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SpaceX Starlink competitor OneWeb misled the FCC, media with false “near-miss” narrative
In the latest trials and tribulations of a SpaceX Starlink competitor that went bankrupt after spending $3 billion to launch just 74 small internet satellites, it appears that OneWeb knowingly misled both media and US regulators over a claimed “near-miss” with a Starlink satellite.
Back on April 9th, OneWeb went public with claims that SpaceX had mishandled its response to a routine satellite collision avoidance warning from the US military, which monitors the location of satellites and space debris. According to OneWeb government affairs chief Chris McLaughlin, SpaceX disabled an automated system designed to detect and automatically command Starlink satellite collision avoidance maneuvers to let OneWeb move its satellite instead. McLaughlin also stated that “Coordination is the issue – it is not sufficient to say ‘I’ve got an automated system.’”
He also recently criticized the maneuverability of Starlink satellites, claiming that “Starlink’s engineers said they couldn’t do anything to avoid a collision and switched off the collision avoidance system so OneWeb could maneuver around the Starlink satellite without interference.” As it turns out, OneWeb’s “near-miss” appears to have been a farce and the company scrambled to promise to retract those statements in an April 20th meeting with the FCC and SpaceX.
In far more egregious comments made on April 20th to the Wall Street Journal, a publication with a long history of blindly disseminating anti-SpaceX rhetoric, McLaughlin likened OneWeb’s satellites to “Ford Focus” cars and attempted to lambast Starlink satellites by comparing them to “Teslas: They launch them and then they have to upgrade and fix them, or even replace them altogether.”
Over the past 17 months, SpaceX has launched more than 1380 operational Starlink v1.0 satellites, some 870 of which are operational. Another ~440 are in the process of reaching operational orbits. All told, some 1365 are still in orbit and around 1345 of those satellites are working as expected for a total Starlink v1.0 failure rate of roughly 2.5%. As is SpaceX’s bread and butter, however, reliability has been continuously improving and of ~960 Starlink satellites launched over the last ~12 months, the overall failure rate has dropped to less than 1% – an almost threefold improvement.
After exiting bankruptcy last November, OneWeb has completed just two more launches for a total of 140 operational satellites in orbit of a planned ~650. Operating at a much higher ~1200 km (~750 mi) orbit, any failure of OneWeb satellites would produce debris that could remain in orbit for decades, whereas SpaceX has explicitly chosen much lower ~550 km (~340 mi) orbits, meaning that debris reenters in a matter of years. At Starlink’s sub-300-kilometer (~185 mi) insertion orbit, any faulty satellites screened during SpaceX’s checkout process reenter in a matter of days or weeks thanks to drag from Earth’s atmosphere.
The first phase of SpaceX’s Starlink constellation will require approximately 4400 satellites in low Earth orbit (LEO) and the company is already almost a third of the way to that milestone. A second phase could see those numbers grow as high as ~12,000, followed by a third phase with more than 40,000 satellites much further down the road. Relative to OneWeb, Starlink is dramatically more ambitious and each SpaceX satellite offers superior bandwidth and latency in a bid to blanket the Earth in affordable, high-quality broadband internet.
Of course, as a consequence of needing so many satellites to build out a network with enough bandwidth to serve tens to hundreds of millions of people, there is an obvious risk that unreliable satellites could make LEO a much more challenging place to operate for both SpaceX and the rest of the world. It also demands an entirely new approach to collision avoidance given the impracticality of human operators manually managing a fleet of thousands – or tens of thousands – of satellites.
Towards that end, SpaceX is developing an autonomous collision avoidance system – though virtually nothing is known about that system outside of the company, creating a far from optimal situation for all other satellite operators. Nevertheless, aside from one publicized avoidance maneuver in 2019, SpaceX appears to be quickly becoming a responsible and (mostly) transparent operator and custodian.
In an apparent attempt to capitalize on vague fears of “space debris” and satellite collisions, OneWeb – or perhaps just McLaughlin – took it upon itself to consciously misconstrue a routine, professional process of collision-avoidance coordination between OneWeb and SpaceX. McLaughlin ran a gauntlet of media outlets to drag SpaceX through the mud and criticize both the company’s technology and response, ultimately claiming that SpaceX’s Starlink satellite was incapable of maneuvering out of the way.
Instead, according to a precise, evidenced timeline of events presented by SpaceX to the FCC, the coordination was routine, uneventful, and entirely successful. OneWeb itself explicitly asked SpaceX to disable its autonomous collision avoidance software and allow the company to maneuver its own satellite out of the way after SpaceX made it clear that the Starlink spacecraft could also manage the task. The event was neither “urgent” or a “close call,” as OneWeb and media outlets later claimed. SpaceX says it has been coordinating similar avoidance maneuvers with OneWeb since March 2020.
Most damningly, SpaceX says that immediately after OneWeb disseminated misleading quotes about the event to the media, “OneWeb met with [FCC] staff and Commissioners [to demand that] unilateral conditions [be] placed on SpaceX’s operations.” Those conditions could have actually made coordination harder, “demonstrating more of a concern with limiting [OneWeb’s] competitors than with a genuine concern for space safety.” Crucially, despite lobbying to restrict its competitors, “OneWeb [has] argued forcefully that [it] should be exempt from Commission rules for orbital debris mitigation due to their status as non-U.S. operators.”
