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The strategy behind the state selection of the Tesla Gigafactory
By now, everyone who has any interest at all in Tesla Motors has heard about their plans for a Gigafactory. Since the plan was introduced in February, the discussion groups and forums have been filled with thoughts on the implications of the huge battery making installation. Four potential sites were named: New Mexico, Nevada, Arizona and Texas.
Speculation about how this would change things became rampant. Nicolas Zart asked how it would affect Tesla’s long-standing relationship with Panasonic, who provides the batteries being used in the Model S and that will likely be used in the upcoming Model X. Yet a more persistent question in the peanut gallery has been why Tesla would choose the states it mentioned as candidates for the factory.
To be straightforward, there was a lot of strategic thinking that went behind the choice of the four states mentioned, and there’s a good reason that a couple of those states, deemed as “Tesla-unfriendly,” are on the list.
Logistics
The states chosen are all within a specific logistical area. They’re warm weather states, have little seismic activity, are within easily-accessed and well-established transportation corridors (trains, highways, etc.), have low-cost land available, and have a surplus of most energy types.
This means that transport of materials and finished products to and from each of these locations is relatively easy and requires minimal work to customize. All of them are in sunny locations (a primary requirement for a solar farm as large as Tesla proposes) and they all have access to low-cost energy at surplus should the wind and solar plans take longer to establish or not perform as expected.
Costs and Baskets of Eggs
Each of the four states named also have highly conducive political environments for business. California, love it or hate it, is one of the worst places in the nation to attempt to start a manufacturing business in terms of bureaucracy, costs, and red tape. Choosing California would also mean Tesla would be putting all of their eggs into one basket, as it were, geographically and politically. This would directly affect our next point. We’ll discuss that in a moment.
All four of the states listed have low or no corporate income tax, have relatively low property taxes (even for industrial use), and are about as business-friendly as a state’s government can be without giving away the farm. Nevada and Arizona also have corporate-friendly incorporation laws, should Tesla need to use them.
Leverage
Now for the real meat of it. Tesla has already leveraged California for about everything it can in terms of concessions and breaks. California would likely be willing to do a lot to help Musk get his Gigafactory built, but it’s just as likely that the other candidates would do just as much on top of their already-friendly atmosphere, industry-wise.
Further, two of these states (do we need to name them?) have been less than friendly to Tesla during the dealership vs direct sales battles. Dangle the “create a green factory and employ a lot of your citizens” carrot, though, and suddenly the discussion might begin to change a little.
You don’t have to be Richard Nixon to see that the prospect of one of the world’s largest automotive battery factories being located in your state will have a hundred benefits to every loss you might politically incur for turning your back on your friends at the auto dealer’s association. Especially if you’re a governor with hopes of getting into the White House (ahemRickPerryahem). It’s things like the Gigafactory that can build legacies for those with the savvy to utilize the PR potential.
Strategically Speaking
Putting it together, the strategy behind the Gigafactory’s geographic location is very astute. Musk and Co gain more by naming enemies in their list of potentials than they would going the relatively safe route of staying in their west coast comfort zone.
Elon Musk flew under the radar with his recent purchase of a $1 billion energy company, according to Federal Trade Commission (FTC) documents.
Transaction number 202612350 listed Tesla and SpaceX frontman Elon Musk as the acquiring party and CF APR Super Holdings LLC as the seller, with New APR Energy, LLC as the acquired entity. The deal, which closed without public announcement, came to light on May 14.
BREAKING: Elon Musk acquires Jacksonville power company APR Energy in a deal valued at more than $1,000,000,000.00.
— Polymarket Money (@PolymarketMoney) July 15, 2026
Analysts inferred the deal’s scale from minority stakeholder disclosures, including one report of a 5 percent interest sold for approximately $50.4 million. Fortress Investment Group had purchased APR’s assets in late 2024, rebranded the operation as New APR Energy, and subsequently transferred ownership to Musk.
APR Energy specializes in rapidly deployable power infrastructure. The company maintains one of the world’s largest fleets of mobile gas and diesel turbines, with more than 1.1 gigawatts of generation capacity. Its modular units, which are often trailer-mounted, enable turnkey installations ranging from 20 MW to over 500 MW.
APR provides full engineering, procurement, construction, operation, and maintenance services for behind-the-meter power plants, serving everything from data centers, utilities, and industrial clients.
The firm has expanded aggressively to meet surging demand, recently adding turbines and deploying over 100 MW for a major AI hyperscaler. Its solutions bridge critical gaps where grid interconnections face delays of two to five years, according to Yahoo.
The acquisition means something more for Musk. As he continues to expand projects in artificial intelligence, especially xAI, his AI venture, there is a greater need to supply energy-intensive supercomputing clusters, including the Colossus project, with what they need: reliable and high-capacity power.
