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SpaceX nears big US govt. missions as ULA handwaves about risks of competition
Speaking at the 2018 Von Braun Symposium in Huntsville, Alabama, ULA COO John Elbon expressed worries that the US National Security Space (NSS) apparatus could be put at significant risk if it comes to rely too heavily on the commercial launch industry to assure access to space.
Given that the US military’s launch capabilities rest solely on SpaceX and ULA and will remain that way for at least three more years, Elbon’s comment was effectively an odd barb tossed in the direction of SpaceX and – to a lesser extent – Blue Origin, two disruptive and commercially-oriented launch providers.
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- The history of ULA and its Delta IV rocket is far wilder than most would expect. (Tom Cross)
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- The first stage of Parker Solar Probe’s Delta IV Heavy rocket prepares to be lifted vertical. (ULA)
Reading between the lines
For the most part, Elbon’s brief presentation centered around a reasonable discussion of ULA’s track record and future vehicle development, emphasizing the respectable reliability of its current Atlas V and Delta IV rockets and the ‘heritage’ they share with ULA’s next-generation Vulcan vehicle. However, the COO twice brought up an intriguing concern that the US military launch apparatus could suffer if it ends up relying too heavily on ‘commercially-sustained’ launch vehicles like Falcon 9/Heavy or New Glenn.
To provide historical context and evidence favorable to his position, Elbon brought up a now-obscure event in the history of the launch industry, where – 20 years ago – companies Lockheed Martin and Boeing reportedly “set out to develop … Atlas V and Delta IV” primarily to support the launch of several large satellite constellations. The reality and causes of the US launch industry’s instability in the late ’90s and early ’00s is almost indistinguishable from this narrative, however.
Despite the many veils of aerospace and military secrecy surrounding the events that occurred afterward, the facts show that – in 1999 – Boeing (per acquisition of McDonnell Douglas) and Lockheed Martin (LM) both received awards of $500M to develop the Delta IV and Atlas V rockets, and the military further committed to buying a full 28 launches for $2B between 2002 and 2006. Combined, the US military effectively placed $3B ($4.5B in 2018 dollars) on the table for its Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program with the goal of ensuring uninterrupted access to space for national security purposes.
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- Crew Dragon arrives at ISS. (SpaceX)
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- Boeing’s Starliner spacecraft. (Boeing)
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- A mockup of Boeing’s Starliner capsule is explored by one of NASA’s Commercial Crew astronauts, clad in a Boeing spacesuit. (Boeing)
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- SpaceX’s Commercial Crew pressure suit seen on NASA astronauts during testing. (SpaceX)
Rocketing into corporate espionage
“The robust commercial market forecast led the Air Force to reconsider its acquisition strategy. The EELV acquisition strategy changed from a planned down-select to a single contractor and a standard Air Force development program [where the USAF funds vehicle development in its entirety] to a dual commercialized approach that leveraged commercial market share and contractor investment.” – USAF EELV Fact Sheet, March 2017
The above quote demonstrates that there is at least an inkling of truth in Elbon’s spin. However, perhaps the single biggest reason that the EELV program and its two awardees stumbled was gross, inexcusable conduct on the part of Boeing. In essence, the company’s space executives conspired to use corporate espionage to gain an upper-hand over Lockheed Martin, knowledge which ultimately allowed Boeing to severely low-ball the prices of its Delta IV rocket, securing 19 of 28 available USAF launch contracts.
Ultimately, Lockheed Martin caught wind of Boeing’s suspect behavior and filed a lawsuit that began several years of USAF investigations and highly unpleasant revelations, while Boeing also had at least 10 future launch contracts withdrawn to the tune of ~$1B (1999). USAF investigations discovered that Boeing had lied extensively to the Air Force for more than four years – the actual volume of information stolen would balloon wildly from Boeing’s initial reports of “seven pages of harmless data” to 10+ boxes containing more than 42,000 pages of extremely detailed technical and proprietary information about Lockheed Martin’s Atlas V rocket proposal.
