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SpaceX Starlink Gen2 constellation weakened by “partial” FCC grant

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More than two and a half years after SpaceX began the process of securing regulatory approval for its next-generation Starlink constellation, the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has finally granted the company a license – but only after drastically decreasing its scope.

In May 2020, SpaceX filed its first FCC license application for Starlink Gen2, an upgraded constellation of 30,000 satellites. In the second half of 2021, SpaceX amended its Starlink Gen2 application to take full advantage of the company’s more powerful Starship rocket and further improve the constellation’s potential utility. Only in December 2021 did the FCC finally accept SpaceX’s Gen2 application for filing, kicking off the final review process.

On November 29th, 2022, the FCC completed that review and granted SpaceX permission to launch just 7,500 of the ~30,000 Starlink Gen2 satellites it had requested permission for more than 30 months prior. The FCC offered no explanation of how it arrived at its arbitrary 75% reduction, nor why the resulting number is slightly lower than a different 7,518-satellite Starlink Gen1 constellation SpaceX had already received a license to deploy in late 2018. Adding insult to injury, the FCC repeatedly acknowledges that “the total number of satellites SpaceX is authorized to deploy is not increased by our action today, and in fact is slightly reduced.”

That claimed reduction is thanks to the fact that shortly before this decision, SpaceX told the FCC in good faith that it would voluntarily avoid launching the dedicated V-band Starlink constellation it already received a license for in order “to significantly reduce the total number of satellites ultimately on orbit.” Instead, once Starlink Gen2 was approved, it would request permission to add V-band payloads to a subset of the 29,988 planned Gen2 satellites, achieving a similar result without the need for another 7,518 satellites.

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In response, the FCC slashed the total number of Starlink Gen2 satellites permitted to less than the number of satellites approved by the FCC’s November 2018 Starlink V-band authorization; limited those satellites to middle-ground orbits, entirely precluding Gen2 launches to higher or lower orbits; and didn’t even structure its compromise in a way that would at least allow SpaceX to fully complete three Starlink Gen2 ‘shells.’ Worse, the FCC’s partial grant barely mentioned SpaceX’s detailed plans to use new E-band antennas on Starlink Gen2 satellites and next-generation ground stations, simply stating that it will “defer acting on” the request until “further review and coordination with Federal users.”

The FCC’s “partial grant” only allows SpaceX to launch 7,500 of 10,080 Starlink Gen2 satellites meant to operate at altitudes between 525 and 535 kilometers.

Throughout the partial grant, the FCC couches its decision to drastically downscale SpaceX’s Starlink Gen2 constellation in terms of needing more time “to evaluate the complex and novel issues on the record before [the Commission],” raising the question of what exactly the Commission was doing instead in the 30 months since SpaceX’s first Gen2 application and 15 months since its Gen2 modification. In comparison, SpaceX received a full license for its 7,518-satellite V-band constellation less than five months after applying. SpaceX’s 4,408-satellite Starlink Gen1 constellation – the first megaconstellation ever reviewed by the modern FCC – was licensed 16 months after its first application and eight months after a modified application was submitted.

Adding to the oddity of the unusual and inconsistent decision-making in this FCC ruling, the Commission openly acknowledges that the idea to grant SpaceX permission to launch a fraction of its Starlink Gen2 constellation came from Amazon’s Project Kuiper [PDF], a major prospective Starlink competitor. The FCC says it agreed with Amazon’s argument, stating that “the public interest would be served by taking this approach in order to permit monitoring of developments involving this large-scale deployment and permit additional consideration of issues unique to the other orbits SpaceX requests.”

The V-band Starlink constellation already approved by the FCC was for 7,518 satellites in very low Earth orbits (~340 km). In the first 4,425-satellite Starlink constellation licensed by the FCC, the Commission gave SpaceX permission to operate 2,814 satellites at orbits between 1100 and 1300 kilometers. Increasingly conscious of the consequences of space debris, which would last hundreds of years at 1000+ kilometers, SpaceX later requested permission in 2019 and 2020 to launch those 2,814 satellites to around 550 kilometers, where failed satellites would reenter in just five years. For unknown reasons, the FCC only fully approved the change two years later, in April 2021.

