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SpaceX Starlink Gen2 constellation weakened by “partial” FCC grant
More than two and a half years after SpaceX began the process of securing regulatory approval for its next-generation Starlink constellation, the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has finally granted the company a license – but only after drastically decreasing its scope.
In May 2020, SpaceX filed its first FCC license application for Starlink Gen2, an upgraded constellation of 30,000 satellites. In the second half of 2021, SpaceX amended its Starlink Gen2 application to take full advantage of the company’s more powerful Starship rocket and further improve the constellation’s potential utility. Only in December 2021 did the FCC finally accept SpaceX’s Gen2 application for filing, kicking off the final review process.
On November 29th, 2022, the FCC completed that review and granted SpaceX permission to launch just 7,500 of the ~30,000 Starlink Gen2 satellites it had requested permission for more than 30 months prior. The FCC offered no explanation of how it arrived at its arbitrary 75% reduction, nor why the resulting number is slightly lower than a different 7,518-satellite Starlink Gen1 constellation SpaceX had already received a license to deploy in late 2018. Adding insult to injury, the FCC repeatedly acknowledges that “the total number of satellites SpaceX is authorized to deploy is not increased by our action today, and in fact is slightly reduced.”
The update that's rolling out to the fleet makes full use of the front and rear steering travel to minimize turning circle. In this case a reduction of 1.6 feet just over the air— Wes (@wmorrill3) April 16, 2024
That claimed reduction is thanks to the fact that shortly before this decision, SpaceX told the FCC in good faith that it would voluntarily avoid launching the dedicated V-band Starlink constellation it already received a license for in order “to significantly reduce the total number of satellites ultimately on orbit.” Instead, once Starlink Gen2 was approved, it would request permission to add V-band payloads to a subset of the 29,988 planned Gen2 satellites, achieving a similar result without the need for another 7,518 satellites.
In response, the FCC slashed the total number of Starlink Gen2 satellites permitted to less than the number of satellites approved by the FCC’s November 2018 Starlink V-band authorization; limited those satellites to middle-ground orbits, entirely precluding Gen2 launches to higher or lower orbits; and didn’t even structure its compromise in a way that would at least allow SpaceX to fully complete three Starlink Gen2 ‘shells.’ Worse, the FCC’s partial grant barely mentioned SpaceX’s detailed plans to use new E-band antennas on Starlink Gen2 satellites and next-generation ground stations, simply stating that it will “defer acting on” the request until “further review and coordination with Federal users.”
Throughout the partial grant, the FCC couches its decision to drastically downscale SpaceX’s Starlink Gen2 constellation in terms of needing more time “to evaluate the complex and novel issues on the record before [the Commission],” raising the question of what exactly the Commission was doing instead in the 30 months since SpaceX’s first Gen2 application and 15 months since its Gen2 modification. In comparison, SpaceX received a full license for its 7,518-satellite V-band constellation less than five months after applying. SpaceX’s 4,408-satellite Starlink Gen1 constellation – the first megaconstellation ever reviewed by the modern FCC – was licensed 16 months after its first application and eight months after a modified application was submitted.
Adding to the oddity of the unusual and inconsistent decision-making in this FCC ruling, the Commission openly acknowledges that the idea to grant SpaceX permission to launch a fraction of its Starlink Gen2 constellation came from Amazon’s Project Kuiper [PDF], a major prospective Starlink competitor. The FCC says it agreed with Amazon’s argument, stating that “the public interest would be served by taking this approach in order to permit monitoring of developments involving this large-scale deployment and permit additional consideration of issues unique to the other orbits SpaceX requests.”
The V-band Starlink constellation already approved by the FCC was for 7,518 satellites in very low Earth orbits (~340 km). In the first 4,425-satellite Starlink constellation licensed by the FCC, the Commission gave SpaceX permission to operate 2,814 satellites at orbits between 1100 and 1300 kilometers. Increasingly conscious of the consequences of space debris, which would last hundreds of years at 1000+ kilometers, SpaceX later requested permission in 2019 and 2020 to launch those 2,814 satellites to around 550 kilometers, where failed satellites would reenter in just five years. For unknown reasons, the FCC only fully approved the change two years later, in April 2021.
