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SpaceX nears big US govt. missions as ULA handwaves about risks of competition
Speaking at the 2018 Von Braun Symposium in Huntsville, Alabama, ULA COO John Elbon expressed worries that the US National Security Space (NSS) apparatus could be put at significant risk if it comes to rely too heavily on the commercial launch industry to assure access to space.
Given that the US military’s launch capabilities rest solely on SpaceX and ULA and will remain that way for at least three more years, Elbon’s comment was effectively an odd barb tossed in the direction of SpaceX and – to a lesser extent – Blue Origin, two disruptive and commercially-oriented launch providers.
- The history of ULA and its Delta IV rocket is far wilder than most would expect. (Tom Cross)
- The first stage of Parker Solar Probe’s Delta IV Heavy rocket prepares to be lifted vertical. (ULA)
Reading between the lines
For the most part, Elbon’s brief presentation centered around a reasonable discussion of ULA’s track record and future vehicle development, emphasizing the respectable reliability of its current Atlas V and Delta IV rockets and the ‘heritage’ they share with ULA’s next-generation Vulcan vehicle. However, the COO twice brought up an intriguing concern that the US military launch apparatus could suffer if it ends up relying too heavily on ‘commercially-sustained’ launch vehicles like Falcon 9/Heavy or New Glenn.
To provide historical context and evidence favorable to his position, Elbon brought up a now-obscure event in the history of the launch industry, where – 20 years ago – companies Lockheed Martin and Boeing reportedly “set out to develop … Atlas V and Delta IV” primarily to support the launch of several large satellite constellations. The reality and causes of the US launch industry’s instability in the late ’90s and early ’00s is almost indistinguishable from this narrative, however.
Despite the many veils of aerospace and military secrecy surrounding the events that occurred afterward, the facts show that – in 1999 – Boeing (per acquisition of McDonnell Douglas) and Lockheed Martin (LM) both received awards of $500M to develop the Delta IV and Atlas V rockets, and the military further committed to buying a full 28 launches for $2B between 2002 and 2006. Combined, the US military effectively placed $3B ($4.5B in 2018 dollars) on the table for its Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program with the goal of ensuring uninterrupted access to space for national security purposes.
- Crew Dragon arrives at ISS. (SpaceX)
- Boeing’s Starliner spacecraft. (Boeing)
- A mockup of Boeing’s Starliner capsule is explored by one of NASA’s Commercial Crew astronauts, clad in a Boeing spacesuit. (Boeing)
- SpaceX’s Commercial Crew pressure suit seen on NASA astronauts during testing. (SpaceX)
Rocketing into corporate espionage
“The robust commercial market forecast led the Air Force to reconsider its acquisition strategy. The EELV acquisition strategy changed from a planned down-select to a single contractor and a standard Air Force development program [where the USAF funds vehicle development in its entirety] to a dual commercialized approach that leveraged commercial market share and contractor investment.” – USAF EELV Fact Sheet, March 2017
The above quote demonstrates that there is at least an inkling of truth in Elbon’s spin. However, perhaps the single biggest reason that the EELV program and its two awardees stumbled was gross, inexcusable conduct on the part of Boeing. In essence, the company’s space executives conspired to use corporate espionage to gain an upper-hand over Lockheed Martin, knowledge which ultimately allowed Boeing to severely low-ball the prices of its Delta IV rocket, securing 19 of 28 available USAF launch contracts.
Ultimately, Lockheed Martin caught wind of Boeing’s suspect behavior and filed a lawsuit that began several years of USAF investigations and highly unpleasant revelations, while Boeing also had at least 10 future launch contracts withdrawn to the tune of ~$1B (1999). USAF investigations discovered that Boeing had lied extensively to the Air Force for more than four years – the actual volume of information stolen would balloon wildly from Boeing’s initial reports of “seven pages of harmless data” to 10+ boxes containing more than 42,000 pages of extremely detailed technical and proprietary information about Lockheed Martin’s Atlas V rocket proposal.