In simple terms, OneWeb is trying to exploit the FCC to suppress its competition while letting it roam free of the exact same regulations. Meanwhile, SpaceX is focused on launching satellites and serving tens of thousands of beta customers as Starlink speeds towards virtually uninterrupted global coverage barely a year and a half after operational launches began – all while coordinating with dozens of other satellite operators to be the best ‘neighbor’ it can be in space.
It is safe to say SpaceX won’t be going for electric rockets anytime soon.
In a characteristically blunt reply on X, SpaceX frontman Elon Musk stated, “Unfortunately, electric rockets are impossible,” following reports that MSCI had assigned SpaceX its lowest possible ESG rating of CCC.
The assessment, issued just this past week, coinciding closely with SpaceX’s public market debut, placed the company on par with nations like Russia in sustainability scoring and cited significant risks in environmental, social, and governance areas.
MSCI flagged SpaceX’s exposure to rocket emissions and other operational impacts, alongside governance concerns such as concentrated control by Musk and limited shareholder protections. Musk’s terse comment directly addressed the environmental pillar, underscoring a core physical constraint that ESG frameworks often overlook when evaluating high-thrust industries.
Unfortunately, electric rockets are impossible
— Elon Musk (@elonmusk) June 21, 2026
Electric propulsion systems do exist and are widely used in space. Ion thrusters and Hall-effect thrusters accelerate ionized propellant, typically xenon or krypton, using electric fields, achieving very high specific impulse, often exceeding 3,000 seconds compared to roughly 300–450 seconds for chemical rockets.
This efficiency makes them ideal for satellite station-keeping, orbit raising, and deep-space missions where low thrust over long durations is sufficient. SpaceX’s own Starlink satellites employ electric propulsion for these purposes.
However, launching from Earth’s surface demands something entirely different: enormous thrust delivered rapidly to overcome gravity and atmospheric drag. A typical orbital-class booster must generate thrust far exceeding its weight, often in the millions of Newtons within seconds.
Chemical rockets achieve this through exothermic combustion of dense propellants, producing high-mass-flow, high-velocity exhaust. Electric systems, by contrast, expel very small amounts of mass at extremely high speeds. Generating equivalent thrust would require impractical onboard power levels, massive energy storage or generation systems, and prohibitive added mass, rendering the approach infeasible with current or near-term technology.
Musk has previously expressed a similar sentiment, noting a desire for electric orbital rockets while acknowledging the inescapable requirements of Newton’s third law and energy delivery. The distinction is clear: electric propulsion excels once a vehicle is already in space; it cannot replace the high-thrust chemical phase required to reach orbit from the ground.
The episode illustrates broader critiques of ESG ratings. Proponents argue they incentivize better risk management and long-term sustainability. Detractors, including Musk—who has previously called ESG a “scam”—contend that such metrics can penalize essential activities when no practical alternative exists, potentially discouraging innovation in sectors like space access.
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SpaceX has sought to mitigate launch-related impacts through reusability: Falcon 9 boosters have flown more than 30 times in some cases, dramatically lowering the manufacturing and emissions burden per kilogram delivered to orbit. Starship’s design further emphasizes rapid reusability and methane propellant, which can theoretically be produced via sustainable pathways.
Ultimately, Musk’s remark serves as a reminder that certain engineering realities persist regardless of scoring systems. As humanity expands its presence in space for communications, science, and exploration, balancing genuine environmental progress with technological necessity remains a central challenge.
ESG frameworks may evolve, but the fundamental limits of electric launch propulsion are unlikely to change soon.
Tesla just trademarked ‘MEGAPOD’ with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), its latest move in what seems to be a hint that the company is incredibly focused on its AI efforts and storage needs as compute increases.
The application carries serial number 99893717 and lists the applicant as Tesla, Inc., located at 1 Tesla Road, Austin, Texas 78725.
The filing remains in ‘live pending’ status, and it is a new application waiting for assignment to an examining attorney. It has not yet been published or registered.
Tesla just trademarked MEGAPOD
Summary:
“Modular data center hardware systems for artificial intelligence computing, comprised of computer servers, computer hardware for artificial intelligence processing, computer networking hardware, electrical power distribution units, and… pic.twitter.com/3l85DsKadl— Robin (@xdNiBoR) June 19, 2026
According to the official goods and services description in the application, Tesla describes ‘MEGAPOD’ as:
“Modular data center hardware systems for artificial intelligence computing, comprised of computer servers, computer hardware for artificial intelligence processing, computer networking hardware, electrical power distribution units, and cooling systems, sold as a unit; self-contained modular computing hardware systems for artificial intelligence workloads; integrated computer hardware platforms for artificial intelligence computing, namely, enclosures containing computer hardware, power distribution hardware, and cooling hardware, sold as a unit; downloadable software for monitoring, managing, optimizing, and regulating modular artificial intelligence computing hardware systems.”
