News
SpaceX nears big US govt. missions as ULA handwaves about risks of competition
Speaking at the 2018 Von Braun Symposium in Huntsville, Alabama, ULA COO John Elbon expressed worries that the US National Security Space (NSS) apparatus could be put at significant risk if it comes to rely too heavily on the commercial launch industry to assure access to space.
Given that the US military’s launch capabilities rest solely on SpaceX and ULA and will remain that way for at least three more years, Elbon’s comment was effectively an odd barb tossed in the direction of SpaceX and – to a lesser extent – Blue Origin, two disruptive and commercially-oriented launch providers.
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- The history of ULA and its Delta IV rocket is far wilder than most would expect. (Tom Cross)
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- The first stage of Parker Solar Probe’s Delta IV Heavy rocket prepares to be lifted vertical. (ULA)
Reading between the lines
For the most part, Elbon’s brief presentation centered around a reasonable discussion of ULA’s track record and future vehicle development, emphasizing the respectable reliability of its current Atlas V and Delta IV rockets and the ‘heritage’ they share with ULA’s next-generation Vulcan vehicle. However, the COO twice brought up an intriguing concern that the US military launch apparatus could suffer if it ends up relying too heavily on ‘commercially-sustained’ launch vehicles like Falcon 9/Heavy or New Glenn.
To provide historical context and evidence favorable to his position, Elbon brought up a now-obscure event in the history of the launch industry, where – 20 years ago – companies Lockheed Martin and Boeing reportedly “set out to develop … Atlas V and Delta IV” primarily to support the launch of several large satellite constellations. The reality and causes of the US launch industry’s instability in the late ’90s and early ’00s is almost indistinguishable from this narrative, however.
Despite the many veils of aerospace and military secrecy surrounding the events that occurred afterward, the facts show that – in 1999 – Boeing (per acquisition of McDonnell Douglas) and Lockheed Martin (LM) both received awards of $500M to develop the Delta IV and Atlas V rockets, and the military further committed to buying a full 28 launches for $2B between 2002 and 2006. Combined, the US military effectively placed $3B ($4.5B in 2018 dollars) on the table for its Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program with the goal of ensuring uninterrupted access to space for national security purposes.
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- Crew Dragon arrives at ISS. (SpaceX)
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- Boeing’s Starliner spacecraft. (Boeing)
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- A mockup of Boeing’s Starliner capsule is explored by one of NASA’s Commercial Crew astronauts, clad in a Boeing spacesuit. (Boeing)
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- SpaceX’s Commercial Crew pressure suit seen on NASA astronauts during testing. (SpaceX)
Rocketing into corporate espionage
“The robust commercial market forecast led the Air Force to reconsider its acquisition strategy. The EELV acquisition strategy changed from a planned down-select to a single contractor and a standard Air Force development program [where the USAF funds vehicle development in its entirety] to a dual commercialized approach that leveraged commercial market share and contractor investment.” – USAF EELV Fact Sheet, March 2017
The above quote demonstrates that there is at least an inkling of truth in Elbon’s spin. However, perhaps the single biggest reason that the EELV program and its two awardees stumbled was gross, inexcusable conduct on the part of Boeing. In essence, the company’s space executives conspired to use corporate espionage to gain an upper-hand over Lockheed Martin, knowledge which ultimately allowed Boeing to severely low-ball the prices of its Delta IV rocket, securing 19 of 28 available USAF launch contracts.
Ultimately, Lockheed Martin caught wind of Boeing’s suspect behavior and filed a lawsuit that began several years of USAF investigations and highly unpleasant revelations, while Boeing also had at least 10 future launch contracts withdrawn to the tune of ~$1B (1999). USAF investigations discovered that Boeing had lied extensively to the Air Force for more than four years – the actual volume of information stolen would balloon wildly from Boeing’s initial reports of “seven pages of harmless data” to 10+ boxes containing more than 42,000 pages of extremely detailed technical and proprietary information about Lockheed Martin’s Atlas V rocket proposal.
