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Lithium mine near Tesla Gigafactory plans to break ground as global shortage rears head
Just 150 miles north of Tesla’s Gigafactory, a plan is brewing to a build a massive mine capable of growing the world’s lithium carbonate supply by a full 15% as early as 2022 and more than 20% by 2026, compared to 2018. Tesla could, in other words, find itself neighbors with one of the largest concentrated supplies of lithium carbonate in the world less than a decade from now.
Known as Lithium Americas, the company behind the study has conservatively estimated that it could break ground on its prospective Northern Nevada Li2CO3 mine as early as the end of 2020 and ramp up to an annual output of 30,000 metric tons of the basic Li-ion battery precursor just 21 months after that. The mine’s output would then double by 2026, coming to rest at a maximum annual lithium carbonate output of 60,000 tons.
Theoretical estimates conducted by a number of academic parties in the 2010s have shown that any given high-quality lithium-ion battery would be expected to require 2-3 kilograms of lithium carbonate per kWh of final capacity, although the absolute physical minimum is closer to 0.4 kg. To sustain Gigafactory 1’s 35 GWh 2018 production goal, that single factory alone could require between 60,000 and 85,000 tons of lithium carbonate annually to sustain its battery production operations alone.
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- The Model 3 assembly line inside the Sprung Structure in Tesla’s Fremont factory. [Credit: The New York Times]
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- Building giant factories like Gigafactory 2 demands major capital investments that often require private equity sales. (Tesla)
To put this requirement in context, the entire global supply of lithium carbonate is expected to peak at ~250,000 tons in 2018 after astounding YoY production growth of 21.5% from 2016 to 2017 – Tesla’s demands this year could thus easily swallow 25-30% of the entire global lithium carbonate supply.
Despite those staggering numbers, Gigafactory 1 production is still expected to ramp (albeit based on optimistic 2016 Elon Musk numbers) as high as 105 GWh of cells and 150 GWh of packs annually by the time it is fully completed, likely a few years after the original 2020 estimate. Roughly 7 times the volume of Tesla’s 2018 production goals for the massive factory, sustaining that final volume of production (255 GWh annually) would literally require the global supply of lithium carbonate to grow by a bare minimum of 250% in less than half a decade. To reiterate, that is for a single Gigafactory, of which Tesla plans to construct several more in China, Europe, and elsewhere.
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- A peek inside a segment of a Tesla Model 3 battery pack.
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- Gayle King tours the Tesla Model 3 production line with CEO Elon Musk at the Fremont factory [Source: CBS This Morning]
Put simply, Tesla is going to need every ounce of lithium supply they can get their hands on, and Lithium Americas’ prospective Nevada offering could theoretically supplement that total required supply by as much as 10% by the mid-2020s. Tesla, however, is already hard at work attempting to secure a strong and satisfactory supply of lithium and other rare earth metals and materials required to produce premium-grade Li-on batteries.
Tesla already has agreements to buy lithium from a somewhat smaller Nevadan effort from Pure Energy Minerals (phase 1 production NET 2020) and Bacanora’s Sonora Lithium prospect (NET 2020), lithium hydroxide (a product of lithium carbonate) from Australian upstart Kidman Resources (NET 2021), and also plans to invest directly in lithium heavyweight SQM to strengthen a foothold in Chile, the current owner of ~50% of the world’s lithium mining rights.
Elon Musk flew under the radar with his recent purchase of a $1 billion energy company, according to Federal Trade Commission (FTC) documents.
Transaction number 202612350 listed Tesla and SpaceX frontman Elon Musk as the acquiring party and CF APR Super Holdings LLC as the seller, with New APR Energy, LLC as the acquired entity. The deal, which closed without public announcement, came to light on May 14.
BREAKING: Elon Musk acquires Jacksonville power company APR Energy in a deal valued at more than $1,000,000,000.00.
— Polymarket Money (@PolymarketMoney) July 15, 2026
Analysts inferred the deal’s scale from minority stakeholder disclosures, including one report of a 5 percent interest sold for approximately $50.4 million. Fortress Investment Group had purchased APR’s assets in late 2024, rebranded the operation as New APR Energy, and subsequently transferred ownership to Musk.
APR Energy specializes in rapidly deployable power infrastructure. The company maintains one of the world’s largest fleets of mobile gas and diesel turbines, with more than 1.1 gigawatts of generation capacity. Its modular units, which are often trailer-mounted, enable turnkey installations ranging from 20 MW to over 500 MW.
APR provides full engineering, procurement, construction, operation, and maintenance services for behind-the-meter power plants, serving everything from data centers, utilities, and industrial clients.
The firm has expanded aggressively to meet surging demand, recently adding turbines and deploying over 100 MW for a major AI hyperscaler. Its solutions bridge critical gaps where grid interconnections face delays of two to five years, according to Yahoo.
The acquisition means something more for Musk. As he continues to expand projects in artificial intelligence, especially xAI, his AI venture, there is a greater need to supply energy-intensive supercomputing clusters, including the Colossus project, with what they need: reliable and high-capacity power.
