps where grid interconnections face delays of two to five years, according to Yahoo.
The acquisition means something more for Musk. As he continues to expand projects in artificial intelligence, especially xAI, his AI venture, there is a greater need to supply energy-intensive supercomputing clusters, including the Colossus project, with what they need: reliable and high-capacity power.
Ownership of APR provides immediate access to flexible generation assets that can be deployed adjacent to data centers, reducing dependence on a strained infrastructure. It also complements Tesla’s energy storage business, so Musk will be able to pull from his own entities to address the rapid scaling demands of AI training and compute.
Tesla had a petition protesting a recall to fix a potential issue with 2017-2023 Model Y and Model 3 vehicles’ headlights was denied, as the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) disagreed with the company’s opinion of things.
The recall covers approximately 19,917 Model Y and Model 3 vehicles built from 2017 to 2023. Tesla initially submitted a noncompliance report for the headlights on these vehicles on March 15, 2024. Tesla then petitioned for an exemption from the fix, which violated FMVSS No. 108 (40 CFR 571.108), arguing that the “noncompliance is inconsequential as it relates to motor vehicle safety.
🚨 Tesla was denied a petition by the NHTSA to avoid a recall of 19,900 2017-2023 Model 3 and Model Y vehicles.
The NHTSA found that the vehicles’ headlights may exceed maximum lighting levels. Tesla argued it was inconsequential and did not require a recall. pic.twitter.com/m8Jmm1teLL
— TESLARATI (@Teslarati) July 16, 2026
The NHTSA disagreed, stating that Tesla’s conclusion that the headlights do not increase any risk was not an opinion it shared. The agency said it disagreed with Tesla’s assumption that glare is not increased to surrounding traffic. This issue could be highlighted even more in certain weather conditions.
Tesla will be required to remedy the issue, the NHTSA ruled:
“In consideration of the foregoing, NHTSA has decided that Tesla has not met its burden of persuasion that the subject FMVSS No. 108 noncompliance is inconsequential to motor vehicle safety. Accordingly, Tesla’s petition is hereby denied, and Tesla is consequently obligated to provide notification of and free remedy for that noncompliance under 49 U.S.C. 30118 and 30120.”
The issue here appears to be the angle of the headlights and the brightness they emit during operation. The NHTSA report states that:
“Tesla’s headlamp supplier, Marelli Automotive Lighting, tested 25 right-hand and 25 left-hand lamps, and for this sample, found the maximum photometric intensity measured in the 10°U to 90°U and 90°L to 90°R zone was between 136.2 cd and 230.1 cd for the right-hand lamps and between 117.5 cd and 160.3 cd for the left-hand lamps. According to Tesla, these tests revealed that the photometric intensity of the right-hand and left-hand headlamp lower beam on the subject vehicles may measure as much as 230.1 cd in the 10°U to 90°U and 90°L to 90°R zone, exceeding the maximum photometric intensity by 105.1 cd. Additionally, Tesla states that a left-hand lamp tested by a Transport Canada recognized laboratory measured a maximum of 171.27 cd in the 10°U to 90°U and 90°L to 90°R zone. Despite these measurements exceeding the allowed photometric maximum of 125 cd, Tesla believes that the subject noncompliance is inconsequential to motor vehicle safety.”
Tesla also argued at some points that the headlights had not been deemed responsible for any complaints, accidents, or injuries related to the noncompliance.
Lifestyle
NTSB findings on fatal Tesla crash tell a very different story
The NTSB confirmed the driver, not Tesla’s FSD, caused the fatal Texas house crash.
The National Transportation Safety Board released preliminary findings Wednesday confirming that a Tesla driver, not the vehicle’s software, caused a fatal crash in Katy, Texas in June. The driver, 44-year-old Michael Butler, had engaged Full Self-Driving Supervised mode on Rose Hollow Lane, a residential street with a 30 mph speed limit, before manually overriding the system by pressing the accelerator pedal all the way to 100%. Data recovered from the 2025 Tesla Model 3 showed the vehicle was traveling over 70 miles per hour when it struck a home and killed 76-year-old Martha Avila, who was inside. Weather was clear, the road was dry, and it was daylight.
Texas man charged in fatal Tesla crash where he blamed Autopilot
Butler told authorities he had passed out at the wheel. But security camera footage obtained by the NTSB told a different story, and showed the car accelerating through an intersection before leaving the road entirely. Police also found that Butler’s phone had Google searches including the terms “Tesla FSD not aggressive enough 2026” and “Tesla FSD too timid,” raising serious questions about how he was using the system before the crash. Butler has since been charged with manslaughter. The victim’s family has filed a lawsuit against both Butler and Tesla, alleging negligence.
The NTSB findings aligned directly with what Tesla VP of AI Software Ashok Elluswamy had already stated publicly on X in the weeks after the crash, writing that “the driver manually overrode self-driving by pressing the accelerator all the way to 100%.” The data confirmed his account.
Yup. In this case, the driver manually overrode self-driving by pressing the accelerator all the way to 100% of the accel pedal in this residential area. They reached a speed of 73 mph during the crash, and had the accelerator pressed even after the crash.
— Ashok Elluswamy (@aelluswamy) June 22, 2026
Elon Musk secretly acquires $1B energy company to power the AI future
Tesla has to fix a big problem with its old headlights, NHTSA says
