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NASA head calls out SpaceX CEO Elon Musk over Starship event in bizarre statement

SpaceX CEO Elon Musk presented an update on Starship on September 28th. NASA's administrator did not approve. (Teslarati - Eric Ralph)

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Roughly 24 hours before SpaceX CEO Elon Musk was scheduled to present an update on the company’s Starship launch vehicle development, NASA administrator Jim Bridenstine tweeted a bizarre and wholly unprovoked statement on the subject.

Seemingly equating SpaceX’s recent Crew Dragon delays with the distribution of Elon Musk’s public attention, the NASA administrator’s comment was almost universally criticized by the spaceflight community at large – and rightfully so.

https://twitter.com/JimBridenstine/status/1177711106300747777

First, some context. Created in 2010 and first supported with serious funding some 12-24 months later, NASA’s Commercial Crew Program (CCP) exists to replace the astronaut transport capabilities once offered by Space Shuttle and now achieved with contracts for seats on Russian Soyuz launches. Primarily the result of inept bureaucracy in NASA and Congress, the Space Shuttle was “retired” in 2011 in full knowledge that the US would have to rely on Russia to get NASA astronauts to the ISS until 2015 (at the absolute earliest).

Congress shut down multiple 2010 proposals to continue Shuttle flights until the late 2010s, choosing instead to kill the Shuttle and divert its associated funding to the expendable Ares V rocket (now the Space Launch System, SLS) and Orion crew capsule. More on that later...

Retweeted by Bridenstine’s official Twitter account, above is the absolute best-case interpretation of the NASA administrator’s comment. Although Eric Berger means well, the interpretation gives NASA far too much credit. Specifically, Bridenstine (or whoever fed him the statement) went out of his way to make it entirely one-sided in its focus on SpaceX. By all appearances, it would have never been posted if not for Elon Musk’s plans to present on Starship. Bridenstine additionally notes that “Commercial Crew is years behind schedule” and indicates that “NASA expects to see the same level of enthusiasm focused on [its] investments”.

Altogether, it’s simply impossible to interpret it as anything less than Bridenstine scolding SpaceX – and SpaceX alone – for not falling to the floor, kissing NASA’s feet, and pretending that Crew Dragon and Falcon 9 are the only things in existence. Absent from Bridenstine’s criticism was NASA’s other (and even more delay-complicit) Commercial Crew Partner, Boeing, who has yet to complete a pad abort or orbital flight test of its Starliner spacecraft. SpaceX completed Crew Dragon’s pad abort in 2015 and completed a flawless orbital flight test in March 2019.

A render of Boeing’s Starliner spacecraft. (Boeing)
An actual photo of Crew Dragon in orbit. (NASA)

In essence, Bridenstine is publicly implying that SpaceX needs to stop being (or appearing to be) distracted by Starship and focus 100% on Crew Dragon. Boeing was not mentioned, despite being a minimum of six months behind SpaceX and dramatically more ‘distracted’ in the Bridenstine-style interpretation of the word. For reference, Boeing is a publicly-traded company with 150,000 employees, annual revenue of more than $100B, and a market cap of $206B. Boeing has 14 subsidiaries, a handful of which are involved in spaceflight, and has no less than one or two dozen products that are each more fiscally important to shareholders and board members than Starliner.

Compared to Boeing’s annual ~$100B revenue, the entirety of the Starliner development program – from the drawing board in 2010 to crewed, orbital spaceflight sometime in 2020 – is ~$4.8B. On the scale of corporate focus, Starliner has likely been a blip at most in 2019, with the company probably far more focused on the systematic organizational failures that lead to the deaths of hundreds of people in two near-identical 737 MAX crashes. Alas, NASA administrator Jim Bridenstine did not release a statement publicly implying that Boeing needs to devote the “same level of enthusiasm” to Starliner after the second fatal 737 MAX crash in March 2019. Nor did Bridenstine release a statement charging Boeing with a lack of focus after continuous reports of issues with the company’s KC-46 Pegasus tanker program, nor Boeing’s recent $9.2B US Air Force trainer jet contract, or myriad other corporate focuses.

A Boeing Starliner test article prepares for thermal vacuum (TVac) testing in January 2019. Starliner’s uncrewed orbital flight test (OFT) – comparable to Crew Dragon’s March 2019 DM-1 launch – is unlikely to occur until November or December 2019. (NASA)

On the other hand, as Musk noted in his relatively subtle September 28th responses to Bridenstine’s implicitly derisive comment, something like 50-80% of the entirety of SpaceX’s workforce and resources are focused on Crew Dragon, the Falcon 9 rockets that will launch it, or a combination of both. At present, Starship is – at most – a side project, even if its strategic importance to SpaceX is hard to exaggerate. The same is largely true for Starlink, SpaceX’s ambitious internet satellite constellation program. It may be true that Starship will eventually make Crew and Cargo Dragon (as well as Falcon 9 and Falcon Heavy) wholly redundant, but that is likely years away and SpaceX will support NASA – as it is contractually required to – for as long as the space agency has vested interest in using Crew Dragon.