Ownership of APR provides immediate access to flexible generation assets that can be deployed adjacent to data centers, reducing dependence on a strained infrastructure. It also complements Tesla’s energy storage business, so Musk will be able to pull from his own entities to address the rapid scaling demands of AI training and compute.
Tesla had a petition protesting a recall to fix a potential issue with 2017-2023 Model Y and Model 3 vehicles’ headlights was denied, as the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) disagreed with the company’s opinion of things.
The recall covers approximately 19,917 Model Y and Model 3 vehicles built from 2017 to 2023. Tesla initially submitted a noncompliance report for the headlights on these vehicles on March 15, 2024. Tesla then petitioned for an exemption from the fix, which violated FMVSS No. 108 (40 CFR 571.108), arguing that the “noncompliance is inconsequential as it relates to motor vehicle safety.
🚨 Tesla was denied a petition by the NHTSA to avoid a recall of 19,900 2017-2023 Model 3 and Model Y vehicles.
The NHTSA found that the vehicles’ headlights may exceed maximum lighting levels. Tesla argued it was inconsequential and did not require a recall. pic.twitter.com/m8Jmm1teLL
— TESLARATI (@Teslarati) July 16, 2026
The NHTSA disagreed, stating that Tesla’s conclusion that the headlights do not increase any risk was not an opinion it shared. The agency said it disagreed with Tesla’s assumption that glare is not increased to surrounding traffic. This issue could be highlighted even more in certain weather conditions.
Tesla will be required to remedy the issue, the NHTSA ruled:
“In consideration of the foregoing, NHTSA has decided that Tesla has not met its burden of persuasion that the subject FMVSS No. 108 noncompliance is inconsequential to motor vehicle safety. Accordingly, Tesla’s petition is hereby denied, and Tesla is consequently obligated to provide notification of and free remedy for that noncompliance under 49 U.S.C. 30118 and 30120.”
The issue here appears to be the angle of the headlights and the brightness they emit during operation. The NHTSA report states that:
“Tesla’s headlamp supplier, Marelli Automotive Lighting, tested 25 right-hand and 25 left-hand lamps, and for this sample, found the maximum photometric intensity measured in the 10°U to 90°U and 90°L to 90°R zone was between 136.2 cd and 230.1 cd for the right-hand lamps and between 117.5 cd and 160.3 cd for the left-hand lamps. According to Tesla, these tests revealed that the photometric intensity of the right-hand and left-hand headlamp lower beam on the subject vehicles may measure as much as 230.1 cd in the 10°U to 90°U and 90°L to 90°R zone, exceeding the maximum photometric intensity by 105.1 cd. Additionally, Tesla states that a left-hand lamp tested by a Transport Canada recognized laboratory measured a maximum of 171.27 cd in the 10°U to 90°U and 90°L to 90°R zone. Despite these measurements exceeding the allowed photometric maximum of 125 cd, Tesla believes that the subject noncompliance is inconsequential to motor vehicle safety.”
Tesla also argued at some points that the headlights had not been deemed responsible for any complaints, accidents, or injuries related to the noncompliance.
Lifestyle
NTSB findings on fatal Tesla crash tell a very different story
The NTSB confirmed the driver, not Tesla’s FSD, caused the fatal Texas house crash.
The National Transportation Safety Board released preliminary findings Wednesday confirming that a Tesla driver, not the vehicle’s software, caused a fatal crash in Katy, Texas in June. The driver, 44-year-old Michael Butler, had engaged Full Self-Driving Supervised mode on Rose Hollow Lane, a residential street with a 30 mph speed limit, before manually overriding the system by pressing the accelerator pedal all the way to 100%. Data recovered from the 2025 Tesla Model 3 showed the vehicle was traveling over 70 miles per hour when it struck a home and killed 76-year-old Martha Avila, who was inside. Weather was clear, the road was dry, and it was daylight.
Texas man charged in fatal Tesla crash where he blamed Autopilot
Butler told authorities he had passed out at the wheel. But security camera footage obtained by the NTSB told a different story, and showed the car accelerating through an intersection before leaving the road entirely. Police also found that Butler’s phone had Google searches including the terms “Tesla FSD not aggressive enough 2026” and “Tesla FSD too timid,” raising serious questions about how he was using the system before the crash. Butler has since been charged with manslaughter. The victim’s family has filed a lawsuit against both Butler and Tesla, alleging negligence.
The NTSB findings aligned directly with what Tesla VP of AI Software Ashok Elluswamy had already stated publicly on X in the weeks after the crash, writing that “the driver manually overrode self-driving by pressing the accelerator all the way to 100%.” The data confirmed his account.
Yup. In this case, the driver manually overrode self-driving by pressing the accelerator all the way to 100% of the accel pedal in this residential area. They reached a speed of 73 mph during the crash, and had the accelerator pressed even after the crash.
— Ashok Elluswamy (@aelluswamy) June 22, 2026
Elon Musk secretly acquires $1B energy company to power the AI future
Tesla has to fix a big problem with its old headlights, NHTSA says
