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SpaceX nears big US govt. missions as ULA handwaves about risks of competition
Speaking at the 2018 Von Braun Symposium in Huntsville, Alabama, ULA COO John Elbon expressed worries that the US National Security Space (NSS) apparatus could be put at significant risk if it comes to rely too heavily on the commercial launch industry to assure access to space.
Given that the US military’s launch capabilities rest solely on SpaceX and ULA and will remain that way for at least three more years, Elbon’s comment was effectively an odd barb tossed in the direction of SpaceX and – to a lesser extent – Blue Origin, two disruptive and commercially-oriented launch providers.
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- The history of ULA and its Delta IV rocket is far wilder than most would expect. (Tom Cross)
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- The first stage of Parker Solar Probe’s Delta IV Heavy rocket prepares to be lifted vertical. (ULA)
Reading between the lines
For the most part, Elbon’s brief presentation centered around a reasonable discussion of ULA’s track record and future vehicle development, emphasizing the respectable reliability of its current Atlas V and Delta IV rockets and the ‘heritage’ they share with ULA’s next-generation Vulcan vehicle. However, the COO twice brought up an intriguing concern that the US military launch apparatus could suffer if it ends up relying too heavily on ‘commercially-sustained’ launch vehicles like Falcon 9/Heavy or New Glenn.
To provide historical context and evidence favorable to his position, Elbon brought up a now-obscure event in the history of the launch industry, where – 20 years ago – companies Lockheed Martin and Boeing reportedly “set out to develop … Atlas V and Delta IV” primarily to support the launch of several large satellite constellations. The reality and causes of the US launch industry’s instability in the late ’90s and early ’00s is almost indistinguishable from this narrative, however.
Despite the many veils of aerospace and military secrecy surrounding the events that occurred afterward, the facts show that – in 1999 – Boeing (per acquisition of McDonnell Douglas) and Lockheed Martin (LM) both received awards of $500M to develop the Delta IV and Atlas V rockets, and the military further committed to buying a full 28 launches for $2B between 2002 and 2006. Combined, the US military effectively placed $3B ($4.5B in 2018 dollars) on the table for its Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program with the goal of ensuring uninterrupted access to space for national security purposes.
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- Crew Dragon arrives at ISS. (SpaceX)
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- Boeing’s Starliner spacecraft. (Boeing)
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- A mockup of Boeing’s Starliner capsule is explored by one of NASA’s Commercial Crew astronauts, clad in a Boeing spacesuit. (Boeing)
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- SpaceX’s Commercial Crew pressure suit seen on NASA astronauts during testing. (SpaceX)
Rocketing into corporate espionage
“The robust commercial market forecast led the Air Force to reconsider its acquisition strategy. The EELV acquisition strategy changed from a planned down-select to a single contractor and a standard Air Force development program [where the USAF funds vehicle development in its entirety] to a dual commercialized approach that leveraged commercial market share and contractor investment.” – USAF EELV Fact Sheet, March 2017
The above quote demonstrates that there is at least an inkling of truth in Elbon’s spin. However, perhaps the single biggest reason that the EELV program and its two awardees stumbled was gross, inexcusable conduct on the part of Boeing. In essence, the company’s space executives conspired to use corporate espionage to gain an upper-hand over Lockheed Martin, knowledge which ultimately allowed Boeing to severely low-ball the prices of its Delta IV rocket, securing 19 of 28 available USAF launch contracts.
Ultimately, Lockheed Martin caught wind of Boeing’s suspect behavior and filed a lawsuit that began several years of USAF investigations and highly unpleasant revelations, while Boeing also had at least 10 future launch contracts withdrawn to the tune of ~$1B (1999). USAF investigations discovered that Boeing had lied extensively to the Air Force for more than four years – the actual volume of information stolen would balloon wildly from Boeing’s initial reports of “seven pages of harmless data” to 10+ boxes containing more than 42,000 pages of extremely detailed technical and proprietary information about Lockheed Martin’s Atlas V rocket proposal.
