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SpaceX Starlink Gen2 constellation weakened by “partial” FCC grant
More than two and a half years after SpaceX began the process of securing regulatory approval for its next-generation Starlink constellation, the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has finally granted the company a license – but only after drastically decreasing its scope.
In May 2020, SpaceX filed its first FCC license application for Starlink Gen2, an upgraded constellation of 30,000 satellites. In the second half of 2021, SpaceX amended its Starlink Gen2 application to take full advantage of the company’s more powerful Starship rocket and further improve the constellation’s potential utility. Only in December 2021 did the FCC finally accept SpaceX’s Gen2 application for filing, kicking off the final review process.
On November 29th, 2022, the FCC completed that review and granted SpaceX permission to launch just 7,500 of the ~30,000 Starlink Gen2 satellites it had requested permission for more than 30 months prior. The FCC offered no explanation of how it arrived at its arbitrary 75% reduction, nor why the resulting number is slightly lower than a different 7,518-satellite Starlink Gen1 constellation SpaceX had already received a license to deploy in late 2018. Adding insult to injury, the FCC repeatedly acknowledges that “the total number of satellites SpaceX is authorized to deploy is not increased by our action today, and in fact is slightly reduced.”
The update that's rolling out to the fleet makes full use of the front and rear steering travel to minimize turning circle. In this case a reduction of 1.6 feet just over the air— Wes (@wmorrill3) April 16, 2024
That claimed reduction is thanks to the fact that shortly before this decision, SpaceX told the FCC in good faith that it would voluntarily avoid launching the dedicated V-band Starlink constellation it already received a license for in order “to significantly reduce the total number of satellites ultimately on orbit.” Instead, once Starlink Gen2 was approved, it would request permission to add V-band payloads to a subset of the 29,988 planned Gen2 satellites, achieving a similar result without the need for another 7,518 satellites.
In response, the FCC slashed the total number of Starlink Gen2 satellites permitted to less than the number of satellites approved by the FCC’s November 2018 Starlink V-band authorization; limited those satellites to middle-ground orbits, entirely precluding Gen2 launches to higher or lower orbits; and didn’t even structure its compromise in a way that would at least allow SpaceX to fully complete three Starlink Gen2 ‘shells.’ Worse, the FCC’s partial grant barely mentioned SpaceX’s detailed plans to use new E-band antennas on Starlink Gen2 satellites and next-generation ground stations, simply stating that it will “defer acting on” the request until “further review and coordination with Federal users.”
Throughout the partial grant, the FCC couches its decision to drastically downscale SpaceX’s Starlink Gen2 constellation in terms of needing more time “to evaluate the complex and novel issues on the record before [the Commission],” raising the question of what exactly the Commission was doing instead in the 30 months since SpaceX’s first Gen2 application and 15 months since its Gen2 modification. In comparison, SpaceX received a full license for its 7,518-satellite V-band constellation less than five months after applying. SpaceX’s 4,408-satellite Starlink Gen1 constellation – the first megaconstellation ever reviewed by the modern FCC – was licensed 16 months after its first application and eight months after a modified application was submitted.
Adding to the oddity of the unusual and inconsistent decision-making in this FCC ruling, the Commission openly acknowledges that the idea to grant SpaceX permission to launch a fraction of its Starlink Gen2 constellation came from Amazon’s Project Kuiper [PDF], a major prospective Starlink competitor. The FCC says it agreed with Amazon’s argument, stating that “the public interest would be served by taking this approach in order to permit monitoring of developments involving this large-scale deployment and permit additional consideration of issues unique to the other orbits SpaceX requests.”
The V-band Starlink constellation already approved by the FCC was for 7,518 satellites in very low Earth orbits (~340 km). In the first 4,425-satellite Starlink constellation licensed by the FCC, the Commission gave SpaceX permission to operate 2,814 satellites at orbits between 1100 and 1300 kilometers. Increasingly conscious of the consequences of space debris, which would last hundreds of years at 1000+ kilometers, SpaceX later requested permission in 2019 and 2020 to launch those 2,814 satellites to around 550 kilometers, where failed satellites would reenter in just five years. For unknown reasons, the FCC only fully approved the change two years later, in April 2021.