At the same time, NASA has explicitly and publicly chosen to prioritize safety over schedule with the Commercial Crew Program, accepting the possibility of delays and cost overruns to ensure that SpaceX and Boeing can build the safest spacecraft possible.

In a September 28th interview with CNN, Musk bluntly noted that the hardware was – at this point in time – more or less ready for flight and will be on-site at SpaceX’s Pad 39A Florida launch site within the next two months. According to Musk, from then on, any additional launch delays can almost entirely be attributed to the paperwork and reviews NASA must complete before giving SpaceX the go-ahead. If Bridenstine wants SpaceX to launch astronauts sooner, one – and possibly the only – solution is to tackle the roadblocks created by NASA’s own self-enforced red tape. The question, then, is whether Bridenstine wants to cut away red tape that may (or may not) be there for good reason.

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When the pot calls the kettle black

Detached from whining about a contractor’s CEO presenting about a non-NASA program, complaining about Commercial Crew delays is at least slightly more reasonable. Originally intended to launch as early as 2015, Congress systematically underfunded the Commercial Crew Program by more than 50% for over half a decade, dispersing $2.4B of the $5.8B NASA requested from 2011 to 2016. Unsurprisingly, this completely upended Boeing and SpaceX development schedules. By September 2014, SpaceX aimed to have Crew Dragon certified by NASA for astronaut transport before the end of 2017, but even then, NASA already saw that schedule as overly optimistic.

It would be another two years before Congress began to seriously fund Commercial Crew at its requested levels, beginning in FY2016. In response to Bridenstine, former NASA deputy administrator Lori Garver noted that over the ~5 years Congress consistently withheld hundreds of millions of dollars of critical funds from Commercial Crew, NASA’s SLS rocket and Orion spacecraft were just as consistently overfunded above and beyond their budget requests. From 2011 to 2016 alone, SLS and Orion programs requested $11B and received an incredible $16.3B (148%) from Congress, while Commercial Crew requested $5.8B and received $2.4B (41%).

NASA’s SLS rocket seen in its Block 1 configuration with on Orion capsule on top. (NASA)

Ironically, despite literally receiving almost seven times as much funding as Crew Dragon and Starliner, SLS and Orion are arguably just as – if not more – delayed than their commercial brethren. Originally intended to launch an uncrewed test flight in 2017, there is now little to no chance that that mission (known then as EM-1 and now as Artemis-1) will launch before 2022, a delay of roughly half a decade. The cost of the SLS/Orion program recently crested $30B, a figure likely to grow to ~$40B before it has conducted a single launch. Of that funding, approximately a third has gone to Boeing, the primary contractor responsible for NASA’s comically-delayed SLS Core Stage – the orange booster pictured above.

The Commercial Crew development program will likely cost NASA $8B total over 9-10 years and produce two clean-sheet, high-performance, (relatively) low-cost crewed spacecraft. After their demonstration launches are completed, NASA will transition to fixed-price service contracts with SpaceX and Boeing to routinely send astronauts to the ISS several times per year.

Put simply, if Bridenstine actually cared about defending “the investments of the American taxpayer” more than wielding their sanctity as a political weapon, he wouldn’t have folded like a house of cards at the slightest resistance to his attempts to cull SLS/Orion delays and cost overruns, and he certainly wouldn’t be wasting breath complaining about what SpaceX’s CEO is or isn’t talking about.

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Eric Ralph is Teslarati's senior spaceflight reporter and has been covering the industry in some capacity for almost half a decade, largely spurred in 2016 by a trip to Mexico to watch Elon Musk reveal SpaceX's plans for Mars in person. Aside from spreading interest and excitement about spaceflight far and wide, his primary goal is to cover humanity's ongoing efforts to expand beyond Earth to the Moon, Mars, and elsewhere.

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The Boring Company just doubled its tunneling power in Nashville

The Boring Company’s Prufrock MB2 is commissioned and ready to mine beneath Nashville’s streets.

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The Boring Company’s second tunnel boring machine, Prufrock MB2, is officially ready to dig in Nashville. The company confirmed the news on X, posting: “Prufrock-MB2 is ready to mine in Nashville! MB2 commissioning is complete, including the brief 11 rpm rotation shown here. Will MB2 catch up to MB1, who had quite the head start? And Prufrock-MB3 ships in August!”

MB2 arrives with meaningful improvements over its predecessor. Lessons learned from the launch and operation of MB1 have already been applied to MB2 to improve efficiency and prepare the machine for launch.