“If you rewind the clock 20 years, there were folks on a panel like this having dialogue about commercial launch, and there were envisioned several constellations that were going to require significant commercial launch. Lockheed Martin and Boeing set out to develop launch vehicles that were focused on that very robust commercial market – in the case of McDonald Douglas at the time, which later became Boeing, the factory in Decatur was…sized to crank out 40 [rocket boosters] a year, a couple of ships were bought to transport those…significant infrastructure put in place to address that envisioned launch market.” – John Elbon, COO, United Launch Alliance (ULA)
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- ULA’s Decatur, Alabama factory now produces both Delta IV and Atlas 5. (ULA)
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- ULA’s Atlas 5 launched AEHF-4 for the USAF earlier this month. (ULA)
In reality, Boeing was so desperate to secure USAF launches – despite the fact that it knew full well that Delta IV was too expensive to be sustainably competitive – that dozens of employees were eventually roped into a systematic, years-long, highly-illegal program of corporate espionage specifically designed to beat out government launch competitor Lockheed Martin. Humorously, Delta IV was not even Boeing’s design – rather, Boeing acquired designer McDonnell Douglas in late 1996, five days before the USAF announced the decision to reject Boeing and another company’s EELV proposals, narrowing down to two finalists (McDonnell Douglas and Lockheed Martin).
Seven years after the original lawsuit snowballed, Boeing settled with Lockheed Martin for a payment of more than $600M in 2006, accepting responsibility for its employees’ actions but admitting no corporate wrongdoing. Five years after that settlement, John Elbon became Vice President of Boeing’s Space Exploration division. This is by no means to suggest that Elbon is in any way complicit, having spent much of his 30+ years at Boeing managing the company’s involvement in the International Space Station, but more serves as an example of how recent these events are and why their consequences almost certainly continue to reverberate loudly within the US space industry.
SpaceX forces change
Worsened significantly by the consequences of Boeing’s lies about the actual operational costs of its Delta IV rocket (it had planned to secretly write off a loss on each rocket in order to steal USAF market share from LockMart), the commercial market for the extremely expensive rocket was and still is functionally nonexistent. 35 out of the family’s 36 launches have been contracted by the US military (30), NOAA (3), or NASA (2); the rocket’s first launch, likely sold at a major discount to Eutelsat, remains its one and only commercial mission.
Atlas V, typically priced around 30% less than comparable Delta IV variants, has had a far more productive career, albeit with very few commercial launches since the Dec. 2006 formation of the United Launch Alliance. Since 2007, just 5 of Atlas V’s 70 launches have been for commercial customers. Frankly, although Atlas V was appreciably more affordable than Delta IV, neither rocket was ever able to sustainably compete with Europe’s Ariane 5 workhorse – Ariane 5 cost more per launch, but superior payload performance often let Arianespace manifest two large satellites on a single launch, approximately halving the cost for each customer. Russia’s affordable (but only moderately reliable) Proton rockets also played an important role in the commercial launch industry prior to SpaceX’s arrival.
After fighting tooth and nail for years to break ULA’s US governmental launch monopoly, SpaceX’s first dedicated National Security Space launch finally occurred less than a year and a half ago, in May 2017. SpaceX has since placed a USAF spaceplane and a classified NSS-related satellite into orbit and been awarded launch contracts for critical USAF payloads, most notably winning five of five competed GPS III satellite launches, to begin as early as mid-December. Falcon 9 will cost the USAF roughly 30% less than a comparable Atlas 5 contract, $97M to ULA’s ~$135M.
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- The aft connection mechanisms on Falcon Heavy Flight 1 and Flight 2 appear to be quite similar. It’s possible that SpaceX has chosen to reuse aspects of the hardware recovered on Flight 1’s two side boosters. (SpaceX)
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- Falcon 9 Block 5 booster B1046 seen during both of its post-launch landings. (SpaceX/SpaceX)
A bit more than two decades after Boeing bought McDonnell Douglas and began a calculated effort to steal trade secrets from Lockheed Martin, Elbon – now COO of the Boeing/Lockheed Martin-cooperative ULA – seems to fervently believe that the most critical mistake made in the late 1990s and early 2000s was the USAF’s decision to partially support the development of two separate rockets. Elbon concluded his remarks on the topic with one impressively unambiguous summary of ULA’s position:
“We have to make sure that we don’t get too much supply and not enough demand so that the [launch] providers can’t survive in a robust business environment, and then we lose the capability as a country to do the launches we need to do … [That’s] the perspective we have at ULA and it’s based on the experience that we’ve been through in the past.”