“If you rewind the clock 20 years, there were folks on a panel like this having dialogue about commercial launch, and there were envisioned several constellations that were going to require significant commercial launch. Lockheed Martin and Boeing set out to develop launch vehicles that were focused on that very robust commercial market – in the case of McDonald Douglas at the time, which later became Boeing, the factory in Decatur was…sized to crank out 40 [rocket boosters] a year, a couple of ships were bought to transport those…significant infrastructure put in place to address that envisioned launch market.” – John Elbon, COO, United Launch Alliance (ULA)
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- ULA’s Decatur, Alabama factory now produces both Delta IV and Atlas 5. (ULA)
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- ULA’s Atlas 5 launched AEHF-4 for the USAF earlier this month. (ULA)
In reality, Boeing was so desperate to secure USAF launches – despite the fact that it knew full well that Delta IV was too expensive to be sustainably competitive – that dozens of employees were eventually roped into a systematic, years-long, highly-illegal program of corporate espionage specifically designed to beat out government launch competitor Lockheed Martin. Humorously, Delta IV was not even Boeing’s design – rather, Boeing acquired designer McDonnell Douglas in late 1996, five days before the USAF announced the decision to reject Boeing and another company’s EELV proposals, narrowing down to two finalists (McDonnell Douglas and Lockheed Martin).
Seven years after the original lawsuit snowballed, Boeing settled with Lockheed Martin for a payment of more than $600M in 2006, accepting responsibility for its employees’ actions but admitting no corporate wrongdoing. Five years after that settlement, John Elbon became Vice President of Boeing’s Space Exploration division. This is by no means to suggest that Elbon is in any way complicit, having spent much of his 30+ years at Boeing managing the company’s involvement in the International Space Station, but more serves as an example of how recent these events are and why their consequences almost certainly continue to reverberate loudly within the US space industry.
SpaceX forces change
Worsened significantly by the consequences of Boeing’s lies about the actual operational costs of its Delta IV rocket (it had planned to secretly write off a loss on each rocket in order to steal USAF market share from LockMart), the commercial market for the extremely expensive rocket was and still is functionally nonexistent. 35 out of the family’s 36 launches have been contracted by the US military (30), NOAA (3), or NASA (2); the rocket’s first launch, likely sold at a major discount to Eutelsat, remains its one and only commercial mission.
Atlas V, typically priced around 30% less than comparable Delta IV variants, has had a far more productive career, albeit with very few commercial launches since the Dec. 2006 formation of the United Launch Alliance. Since 2007, just 5 of Atlas V’s 70 launches have been for commercial customers. Frankly, although Atlas V was appreciably more affordable than Delta IV, neither rocket was ever able to sustainably compete with Europe’s Ariane 5 workhorse – Ariane 5 cost more per launch, but superior payload performance often let Arianespace manifest two large satellites on a single launch, approximately halving the cost for each customer. Russia’s affordable (but only moderately reliable) Proton rockets also played an important role in the commercial launch industry prior to SpaceX’s arrival.
After fighting tooth and nail for years to break ULA’s US governmental launch monopoly, SpaceX’s first dedicated National Security Space launch finally occurred less than a year and a half ago, in May 2017. SpaceX has since placed a USAF spaceplane and a classified NSS-related satellite into orbit and been awarded launch contracts for critical USAF payloads, most notably winning five of five competed GPS III satellite launches, to begin as early as mid-December. Falcon 9 will cost the USAF roughly 30% less than a comparable Atlas 5 contract, $97M to ULA’s ~$135M.
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- The aft connection mechanisms on Falcon Heavy Flight 1 and Flight 2 appear to be quite similar. It’s possible that SpaceX has chosen to reuse aspects of the hardware recovered on Flight 1’s two side boosters. (SpaceX)
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- Falcon 9 Block 5 booster B1046 seen during both of its post-launch landings. (SpaceX/SpaceX)
A bit more than two decades after Boeing bought McDonnell Douglas and began a calculated effort to steal trade secrets from Lockheed Martin, Elbon – now COO of the Boeing/Lockheed Martin-cooperative ULA – seems to fervently believe that the most critical mistake made in the late 1990s and early 2000s was the USAF’s decision to partially support the development of two separate rockets. Elbon concluded his remarks on the topic with one impressively unambiguous summary of ULA’s position:
“We have to make sure that we don’t get too much supply and not enough demand so that the [launch] providers can’t survive in a robust business environment, and then we lose the capability as a country to do the launches we need to do … [That’s] the perspective we have at ULA and it’s based on the experience that we’ve been through in the past.”
In his sole Delta IV vs. Atlas V case-study, what ULA now seems to think might have been “too much supply” under the USAF’s EELV program appears to literally be the fundamental minimum conditions needed for competition to exist at all – two companies offering two competing products. Short of directly stating as much, it’s difficult to imagine a more concise method of revealing the apparent belief that competition – at all – is intrinsically undesirable or risky.