The “other orbits [requested by SpaceX]” that the FCC says create unique issues that demand “additional consideration” of Starlink Gen2 are for 19,400 satellites between 340 and 360 kilometers and 468 satellites between 604 and 614 kilometers. Starlink satellites are expected to be around four times heavier and feature a magnitude more surface area, but the fact remains that the FCC has already granted SpaceX permission to launch almost 3000 smaller satellites to orbits much higher than 604 kilometers and more than 7500 satellites to orbits lower than 360 kilometers. It’s thus hard not to conclude that the Commission’s claims that a partial license denial was warranted by “concerns about orbital debris and space safety,” and “issues unique to…other orbits” are incoherent at best.

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SpaceX has already built a significant number of Starlink Gen2 prototypes.

Perhaps the strangest inclusion in the partial grant is a decision by the FCC to subject SpaceX to an arbitrary metric devised by another third-party, for-profit company LeoLabs. In a March 2022 letter, LeoLabs reportedly proposed that “SpaceX’s authorization to continue deploying satellites” be directly linked to an arbitrary metric measuring “the number of years each failed satellite remains in orbit, summed across all failed satellites.” The FCC apparently loved the suggestion and made it an explicit condition of its already harsh Starlink Gen2 authorization, even adopting the arbitrary limit of “100 object years” proposed by LeoLabs.

In other words, once the sum of the time required for all failed Starlink Gen2 satellites to naturally deorbit reaches 100 years, the FCC will force SpaceX to “cease satellite deployment” while it “[reviews] sources of satellite failure” and “determine[s] whether there are any adequate and reliable mitigation measures going forward.” The FCC acknowledges that the arbitrary 100-year limit means that the failure of just 20 Starlink satellites at operational orbits would force the company to halt launches. The Commission does not explain how it will decide when SpaceX can restart Starlink launches after a launch halt. SpaceX must simultaneously follow the FCC’s deployment schedule, which could see the company’s license revoked if it doesn’t deploy 3,750 Starlink Gen2 satellites by November 2028 and all 7,500 satellites by November 2031.

Based on the unofficial observations of astrophysicist Jonathan McDowell, SpaceX currently has more 30 failed Starlink Gen1 satellites at or close to their operational altitudes of 500+ kilometers, meaning that SpaceX would almost certainly be forced to stop launching Gen1 satellites if this arbitrary new rule were applied to other constellations. The same is true for competitor OneWeb, which had a single satellite fail at around 1200 kilometers in 2021. At that altitude, it will likely take hundreds of “object years” to naturally deorbit, easily surpassing LeoLabs’ draconian 100-year limit.

In theory, the FCC does make it clear that it will consider changing those restrictions and allowing SpaceX to launch more of its proposed Starlink Gen2 constellation in the future. But the Commission has also repeatedly demonstrated to SpaceX that it will happily take years to modify existing licenses or approve new ones – not a particularly reassuring foundation for investments as large and precarious as megaconstellations.

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Ultimately, short of shady handshake deals in back rooms, the FCC’s partial grant leaves SpaceX’s Starlink Gen2 constellation in an undesirable position. For the company to proceed under the current license, it could be forced to redesign its satellites and ground stations to avoid the E-band, or gamble by continuing to build and deploy satellites and ground stations with E-band antennas without a guarantee that it’ll ever be able to use that hardware. There is also no guarantee that the FCC will permit SpaceX to launch any of the ~22,500 satellites left on the table by the partial grant, which will drastically change the financial calculus that determines whether the constellation is economically viable and how expansive associated infrastructure needs to be.

Additionally, if SpaceX accepts the gambit and launches all 7,500 approved Gen2 satellites only for the FCC to fail to approve expansions, Starlink Gen2 would be stuck with zero polar coverage, significantly reducing the constellation’s overall utility. Starlink Gen2 likely represents an investment of at least $30-60 billion (assuming an unprecedentedly low $1-2M to build and launch each 50-150 Gbps satellite). With its partial license denial and the addition of several new and arbitrary conditions, the FCC is effectively forcing SpaceX to take an even riskier gamble with the billions of dollars of brand new infrastructure it will need to build to manufacture, launch, operate, and utilize its Starlink Gen2 constellation.