The “other orbits [requested by SpaceX]” that the FCC says create unique issues that demand “additional consideration” of Starlink Gen2 are for 19,400 satellites between 340 and 360 kilometers and 468 satellites between 604 and 614 kilometers. Starlink satellites are expected to be around four times heavier and feature a magnitude more surface area, but the fact remains that the FCC has already granted SpaceX permission to launch almost 3000 smaller satellites to orbits much higher than 604 kilometers and more than 7500 satellites to orbits lower than 360 kilometers. It’s thus hard not to conclude that the Commission’s claims that a partial license denial was warranted by “concerns about orbital debris and space safety,” and “issues unique to…other orbits” are incoherent at best.
Perhaps the strangest inclusion in the partial grant is a decision by the FCC to subject SpaceX to an arbitrary metric devised by another third-party, for-profit company LeoLabs. In a March 2022 letter, LeoLabs reportedly proposed that “SpaceX’s authorization to continue deploying satellites” be directly linked to an arbitrary metric measuring “the number of years each failed satellite remains in orbit, summed across all failed satellites.” The FCC apparently loved the suggestion and made it an explicit condition of its already harsh Starlink Gen2 authorization, even adopting the arbitrary limit of “100 object years” proposed by LeoLabs.
In other words, once the sum of the time required for all failed Starlink Gen2 satellites to naturally deorbit reaches 100 years, the FCC will force SpaceX to “cease satellite deployment” while it “[reviews] sources of satellite failure” and “determine[s] whether there are any adequate and reliable mitigation measures going forward.” The FCC acknowledges that the arbitrary 100-year limit means that the failure of just 20 Starlink satellites at operational orbits would force the company to halt launches. The Commission does not explain how it will decide when SpaceX can restart Starlink launches after a launch halt. SpaceX must simultaneously follow the FCC’s deployment schedule, which could see the company’s license revoked if it doesn’t deploy 3,750 Starlink Gen2 satellites by November 2028 and all 7,500 satellites by November 2031.
Based on the unofficial observations of astrophysicist Jonathan McDowell, SpaceX currently has more 30 failed Starlink Gen1 satellites at or close to their operational altitudes of 500+ kilometers, meaning that SpaceX would almost certainly be forced to stop launching Gen1 satellites if this arbitrary new rule were applied to other constellations. The same is true for competitor OneWeb, which had a single satellite fail at around 1200 kilometers in 2021. At that altitude, it will likely take hundreds of “object years” to naturally deorbit, easily surpassing LeoLabs’ draconian 100-year limit.
In theory, the FCC does make it clear that it will consider changing those restrictions and allowing SpaceX to launch more of its proposed Starlink Gen2 constellation in the future. But the Commission has also repeatedly demonstrated to SpaceX that it will happily take years to modify existing licenses or approve new ones – not a particularly reassuring foundation for investments as large and precarious as megaconstellations.
Ultimately, short of shady handshake deals in back rooms, the FCC’s partial grant leaves SpaceX’s Starlink Gen2 constellation in an undesirable position. For the company to proceed under the current license, it could be forced to redesign its satellites and ground stations to avoid the E-band, or gamble by continuing to build and deploy satellites and ground stations with E-band antennas without a guarantee that it’ll ever be able to use that hardware. There is also no guarantee that the FCC will permit SpaceX to launch any of the ~22,500 satellites left on the table by the partial grant, which will drastically change the financial calculus that determines whether the constellation is economically viable and how expansive associated infrastructure needs to be.
Additionally, if SpaceX accepts the gambit and launches all 7,500 approved Gen2 satellites only for the FCC to fail to approve expansions, Starlink Gen2 would be stuck with zero polar coverage, significantly reducing the constellation’s overall utility. Starlink Gen2 likely represents an investment of at least $30-60 billion (assuming an unprecedentedly low $1-2M to build and launch each 50-150 Gbps satellite). With its partial license denial and the addition of several new and arbitrary conditions, the FCC is effectively forcing SpaceX to take an even riskier gamble with the billions of dollars of brand new infrastructure it will need to build to manufacture, launch, operate, and utilize its Starlink Gen2 constellation.
SpaceX confirmed today that it has officially signed its third massive compute deal, providing compute at its Colossus data center in Southaven, Tennessee.
Reflection AI will gain immediate access to NVIDIA GB300 chips at SpaceX’s Colossus 2 data center. In return, Reflection will pay SpaceX $150 million per month starting on July 1, with total payments reaching approximately $6.3 billion if the contract runs through its duration, which is until 2029. Either party can terminate the agreement with 90 days’ notice after the initial three-month period.
CNBC first reported the deal.
🚨 SpaceXAI has agreed to a new compute deal with Reflection AI.