“If you rewind the clock 20 years, there were folks on a panel like this having dialogue about commercial launch, and there were envisioned several constellations that were going to require significant commercial launch. Lockheed Martin and Boeing set out to develop launch vehicles that were focused on that very robust commercial market – in the case of McDonald Douglas at the time, which later became Boeing, the factory in Decatur was…sized to crank out 40 [rocket boosters] a year, a couple of ships were bought to transport those…significant infrastructure put in place to address that envisioned launch market.” – John Elbon, COO, United Launch Alliance (ULA)
- ULA’s Decatur, Alabama factory now produces both Delta IV and Atlas 5. (ULA)
- ULA’s Atlas 5 launched AEHF-4 for the USAF earlier this month. (ULA)
In reality, Boeing was so desperate to secure USAF launches – despite the fact that it knew full well that Delta IV was too expensive to be sustainably competitive – that dozens of employees were eventually roped into a systematic, years-long, highly-illegal program of corporate espionage specifically designed to beat out government launch competitor Lockheed Martin. Humorously, Delta IV was not even Boeing’s design – rather, Boeing acquired designer McDonnell Douglas in late 1996, five days before the USAF announced the decision to reject Boeing and another company’s EELV proposals, narrowing down to two finalists (McDonnell Douglas and Lockheed Martin).
Seven years after the original lawsuit snowballed, Boeing settled with Lockheed Martin for a payment of more than $600M in 2006, accepting responsibility for its employees’ actions but admitting no corporate wrongdoing. Five years after that settlement, John Elbon became Vice President of Boeing’s Space Exploration division. This is by no means to suggest that Elbon is in any way complicit, having spent much of his 30+ years at Boeing managing the company’s involvement in the International Space Station, but more serves as an example of how recent these events are and why their consequences almost certainly continue to reverberate loudly within the US space industry.
SpaceX forces change
Worsened significantly by the consequences of Boeing’s lies about the actual operational costs of its Delta IV rocket (it had planned to secretly write off a loss on each rocket in order to steal USAF market share from LockMart), the commercial market for the extremely expensive rocket was and still is functionally nonexistent. 35 out of the family’s 36 launches have been contracted by the US military (30), NOAA (3), or NASA (2); the rocket’s first launch, likely sold at a major discount to Eutelsat, remains its one and only commercial mission.

Atlas V, typically priced around 30% less than comparable Delta IV variants, has had a far more productive career, albeit with very few commercial launches since the Dec. 2006 formation of the United Launch Alliance. Since 2007, just 5 of Atlas V’s 70 launches have been for commercial customers. Frankly, although Atlas V was appreciably more affordable than Delta IV, neither rocket was ever able to sustainably compete with Europe’s Ariane 5 workhorse – Ariane 5 cost more per launch, but superior payload performance often let Arianespace manifest two large satellites on a single launch, approximately halving the cost for each customer. Russia’s affordable (but only moderately reliable) Proton rockets also played an important role in the commercial launch industry prior to SpaceX’s arrival.
After fighting tooth and nail for years to break ULA’s US governmental launch monopoly, SpaceX’s first dedicated National Security Space launch finally occurred less than a year and a half ago, in May 2017. SpaceX has since placed a USAF spaceplane and a classified NSS-related satellite into orbit and been awarded launch contracts for critical USAF payloads, most notably winning five of five competed GPS III satellite launches, to begin as early as mid-December. Falcon 9 will cost the USAF roughly 30% less than a comparable Atlas 5 contract, $97M to ULA’s ~$135M.
- The aft connection mechanisms on Falcon Heavy Flight 1 and Flight 2 appear to be quite similar. It’s possible that SpaceX has chosen to reuse aspects of the hardware recovered on Flight 1’s two side boosters. (SpaceX)
- Falcon 9 Block 5 booster B1046 seen during both of its post-launch landings. (SpaceX/SpaceX)
A bit more than two decades after Boeing bought McDonnell Douglas and began a calculated effort to steal trade secrets from Lockheed Martin, Elbon – now COO of the Boeing/Lockheed Martin-cooperative ULA – seems to fervently believe that the most critical mistake made in the late 1990s and early 2000s was the USAF’s decision to partially support the development of two separate rockets. Elbon concluded his remarks on the topic with one impressively unambiguous summary of ULA’s position:
“We have to make sure that we don’t get too much supply and not enough demand so that the [launch] providers can’t survive in a robust business environment, and then we lose the capability as a country to do the launches we need to do … [That’s] the perspective we have at ULA and it’s based on the experience that we’ve been through in the past.”
