News
SpaceX nears big US govt. missions as ULA handwaves about risks of competition
Speaking at the 2018 Von Braun Symposium in Huntsville, Alabama, ULA COO John Elbon expressed worries that the US National Security Space (NSS) apparatus could be put at significant risk if it comes to rely too heavily on the commercial launch industry to assure access to space.
Given that the US military’s launch capabilities rest solely on SpaceX and ULA and will remain that way for at least three more years, Elbon’s comment was effectively an odd barb tossed in the direction of SpaceX and – to a lesser extent – Blue Origin, two disruptive and commercially-oriented launch providers.
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- The history of ULA and its Delta IV rocket is far wilder than most would expect. (Tom Cross)
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- The first stage of Parker Solar Probe’s Delta IV Heavy rocket prepares to be lifted vertical. (ULA)
Reading between the lines
For the most part, Elbon’s brief presentation centered around a reasonable discussion of ULA’s track record and future vehicle development, emphasizing the respectable reliability of its current Atlas V and Delta IV rockets and the ‘heritage’ they share with ULA’s next-generation Vulcan vehicle. However, the COO twice brought up an intriguing concern that the US military launch apparatus could suffer if it ends up relying too heavily on ‘commercially-sustained’ launch vehicles like Falcon 9/Heavy or New Glenn.
To provide historical context and evidence favorable to his position, Elbon brought up a now-obscure event in the history of the launch industry, where – 20 years ago – companies Lockheed Martin and Boeing reportedly “set out to develop … Atlas V and Delta IV” primarily to support the launch of several large satellite constellations. The reality and causes of the US launch industry’s instability in the late ’90s and early ’00s is almost indistinguishable from this narrative, however.
Despite the many veils of aerospace and military secrecy surrounding the events that occurred afterward, the facts show that – in 1999 – Boeing (per acquisition of McDonnell Douglas) and Lockheed Martin (LM) both received awards of $500M to develop the Delta IV and Atlas V rockets, and the military further committed to buying a full 28 launches for $2B between 2002 and 2006. Combined, the US military effectively placed $3B ($4.5B in 2018 dollars) on the table for its Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program with the goal of ensuring uninterrupted access to space for national security purposes.
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- Crew Dragon arrives at ISS. (SpaceX)
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- Boeing’s Starliner spacecraft. (Boeing)
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- A mockup of Boeing’s Starliner capsule is explored by one of NASA’s Commercial Crew astronauts, clad in a Boeing spacesuit. (Boeing)
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- SpaceX’s Commercial Crew pressure suit seen on NASA astronauts during testing. (SpaceX)
Rocketing into corporate espionage
“The robust commercial market forecast led the Air Force to reconsider its acquisition strategy. The EELV acquisition strategy changed from a planned down-select to a single contractor and a standard Air Force development program [where the USAF funds vehicle development in its entirety] to a dual commercialized approach that leveraged commercial market share and contractor investment.” – USAF EELV Fact Sheet, March 2017
The above quote demonstrates that there is at least an inkling of truth in Elbon’s spin. However, perhaps the single biggest reason that the EELV program and its two awardees stumbled was gross, inexcusable conduct on the part of Boeing. In essence, the company’s space executives conspired to use corporate espionage to gain an upper-hand over Lockheed Martin, knowledge which ultimately allowed Boeing to severely low-ball the prices of its Delta IV rocket, securing 19 of 28 available USAF launch contracts.
Ultimately, Lockheed Martin caught wind of Boeing’s suspect behavior and filed a lawsuit that began several years of USAF investigations and highly unpleasant revelations, while Boeing also had at least 10 future launch contracts withdrawn to the tune of ~$1B (1999). USAF investigations discovered that Boeing had lied extensively to the Air Force for more than four years – the actual volume of information stolen would balloon wildly from Boeing’s initial reports of “seven pages of harmless data” to 10+ boxes containing more than 42,000 pages of extremely detailed technical and proprietary information about Lockheed Martin’s Atlas V rocket proposal.
“If you rewind the clock 20 years, there were folks on a panel like this having dialogue about commercial launch, and there were envisioned several constellations that were going to require significant commercial launch. Lockheed Martin and Boeing set out to develop launch vehicles that were focused on that very robust commercial market – in the case of McDonald Douglas at the time, which later became Boeing, the factory in Decatur was…sized to crank out 40 [rocket boosters] a year, a couple of ships were bought to transport those…significant infrastructure put in place to address that envisioned launch market.” – John Elbon, COO, United Launch Alliance (ULA)
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- ULA’s Decatur, Alabama factory now produces both Delta IV and Atlas 5. (ULA)
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- ULA’s Atlas 5 launched AEHF-4 for the USAF earlier this month. (ULA)
In reality, Boeing was so desperate to secure USAF launches – despite the fact that it knew full well that Delta IV was too expensive to be sustainably competitive – that dozens of employees were eventually roped into a systematic, years-long, highly-illegal program of corporate espionage specifically designed to beat out government launch competitor Lockheed Martin. Humorously, Delta IV was not even Boeing’s design – rather, Boeing acquired designer McDonnell Douglas in late 1996, five days before the USAF announced the decision to reject Boeing and another company’s EELV proposals, narrowing down to two finalists (McDonnell Douglas and Lockheed Martin).