Elon Musk
NASA updated Artemis III and SpaceX’s role just got more complicated
SpaceX’s Starship is the key to NASA’s Moon plan and the timeline is already slipping.
SpaceX has been at the center of NASA’s Moon ambitions for five years, and the updated Artemis III plan recently released by NASA makes that relationship more visible than ever. In April 2021, NASA awarded SpaceX a $2.89 billion contract to develop the Starship Human Landing System, selecting it as the sole provider to land astronauts on the Moon under Artemis III. Blue Origin filed legal protests, lost, and eventually received its own contract, but SpaceX was always the program’s primary lander contractor.
The original plan called for Starship to land two astronauts on the lunar south pole. That mission slipped as Starship development ran behind schedule, and in February 2026, NASA officially revised the Artemis III architecture entirely. The mission will now remain in low Earth orbit and serve as a crewed rendezvous and docking test between the Orion spacecraft and both the SpaceX Starship HLS pathfinder and Blue Origin’s Blue Moon Mark 2 pathfinder, with the actual Moon landing pushed to Artemis IV in 2028.
What makes SpaceX’s position particularly significant is the direct line between this week’s Starship V3 launch and the Artemis timeline. The Starship HLS is essentially a modified version of the V3 upper stage, meaning SpaceX cannot realistically prepare a lander for a 2027 docking test until it has demonstrated that the base vehicle flies reliably at scale. Flight 12, targeting this week, is the first data point in that sequence.
NASA has spent nearly $7 billion on Human Landing System development since awarding contracts to SpaceX and Blue Origin in 2021 and 2023, and NASA administrator Jared Isaacman has indicated a desire to drive down costs going forward. As Teslarati reported, before Starship HLS can put anyone on the Moon it has to solve a problem no rocket has demonstrated at scale, which is refueling in orbit, requiring approximately ten tanker launches worth of propellant loaded into a depot before the lander has enough fuel to reach the lunar surface.
The Artemis III mission described by NASA is essentially a stress test for every system that needs to work before any of that happens.
SpaceX has gone from a launch contractor to the single most critical hardware provider in America’s return-to-the-Moon program. With an IPO targeting a $1.75 trillion valuation and Elon Musk’s compensation tied directly to Mars colonization, the pressure on every Starship milestone between now and 2028 has never been higher.
Tesla is continuing to refine and improve its Robotaxi program from A to Z, and it is now going to make some sweeping changes to the smartphone app portion of the suite.
The company is aiming to make some sweeping changes with the release of Robotaxi app version 26.4.5, which was recently decompiled by Tesla App Updates on X. The update reveals significant new code, focused on remote operations, safety protocols, and seamless autonomous ride-hailing.
These improvements evidently signal Tesla’s preparations for scaling unsupervised Cybercab deployments, particularly the steering wheel-less variants spotted in production. The enhancements emphasize providing a reliable experience that gives passengers support when needed, along with operational efficiency.
Version 26.4.5 of the Robotaxi app has been de-compiled and we’ve got some interesting things added this update (https://t.co/jInbED7fOv):
– Remote Operator Voice Calls 📞
– Proactive Remote Assistance 🤖
– Manual Override + Remote Start for wheel-less Cybercabs 🎮
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— Tesla App Updates (iOS) (@Tesla_App_iOS) May 16, 2026
Remote Operator Voice Calls
One standout addition is support for remote operator voice calls. The app now includes a dedicated native voice-communication system linking passengers directly to Tesla teleoperators via the vehicle’s cabin microphone and speakers.
This feature allows real-time assistance during rides, addressing issues like navigation questions or comfort adjustments without disrupting the autonomous journey. It builds on existing support protocols, making human intervention more accessible and intuitive.
Proactive Remote Assistance
The update introduces proactive remote assistance capabilities. Rather than waiting for passenger-initiated requests, the system can anticipate and offer help based on monitored conditions.
This might include something like suggesting route changes, climate adjustments, or addressing potential delays. By integrating AI-driven monitoring with human oversight, Tesla aims to deliver a smoother, more attentive experience that exceeds traditional ride-sharing services.
Manual Override and Remote Start for Steering Wheel-less Cybercabs
A key highlight for the wheel-less Cybercab fleet is manual override plus remote start functionality. Fleet operators and technicians can now temporarily take control or remotely start vehicles lacking steering wheels. This is crucial for lower-speed maneuvers, such as getting vehicles from tight parking situations or even performing maintenance.
