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SpaceX & ULA could compete to launch NASA’s Orion spacecraft around the Moon

The Orion spacecraft and European Service Module (ESM) visualized in Earth orbit. (NASA)

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In barely 48 hours, the future of NASA’s SLS rocket was buffeted relentlessly by a combination of new priorities in the White House’s FY2020 budget request and statements made before Congress by NASA administrator Jim Bridenstine. Contracted by NASA to companies like Boeing, the outright failure of SLS contractors to stem years of launch delays and billions in cost overruns has lead to what can only be described as a possible tipping point, one that could benefit companies like ULA, SpaceX, and Blue Origin.

On March 11th, the White House’s 2020 NASA budget request proposed an aggressive curtail of mission options available for the SLS rocket, preferring instead to save hundreds of millions (and eventually billions) of dollars by prioritizing commercial launch vehicles and indefinitely pausing all upgrade work on SLS. On March 13th, Administrator Bridenstine stated before Congress that he was dead-set on ensuring that NASA sticks to a current 2020 deadline for Orion’s first uncrewed circumlunar voyage (EM-1), even if it required using two commercial rockets (either Falcon Heavy or Delta IV Heavy) to send the spacecraft around the Moon next year. In both cases, it’s safe to say that the political tides have somehow undergone a spectacular 180-degree shift in attitude toward SLS, the first salvo in what is guaranteed to be a major political battle.

“Deferred” upgrades

Of the many potential challenges the ides of March have placed before SLS, the first and potentially most significant involves the rocket’s tentative path to future upgrades over the course of its operation. Those upgrades primarily center around the Exploration Upper Stage (EUS) and a new mobile launcher (ML) platform, as well as a longer-term vision known as SLS Block 2. At least with respect to the EUS, NASA (and politicians) were apparently less and less okay with the extraordinary amount of money and time Boeing suggested it would need to develop the new upper stage, to the extent that cutting (or “deferring”) its development could likely save NASA billions of dollars between now and the distant and unstable completion date. Without the EUS, SLS would be dramatically less useful for extreme deep space exploration, effectively the entire purpose of its existence. Instead, the White House included language that would limit SLS launches to crew transfer missions with the Orion spacecraft and nothing more, cutting out heavy cargo missions for science or station-building. Ultimately, those crew transport launches would probably be more than enough to keep SLS Block 1 and Orion busy.

https://twitter.com/JimBridenstine/status/1105859576023445506?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1105859576023445506&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.teslarati.com%2Fwp-admin%2Fpost.php%3Fpost%3D97670%26action%3Dedit

However, two days later, Administrator Bridenstine stated before Congress that he was dead-set on ensuring that NASA sticks to a current 2020 deadline for Orion’s first uncrewed circumlunar voyage (EM-1), going so far as to suggest that NASA was examining the possibility of launching the ~26 ton (57,000 lb) spacecraft on a commercial rocket, followed by a separate launch of a boost stage to send Orion to the Moon. If this were to occur, the consequences could be far-reaching for SLS, potentially delaying the first crewed launch of Orion on SLS until EM-3 and creating a ready-made, one-to-one replacement for SLS at drastically lower costs. At that point, nothing short of political heroics and aggressive bribery could save the SLS program from outright cancellation.

As it stands, the only rockets capable of conceivably supporting a 2020 launch of the 26-ton Orion are ULA’s Delta IV Heavy and SpaceX’s Falcon Heavy, both of which are certified by NASA for (uncrewed) launches. In fact, Falcon 9 was very recently certified by NASA’s Launch Services Program (LSP) to launch the highest priority NASA payloads, signifying the space agency’s growing confidence in SpaceX’s reliability and mission assurance. While the process of certifying Falcon Heavy for an uncrewed Orion launch would be far more complicated than simply grouping Falcon 9’s readiness with Heavy, it would no doubt help that Falcon Heavy is based on hardware (aside from the center core) almost identical to that found on Falcon 9.

NASA’s SLS rocket seen in its Block 1 configuration with on Orion capsule on top. (NASA)
The Orion spacecraft and European Service Module (ESM). (NASA)

The fact that Bridenstine indicated that the primary goal of these potential changes was to speed up EM-1 – an uncrewed demonstrated of Orion functionally similar to Crew Dragon’s recent DM-1 mission – is also significant, as is the fact that such a commercial SLS stand-in would require two separate launches to complete the mission. One launch would place Orion and its service module (ESM) into Low Earth Orbit (LEO), while a second launch would place a partially or fully-fueled upper stage into orbit to propel Orion on a trajectory that would take it around the Moon and back to Earth, similar to the milestone Apollo 8 mission. The need for two launches and the fact that Orion would be uncrewed means that both SpaceX and ULA would be possible candidates for either or both launches, potentially allowing NASA to exploit a competitive procurement process that could lower costs further still.