Reflection gets access to NIVIDIA GB300s, and will pay $150M per month to SpaceXAI for the compute. pic.twitter.com/bNPare8U5u
— TESLARATI (@Teslarati) June 22, 2026
This latest partnership highlights SpaceX’s strategy of commercializing its massive Colossus supercomputing infrastructure, originally developed to power Elon Musk’s Grok AI models. The company has rapidly expanded its customer base in the AI sector following its February 2026 merger with xAI, a transaction that valued the combined entity at $1.25 trillion.
SpaceX has previously signed significant compute deals with other major players.
It granted Anthropic exclusive access to the full capacity of its Colossus 1 data center, which exceeds 300 megawatts and includes over 220,000 NVIDIA GPUs. Details from SpaceX’s IPO filings indicate Anthropic will pay $1.25 billion per month through May 2029, potentially generating around $45 billion over the term of the deal.
Additionally, Google agreed to pay SpaceX $920 million per month for compute capacity from October 2026 through June 2029. This 32-month period will provide Google access to roughly 110,000 NVIDIA GPUs, along with supporting processors and memory. Capacity ramps up through September at a reduced fee, with termination options after the first year.
SpaceXA also established arrangements for computing power with Cursor, an AI coding startup. SpaceX acquired them in a $60 billion all-stock deal.
These arrangements position SpaceX’s collective position as an AI infrastructure powerhouse with high-margin revenue potential. The Google deal alone could generate nearly $29.5 billion over its term, while the Reflection contract adds another $6.3 billion.
Combined with the Anthropic arrangement, SpaceX stands to realize tens of billions in revenue from compute leasing in the coming years, which diversifies beyond SpaceX’s traditional rocket launches and Starlink operation.
The deals underscore growing demand for advanced AI training and inference capacity amid chip shortages and surging model development needs. Reflection, valued at $25 billion and focused on “American open intelligence” with government and national security ties, cited recent restrictions on closed models as validation for open-source approaches.
For SpaceX, the partnerships transform capital-intensive data centers into flexible revenue sources while supporting its broader AI ambitions after the company has gone public.
It is safe to say SpaceX won’t be going for electric rockets anytime soon.
In a characteristically blunt reply on X, SpaceX frontman Elon Musk stated, “Unfortunately, electric rockets are impossible,” following reports that MSCI had assigned SpaceX its lowest possible ESG rating of CCC.
The assessment, issued just this past week, coinciding closely with SpaceX’s public market debut, placed the company on par with nations like Russia in sustainability scoring and cited significant risks in environmental, social, and governance areas.
MSCI flagged SpaceX’s exposure to rocket emissions and other operational impacts, alongside governance concerns such as concentrated control by Musk and limited shareholder protections. Musk’s terse comment directly addressed the environmental pillar, underscoring a core physical constraint that ESG frameworks often overlook when evaluating high-thrust industries.
Unfortunately, electric rockets are impossible
— Elon Musk (@elonmusk) June 21, 2026
Electric propulsion systems do exist and are widely used in space. Ion thrusters and Hall-effect thrusters accelerate ionized propellant, typically xenon or krypton, using electric fields, achieving very high specific impulse, often exceeding 3,000 seconds compared to roughly 300–450 seconds for chemical rockets.
This efficiency makes them ideal for satellite station-keeping, orbit raising, and deep-space missions where low thrust over long durations is sufficient. SpaceX’s own Starlink satellites employ electric propulsion for these purposes.
However, launching from Earth’s surface demands something entirely different: enormous thrust delivered rapidly to overcome gravity and atmospheric drag. A typical orbital-class booster must generate thrust far exceeding its weight, often in the millions of Newtons within seconds.
Chemical rockets achieve this through exothermic combustion of dense propellants, producing high-mass-flow, high-velocity exhaust. Electric systems, by contrast, expel very small amounts of mass at extremely high speeds. Generating equivalent thrust would require impractical onboard power levels, massive energy storage or generation systems, and prohibitive added mass, rendering the approach infeasible with current or near-term technology.
Musk has previously expressed a similar sentiment, noting a desire for electric orbital rockets while acknowledging the inescapable requirements of Newton’s third law and energy delivery. The distinction is clear: electric propulsion excels once a vehicle is already in space; it cannot replace the high-thrust chemical phase required to reach orbit from the ground.
The episode illustrates broader critiques of ESG ratings. Proponents argue they incentivize better risk management and long-term sustainability. Detractors, including Musk—who has previously called ESG a “scam”—contend that such metrics can penalize essential activities when no practical alternative exists, potentially discouraging innovation in sectors like space access.