Traditional tunnel boring machines operate in a stop-and-go cycle, digging roughly five feet, halt, erect precast concrete segments to line the tunnel wall, then resume. That repeated interruption is one of the main reasons conventional tunneling is slow and expensive. Prufrock is designed to install the tunnel liner simultaneously with mining, eliminating the need to stop every five feet. The machine also skips the need for excavated launch pits. Prufrock arrives on a truck, tilts down, and launches into the ground within 24 hours. And when the tunnel is complete, it emerges from the ground and drives to its next launch site on a trailer, eliminating the need for expensive cranes or pit excavation. The machine is also fully electric and runs with zero people in the tunnel during normal operations, controlled remotely from a surface operations center.

It won’t be long before we hear of another major update on The Boring Company’s Music City Loop project – a planned underground transit network beneath Nashville that would move passengers in electric vehicles through a series of tunnels at highway speeds, and bypassing surface traffic entirely. Nashville was selected in part because of its strong rock conditions that suits the Prufrock machines well, and relatively less regulatory hurdles.

Progress has been steady on multiple fronts. All 37 permits and approvals required ahead of tunneling have been obtained, out of 45 total. Key wins include a fully executed TDOT tunnel permit authorizing 25 miles of tunnel, unanimous airport authority approval for a Nashville International Airport station, and the city’s first residential station agreement serving downtown tower residents.

With MB1 already tunneling, MB2 now commissioned, and MB3 shipping in August, Nashville is becoming something of a live proving ground for scaled tunnel boring. The broader ambition is not limited to one city. The Boring Company’s stated goal is to make underground transportation a practical alternative to surface roads across major metro areas. Nashville is one of many cities, including a successful Las Vegas tunnel system, where that idea is being put to the test at real speed.

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Tesla urges New Jersey owners to oppose new bill that could block Robotaxi

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Credit: Grok

Tesla has launched a direct campaign targeting its customers in New Jersey, sending emails that warn of pending legislation that could effectively block true driverless technology in the state.

The email focuses on Senate Bill S.1677 and Assembly Bill A.3968, measures intended to create a three-year autonomous vehicle pilot program but laden with requirements that Tesla argues make unsupervised Robotaxis impossible.

According to the email, the bills impose “restrictions so severe that true driverless deployment would remain illegal.” Specific hurdles include mandates for human safety drivers during operations, multimillion-dollar insurance minimums, reportedly $5 million, and thresholds like 100,000 miles of demonstrated safe autonomous driving before any driverless approval.

Tesla contends these are arbitrary barriers that ignore real-world performance data and favor entrenched competitors over innovative technologies like its Full Self-Driving (FSD) system.

The push comes as Tesla has started expanding Robotaxi operations in states like Texas, where unsupervised vehicles are already providing rides in several cities. New Jersey, by contrast, risks falling behind. The company highlights in the email communication that more than 94 percent of serious crashes result from human error, meaning impairment, distraction, or fatigue. These are all problems that Robotaxis eliminate entirely.

In 2025, New Jersey recorded 582 traffic deaths, underscoring the human cost of delayed adoption.

Tesla’s outreach stresses the transformative potential of robotaxis. For families, they could offer safer school runs without drowsy or distracted drivers. For seniors and people with disabilities, robotaxis promise independence and reliable mobility.

In areas with limited public transit, they could deliver affordable, on-demand transportation, reducing congestion, emissions, and overall transportation costs. Economically, the company warns that restrictive rules could cost New Jersey jobs, innovation investment, and billions in potential growth as autonomous ride-hailing scales elsewhere.

Supporters of the legislation, including Sen. Andrew Zwicker, describe the pilot as a cautious framework with strong safety oversight, including incident reporting, expert task forces, and restrictions in sensitive zones like school areas. They view it as balancing innovation with public protection.

Tesla and pro-AV advocates counter that the bill lacks technology neutrality, creates insurmountable entry barriers for commercial deployment, and prioritizes process over outcomes — effectively functioning as a de facto ban on services like Robotaxi.

This latest clash echoes Tesla’s past battles in New Jersey over direct vehicle sales. The email directs owners to Tesla’s advocacy platform, where they can send customized messages to legislators calling for amendments: outcome-based safety standards, open competition, and clear pathways for fully driverless commercial operations.

As hearings approach, Tesla’s campaign frames the issue as a choice between protecting the status quo and embracing life-saving progress. With robotaxi technology already proving itself in permissive states, New Jersey owners are being asked to ensure their state doesn’t lock out the future of transportation.

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Tesla’s Navigation Nightmare: Why the easiest part of FSD might be the hardest

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Credit: TESLARATI

Turn-by-turn navigation is not new technology.

For over two decades, drivers have relied on Garmin, TomTom, and later smartphone apps like Google Maps and Waze to receive precise, reliable directions. These systems have guided millions safely through unfamiliar cities, highways, and backroads with remarkable effectiveness. They handle real-time traffic, construction detours, and complex intersections with minimal fuss.