Eric Ralph is Teslarati's senior spaceflight reporter and has been covering the industry in some capacity for almost half a decade, largely spurred in 2016 by a trip to Mexico to watch Elon Musk reveal SpaceX's plans for Mars in person. Aside from spreading interest and excitement about spaceflight far and wide, his primary goal is to cover humanity's ongoing efforts to expand beyond Earth to the Moon, Mars, and elsewhere.

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Tesla Model Y prices just went up for the first time in two years

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Credit: Tesla Asia | X

Tesla just raised Model Y prices for the first time in two years, with the largest increase being $1,000.

The move signals shifting dynamics in the competitive electric vehicle market as the company continues to work on balancing demand, profitability, and accessibility.

The new pricing affects premium trims while leaving entry-level options unchanged. The Model Y Premium Rear-Wheel Drive (RWD) now starts at $45,990, a $1,000 increase.

The Model Y Premium All-Wheel Drive (AWD)—previously referred to in the post as simply “Model Y AWD”—rises to $49,990, also up $1,000. The top-tier Model Y Performance sees a more modest $500 bump, bringing its starting price to $57,990.

Base models remain untouched to preserve affordability. The entry-level Model Y RWD holds steady at $39,990, and the base Model Y AWD stays at $41,990. This selective approach keeps the crossover accessible for budget-conscious buyers while extracting more revenue from higher-margin configurations.

After years of aggressive price cuts to stimulate volume amid slowing EV adoption and rising competition from rivals like BYD, Ford, and GM, Tesla appears confident in underlying demand. Recent lineup refreshes for the 2026 Model Y, including refreshed styling and efficiency gains, have helped maintain its status as America’s best-selling EV.

By protecting base prices, Tesla avoids alienating price-sensitive customers while improving margins on the more popular variants.

Tesla Model Y ownership review after six months: What I love and what I don’t

For consumers, the changes are relatively modest—under 3% on affected trims—and still position the Model Y competitively against gas-powered SUVs in the same class. Federal tax credits and potential state incentives may further offset costs for eligible buyers.

This marks a subtle but notable shift from the deep discounting era that defined much of 2024 and 2025. As the EV market matures into 2026, Tesla’s pricing strategy will be closely watched for clues about production ramps, new variants like the rumored longer-wheelbase Model Y, and broader profitability goals.

In short, today’s adjustment reflects a company that remains dominant yet pragmatic—willing to test higher pricing where demand supports it. It is unlikely to deter consumers from choosing other options.

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Elon Musk explains why he cannot be fired from SpaceX

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Credit: SpaceX

Elon Musk cannot be fired from SpaceX, and there’s a reason for that.

In a blunt post on X on Friday, Elon Musk confirmed plans to structurally shield his leadership at SpaceX, ensuring he cannot be fired while tying a potential trillion-dollar compensation package to the company’s long-term goal of establishing a self-sustaining colony on Mars.

The revelation stems from a Financial Times report detailing SpaceX’s intention to restructure its governance and compensation framework. The moves are designed to protect Musk’s control and align his incentives with the company’s founding mission rather than short-term financial pressures. Musk’s reply left no ambiguity:

“Yes, I need to make sure SpaceX stays focused on making life multiplanetary and extending consciousness to the stars, not pandering to someone’s bullshit quarterly earnings bonus!”

He added that success in this “absurdly difficult goal” would generate value “many orders of magnitude more than the economy of Earth,” though he cautioned that the journey will not be smooth. “Don’t expect entirely smooth sailing along the way,” Musk wrote.

The strategy reflects Musk’s deep concerns about how public-market expectations could derail SpaceX’s core objective. Founded in 2002, SpaceX has repeatedly stated its purpose is to reduce the cost of space travel and ultimately make humanity a multiplanetary species.

Unlike Tesla, which went public in 2010 and has faced repeated battles over Musk’s compensation and board influence, SpaceX remains privately held. Musk has long resisted taking the rocket company public precisely to avoid the quarterly earnings treadmill that forces most CEOs to prioritize short-term stock performance over ambitious, high-risk projects.