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The “other orbits [requested by SpaceX]” that the FCC says create unique issues that demand “additional consideration” of Starlink Gen2 are for 19,400 satellites between 340 and 360 kilometers and 468 satellites between 604 and 614 kilometers. Starlink satellites are expected to be around four times heavier and feature a magnitude more surface area, but the fact remains that the FCC has already granted SpaceX permission to launch almost 3000 smaller satellites to orbits much higher than 604 kilometers and more than 7500 satellites to orbits lower than 360 kilometers. It’s thus hard not to conclude that the Commission’s claims that a partial license denial was warranted by “concerns about orbital debris and space safety,” and “issues unique to…other orbits” are incoherent at best.
Perhaps the strangest inclusion in the partial grant is a decision by the FCC to subject SpaceX to an arbitrary metric devised by another third-party, for-profit company LeoLabs. In a March 2022 letter, LeoLabs reportedly proposed that “SpaceX’s authorization to continue deploying satellites” be directly linked to an arbitrary metric measuring “the number of years each failed satellite remains in orbit, summed across all failed satellites.” The FCC apparently loved the suggestion and made it an explicit condition of its already harsh Starlink Gen2 authorization, even adopting the arbitrary limit of “100 object years” proposed by LeoLabs.
In other words, once the sum of the time required for all failed Starlink Gen2 satellites to naturally deorbit reaches 100 years, the FCC will force SpaceX to “cease satellite deployment” while it “[reviews] sources of satellite failure” and “determine[s] whether there are any adequate and reliable mitigation measures going forward.” The FCC acknowledges that the arbitrary 100-year limit means that the failure of just 20 Starlink satellites at operational orbits would force the company to halt launches. The Commission does not explain how it will decide when SpaceX can restart Starlink launches after a launch halt. SpaceX must simultaneously follow the FCC’s deployment schedule, which could see the company’s license revoked if it doesn’t deploy 3,750 Starlink Gen2 satellites by November 2028 and all 7,500 satellites by November 2031.
Based on the unofficial observations of astrophysicist Jonathan McDowell, SpaceX currently has more 30 failed Starlink Gen1 satellites at or close to their operational altitudes of 500+ kilometers, meaning that SpaceX would almost certainly be forced to stop launching Gen1 satellites if this arbitrary new rule were applied to other constellations. The same is true for competitor OneWeb, which had a single satellite fail at around 1200 kilometers in 2021. At that altitude, it will likely take hundreds of “object years” to naturally deorbit, easily surpassing LeoLabs’ draconian 100-year limit.
In theory, the FCC does make it clear that it will consider changing those restrictions and allowing SpaceX to launch more of its proposed Starlink Gen2 constellation in the future. But the Commission has also repeatedly demonstrated to SpaceX that it will happily take years to modify existing licenses or approve new ones – not a particularly reassuring foundation for investments as large and precarious as megaconstellations.
Ultimately, short of shady handshake deals in back rooms, the FCC’s partial grant leaves SpaceX’s Starlink Gen2 constellation in an undesirable position. For the company to proceed under the current license, it could be forced to redesign its satellites and ground stations to avoid the E-band, or gamble by continuing to build and deploy satellites and ground stations with E-band antennas without a guarantee that it’ll ever be able to use that hardware. There is also no guarantee that the FCC will permit SpaceX to launch any of the ~22,500 satellites left on the table by the partial grant, which will drastically change the financial calculus that determines whether the constellation is economically viable and how expansive associated infrastructure needs to be.
Additionally, if SpaceX accepts the gambit and launches all 7,500 approved Gen2 satellites only for the FCC to fail to approve expansions, Starlink Gen2 would be stuck with zero polar coverage, significantly reducing the constellation’s overall utility. Starlink Gen2 likely represents an investment of at least $30-60 billion (assuming an unprecedentedly low $1-2M to build and launch each 50-150 Gbps satellite). With its partial license denial and the addition of several new and arbitrary conditions, the FCC is effectively forcing SpaceX to take an even riskier gamble with the billions of dollars of brand new infrastructure it will need to build to manufacture, launch, operate, and utilize its Starlink Gen2 constellation.
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Elon Musk has declared that SpaceX has effectively solved one of Starship’s most persistent engineering challenges: the reliability of its heat shield tiles.
During the company’s first-ever Earnings Call, the SpaceX CEO stated:
“I don’t want to jinx it or anything, but I think I would call the heat shield problem solved at this point. All indications from data and visual inspection is we have solved it. That doesn’t mean we won’t make improvements, but we do not see any technical obstacles to achieving rapid reusability at this point.”