In his sole Delta IV vs. Atlas V case-study, what ULA now seems to think might have been “too much supply” under the USAF’s EELV program appears to literally be the fundamental minimum conditions needed for competition to exist at all – two companies offering two competing products. Short of directly stating as much, it’s difficult to imagine a more concise method of revealing the apparent belief that competition – at all – is intrinsically undesirable or risky.
News
Tesla Summon got insanely good in FSD v14.3.2 — Navigation? Not so much
There were two new lines of improvements in the release notes: one addressing Actually Smart Summon (ASS), and another that now allows drivers to choose a reason for an intervention via a small menu during disengagement.
Tesla Full Self-Driving v14.3.2 began rolling out to some owners earlier this week, and there are some notable improvements that came with this update.
There were two new lines of improvements in the release notes: one addressing Actually Smart Summon (ASS), and another that now allows drivers to choose a reason for an intervention via a small menu during disengagement.
Overall operation saw a handful of slight improvements, especially with parking performance, which has been the most notable difference with the arrival of FSD v14.3. However, there are still some very notable shortcomings, most notably with region-specific signage and navigation.
Tesla Assisted Smart Summon (ASS) improvements
There are noticeable improvements to ASS operation, which has definitely been inconsistent in terms of performance. Tesla wrote in the release notes for v14.3.2:
“Unified the model between Actually Smart Summon, FSD, and Robotaxi for more capable and reliable behavior.”
As recently as this month, I used Summon with no success. It had pulled around the parking lot I was in incorrectly, leaving the range at which Summon can be operated and losing a signal while moving in the middle of the lot.
This caused me to sprint across the lot to retrieve the vehicle:
It was pouring when I left the gym so I tried to Summon my Model Y
It turned the opposite way and drove out of range, stopping here and forcing me to walk even further across the lot in the rain for it 🤣
One day pic.twitter.com/iD10c8sriB
— TESLARATI (@Teslarati) April 5, 2026
Unfortunately, Summon was not dependable or accurate enough to use regularly. It appears Tesla might have bridged the gap needed to make it an effective feature, as two tests in parking lots proved that Summon was more responsive and faster to navigate to the location chosen.
It also did so without hesitation, confidently, and at a comfortable speed. I was able to test it twice at different distances:
🚨 Tesla FSD v14.3.2 ASS testing part 1
This was a significant improvement than recent tries using ASS. The parking lot was pretty empty but getting it to come to my location in one singular motion and maneuver was encouraging. https://t.co/vF7TS48GGV pic.twitter.com/sYt8tyHgNn
— TESLARATI (@Teslarati) April 23, 2026
Tesla Full Self-Driving v14.3.2 ASS testing part 2 https://t.co/lxfWfnLUxf pic.twitter.com/2R0r3ohI3M
— TESLARATI (@Teslarati) April 23, 2026
I plan to test this more thoroughly and regularly through the next few weeks, and I avoided using it in a congested parking lot initially because I have not had overwhelming success with Summon in the past. I wanted to set a low baseline for it to see if it could simply pull up to the place I pinned in the Tesla app.
It was two for two, which is a big improvement because I don’t think I ever had successful Summon attempts back-to-back. It just seems more confident than ever before.
New Disengagement Categories
This is a really good idea from Tesla, but there are some issues with it. The categories you can select are Critical, Comfort, Preference, and Other.
I think the reasons why people choose to take over would be a better way to prompt drivers, like, “Traveling Too Fast,” “Incorrect Maneuver,” “Navigation Error,” would be more beneficial.
I say this because it seems that how we each categorize things might be different. For example, I shared a video of an intervention because the car had navigated to an exit to a parking lot and put its left blinker on, despite left turns not being allowed there.
I disengaged and chose Critical as the reason; it’s not a comfort issue, it’s not a preference, it’s quite literally an illegal turn, and it’s also dangerous because it cuts across several lanes of traffic and is 180 degrees.
I chose to label this Navigation error as “Critical” while testing FSD v14.3.2
Here’s why:
✅ This intervention wasn’t “preference,” as the maneuver FSD routed was illegal
✅ If a police officer saw this maneuver, it would result in a ticket https://t.co/znhHb4haAo pic.twitter.com/bZOiLwWmQa— TESLARATI (@Teslarati) April 23, 2026
Some said I should not have labeled this as Critical, but that’s the description I best characterized the disengagement as.