By embedding protections against his removal and linking any outsized pay package to verifiable milestones—such as a functioning Mars colony—SpaceX aims to insulate its leadership from activist investors or board members who might demand faster profits or safer bets.

SpaceX Board has set a Mars bonus for Elon Musk

Musk has referenced past experiences, including his ouster from OpenAI and shareholder lawsuits at Tesla, as cautionary tales. In those cases, he argued, external pressures risked diluting the original vision.

Critics may view the arrangement as excessive, especially given Musk’s already substantial voting power and wealth. Supporters, however, argue it is a necessary safeguard for a company pursuing goals measured in decades rather than quarters. Achieving a Mars colony would require sustained investment in Starship development, orbital refueling, life-support systems, and in-situ resource utilization—technologies that may deliver no immediate financial return.

Musk’s post underscores a broader philosophical point: true breakthrough innovation often demands tolerance for volatility and a willingness to ignore conventional business wisdom. As SpaceX prepares for increasingly ambitious Starship test flights and eventual crewed missions, the new governance structure signals that the company’s North Star remains unchanged—humanity’s expansion beyond Earth.

Whether the trillion-dollar package materializes depends on execution, but Musk’s message is clear: SpaceX exists to reach the stars, not to chase the next earnings beat. For investors or employees who share that vision, the protections are not a perk—they are a prerequisite for success.

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Tesla discloses two Robotaxi crashes to NHTSA

Newly unredacted data filed with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) reveals the two incidents. 

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Tesla has disclosed information on two low-speed crashes that occurred in Austin with its Robotaxi platform. These incidents occurred with teleoperators steering the vehicle, and there were no passengers in the car at the time they happened.

Newly unredacted data filed with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) reveals the two incidents.

The first crash took place in July 2025, shortly after Tesla launched its nascent Robotaxi network in Austin. The ADS reportedly struggled to move forward while stopped on a street. A teleoperator assumed control, gradually accelerating and turning left toward the roadside. The vehicle then mounted the curb and struck a metal fence.

In the second incident, in January 2026, the ADS was traveling straight when the safety monitor requested navigation support. The teleoperator took over from a stop, continued forward, and collided with a temporary construction barricade at approximately 9 mph, scraping the front-left fender and tire.

Tesla Robotaxi service in Austin achieves monumental new accomplishment

Tesla has previously told lawmakers that teleoperators are authorized to pilot vehicles remotely—but only at speeds below 10 mph, as the only maneuvers they were approved to perform were repositioning in awkward areas.

“This capability enables Tesla to promptly move a vehicle that may be in a compromising position, thereby mitigating the need to wait for a first responder or Tesla field representative to manually recover the vehicle,” the company stated in filings earlier this year.

Before this week, Tesla redacted the NHTSA reports, but they decided to reveal all 17 Robotaxi incidents recorded since the launch in Austin last Summer. Most of the other crashes involved the Tesla being struck by other road users and were not caused by the self-driving suite itself.

There were other incidents, including two additional self-caused accidents involving the ADS clipping side mirrors on parked cars. In September 2025, one Robotaxi struck a dog that darted into the roadway (the dog escaped unharmed), while another made an unprotected left turn into a parking lot and hit a metal chain.

Although Waymo and Zoox have reported more total crashes, Tesla operates at a far smaller scale. The cautious pace reflects the company’s broader safety concerns; it has been very slow with the Robotaxi rollout to ensure the suite is ready for operation.

Last month, CEO Elon Musk acknowledged that “making sure things are completely safe” remains the primary bottleneck to expanding the network, describing the company’s approach as “very cautious.”

The unredacted filings arrive amid heightened regulatory scrutiny of autonomous vehicles. NHTSA recently closed a separate probe into Tesla’s Full Self-Driving software repeatedly striking parking-lot obstacles such as bollards and chains—a problem that also prompted a recall at Waymo last year.

Tesla Robotaxi has been a widely successful program in its early days of operation, and the transparency Tesla brings here is greatly appreciated. Incidents will happen, of course, but the honesty gives customers and regulators a sense of where Tesla is in terms of developing its self-driving and fully autonomous ride-hailing suite.

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