Ownership of APR provides immediate access to flexible generation assets that can be deployed adjacent to data centers, reducing dependence on a strained infrastructure. It also complements Tesla’s energy storage business, so Musk will be able to pull from his own entities to address the rapid scaling demands of AI training and compute.
Tesla had a petition protesting a recall to fix a potential issue with 2017-2023 Model Y and Model 3 vehicles’ headlights was denied, as the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) disagreed with the company’s opinion of things.
The recall covers approximately 19,917 Model Y and Model 3 vehicles built from 2017 to 2023. Tesla initially submitted a noncompliance report for the headlights on these vehicles on March 15, 2024. Tesla then petitioned for an exemption from the fix, which violated FMVSS No. 108 (40 CFR 571.108), arguing that the “noncompliance is inconsequential as it relates to motor vehicle safety.
🚨 Tesla was denied a petition by the NHTSA to avoid a recall of 19,900 2017-2023 Model 3 and Model Y vehicles.
The NHTSA found that the vehicles’ headlights may exceed maximum lighting levels. Tesla argued it was inconsequential and did not require a recall. pic.twitter.com/m8Jmm1teLL
— TESLARATI (@Teslarati) July 16, 2026
The NHTSA disagreed, stating that Tesla’s conclusion that the headlights do not increase any risk was not an opinion it shared. The agency said it disagreed with Tesla’s assumption that glare is not increased to surrounding traffic. This issue could be highlighted even more in certain weather conditions.
Tesla will be required to remedy the issue, the NHTSA ruled:
“In consideration of the foregoing, NHTSA has decided that Tesla has not met its burden of persuasion that the subject FMVSS No. 108 noncompliance is inconsequential to motor vehicle safety. Accordingly, Tesla’s petition is hereby denied, and Tesla is consequently obligated to provide notification of and free remedy for that noncompliance under 49 U.S.C. 30118 and 30120.”
The issue here appears to be the angle of the headlights and the brightness they emit during operation. The NHTSA report states that:
“Tesla’s headlamp supplier, Marelli Automotive Lighting, tested 25 right-hand and 25 left-hand lamps, and for this sample, found the maximum photometric intensity measured in the 10°U to 90°U and 90°L to 90°R zone was between 136.2 cd and 230.1 cd for the right-hand lamps and between 117.5 cd and 160.3 cd for the left-hand lamps. According to Tesla, these tests revealed that the photometric intensity of the right-hand and left-hand headlamp lower beam on the subject vehicles may measure as much as 230.1 cd in the 10°U to 90°U and 90°L to 90°R zone, exceeding the maximum photometric intensity by 105.1 cd. Additionally, Tesla states that a left-hand lamp tested by a Transport Canada recognized laboratory measured a maximum of 171.27 cd in the 10°U to 90°U and 90°L to 90°R zone. Despite these measurements exceeding the allowed photometric maximum of 125 cd, Tesla believes that the subject noncompliance is inconsequential to motor vehicle safety.”
Tesla also argued at some points that the headlights had not been deemed responsible for any complaints, accidents, or injuries related to the noncompliance.
Lifestyle
NTSB findings on fatal Tesla crash tell a very different story
The NTSB confirmed the driver, not Tesla’s FSD, caused the fatal Texas house crash.
The National Transportation Safety Board released preliminary findings Wednesday confirming that a Tesla driver, not the vehicle’s software, caused a fatal crash in Katy, Texas in June. The driver, 44-year-old Michael Butler, had engaged Full Self-Driving Supervised mode on Rose Hollow Lane, a residential street with a 30 mph speed limit, before manually overriding the system by pressing the accelerator pedal all the way to 100%. Data recovered from the 2025 Tesla Model 3 showed the vehicle was traveling over 70 miles per hour when it struck a home and killed 76-year-old Martha Avila, who was inside. Weather was clear, the road was dry, and it was daylight.
Texas man charged in fatal Tesla crash where he blamed Autopilot
Butler told authorities he had passed out at the wheel. But security camera footage obtained by the NTSB told a different story, and showed the car accelerating through an intersection before leaving the road entirely. Police also found that Butler’s phone had Google searches including the terms “Tesla FSD not aggressive enough 2026” and “Tesla FSD too timid,” raising serious questions about how he was using the system before the crash. Butler has since been charged with manslaughter. The victim’s family has filed a lawsuit against both Butler and Tesla, alleging negligence.
The NTSB findings aligned directly with what Tesla VP of AI Software Ashok Elluswamy had already stated publicly on X in the weeks after the crash, writing that “the driver manually overrode self-driving by pressing the accelerator all the way to 100%.” The data confirmed his account.
Yup. In this case, the driver manually overrode self-driving by pressing the accelerator all the way to 100% of the accel pedal in this residential area. They reached a speed of 73 mph during the crash, and had the accelerator pressed even after the crash.
— Ashok Elluswamy (@aelluswamy) June 22, 2026
Elon Musk secretly acquires $1B energy company to power the AI future
Tesla has to fix a big problem with its old headlights, NHTSA says