If Europa Clipper is anything to go off of, launching Orion EM-1 on a commercial rocket could save NASA and the US taxpayer at least $700M (before any potential development costs), aided further by potential competition between ULA and SpaceX. On the other hand, a system that can launch Orion and support EM-1 could fundamentally support all Orion EM missions, of which many are planned. Whether or not Bridenstine and the White House have considered the ramifications, what that translates into is a direct and pressing threat to the continued existence of SLS, with the White House recommending that the rocket be barred from launching large science missions or space station segments as the NASA administrator proposes making it redundant for Orion launches. As Ars Technica’s Eric Berger rightly notes in the tweet at the top of this article, those are the only three conceivable projects where SLS would have any value at all.

If NASA actually went through with this preliminary plan to launch Orion around the Moon on a commercial rocket, they agency would have also fundamentally created a packaged replacement for SLS with a price tag likely 2-5 times cheaper. If Congress had the option to choose between two offerings with similar end-results where one of the two could save the US hundreds of millions of dollars at minimum, it would be almost impossible to argue for the more expensive solution.

Battle of the Heavies

Despite the potential competitive procurement opportunity for a commercial Orion launch, things could get significantly more complicated depending on the political motivations behind the White House and NASA administrator. While Bridenstine explicitly avoided saying as much, the options available to NASA would be ULA’s Boeing-built Delta IV Heavy (DIVH) rocket and SpaceX’s brand new Falcon Heavy. DIVH holds a present-day advantage with active NASA LSP certification for uncrewed spacecraft launches, something Falcon Heavy has yet to achieve.

Nevertheless, it could be the case that NASA, Bridenstine, and/or the White House have a vested interested in potentially replacing SLS for crewed Orion launches entirely. Either way, it’s incredibly unlikely that NASA would launch SLS for the first time ever with astronauts aboard, a massive risk that would also patently contradict the agency’s posture on Commercial Crew launch safety, which has resulted in one uncrewed demo for both Boeing and SpaceX before either be allowed to launch astronauts. NASA also demanded that SpaceX launch Falcon 9 Block 5 seven times in the same configuration meant to launch crew. If NASA is actually interested in at least preserving the option for future crewed launches using the same commercial arrangement, Falcon Heavy is by far the most plausible option Orion’s first uncrewed launch. NASA and SpaceX are deep into the process of human-rating Falcon 9 for imminent Crew Dragon launches with NASA astronauts aboard, meaning that NASA’s human spaceflight certification engineers are about as intimately familiar with Falcon 9 as they possibly can be.

Falcon Heavy successfully clears the tower after its maiden launch, February 6, 2018. (Tom Cross)
Delta IV Heavy lifts off in August 2018 for NASA’s Parker Solar Probe mission. (Tom Cross)

Given that much of Falcon Heavy has direct heritage to Falcon 9, particularly so for the family’s newest Block 5 variant, SpaceX has a huge leg up over ULA’s Delta IV Heavy if it ever came time to certify either heavy-lift rocket for crewed launches. In a third-party study commissioned by NASA and completed in 2009, The Aerospace Corporation concluded that Delta IV Heavy could be human-rated but would require far-reaching modifications to almost every aspect of the rocket’s hardware and software. Most notably, Aerospace found – in a truly ironic twist of fate – that Boeing would likely need to develop a wholly new upper stage for a human-rated Delta IV Heavy, increasing redundancy by increasing the number of RL-10 engines from two to four. As proposed by Boeing, the Exploration Upper Stage – under threat of deferment due to high cost and slow progress – would also feature four RL-10 engines and much of the same upgrades Boeing would need to develop for EUS. Aside from an entirely new upper stage, ULA would also need to develop and qualify an entirely new variant of the RS-68A engine that powers each DIVH booster. Ultimately, TAC believed it would take “5.5 to 7 years” and major funding to human-rate Delta IV Heavy.

Meanwhile, Falcon Heavy already offers multiple-engine-out capabilities, uses the same M1D and MVac engines – as well as an entire upper stage – that are on a direct path to be human-rated later this year, and two side boosters with minimal changes from Falcon 9’s nearly human-rated booster. NASA would still need to analyze the center core variant and stage separation mechanisms, as well as Falcon Heavy as an integrated and distinct system, but the odds of needing major hardware changes would be far smaller than Delta IV Heavy.