Seven years after the original lawsuit snowballed, Boeing settled with Lockheed Martin for a payment of more than $600M in 2006, accepting responsibility for its employees’ actions but admitting no corporate wrongdoing. Five years after that settlement, John Elbon became Vice President of Boeing’s Space Exploration division. This is by no means to suggest that Elbon is in any way complicit, having spent much of his 30+ years at Boeing managing the company’s involvement in the International Space Station, but more serves as an example of how recent these events are and why their consequences almost certainly continue to reverberate loudly within the US space industry.
SpaceX forces change
Worsened significantly by the consequences of Boeing’s lies about the actual operational costs of its Delta IV rocket (it had planned to secretly write off a loss on each rocket in order to steal USAF market share from LockMart), the commercial market for the extremely expensive rocket was and still is functionally nonexistent. 35 out of the family’s 36 launches have been contracted by the US military (30), NOAA (3), or NASA (2); the rocket’s first launch, likely sold at a major discount to Eutelsat, remains its one and only commercial mission.
Atlas V, typically priced around 30% less than comparable Delta IV variants, has had a far more productive career, albeit with very few commercial launches since the Dec. 2006 formation of the United Launch Alliance. Since 2007, just 5 of Atlas V’s 70 launches have been for commercial customers. Frankly, although Atlas V was appreciably more affordable than Delta IV, neither rocket was ever able to sustainably compete with Europe’s Ariane 5 workhorse – Ariane 5 cost more per launch, but superior payload performance often let Arianespace manifest two large satellites on a single launch, approximately halving the cost for each customer. Russia’s affordable (but only moderately reliable) Proton rockets also played an important role in the commercial launch industry prior to SpaceX’s arrival.
After fighting tooth and nail for years to break ULA’s US governmental launch monopoly, SpaceX’s first dedicated National Security Space launch finally occurred less than a year and a half ago, in May 2017. SpaceX has since placed a USAF spaceplane and a classified NSS-related satellite into orbit and been awarded launch contracts for critical USAF payloads, most notably winning five of five competed GPS III satellite launches, to begin as early as mid-December. Falcon 9 will cost the USAF roughly 30% less than a comparable Atlas 5 contract, $97M to ULA’s ~$135M.
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- The aft connection mechanisms on Falcon Heavy Flight 1 and Flight 2 appear to be quite similar. It’s possible that SpaceX has chosen to reuse aspects of the hardware recovered on Flight 1’s two side boosters. (SpaceX)
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- Falcon 9 Block 5 booster B1046 seen during both of its post-launch landings. (SpaceX/SpaceX)
A bit more than two decades after Boeing bought McDonnell Douglas and began a calculated effort to steal trade secrets from Lockheed Martin, Elbon – now COO of the Boeing/Lockheed Martin-cooperative ULA – seems to fervently believe that the most critical mistake made in the late 1990s and early 2000s was the USAF’s decision to partially support the development of two separate rockets. Elbon concluded his remarks on the topic with one impressively unambiguous summary of ULA’s position:
“We have to make sure that we don’t get too much supply and not enough demand so that the [launch] providers can’t survive in a robust business environment, and then we lose the capability as a country to do the launches we need to do … [That’s] the perspective we have at ULA and it’s based on the experience that we’ve been through in the past.”
In his sole Delta IV vs. Atlas V case-study, what ULA now seems to think might have been “too much supply” under the USAF’s EELV program appears to literally be the fundamental minimum conditions needed for competition to exist at all – two companies offering two competing products. Short of directly stating as much, it’s difficult to imagine a more concise method of revealing the apparent belief that competition – at all – is intrinsically undesirable or risky.
Energy
Tesla’s newest “Folding V4 Superchargers” are key to its most aggressive expansion yet
Tesla’s folding V4 Supercharger ships 33% more per truck, cuts deployment time and cost significantly.
Tesla is rolling out a folding V4 Supercharger design, an engineering change that allows 33% more units to fit on a single delivery truck, cuts deployment time in half, and reduces overall installation cost by roughly 20%.
The folding mechanism addresses one of the least glamorous but most consequential bottlenecks in charging infrastructure: getting hardware from factory floor to job site efficiently. By collapsing the form factor for transit and unfolding into an operational configuration on arrival, the new design dramatically reduces the logistics overhead that has historically slowed Supercharger rollouts, particularly at large or remote sites where multiple units are needed simultaneously.