Elon Musk dubs the S&P 500 ESG as “outrageous scam” after Tesla gets booted from index
SpaceX has sought to mitigate launch-related impacts through reusability: Falcon 9 boosters have flown more than 30 times in some cases, dramatically lowering the manufacturing and emissions burden per kilogram delivered to orbit. Starship’s design further emphasizes rapid reusability and methane propellant, which can theoretically be produced via sustainable pathways.
Ultimately, Musk’s remark serves as a reminder that certain engineering realities persist regardless of scoring systems. As humanity expands its presence in space for communications, science, and exploration, balancing genuine environmental progress with technological necessity remains a central challenge.
ESG frameworks may evolve, but the fundamental limits of electric launch propulsion are unlikely to change soon.
Tesla just trademarked ‘MEGAPOD’ with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), its latest move in what seems to be a hint that the company is incredibly focused on its AI efforts and storage needs as compute increases.
The application carries serial number 99893717 and lists the applicant as Tesla, Inc., located at 1 Tesla Road, Austin, Texas 78725.
The filing remains in ‘live pending’ status, and it is a new application waiting for assignment to an examining attorney. It has not yet been published or registered.
Tesla just trademarked MEGAPOD
Summary:
“Modular data center hardware systems for artificial intelligence computing, comprised of computer servers, computer hardware for artificial intelligence processing, computer networking hardware, electrical power distribution units, and… pic.twitter.com/3l85DsKadl— Robin (@xdNiBoR) June 19, 2026
According to the official goods and services description in the application, Tesla describes ‘MEGAPOD’ as:
“Modular data center hardware systems for artificial intelligence computing, comprised of computer servers, computer hardware for artificial intelligence processing, computer networking hardware, electrical power distribution units, and cooling systems, sold as a unit; self-contained modular computing hardware systems for artificial intelligence workloads; integrated computer hardware platforms for artificial intelligence computing, namely, enclosures containing computer hardware, power distribution hardware, and cooling hardware, sold as a unit; downloadable software for monitoring, managing, optimizing, and regulating modular artificial intelligence computing hardware systems.”
This description specifies complete, self-contained modular units that integrate servers and specialized AI processing hardware with networking components, power distribution, and cooling systems. It also includes associated downloadable software for oversight and optimization of these systems. The language emphasizes hardware sold “as a unit” and enclosures that combine the necessary elements for AI computing workloads.
Tesla has an established history of developing and commercializing modular hardware systems. Its Megapack product line, for example, consists of utility-scale battery energy storage systems designed as containerized units for grid applications. The MEGAPOD filing follows a similar pattern of protecting a name for modular, integrated hardware platforms, this time focused on artificial intelligence computing infrastructure.
This could be an early move, especially as Tesla did not have trademark rights to the word ‘Cybercab,’ the name of its self-driving, ride-hailing-focused vehicle.
Trademark applications of this type allow companies to secure priority rights to a name for defined categories of goods and services. The USPTO examines applications for compliance with legal requirements, including distinctiveness and absence of conflicts with prior marks. If the application proceeds successfully through examination, publication, and any opposition period, it could result in a federal trademark registration providing nationwide protection. This is what Tesla’s obvious intention is with ‘MEGAPOD.’
Public reports and analysis suggest MEGAPOD could represent modular, container-style AI computing pods designed for easy deployment. These would bundle servers, AI accelerators, power systems, and cooling into self-contained units suitable for distributed AI workloads. This approach aligns with Tesla’s announced AI compute strategy.
In March 2026, Elon Musk outlined plans for “Digital Optimus” (also referred to as Macrohard), a joint Tesla-xAI project for AI agents capable of handling complex digital tasks. The plans include running these agents on Tesla’s AI4 hardware in parked vehicles as well as dedicated compute units installed at Supercharger stations, which collectively offer substantial unused electrical capacity.
What is Digital Optimus? The new Tesla and xAI project explained
A modular hardware platform like the one described in the ‘MEGAPOD’ filing would support scalable, rapid deployment of such distributed compute resources. It could complement Tesla’s other AI infrastructure efforts, including the Dojo supercomputer used for training models and the development of AI systems for autonomous driving and robotics, by enabling edge or regional AI inference without reliance on traditional centralized data centers.
SpaceX confirms third massive compute deal at Colossus data center
Elon Musk responds to SpaceX’s ESG rating and says its rockets won’t go electric