Falcon 9 B1051 lifts off with Crew Dragon on the human-rated spacecraft and rocket’s first join launch, March 2nd. (NASA)

Regardless, it will be truly fascinating to see how this wholly unexpected series of events ultimately plays out as Congress and its several SLS stakeholders begin to analyze the options at hand and (most likely) formulate a battle plan to combat the threats now facing the NASA rocket. According to Administrator Bridenstine, NASA will have come to a final decision on how to proceed with Orion EM-1 as soon as a few weeks from now.

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Eric Ralph is Teslarati's senior spaceflight reporter and has been covering the industry in some capacity for almost half a decade, largely spurred in 2016 by a trip to Mexico to watch Elon Musk reveal SpaceX's plans for Mars in person. Aside from spreading interest and excitement about spaceflight far and wide, his primary goal is to cover humanity's ongoing efforts to expand beyond Earth to the Moon, Mars, and elsewhere.

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SpaceX tells the FCC that Starship Flight 14 is going to orbit

SpaceX filed with the FCC for Starship Flight 14, its first true orbital launch attempt.

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SpaceX has asked the Federal Communications Commission for permission to fly Starlink terminals during Starship’s fourteenth flight test, and the filing lays out a genuine trip to orbit, something the program has never attempted.

Every Starship flight so far, including Flight 13’s successful splashdown in the Indian Ocean on July 24, has flown a suborbital arc that ends with the ship reentering the atmosphere within the same hour it launches. The FCC paperwork describes a mission profile built around an actual orbital insertion instead.

The payload is the other half of the story. Flight 13 carried 20 production Starlink V3 satellites, but because that mission never reached orbit, the satellites reentered along with the ship rather than joining the constellation, something Teslarati covered in detail after SpaceX released footage shot from one of those satellites as it drifted away from Starship in space. Flight 14 is designed to close that gap. If the orbital insertion holds, the roughly 20 V3 satellites onboard would separate into an operational orbit and could eventually go into service, each one rated for about 1 terabit per second of downlink capacity by SpaceX’s own account.

SpaceX announces new Starbase for ‘thousands of Starship launches annually’

Elon Musk first flagged the orbital attempt during SpaceX’s August 4 earnings call, the company’s first as a public entity following its June IPO under the ticker SPCX. He also floated catching the ship with the Starbase tower on the same flight, an idea he walked back on August 20, saying the catch attempt would more likely come “in a few months,” as Teslarati reported at the time. Flight 14 will instead target a splashdown for the ship in the Indian Ocean, the same recovery method used since Flight 12.

Hardware has been catching up to the ambition. Booster 21 completed a full 33-engine static fire on August 28, and Ship 41 finished its own six-engine test the week before. An airspace briefing circulated to pilots on August 20 listed September 15 as the target date, later than the end of August window Musk mentioned on the earnings call, though SpaceX has not confirmed a launch date publicly and Starship schedules routinely slip while hardware and FAA paperwork line up.

The FCC filing itself does not guarantee a launch date. It covers communications authority, and not flight readiness, considering SpaceX still needs Ship 41 fully stacked and cleared by the FAA before Flight 14 can fly. But the filing is a real marker of intent and it puts a specific regulatory process behind what had so far only been Musk’s word on the earnings call.

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Elon Musk

SpaceX would not exist if this crucial early launch failed, Musk says

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Credit: SpaceX

Elon Musk recently restated a fact that still defines SpaceX’s origin story: if Falcon 1’s fourth launch had failed, the company would not exist. The comment answered a reminder that after three consecutive losses, SpaceX had money for only one more attempt.

On X, Peter Diamandis said that the present-day acknowledgement of SpaceX’s success does not discount the rough start the company had. “Almost nobody remembers that Elon’s first rocket failed three times, and there was money for exactly only one more attempt.”

Musk said, “If the 4th launch had failed, SpaceX would not exist.”

In late 2008, the firm was nearly out of cash. Another failure would have ended payroll, closed the Hawthorne factory, and left the Falcon 9 and Dragon programs as unfinished drawings.

The first flight lifted off from Omelek Island on 24 March 2006. Thirty-three seconds later, a corroded aluminum fitting on a fuel line leaked. Kerosene ignited around the Merlin engine, control was lost, and the vehicle came apart. The small DARPA payload, FalconSAT-2, survived the short flight only to land on a storage shed near the pad. Investigators later traced the fitting to a materials mix-up that should never have reached the rocket.

Flight 2, on 21 March 2007, looked far better at first. The first stage burned cleanly and handed off to the Kestrel-powered upper stage. The vehicle crossed 100 kilometers and reached a peak of about 289 kilometers. Then propellant slosh in the second-stage tank started a circular coning motion that grew until the engine shut down. Telemetry faded as the stage tumbled, and SpaceX had reached space but not orbit. Over the next year, the team redesigned everything from the ground up, including tanks, baffles, and the new regeneratively cooled Merlin 1C.