The timing aligns with a broader acceleration in Tesla’s network strategy. In March 2026, Tesla’s Gigafactory New York produced its final V3 Supercharger cabinet after more than seven years and 15,000 units, pivoting entirely to V4 cabinet production. The V4 cabinet itself is already a generational leap, delivering up to 500 kW per stall for passenger vehicles and up to 1.2 MW for the Tesla Semi, while supporting twice the stalls per cabinet at three times the power density of its predecessor. The folding transport innovation layers logistical efficiency on top of that technical foundation.
Tesla launches first ‘true’ East Coast V4 Supercharger: here’s what that means
Tesla Charging’s Director Max de Zegher, commenting on the V4 cabinet when it launched, captured the operational philosophy behind these changes: “Posts can peak up to 500kW for cars, but we need less than 1MW across 8 posts to deliver maximum power to cars 99% of the time.” The design philosophy has always been about maximizing real-world throughput, not just peak specs, and the folding transport upgrade extends that thinking into the supply chain itself.
Posts can peak up to 500kW for cars, but we need less than 1MW across 8 posts to deliver maximum power to cars 99% of the time.
No more DC busbar between cabinets. Power comes from a single V4 cabinet to 8 stalls. Easier to install, cheaper, more reliable.
Introducing Folding Unit Superchargers
– V4 cabinet with 500kW charging
– 8 posts per unit
– 2 units per truck
– 2 configurations: folded, unfoldedFaster. Cheaper. Better. pic.twitter.com/YyALz0U5cA
— Tesla Charging (@TeslaCharging) March 25, 2026
The network is expanding rapidly on multiple fronts. The first true 500 kW V4 Supercharger on the East Coast opened in Kissimmee, Florida in March 2026, followed closely by a new site in Nashville, Tennessee. A public Megacharger for the Tesla Semi launched in Ontario, California in early March, with 37 additional Megacharger sites targeted for completion by end of year. Meanwhile, more than 27,500 Supercharger stalls are now accessible to non-Tesla EVs from brands including Ford, GM, Rivian, Hyundai, and most recently Stellantis, whose Dodge, Jeep, Ram, Fiat, and Maserati BEV customers gained access in March 2026.
As Tesla pushes toward a denser, faster, and more open charging network, innovations like the folding V4 Supercharger reflect the company’s growing focus on deployment velocity, not just hardware performance. Getting chargers to the ground faster, cheaper, and in greater volume per shipment may ultimately matter as much as the kilowatts they deliver.
Elon Musk
The Boring Company clears final Nashville hurdle: Music City loop is full speed ahead
The Boring Company has cleared its final Nashville hurdles, putting the Music City Loop on track for 2026.
The Boring Company has cleared one of its most significant regulatory milestones yet, securing a key easement from the Music City Center in Nashville just days ago, the latest in a series of approvals that have pushed the Music City Loop project firmly into construction reality.
On March 24, 2026, the Convention Center Authority voted to grant The Boring Company access to an easement along the west side of the Music City Center property, allowing tunneling beneath the privately owned venue. The move follows a unanimous 7-0 vote by the Metro Nashville Airport Authority on February 18, and a joint state and federal approval from the Tennessee Department of Transportation and the Federal Highway Administration on February 25. Together, these green lights have cleared the path for a roughly 10-mile underground tunnel connecting downtown Nashville to Nashville International Airport, with potential extensions into midtown along West End Avenue.
Music City Loop could highlight The Boring Company’s real disruption
Nashville was selected by The Boring Company largely because of its rapid population growth and the strain that growth has placed on surface infrastructure. Traffic has become a persistent problem for residents, convention visitors, and airport travelers alike. The Music City Loop promises an approximately 8-minute underground transit time between downtown and the Nashville International Airport (BNA), removing thousands of vehicles from surface roads daily while operating as a fully electric, zero-emissions system at no cost to taxpayers.
The project fits squarely within a broader vision Musk has championed for years. In responding to a breakdown of the Loop’s construction costs, Musk posted on X: “Tunnels are so underrated.” The comment reflected a longstanding belief that underground transit represents one of the most cost-effective and scalable infrastructure solutions available. The Boring Company has claimed it can build 13 miles of twin tunnels in Nashville for between $240 million and $300 million total, a fraction of what comparable projects cost elsewhere in the country.
Image Credit: The Boring Company/Twitter
The Las Vegas Loop, The Boring Company’s first operational system, has served as a proof of concept. During the CONEXPO trade show in March 2026, the Vegas Loop transported approximately 82,000 passengers over five days at the Las Vegas Convention Center, demonstrating the system’s capacity during large-scale events. Nashville draws millions of convention visitors and tourists each year, and local business leaders have pointed to that same capacity as a major draw for supporting the project.