“If you rewind the clock 20 years, there were folks on a panel like this having dialogue about commercial launch, and there were envisioned several constellations that were going to require significant commercial launch. Lockheed Martin and Boeing set out to develop launch vehicles that were focused on that very robust commercial market – in the case of McDonald Douglas at the time, which later became Boeing, the factory in Decatur was…sized to crank out 40 [rocket boosters] a year, a couple of ships were bought to transport those…significant infrastructure put in place to address that envisioned launch market.” – John Elbon, COO, United Launch Alliance (ULA)
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- ULA’s Decatur, Alabama factory now produces both Delta IV and Atlas 5. (ULA)
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- ULA’s Atlas 5 launched AEHF-4 for the USAF earlier this month. (ULA)
In reality, Boeing was so desperate to secure USAF launches – despite the fact that it knew full well that Delta IV was too expensive to be sustainably competitive – that dozens of employees were eventually roped into a systematic, years-long, highly-illegal program of corporate espionage specifically designed to beat out government launch competitor Lockheed Martin. Humorously, Delta IV was not even Boeing’s design – rather, Boeing acquired designer McDonnell Douglas in late 1996, five days before the USAF announced the decision to reject Boeing and another company’s EELV proposals, narrowing down to two finalists (McDonnell Douglas and Lockheed Martin).
Seven years after the original lawsuit snowballed, Boeing settled with Lockheed Martin for a payment of more than $600M in 2006, accepting responsibility for its employees’ actions but admitting no corporate wrongdoing. Five years after that settlement, John Elbon became Vice President of Boeing’s Space Exploration division. This is by no means to suggest that Elbon is in any way complicit, having spent much of his 30+ years at Boeing managing the company’s involvement in the International Space Station, but more serves as an example of how recent these events are and why their consequences almost certainly continue to reverberate loudly within the US space industry.
SpaceX forces change
Worsened significantly by the consequences of Boeing’s lies about the actual operational costs of its Delta IV rocket (it had planned to secretly write off a loss on each rocket in order to steal USAF market share from LockMart), the commercial market for the extremely expensive rocket was and still is functionally nonexistent. 35 out of the family’s 36 launches have been contracted by the US military (30), NOAA (3), or NASA (2); the rocket’s first launch, likely sold at a major discount to Eutelsat, remains its one and only commercial mission.
Atlas V, typically priced around 30% less than comparable Delta IV variants, has had a far more productive career, albeit with very few commercial launches since the Dec. 2006 formation of the United Launch Alliance. Since 2007, just 5 of Atlas V’s 70 launches have been for commercial customers. Frankly, although Atlas V was appreciably more affordable than Delta IV, neither rocket was ever able to sustainably compete with Europe’s Ariane 5 workhorse – Ariane 5 cost more per launch, but superior payload performance often let Arianespace manifest two large satellites on a single launch, approximately halving the cost for each customer. Russia’s affordable (but only moderately reliable) Proton rockets also played an important role in the commercial launch industry prior to SpaceX’s arrival.
After fighting tooth and nail for years to break ULA’s US governmental launch monopoly, SpaceX’s first dedicated National Security Space launch finally occurred less than a year and a half ago, in May 2017. SpaceX has since placed a USAF spaceplane and a classified NSS-related satellite into orbit and been awarded launch contracts for critical USAF payloads, most notably winning five of five competed GPS III satellite launches, to begin as early as mid-December. Falcon 9 will cost the USAF roughly 30% less than a comparable Atlas 5 contract, $97M to ULA’s ~$135M.
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- The aft connection mechanisms on Falcon Heavy Flight 1 and Flight 2 appear to be quite similar. It’s possible that SpaceX has chosen to reuse aspects of the hardware recovered on Flight 1’s two side boosters. (SpaceX)
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- Falcon 9 Block 5 booster B1046 seen during both of its post-launch landings. (SpaceX/SpaceX)
A bit more than two decades after Boeing bought McDonnell Douglas and began a calculated effort to steal trade secrets from Lockheed Martin, Elbon – now COO of the Boeing/Lockheed Martin-cooperative ULA – seems to fervently believe that the most critical mistake made in the late 1990s and early 2000s was the USAF’s decision to partially support the development of two separate rockets. Elbon concluded his remarks on the topic with one impressively unambiguous summary of ULA’s position:
“We have to make sure that we don’t get too much supply and not enough demand so that the [launch] providers can’t survive in a robust business environment, and then we lose the capability as a country to do the launches we need to do … [That’s] the perspective we have at ULA and it’s based on the experience that we’ve been through in the past.”
In his sole Delta IV vs. Atlas V case-study, what ULA now seems to think might have been “too much supply” under the USAF’s EELV program appears to literally be the fundamental minimum conditions needed for competition to exist at all – two companies offering two competing products. Short of directly stating as much, it’s difficult to imagine a more concise method of revealing the apparent belief that competition – at all – is intrinsically undesirable or risky.