Controls are strictly limited for safety–typically to speeds under 2 MPH–ensuring these interventions remain emergency measures only.
Tesla is adding a secure “Enable Manual Drive” mode that will allow those fleet operators or others to take control temporarily.
Additionally, a Remote Start feature, which authorizes an empty vehicle to begin a driverless ride alone.
Ride-Hailing and Dispatch Features
Ride dispatch has been enhanced with soft-matching and multi-stop support. The app can intelligently pair riders with available Cybercabs while accommodating multiple destinations in a single trip.
This optimizes fleet utilization, reduces wait times, and improves efficiency for shared rides. Soft-matching likely considers factors like proximity, rider preferences, and vehicle availability for better user satisfaction.
Rider-Cabin Sync, Real-Time Routing
New synchronization tools allow the rider’s app to mirror and control cabin settings like seating, climate, and entertainment directly from their phone. Real-time routing updates adapt dynamically to traffic or road conditions, while dynamic safety monitoring continuously assesses the environment.
The app can now push updates directly to the main screen, enabling Center Display Control. Additionally, there is a dedicated navigation protocol sharing the exact coordinates of road closures and construction, which could prevent the car from getting stuck and needing manual override.
These features create a cohesive, responsive experience where the vehicle and app work in harmony.
Kill Switch
A high-security command lets Tesla completely freeze a vehicle’s ability to drive. This would take the vehicle out of the Robotaxi fleet for any reason Tesla sees fit, and would not allow it to be put into gear even with the correct equipment, like valid keys.
Elon Musk
SpaceX just forced Verizon, AT&T and T-Mobile to team up for the first time in history
AT&T, T-Mobile, and Verizon just joined forces for one reason: Starlink is winning.
America’s three largest wireless carriers, AT&T, T-Mobile, and Verizon, announced on On May 14, 2026 that they had agreed in principle to form a joint venture aimed at pooling their spectrum resources to expand satellite-based direct-to-device (D2D) connectivity across the United States in what can be seen as a direct response to SpaceX’s Starlink initiative. D2D, in plain terms, is technology that lets a standard smartphone connect directly to a satellite in orbit, the same way it connects to a cell tower, with no extra hardware required.
The alliance is widely seen as a means to slow Starlink’s rapid expansion in the satellite internet and mobile markets. SpaceX’s Starlink Mobile service launched commercially in July 2025 through a partnership with T-Mobile, starting with messaging before expanding to broadband data. SpaceX secured access to valuable wireless spectrum through its $17 billion deal with EchoStar, paving the way for significantly faster satellite-to-phone speeds.
SpaceX was not shy about its reaction. SpaceX president and COO Gwynne Shotwell responded on X: “Weeeelllll, I guess Starlink Mobile is doing something right! It’s David and Goliath (X3) all over again — I’m bettin’ on David.” SpaceX’s VP of Satellite Policy David Goldman went further, flagging potential antitrust concerns and asking whether the DOJ would even allow three dominant competitors to coordinate in a market where a new rival is actively entering.
Weeeelllll, I guess @Starlink Mobile is doing something right! It’s David and Goliath (X3) all over again — I’m bettin’ on David 🙂 https://t.co/5GzS752mxL
— Gwynne Shotwell (@Gwynne_Shotwell) May 14, 2026
Financial analysts at LightShed Partners were blunt, saying the announcement showed the three carriers are “nervous,” and pointed to the timing: “You announce an agreement in principle when the point is the announcement, not the deal. The timing, weeks ahead of the SpaceX roadshow, was the point.”
As Teslarati reported, SpaceX’s next generation Starlink V2 satellites will deliver up to 100 times the data density of the current system, with custom silicon and phased array antennas enabling around 20 times the throughput of the first generation. The carriers’ JV, which has no definitive agreement, no financial structure, and no deployment timeline yet, will need to move quickly to matter.
Elon Musk’s SpaceX is targeting a Nasdaq listing as early as June 12, aiming for what would be the largest IPO in history. With Starlink now serving over 9 million subscribers across 155 countries, holding 59 carrier partnerships globally, and now powering Air Force One, the carriers’ joint venture announcement landed at exactly the wrong time to look like anything other than a defensive move.
NASA updated Artemis III and SpaceX’s role just got more complicated
Tesla is making sweeping improvements to Robotaxi