In his sole Delta IV vs. Atlas V case-study, what ULA now seems to think might have been “too much supply” under the USAF’s EELV program appears to literally be the fundamental minimum conditions needed for competition to exist at all – two companies offering two competing products. Short of directly stating as much, it’s difficult to imagine a more concise method of revealing the apparent belief that competition – at all – is intrinsically undesirable or risky.
News
Tesla’s Cybercab fleet just had its biggest day ever
Tesla registered a record 200 Cybercabs in one day, and Dallas could be next up.
Tesla added a record 200 Cybercabs to its Texas Robotaxi fleet in a single day, pushing the purpose-built two-seater past 750 registered units in the state. The batch landed on the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles automated vehicle register at 3:45 p.m. CT on November 17 and included 200 Cybercabs and one Model Y. Tesla’s Cybercab count had sat at 573 since late October before the jump.
The additions also put Tesla back ahead of Waymo on the register. Tesla now has 1,507 vehicles registered for driverless operation in Texas against Waymo’s 1,321, a lead of 186. Waymo had been ahead by 15 vehicles before the batch arrived. Tesla first passed Waymo on November 10, as Teslarati reported, before Waymo briefly moved back in front.
🚨 There are more CYBERCABS in the Tesla Robotaxi fleet in Texas than Model Y! https://t.co/BdRK2LnnAP — TESLARATI (@Teslarati) November 18, 2026
Cybercabs now make up 51.3 percent of Tesla’s registered Texas fleet, at 773 units against 734 Model Ys. Waymo’s fleet in the state is split between 874 Jaguar I-PACEs and 447 Ojai vehicles.
The register does not say where vehicles will operate, and registration does not mean a car is carrying riders. Still, the timing lines up with Tesla’s plans for Dallas. On the company’s third quarter earnings call in October, AI chief Ashok Elluswamy said, “next month, we’ll be launching in Dallas,” and a video posted over the weekend showed more than 50 Cybercabs parked in rows at a Dallas lot, with more on a car carrier nearby. Tesla has not announced a start date.
Dallas is already one of Tesla’s busiest Robotaxi markets. Model Y Robotaxis there have run without anyone in the driver’s seat around the clock since November 11, and the city logged 608,130 miles with no safety monitor between January 22 and October 18, second only to Austin, according to Tesla’s first Robotaxi Safety Report. Public Cybercab rides have been limited to Austin since the vehicle joined the service in September.
The fleet growth comes as Tesla shifts more of its factory capacity toward the Cybercab. The company is winding down Cybertruck production at Giga Texas by the end of summer 2027 to make room, and announced this week a €3 billion expansion of Giga Berlin with a new building designed to produce up to 1 million Cybercabs a year starting in 2029, as Teslarati covered.
Some Cybercabs will soon go to private owners too. Tesla began inviting select customers to buy the vehicle for personal use last week at $29,990 with a required $299 monthly Autonomy Subscription, with deliveries targeted for December in the same five Texas cities where Robotaxi operates.
News
Tesla Robotaxi takes over for Uber credits and loaners at Service locations
Tesla is now utilizing its in-house Robotaxi platform to give those waiting for their vehicles during Service visits rides instead of offering Uber credits or Loaner vehicles.
Tesla owners in Austin who bring vehicles in for service are receiving in-app prompts to use the company’s Robotaxi network while their cars are being worked on.
One recent notification, sent during a frunk repair, carried the heading “Try Robotaxi During Your Service Visit” and stated that while the vehicle is being serviced, the customer can take an autonomous Robotaxi ride to the next destination in Austin and download the Robotaxi app to get started.
Interesting. While my frunk gets fixed Tesla suggests taking a Robotaxi 😇 https://t.co/QiUbAmrp4a
— Wadesmith (@LanceWade) November 17, 2026
The suggestion arrives as Tesla has long relied on two main ways to keep customers mobile during longer service visits. Service centers have typically offered loaner vehicles drawn from a limited fleet; when those vehicles were unavailable, centers have issued Uber or Lyft credits. Uber credits were widely eliminated years ago, but some locations will still give them out.
Both approaches carry costs: loaner cars occupy inventory that could otherwise be sold, and third-party credits generate recurring expense.