Tesla has started to perform earthworks engineering on the roughly 3,000-acre site in Fort Bend County, Texas, advancing the massive $10 billion Project Crystal Sun plan to build a vertically integrated solar manufacturing complex.
Flyover drone footage from S.E. Robinson, Jr. released this morning shows the location under development. Tesla has crews on site performing large clearings, but you can also see equipment staging areas, the use of an existing homestead, and active leveling across a substantial portion of the property.
Tesla has started construction on Project Crystal Sun, its $10B vertically integrated solar factory near Houston, Texas.
The plant will make everything from silicon ingots and wafers to finished cells and panels, with operations targeted for Q1 2029.
@SERobinsonJr with a great flyover of the facility:
— TESLARATI (@Teslarati) November 9, 2026
Public filings first submitted in July under Texas’s Jobs, Energy, Technology and Innovation Act describe a plant that would manufacture the full solar chain: everything from silicon ingots, wafers, coated cells, and finished modules.
Tesla projects 9,712 permanent jobs by 2033, ramping from roughly 1,900 positions in the first year of operations, plus a peak of about 1,147 construction jobs. Construction is targeted for 2026–2028, with commercial production beginning in the first quarter of 2029. An accompanying economic analysis estimates the project could add roughly $107 billion to Texas GDP over several decades.
Local incentives have cleared major hurdles. Lamar Consolidated Independent School District unanimously approved school-tax limitations in September, and Fort Bend County commissioners approved a package of abatements and related agreements in late October that could extend equipment tax breaks for as long as 35 years.
Tesla had previously indicated it was evaluating a competing out-of-state location.
The effort fits broader statements by Musk that Tesla and SpaceX are each working toward 100 gigawatts of annual U.S. solar manufacturing capacity. If built as described, Project Crystal Sun would stand as one of the largest domestic attempts to create a fully integrated solar supply chain on American soil.
While Tesla has not issued a formal groundbreaking announcement, the visible site preparation and high-profile social media activity represent a concrete step forward for a project that has moved from confidential filings to active earthworks in a matter of months.
Elon Musk continues to shed more reasons that justify the cancelation of the Tesla Cybertruck, but some of the reasons for the sunset, as well as the process the company is choosing, do not make a lot of sense.
Musk announced last week on X that Tesla would wind down Cybertruck production in mid-2027, a decision that aims to prioritize Cybercab and its importance to the company’s future and passenger transportation as a whole.
But some of what Tesla and Musk are saying does not seem to make much sense. From the process the company is taking with orders to some of the reasoning for the cancelation, the whole situation seems strange.
With that being said: I totally see the merit in prioritizing Cybercab, but I also believe there is room for Cybertruck, a vehicle that has traditionally had low volumes, especially now at its current price point. If it were not for the cancelation, Cybertruck would sell very few units with the recent price adjustments.
Musk Talks Order Rate vs. Production Rate
The first thing that does not make a lot of sense here is the fact that this morning, Musk said that “The Cybertruck order rate far exceeds our production rate. We will try to make as any as possible before shutting down the line in about 8 months, but will have to return deposits for a lot of people.”
The Cybertruck order rate far exceeds our production rate. We will try to make as many as possible before shutting down the line in about 8 months, but will have to return deposits for a lot of people.
This is not a case of Cybertruck being unprofitable, as has been misreported by legacy media, but rather that the opportunity cost of the complexity of Cybertruck is vastly outweighed by the value of incremental Cybercab production.
— Elon Musk (@elonmusk) November 9, 2026
Then why is Tesla STILL accepting orders for the Cybertruck if it already cannot fulfill its order log by mid-2027?
There are so many people ordering Cybertruck that will not receive it. If Tesla already is having trouble seeing how it will build its current orders, why would it allow additional ones?
There are going to be a lot of people who are very upset next June or July, all because they placed an order for a truck that Tesla knew it would not have the time to build. At this point, it seems like a better idea from a customer service standpoint to simply stop accepting orders on a certain date, build those trucks, fulfill those orders, and then close production.
Continuing to accept orders at this point seems wildly strange. If anything, it feels like the $59k Cybertruck orderers will be the ones who get the short end of the stick here, but that’s speculation and just a hunch on my end.
If not Cybertruck, then what?