Categorizing interventions is a good thing, but it’s kind of hard to determine how to label them correctly.
Inconsistency with Regional Traffic Patterns
Tesla Full Self-Driving is pretty inconsistent with how it handles regional or local traffic patterns and road rules. The most frequent example I like to use is that of the “Except Right Turn” stop sign, which has become a notorious sighting on our social media platforms.
In the initial rollout of v14.3, my Model Y successfully navigated through one of these stop signs with no issues. However, testing at two of these stop signs yesterday proved it is still not sure how to read signs and navigate through them properly.
🚨 Tesla FSD v14.3.2 attempts the “Except Right Turn” stop sign: https://t.co/W5MjAybaNK pic.twitter.com/P6oeUsk4PN
— TESLARATI (@Teslarati) April 23, 2026
Off camera, I approached another one of these signs and felt the car coming to a stop, so I nudged it forward with the accelerator pedal pressed.
This helped the car go through the sign without stopping, but I could feel the bucking of the vehicle as the car really wanted to stop.
Musk said on the earnings call earlier this week that unsupervised FSD would probably be available in some regions before others, including a state-to-state basis in the U.S.
“It’s difficult to release this like to everyone everywhere all at once because we do want to make sure that they’re not unique situations in a city that particularly complex intersection or — actually, they tend to be places where people get into accidents a lot because they’re just — perhaps there’s — and like I said, an unsafe intersection or bad road markings or a lot of weather challenges. So I think we would release unsupervised gradually to the customer fleet as we feel like a particular geography is confirmed to be safe.”
This could be one of those examples that Tesla just has to figure out.
Highway Operation
Full Self-Driving is already pretty good at routine roadway navigation, so I don’t have too much to report here.
However, I was happy with FSD’s decision-making at several points, including its choice not to pass a slightly slower car and remain in the right lane as we approached the off-ramp:
🚨 Tesla FSD v14.3.2 highway operation: generally happy with the performance here, especially behavior near the exit
Love that the car got over in the right lane after its final pass, and stayed there as the off ramp was approaching https://t.co/qVRVhg6XGR pic.twitter.com/1ELwHf2XKS
— TESLARATI (@Teslarati) April 23, 2026
Better Maneuvering at Stop Signs
Many FSD users report some strange operations at stop signs, especially four-way intersections where there is a stop sign and a line on the road, and they’re not even with one another.
I experienced this quite frequently and found that FSD would actually double stop: once at the stop sign and again at the line.
This created some interesting scenarios for me and I had many cars honk at me when the second stop would happen. Other vehicles that had waved me on to proceed through the intersection would become frustrated at the second stop.
FSD seems to have worked through this particular maneuver:
🚨 Tesla FSD v14.3.2 with a singular stop at the correct spot
No double stopping anymore in my experience https://t.co/Wd0TaNjc1R pic.twitter.com/CdQPvJHaAM
— TESLARATI (@Teslarati) April 23, 2026
FSD should know to go to the more appropriate location (whichever provides better visibility), and proceed when it is the car’s turn to move. The double stop really ruined the flow of traffic at times and generally caused some frustration from other drivers.
News
Tesla plans to resolve its angriest bunch of owners: here’s how
Since the rollout of the AI4 chip in Tesla vehicles, owners with the last generation self-driving chip, known as Hardware 3, have been persistent in their quest for a solution to their issue: they were told their cars were capable of unsupervised Full Self-Driving. It turns out the cars are not.
Tesla has a plan to make Hardware 3 owners whole after CEO Elon Musk admitted that those with that self-driving chip in their cars will not have access to unsupervised Full Self-Driving.
The company’s strategy is so crazy that it is sort of hard to believe.
Since the rollout of the AI4 chip in Tesla vehicles, owners with the last generation self-driving chip, known as Hardware 3, have been persistent in their quest for a solution to their issue: they were told their cars were capable of unsupervised Full Self-Driving. It turns out the cars are not.
Tesla owners with HW3 finally get their answer: https://t.co/CSZTKKkWXx
— TESLARATI (@Teslarati) April 22, 2026
During the Tesla Q1 earnings call on Wednesday, Musk finally clarified what the company’s plans are for Hardware 3 owners, what they will be offered, and what Tesla will have to do internally to prepare for it.