The Music City Loop was first announced in July 2025. Construction began within hours of the February 25 state approval, with The Boring Company’s Prufrock tunneling machine already in the ground the same evening. The first operational segment is targeted for late 2026, with the full route expected to be complete by 2029. The project represents one of the largest privately funded infrastructure efforts currently underway in the United States.
Elon Musk
Elon Musk demands Delaware Judge recuse herself after ‘support’ post celebrating $2B court loss
A banner on the post read “Katie McCormick supports this,” using LinkedIn’s heart-in-hand “support” icon, an endorsement stronger than a simple “like.” Musk’s lawyers argue the action creates “a perception of bias against Mr. Musk,” warranting immediate recusal to preserve judicial impartiality.
Tesla CEO Elon Musk’s legal team has filed a motion demanding that Delaware Chancellor Kathaleen McCormick disqualify herself from an ongoing high-stakes Tesla shareholder lawsuit.
The filing, submitted March 25, cites an apparent LinkedIn “support” reaction from McCormick’s account to a post celebrating a $2 billion jury verdict against Musk in a separate California securities-fraud case.
The move escalates long-simmering tensions between Musk, Tesla, and the Delaware judiciary, where McCormick previously presided over the landmark challenge to Musk’s record $56 billion 2018 compensation package.
Delaware Supreme Court reinstates Elon Musk’s 2018 Tesla CEO pay package
The LinkedIn post was written by Harry Plotkin, a Southern California jury consultant who assisted the plaintiffs who sued Musk over 2022 tweets about his Twitter acquisition. Plotkin praised the trial team for “standing up for the little guy against the richest man in the world.”
The New York Post initially reported the story.
A banner on the post read “Katie McCormick supports this,” using LinkedIn’s heart-in-hand “support” icon, an endorsement stronger than a simple “like.” Musk’s lawyers argue the action creates “a perception of bias against Mr. Musk,” warranting immediate recusal to preserve judicial impartiality.
This appears to be unequivocal proof she denied the pay package because of her own personal beliefs and not the law.
Corruption. https://t.co/8dvgcfYuvh
— TESLARATI (@Teslarati) March 25, 2026
McCormick swiftly denied intentional endorsement. In a letter to attorneys, she stated she was unaware of the interaction until LinkedIn notified her. She wrote:
“I either did not click the ‘support’ icon at all, or I did so accidentally. I do not believe that I did it accidentally.”
The chancellor maintains the reaction was inadvertent, but critics, including Musk allies, call the explanation implausible given the platform’s deliberate interface.
McCormick’s central role in the Tesla pay-package litigation underscores the stakes. In Tornetta v. Musk, in January 2024, she ruled the 2018 performance-based stock-option grant, potentially worth $56 billion at the time and now valued far higher, was invalid.
The package consisted of 12 tranches of options, each vesting only after Tesla achieved ambitious market-cap and operational milestones. McCormick found Musk exercised “transaction-specific control” over Tesla as a controlling stockholder, the board lacked sufficient independence, and proxy disclosures to shareholders were materially deficient.
Applying the entire-fairness standard, she concluded defendants failed to prove the deal was fair in process or price and ordered full rescission, an “unfathomable” remedy she described as necessary to deter fiduciary breaches.
After the ruling, Tesla shareholders ratified the package a second time in June 2024. McCormick rejected that ratification in December 2024, holding that post-trial votes could not cure defects.
Tesla appealed. On December 19 of last year, the Delaware Supreme Court unanimously reversed the rescission remedy while largely leaving McCormick’s liability findings intact. The high court deemed total unwinding inequitable and impractical, restoring the package but awarding the plaintiff only nominal $1 damages plus reduced attorneys’ fees. Musk ultimately received the full award.
The current recusal motion arises in yet another Tesla derivative suit before McCormick. Legal observers say granting it could signal heightened scrutiny of judicial social-media activity; denial might reinforce perceptions of an insular Delaware bench.
Broader fallout includes accelerated corporate migration out of Delaware, Musk himself moved Tesla’s incorporation to Texas after the first ruling, and renewed debate over whether the state’s specialized courts remain the gold standard for corporate governance disputes.
A decision is expected soon; whichever way it lands, the episode highlights the fragile balance between judicial independence and public confidence in high-profile litigation.
Tesla’s newest “Folding V4 Superchargers” are key to its most aggressive expansion yet
The Boring Company clears final Nashville hurdle: Music City loop is full speed ahead
Elon Musk demands Delaware Judge recuse herself after ‘support’ post celebrating $2B court loss
What is Digital Optimus? The new Tesla and xAI project explained
Elon Musk’s Boring Co. Tunnel Vision Challenge ends with a surprise for Louisiana, Maryland and Dallas