With only the Model 3 and Model Y available for consumers, meaning the general public, to buy, there is now no utility vehicle in the Tesla lineup, and that is definitely a disappointment.
Ford already washed its hands of the Lightning, which means the Rivian R1T will likely be the best-selling EV pickup on the market, dueling with the GMC Hummer Pickup, Chevy Silverado EV, and the GMC Sierra EV. There are several pickups that are set to hit the market soon, like the Slate EV Truck, and Ford’s new EV pickup, the Fathom.
Tesla could provide some some transparency on what it is planning to do with a future pickup or utility design. Musk said in the past that something much cooler than a minivan will be built. Cries for a full-size SUV have been heard by Tesla, but the company seems to adamant on prioritizing ridesharing vehicles instead of vehicles people want for work, climate, or hobbies.
Some clarity here, past the point of “Tesla is still going to build cars” would be nice. Even a simple, “Yes” response from all the people asking if Tesla will build something larger would be more than enough. We don’t need all the details now, but something would be nice.
Closing Thoughts
More than anything, it is important to note that I do believe Tesla is making a tough decision and one that, from a business standpoint, does make sense. However, I also believe that there is room for the Cybertruck in Tesla’s lineup.
One thing I think it’s worth mentioning is Tesla is not that much different from many companies. They do things that are better for the business that will surely upset consumers. The difference is very few companies have a following like Tesla, so when these things happen, they feel very personal.
Add in the fact that Cybertruck has truly become a symbol of Tesla, and people are even more upset about it.
It will all get figured out, but it’s still very confusing when we step back and take a look at the bigger picture.
Elon Musk
SpaceX’s Anthropic deal has a catch, and Elon Musk just addressed it
Elon Musk says SpaceX’s Anthropic compute deal cuts both ways after Chamath floats higher prices.
Elon Musk pushed back on Sunday against the idea that SpaceX’s compute contract with Anthropic is a one way bet, after venture capitalist Chamath Palihapitiya argued the company could use a termination clause to charge the AI lab far more.
“It works both ways, of course. If compute becomes plentiful and cheap, SpaceX revenue will drop. No crying in the casino for either party,” Musk wrote on X Sunday evening, replying to a clip of Palihapitiya’s comments shared by AI commentator Rohan Paul.
On the All-In podcast released Sunday, Palihapitiya said either side can walk away from the agreement on 90 days’ notice. If data center supply tightens, he argued, SpaceX could exercise that option and bring the contract back at two to three times the current price, and Anthropic would have little choice but to accept. He called it “the kingmaking move,” according to BigGo Finance.
The clause itself is not new. SpaceX disclosed in its IPO filings in May that Anthropic would pay $1.25 billion per month for dedicated capacity at its Colossus clusters through May 2029, nearly $45 billion in total, with both companies able to terminate on 90 days’ notice, as Teslarati reported at the time. SpaceX’s later compute deals with Google and Reflection AI carry similar exit terms.
What has changed is the political backdrop. Palihapitiya’s thesis rests on incoming Democratic governors pulling tax incentives for data centers and slowing new construction. In Texas, Gov.-elect Gina Hinojosa campaigned on a moratorium on new data center approvals, and Deutsche Bank analysts warned last week that SpaceX’s Texas compute capacity could face delays. SpaceX and Tesla shares both fell after the midterm results.
A slowdown would favor companies that already own capacity. SpaceX acquired xAI in February and has been renting data centers to outside AI labs before the space is needed for Grok. At the Baron Investment Conference on Friday, Musk said SpaceX was “getting 50 billion a year for 35 billion dollar investments” and that it can bring a data center online in eight or nine months, compared to two and a half years for competitors. He also said SpaceX is tracking toward an annualized revenue rate above $100 billion in December, with a “best guess” of $500 billion by December 2027.
Musk’s reply points to the other side of the clause. Anthropic has signed large compute agreements with Amazon, Google and Microsoft, and if that capacity comes online faster than new construction slows, the AI lab would have its own leverage to renegotiate or leave. Musk has called Anthropic “obviously currently the leader in AI,” and it remains one of SpaceX’s largest compute customers.
SpaceX shares rose more than 2 percent in overnight trading late Sunday after closing Friday at $134.27, according to Stocktwits.
Tesla begins groundworks on $10B ‘Project Crystal Sun’ in Texas
Elon Musk keeps justifying Tesla Cybertruck’s cancelation, but it’s confusing