Starship’s heat shield consists of roughly 18,000 hexagonal ceramic tiles covering the windward side of the upper stage. These tiles form the thermal protection system that shields the vehicle’s stainless-steel structure from the extreme heat of atmospheric reentry.
Elon says he believes the heat shield problem with Starship is currently solved.
He called it “arguably the single biggest problem” pic.twitter.com/eEE9vM5zlz
— TESLARATI (@Teslarati) August 4, 2026
During descent, atmospheric friction generates temperatures exceeding several thousand degrees Celsius and creates plasma flows capable of melting unprotected metal. The tiles absorb, radiate, and insulate against this energy, allowing the vehicle to survive and potentially fly again. Without a durable heat shield, full and rapid reusability, the cornerstone of Starship’s design for frequent launches, satellite deployments, and deep-space missions, would remain impossible.
The tiles have long been a source of difficulty. On earlier test flights, a significant number of tiles detached during ascent due to vibration, aerodynamic loads, and imperfect attachment methods using pins and adhesives. Gaps between tiles allowed hot plasma to infiltrate, causing secondary damage and hot spots on the underlying structure.
These issues echoed challenges faced by NASA’s Space Shuttle, whose ceramic tiles required extensive, labor-intensive inspections and replacements between missions, preventing rapid turnaround. SpaceX has iteratively improved materials, standardized tile shapes, refined attachment techniques, added secondary ablative layers, and tested sealing methods such as “crunch wrap” felt to close gaps.
Progress was visible across Flights 10–12, with steadily better tile retention, yet questions remained about whether the system could support the minimal-refurbishment goal of rapid reuse.
Flight 13 on July 24 provided the decisive evidence. Ship 40 flew a deliberately more demanding profile with higher dynamic pressure to stress the heat shield beyond typical operational loads. It successfully deployed 20 operational Starlink V3 satellites, the first such payload on a Starship mission, performed an in-space Raptor engine relight, and executed a controlled reentry.
Elon Musk sheds two new bits of detail on Starship after 13th test launch
Cameras on six of the satellites and onboard sensors captured extensive imagery and data of the shield throughout the flight. The ship then achieved its softest splashdown to date in the Indian Ocean, remaining intact and floating rather than breaking apart or exploding as on prior missions. This allowed drone inspections and continuous telemetry of the heat shield in near-real time.
Post-flight analysis showed the majority of tiles remaining attached with only minor damage and limited plasma streaking at seams. Musk noted that the mission delivered “all the heat shield data we needed and then some.” Combined with visual inspections, these results underpinned his subsequent assessment that the core technical barriers to rapid reusability have been cleared. While refinements will continue, Flight 13 marked a pivotal step toward Starship’s operational future.
SpaceX COO Gwynne Shotwell outlined ambitious plans for Starlink Mobile during the company’s August 4 Earnings call, signaling a direct challenge to U.S. wireless giants like AT&T, T-Mobile, and Verizon.
Shotwell noted that the three companies generate roughly $600 billion in combined annual revenue. “I anticipate us to be able to acquire quite a few of their customers because I think our service will be better,” she said. “We will eliminate dead zones leveraging the satellites in orbit. It will be better during any natural disaster… I’m quite excited about Starlink Mobile.”
SpaceX President & COO Gwynne Shotwell on @Starlink Mobile and its impact on Verizon, AT&T and T-Mobile:
“Roughly, between them, $600 billion a year. I anticipate us to be able to acquire quite a few of their customers. Our service will be better. We will eliminate dead zones… pic.twitter.com/UYZUkrGc0L
— Sawyer Merritt (@SawyerMerritt) August 4, 2026
SpaceX intends to combine its satellite constellation with terrestrial infrastructure. The company has acquired about 65 MHz of spectrum from EchoStar and plans to deploy next-generation Starlink Mobile satellites in 2027, with upgraded service targeted for the end of that year.
Shotwell described the enhanced network, leveraging more satellites and spectrum, as potentially “100 times better” than the current direct-to-cell offering, which already supports basic texting and app-based voice/video in coverage gaps through partnerships. She also indicated plans for low-cost cellular base stations that could integrate with existing Starlink dishes, creating a hybrid system for broader capacity in urban, suburban, and rural areas.