Code discovered in Tesla app version 4.60.5 in September 2026 already listed “sv_transport_robotaxi” among the transportation options available for service appointments, alongside paid loaners and other alternatives, indicating the company had been preparing to route customers through its own autonomous fleet.
Your Tesla could be in the Robotaxi fleet next month, Elon Musk claims
Austin provides the clearest early example. The city remains Tesla’s primary Robotaxi market, with unsupervised Model Y and Cybercab vehicles operating across an expanded zone of roughly 400–440 square miles and running 24/7 since November 11. Public driverless service is also live in Dallas, Fort Worth, Houston, San Antonio, Miami, Orlando, and Tampa.
Directing service customers into this network keeps the vehicles utilized and reduces reliance on external rideshare credits, while giving owners practical experience with the Robotaxi app and vehicles during the repair window. Once service is complete, the same network can be used for the return trip without a staffed loaner handoff.
The Austin notification is the first public instance of the capability the September app code previewed. As Robotaxi expands into additional U.S. markets and the fleet grows, service centers in those cities are positioned to follow the same pattern, presenting autonomous rides as a primary transportation option during the service appointment rather than defaulting to loaner vehicles or third-party credits.
For customers, the change preserves mobility without the logistics of arranging a temporary car; for Tesla, it links the service operation more tightly to the expanding Robotaxi business.
Elon Musk
Sean Duffy fires back at Elon Musk over free Starlink
Sean Duffy says the FAA picked a ground network over Starlink, and Musk isn’t impressed.
Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy has responded to Elon Musk’s claim that the Federal Aviation Administration turned down free Starlink terminals before last week’s nationwide ground stop, saying the department chose a ground-based network after running into problems with an earlier version of the satellite service. Musk’s reply was a single emoji: “🤦♂️.”
Speaking at a press conference, Duffy said Starlink had been useful in some parts of the system. “I’ve worked well with Elon, and he, Starlink was a great solution for some of our assets in Alaska, but we sent Starlink, in one of its prior iterations, to our tech lab, and, there was some issues that we had to navigate, and we thought that the best method is to have a network that’s based on the ground,” Duffy said, according to a transcript published by ZeroHedge. “Now, I think what he’s doing with Starlink and the speed is remarkable, but, our airspace is very big. We have assets everywhere. And so, again, we used him for different parts of the airspace.”
Duffy did not dispute that the offer was made. He also did not say what problems the FAA found during testing.
The exchange started Monday, when Musk wrote on X, “Free Starlinks for FAA were offered to Sec Duffy, but he said they were not needed. As it turns out, they were,” as Teslarati reported. That post came three days after the FAA grounded departures nationwide on November 13, when its legacy equipment became unstable as data flooded its telecommunications network at 1,000 connection attempts every four to five seconds. The FAA traced the flood to a radar site in Amarillo, Texas, and a radio site in El Dorado, Arkansas, where L3Harris had been installing a new router. Roughly 12,462 flights were canceled that day.
As I was saying …
Free Starlinks for FAA were offered to Sec Duffy, but he said they were not needed. As it turns out, they were.
— Elon Musk (@elonmusk) November 16, 2026
Duffy has also signaled frustration with L3Harris, which runs the FAA’s current network. “I want to get away from L3Harris and get to a new one, but they own the network,” he said. “I can’t cancel the network that they own.” He has asked Congress for $50 billion to modernize air traffic control, arguing against “a patchwork, a fix to a system that’s critical for every single family.”
The FAA’s position on satellite links predates this week. In a July 2025 letter to lawmakers, FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford said the agency “would not use Starlink (or any satellite service) as the sole communications technology” for safety-critical air traffic services. Reuters reported at the time that the FAA was not considering replacing its L3Harris and Verizon contracts with Starlink. Verizon’s FAA Enterprise Network Services contract, awarded in 2023, is valued at up to $2.4 billion over 15 years.
Musk first pressed the issue in February 2025, while he was leading the Department of Government Efficiency, writing that “the Verizon system is not working and so is putting air travelers at serious risk” before correcting himself days later to blame L3Harris. SpaceX said at the time it was supplying Starlink kits to the FAA at no cost and had no intent to take over any existing contract.