The answer was somewhat mind-boggling.
Musk said:
“Unfortunately, Hardware 3 — I wish it were otherwise, but Hardware 3 simply does not have the capability to achieve unsupervised FSD. We did think at one point it would have that, but relative to Hardware 4, it has only 1/8 of the memory bandwidth of Hardware 4. And memory bandwidth is one of the key elements needed for unsupervised FSD.”
He continued, stating that HW3 owners would have the opportunity to trade their cars in at a discounted rate in order to get the AI4 chip:
“So for customers that have bought FSD, what we’re offering is essentially a trade-in — like a discounted trade-in for cars that have AI4 hardware, and we’ll also be offering the ability to upgrade the car, to replace the computer. And you also need to replace the cameras, unfortunately, to go to Hardware 4.”
Obviously, Tesla has a lot of people to work with and make this whole thing right. Musk was adamant that HW3 would be capable of FSD, and now that the company has finally admitted that it is not, there are some things that could come of this.
There has been open talk about some sort of class action lawsuit against Tesla. The promises that Tesla made previously could be considered a breach of contract or even false advertising, and that’s according to Grok, Musk’s own AI program.
Musk went on to say that Tesla would likely have to establish new microfactories to effectively and efficiently replace HW3 computers and cameras:
…So to do this efficiently, we’re going to have to set up, like kind of micro factories or small factories in major metropolitan areas in order to do it efficiently. Because if it’s done just at the service center, it is extremely slow to do so and inefficient. So we basically need like many production lines to make the change.”
This is going to be an extremely costly process, especially if Tesla has to buy real estate, properties, and equipment to complete this work. Additionally, there was no wording on pricing, but Musk never said it would be free. It will likely come with some kind of price tag, and HW3 owners, after being left hanging for so long, will have something to say about that.
Elon Musk
SpaceX just got pulled into the biggest Weapons Program in U.S. history
SpaceX joins the Golden Dome software group, deepening its role in America’s most expensive defense program.
SpaceX has joined a nine-company group developing the core operating software for the Golden Dome, America’s next-generation missile defense system. According to a Bloomberg report, SpaceX is focused on integrating satellite communications for military operations and is working alongside eight other defense and artificial intelligence companies, including Anduril Industries, Palantir Technologies, and Aalyria Technologies, to build software connecting missile defense capabilities.
The Golden Dome concept dates back to President Trump’s 2024 campaign, and on January 27, 2025, he signed an executive order directing the U.S. Armed Forces to construct the system before the end of his term. The system is planned to employ a constellation of thousands of satellites equipped with interceptors, with data centers in space providing automated control through an AI network.
FCC accepts SpaceX filing for 1 million orbital data center plan
Space Force Gen. Michael Guetlein, director of the Golden Dome initiative, has described the software layer as a “glue layer” that would enable officers to manage and control radars, sensors, and missile batteries across services. The consortium is aiming to test the platform this summer.
Trump selected a design in May 2025 with a $175 billion price tag, expected to be operational by the end of his term in 2029, though the Congressional Budget Office projected the cost could reach $831 billion over two decades.
The Golden Dome role is only the latest in a string of military wins for SpaceX. As Teslarati reported, the U.S. Space Force awarded SpaceX a $178.5 million task order on April 1, 2026 to launch missile tracking satellites for the Space Development Agency, covering two Falcon 9 launches beginning in Q3 2027. That came on top of more than $22 billion in government contracts held by SpaceX as of 2024, per CEO Gwynne Shotwell, spanning NASA resupply missions, classified intelligence satellites through its Starshield program, and military broadband.
The accumulation of defense contracts, now including a seat at the table on the most expensive weapons program in U.S. history, positions SpaceX as the dominant infrastructure provider for American national security in space. With a SpaceX IPO still on the horizon, each new contract adds weight to what is already one of the most consequential companies in aerospace history, raising real questions about how much of America’s defense architecture will depend on a single private operator before it ever trades publicly.
Tesla Summon got insanely good in FSD v14.3.2 — Navigation? Not so much
Tesla plans to resolve its angriest bunch of owners: here’s how