For the general public, Starlink Mobile promises significant advantages. Satellite connectivity can fill gaps where traditional cell towers fail, delivering service in remote locations, mountains, or during outages caused by storms, wildfires, or infrastructure damage—conditions in which ground networks often collapse.
Users could enjoy more consistent coverage without relying solely on dense tower builds, potentially at competitive prices as SpaceX scales. The hybrid approach aims to support full mobile services, including higher-speed data, while working with unmodified smartphones over time.
These developments revive long-standing but unfounded rumors of a Musk-developed “Tesla phone.” Speculative claims of a “Pi Phone” or similar device with built-in Starlink connectivity have circulated for years on social media, often featuring fabricated images and details. Elon Musk has repeatedly denied any such plans, stating Tesla has no intention of entering the smartphone market unless forced by extreme circumstances with app stores.
No official product, filings, or development announcements have ever materialized; the rumors remain hoaxes.
The announcement quickly pressured telecom stocks. Shares of AT&T, Verizon, and T-Mobile fell between roughly 2 and 4 percent in after-hours and premarket trading as investors weighed the competitive threat from a hybrid satellite-terrestrial network.
While execution challenges remain—spectrum deployment, infrastructure rollout, and regulatory hurdles—Shotwell’s remarks mark SpaceX’s clearest signal yet of entering the consumer mobile market as a full competitor.
Venture capitalist Chamath Palihapitiya has cautioned investors shorting SpaceX shares, drawing a direct parallel to the intense short-selling pressure Tesla faced in its early public years.
Responding to reports of elevated short interest in the newly public rocket, satellite, and AI company, Palihapitiya noted that similar dynamics played out with Tesla, where aggressive short sellers ultimately “went broke.”
SpaceX (NASDAQ: SPCX) went public on June 12, 2026, in the largest IPO on record, pricing at $135 per share. Shares quickly surged to an all-time high of $225.64 just days later, briefly implying a valuation exceeding $2 trillion. The stock has since retreated sharply amid valuation concerns, lockup expiration fears, and broader market dynamics.
By early August, it traded near $108–$125, representing a roughly 50 percent decline from the peak and bringing the market capitalization closer to the $1.5–1.7 trillion range. On August 4, shares closed up more than 9 percent at $125.33 ahead of earnings before facing pressure in after-hours and premarket trading.
Short interest has climbed dramatically. According to S3 Partners data widely cited in market reports, short positions reached approximately 219.3 million shares by late July, about 34 percent of the limited public float of roughly 640 million shares, and represented a notional value of around $24.6 billion.
Utilization of shares available to borrow hit 95 percent, with borrow fees rising. This level of shorting exceeded the dollar value of short bets against Tesla at the time and built rapidly ahead of two catalysts: the company’s first post-IPO earnings and an August 6 lockup expiration that could free up to 911.5 million additional shares.
CEO Elon Musk has issued warnings of his own. In mid-July, as short interest approached one-third of the float, he posted that “the survival probability of firms who maintain a significant short position in SpaceX over time is very low,” reiterating his view that the company could ultimately be worth more than Earth if it achieves its goals.
On August 4, just before earnings, Musk responded to the latest short-interest data by saying, “I try to warn them, but they just double down.”
SpaceX delivered its first quarterly results as a public company after the close on August 4. Second-quarter revenue rose 92 percent year-over-year to $7.8 billion, beating consensus estimates near $6.8–6.9 billion.
The net loss narrowed to $541 million, or 9 cents per share, better than the roughly 23–24 cent loss expected. Starlink/connectivity contributed about $4.3 billion (up 66 percent), while the AI business generated $2.6 billion (up roughly 250 percent). Capital expenditures were heavy at $18.4 billion, largely tied to AI infrastructure. Management projected a $100 billion annualized revenue run rate by year-end 2026 and outlined a path toward $1 trillion in annual revenue by 2030.
The combination of Chamath’s historical reminder, Musk’s repeated alerts, and the company’s ambitious growth targets underscores the high-stakes debate surrounding SPCX. Short sellers are positioned for near-term supply pressure from the lockup, while long-term bulls point to Starlink scale, Starship progress, and AI compute expansion as reasons the bears may ultimately face the same fate as many early Tesla skeptics.
SpaceX has solved Starship’s biggest challenge, Elon Musk says
SpaceX is coming for wireless giants with Starlink Mobile