Yet Tesla, the company that promised revolutionary Full Self-Driving (FSD), continues to struggle with this foundational capability. As FSD (Supervised) v14.3.4 has started rolling out to cars this week, navigation remains its glaring Achilles’ heel, undermining the entire autonomous vision.

Tesla Summon got insanely good in FSD v14.3.2 — Navigation? Not so much

Tesla’s FSD excels in many driving behaviors—smooth acceleration, confident lane changes in ideal conditions, and responsive handling of visible obstacles. However, when it comes to following a route accurately, the system falters repeatedly.

Owners report wrong turns, missed exits, inefficient routing through local roads instead of highways, phantom speed limit errors, and even directing vehicles to building rear entrances. Interventions for navigation issues often outnumber those for core driving maneuvers. Tesla has begun surveying owners specifically about these errors, acknowledging the problem after years of complaints.

Navigation is perhaps my biggest complaint when it comes to FSD, because sometimes, we do know better. Some of us have been living in our areas for our entire lives, but even those who have not have years or even decades of experience driving on local roads. We might know a little better about routing.

But the navigation mistakes are more than just FSD potentially taking a slightly different route that may or may not save you a few minutes. Sometimes, they’re genuinely mind-boggling.

This isn’t just annoying; it cascades into broader failures. A flawed route plan confuses the AI’s decision-making, leading to hesitant behavior, unnecessary disengagements, or dangerous maneuvers like attempting impossible U-turns or ignoring clear ramps. In a system meant to operate with minimal supervision, unreliable navigation erodes trust.

More often than not, false or plain incorrect navigation is what causes me to interrupt FSD operation. Unfortunately, I believe the latest FSD version is the worst example of it, and it leads me to believe that Tesla might be making some changes; they’ve just made them in the wrong direction.

It makes you wonder: Why is a company that has done so much with the progress of FSD and autonomy struggling so much with navigation, something that is not new and has been around a long time?

Multiple Data Sources

First, Tesla’s navigation relies on a fragile patchwork of multiple data sources—Google Maps, TomTom, OpenStreetMap, Valhalla, and its own fleet-derived data—stitched together rather than a single authoritative map. When these conflict on lane geometry, road status, or turn details, the system hesitates or chooses incorrectly.

Traditional GPS providers maintain centralized, regularly validated databases with professional curation and rapid updates. Tesla’s hybrid approach, while innovative in crowdsourcing, introduces inconsistencies that a purely vision-based or end-to-end AI approach may not easily reconcile in real time.

Persistent Learning

FSD seems to struggle with persistent learning from driver interventions.

Unlike consumer apps that quickly adapt to repeated corrections or user preferences (e.g., avoiding certain routes or remembering habitual detours), Tesla’s FSD often fails to internalize fixes on the same trip or across similar scenarios. Owners note making the same manual override multiple times without the routing engine updating its behavior meaningfully.

This stems from the neural architecture prioritizing real-time perception and control over long-term route memory and personalization, making navigation feel rigid and “opinionated” compared to the adaptive logic in Waze or Google Maps.

I noticed that when I asked Grok to try and get me home a certain way (a way that FSD routinely took in the past because it was the most efficient), it had to place a waypoint between my location at the time and my house. When I went to edit the waypoint out, as Grok had placed it for a way to get FSD to get off the highway at the right exit, it was stumped again, rerouted, and took a longer way home.

Reasoning, Scaling, and Intuition

Third, scaling navigation for unsupervised or robotaxi ambitions requires not just accuracy but adaptability and user-like reasoning. Current FSD often defaults to single routes that ignore driver preferences or real-world nuances like time-of-day traffic patterns. It fails to match the intuitive, context-aware planning that traditional systems have refined over the years.

Resolving navigation is critical for several reasons. Practically, it is the backbone of any autonomous journey: without trustworthy routing, the car cannot reliably reach destinations, rendering FSD useless for robotaxis or hands-free commutes. Safety depends on it—mismatched plans create hesitation in merges or intersections, increasing accident risk.

Economically, Tesla’s valuation and future hinge on FSD delivering unsupervised driving; persistent navigation flaws delay regulatory approval and erode consumer confidence. For owners who paid premiums for FSD, these issues represent unfulfilled promises. While it is unlikely Tesla will lose too many customers due to bad navigation, some will be frustrated with the constant need for human input.

Tesla has achieved miracles in electric vehicles and battery tech. Mastering turn-by-turn—technology Garmin nailed in the early 2000s—should not be this hard. By investing in tighter data integration, faster learning loops from interventions, and more intuitive routing algorithms, Tesla could close this gap.

Until then, FSD’s navigation struggles highlight a humbling truth: even the most ambitious innovator must sometimes master the basics before conquering the future.

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