This description specifies complete, self-contained modular units that integrate servers and specialized AI processing hardware with networking components, power distribution, and cooling systems. It also includes associated downloadable software for oversight and optimization of these systems. The language emphasizes hardware sold “as a unit” and enclosures that combine the necessary elements for AI computing workloads.
Tesla has an established history of developing and commercializing modular hardware systems. Its Megapack product line, for example, consists of utility-scale battery energy storage systems designed as containerized units for grid applications. The MEGAPOD filing follows a similar pattern of protecting a name for modular, integrated hardware platforms, this time focused on artificial intelligence computing infrastructure.
This could be an early move, especially as Tesla did not have trademark rights to the word ‘Cybercab,’ the name of its self-driving, ride-hailing-focused vehicle.
Trademark applications of this type allow companies to secure priority rights to a name for defined categories of goods and services. The USPTO examines applications for compliance with legal requirements, including distinctiveness and absence of conflicts with prior marks. If the application proceeds successfully through examination, publication, and any opposition period, it could result in a federal trademark registration providing nationwide protection. This is what Tesla’s obvious intention is with ‘MEGAPOD.’
Public reports and analysis suggest MEGAPOD could represent modular, container-style AI computing pods designed for easy deployment. These would bundle servers, AI accelerators, power systems, and cooling into self-contained units suitable for distributed AI workloads. This approach aligns with Tesla’s announced AI compute strategy.
In March 2026, Elon Musk outlined plans for “Digital Optimus” (also referred to as Macrohard), a joint Tesla-xAI project for AI agents capable of handling complex digital tasks. The plans include running these agents on Tesla’s AI4 hardware in parked vehicles as well as dedicated compute units installed at Supercharger stations, which collectively offer substantial unused electrical capacity.
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A modular hardware platform like the one described in the ‘MEGAPOD’ filing would support scalable, rapid deployment of such distributed compute resources. It could complement Tesla’s other AI infrastructure efforts, including the Dojo supercomputer used for training models and the development of AI systems for autonomous driving and robotics, by enabling edge or regional AI inference without reliance on traditional centralized data centers.
Investor's Corner
SpaceX is launching a secret spacecraft that could change how things are made in space
SpaceX’s secret disk-shaped Starfall capsule is targeting a market no reentry vehicle has cracked.
SpaceX is targeting Tuesday, June 23 for the first flight of Starfall, a reentry capsule the company has developed almost entirely in private. The Falcon 9 launch window opens at 6:43 a.m. ET from Space Launch Complex 40 at Cape Canaveral Space Force Station, with a backup window available the same time on June 24. SpaceX has made no public announcement about the vehicle, only providing launch details. Everything known about it has come through FAA and FCC regulatory filings.
What makes Starfall different starts with its shape. Rather than the traditional cone used by Dragon and every other cargo return capsule in operation, Starfall is a flat disk that measures roughly 10.2 feet (3.1 meters) wide and just 2.5 feet (0.75 meters) tall, and weighing 4,630 pounds (2,100 kg) and capable of returning up to 2,200 pounds (1,000 kilograms) of payload from orbit. The disk geometry maximizes structural efficiency and payload volume relative to mass, and the heat shield mechanically jettisons just before splashdown, allowing recovery teams to retrieve both the capsule and the shield separately from the Pacific Ocean.
The difference with Starfall from existing competitors, such as Varda Space Industries, which has largely built the orbital manufacturing market and returns heavy payloads per flight is that Starfall’s specification is roughly 30 times more per mission, and is designed to be mass-produced and launched on either Falcon 9 or Starship. That combination of volume and launch access is something no standalone startup can replicate, and it puts SpaceX in direct competition with the companies that currently pay it to reach orbit.
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The intended market is orbital manufacturing: pharmaceuticals, protein crystals, semiconductors, and advanced optical fiber that physically cannot be produced in the presence of gravity. FAA documents describe Starfall’s long-term purpose as building a “self-sustaining commercial in-space manufacturing market” and as a potential successor to the industrial capabilities of the International Space Station, which is set to retire in the late 2020s. Military rapid global cargo delivery is a parallel application under active discussion with the Pentagon.
The reason some industries seek manufacturing in space comes down to gravity. On Earth, gravity causes materials to settle, separate, and deform during production. In microgravity, those constraints disappear.
SpaceX’s already controls launch access, which means it currently functions as the landlord for every competitor in the orbital manufacturing return space. Starfall converts that landlord position into vertical ownership, and it would no longer just carry other companies’ capsules to orbit, but rather operate the capsule, own the return logistics, and capture the service revenue directly. Viewed alongside Starlink, Colossus, and the xAI merger, Starfall fits a consistent pattern: SpaceX identifying infrastructure layers that others depend on and moving to own them outright. Orbital manufacturing return is the next layer on that list.
If Tuesday’s reentry, parachute sequence, and recovery demonstration goes as planned, the second FAA-approved test flight follows. A successful pair of demos would position SpaceX to begin offering Starfall as a commercial service, likely first to pharmaceutical and materials science customers before scaling toward the military and broader manufacturing segments.
Elon Musk responds to SpaceX’s ESG rating and says its rockets won’t go electric
Tesla just trademarked MEGAPOD: here’s what it is