That engine flew on Flight 3 on 2 August 2008. The first stage performed almost perfectly and reached 217 kilometers. After main-engine cutoff, leftover fuel in the cooling channels produced a faint residual thrust, roughly 10 pounds per square inch of chamber pressure. On a Texas test stand, the effect was invisible beneath ambient air pressure. In vacuum it was enough to push the spent first stage back into the second stage after separation. The stages collided, the upper stage spun, and the mission was lost. Musk later said a slightly longer delay before staging would have saved the flight.

Six weeks later, the team assembled Flight 4 from remaining parts and flew it on 28 September 2008 at 23:15 UTC. The payload was Ratsat, a 165-kilogram aluminum mass simulator built in-house. Staging was delayed so residual thrust could decay. The Kestrel ignited, the fairing split away, and nine and a half minutes after liftoff the vehicle was in orbit. After a coast, the second stage restarted, settling into a 621-by-643-kilometer path at 9.35 degrees inclination. Falcon 1 became the first privately developed liquid-fueled rocket to reach Earth orbit. Musk called the insertion “middle of the bull’s-eye.”

SpaceX restores a Falcon 1 rocket for 10th anniversary of first launch success

That success unlocked NASA’s Commercial Resupply Services award later that year. Without it, there would have been no Falcon 9, no reusable first stages, and no Dragon cargo or crew flights to the International Space Station. Launch prices would have remained far higher. Starlink’s constellation would not exist; broadband from low Earth orbit would still be a paper concept.

Ride-share markets, high launch cadence, and the current pace of lunar and Mars hardware would be years behind. Communications, Earth observation, and the cost of putting anything into space would look more like the 2000s than the 2020s.

One extra second of residual thrust in August 2008 would have written a different decade.

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OpenAI cites distrust of SpaceX in decision to drop Cursor partnership

OpenAI will cut SpaceX-owned Cursor’s model access in November, citing Musk’s history of broken contracts.

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OpenAI, the company behind ChatGPT, announced late Friday that it is ending its partnership with Cursor, cutting off the coding tool’s access to its models on November 12. The move comes two weeks after SpaceX completed its $60 billion acquisition of Cursor’s parent company, Anysphere, folding the popular AI coding assistant into Elon Musk’s growing SpaceXAI division.

In a post on its website, OpenAI said the decision came down to trust, not technology. “We cannot be confident that SpaceX will use our technology within our terms of service, based on our experience with Elon Musk’s companies violating contracts,” the company wrote. OpenAI pointed to two specific incidents: X, now part of SpaceX, allegedly breaking the terms of an existing OpenAI contract after Musk bought Twitter.

That lawsuit is the backdrop for all of this. Musk cofounded OpenAI in 2015, left the board in 2018, and sued Sam Altman and Greg Brockman in 2024, arguing they abandoned the company’s nonprofit mission for profit. A federal jury sided with OpenAI in May, finding Musk waited too long to sue rather than ruling on the merits of his claims. Musk said at the time he would appeal to the Ninth Circuit, calling the outcome a “calendar technicality” rather than a real judgment.

Elon Musk breaks silence on OpenAI trial decision

SpaceX’s interest in Cursor predates that verdict by weeks. The company first struck a deal with Cursor in April, securing an option to acquire it for $60 billion or pay $10 billion for joint development work instead. As Teslarati reported at the time, the logic was straightforward: Cursor was paying retail prices to Anthropic and OpenAI, two of its most direct competitors, every time a developer used its product, while SpaceX had idle capacity on its Colossus supercomputer, roughly the equivalent of a million Nvidia H100 GPUs, that Cursor could use to train its own models instead. SpaceX exercised the option in June, days after its own IPO, and the deal closed in mid-August.

Once it closed, Musk moved fast. On an all-hands call with more than 1,000 Cursor employees, he reportedly told staff that SpaceXAI’s Grok was playing catchup in the AI race, unlike Tesla and SpaceX in their own markets, and singled out Anthropic as the company to catch. Cursor CEO Michael Truell now reports directly to Musk inside SpaceXAI.

Elon Musk admits he was ‘clearly wrong’ about Anthropic

Losing OpenAI’s models leaves Cursor leaning harder on Anthropic’s Claude, which has its own compute agreement with SpaceX, and on Cursor’s in-house Composer model, the one SpaceX’s compute was supposed to accelerate in the first place. OpenAI framed the November deadline as maximum notice under its contract, and said it wants to “go above and beyond” to help developers through the transition. Whether Anthropic makes the same call is now the open question in AI coding.

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