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SpaceX’s response to Crew Dragon explosion unfairly maligned by head of NASA
In a bizarre turn of events, NASA administrator Jim Bridenstine has offered harsh criticism of SpaceX’s response to Crew Dragon’s April 20th explosion, suffered just prior to a static fire test of its eight Super Draco abort engines.
The problem? The NASA administrator’s criticism explicitly contradicts multiple comments made by other NASA officials, the director of the entire Commercial Crew Program, and SpaceX itself. Lest all three of the above sources were either blatant lies or deeply incorrect, it appears that Bridenstine is – intentionally or accidentally – falsely maligning SpaceX and keeping the criticism entirely focused on just one of the two Commercial Crew partners. The reality is that his initial comments were misinterpreted, but an accurate interpretation is just as unflattering.
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Follow along as our team gives you their take on the biggest stories of the week.Ultimately, Bridenstine responded to a tweet by Ars Technica’s Eric Berger to correct the record, noting that the criticism was directed at his belief that SpaceX’s “communication with the public was not [good]”, while the company’s post-failure communication with NASA was actually just fine. In fact, according to Commercial Crew Program (CCP) Manager Kathy Lueders, NASA team members were quite literally in the control room during the pre-static fire explosion and the failure investigation began almost instantly.
A blog post and official update published by NASA on May 28th further confirms Lueders’ praise for the immediate SpaceX/NASA response that followed the failure.
“Following the test [failure], NASA and SpaceX immediately executed mishap plans established by the agency and company. SpaceX fully cleared the test site and followed all safety protocols. Early efforts focused on making the site safe, collecting data and developing a timeline of the anomaly, which did not result in any injuries. NASA assisted with the site inspection including the operation of drones and onsite vehicles.”
— NASA, May 28th, 2019
Why, then, are Bridenstine’s comments so bizarre and unfair?
A trip down memory lane
Back in mid-2018, Boeing’s Starliner spacecraft suffered a major setback (albeit not as catastrophic as Crew Dragon’s) when a static fire test ended with a valve failing to close, leaking incredibly toxic hydrazine fuel all over the test stand and throughout the service module that was test-fired. The failure reportedly delayed Boeing’s Starliner program months as a newer service module had to replace the contaminated article that was meant to support a critical 2019 pad-abort test preceding Starliner’s first crew launch.
According to anonymous sources that have spoken with reporters like Eric Berger and NASASpaceflight.com, the anomalous test occurred in late-June 2018, followed by no less than 20-30 days of complete silence from both Boeing and NASA. If Boeing told NASA, NASA certainly didn’t breathe a word of that knowledge to – in Bridenstine’s words – “the public (taxpayers)”. Prior to Mr. Berger breaking the news, Boeing ignored at least one private request for comment for several days before the author gave up and published the article, choosing to trust his source.
After the article was published, Boeing finally provided an official comment vaguely acknowledging the issue.
“We have been conducting a thorough investigation with assistance from our NASA and industry partners. We are confident we found the cause and are moving forward with corrective action. Flight safety and risk mitigation are why we conduct such rigorous testing, and anomalies are a natural part of any test program.”
— Boeing, July 21st, 2018 (T+~30 days)
SpaceX, for reference, offered an official media statement hours after Crew Dragon capsule C201 suffered a major failure during testing, acknowledging that an “anomaly” had occurred and that SpaceX and NASA were already working closely to investigate the accident. Less than two weeks after that, Vice President of Mission Assurance Hans Koenigsmann spent several minutes discussing Crew Dragon’s failure at a press conference, despite the fact that it was off topic in an event meant for a completely different mission (Cargo Dragon CRS-17).
“Earlier today, SpaceX conducted a series of engine tests on a Crew Dragon test vehicle on our test stand at Landing Zone 1 in Cape Canaveral, Florida. The initial tests completed successfully but the final test resulted in an anomaly on the test stand. Ensuring that our systems meet rigorous safety standards and detecting anomalies like this prior to flight are the main reasons why we test. Our teams are investigating and working closely with our NASA partners.”
— SpaceX, April 20th, 2019 (T+several hours)
Within ~40 days, NASA published an official update acknowledging Crew Dragon’s accident and the ongoing mishap investigation. Meanwhile, a full year after Starliner’s own major accident, NASA communications have effectively never once acknowledged it, while Boeing has been almost equally resistant to discussing or even acknowledging the problem and the delays it caused. On May 24th, NASA and Boeing announced that Starliner’s service module had passed important propulsion tests (essentially a repeat of the partially failed test in June 2018) – the anomaly that incurred months of delays and required a retest with a new service section was not mentioned once.
On April 3rd, NASA published a Commercial Crew schedule update that showed Boeing’s orbital Starliner launch debut (Orbital Flight Test, OFT) launching no earlier than August 2019, a delay of 4-5 months. In the article, NASA’s explanation (likely supplied in part by Boeing) bizarrely pointed the finger at ULA and the technicalities of Atlas V launch scheduling.
In other words, NASA somehow managed to completely leave out the fact that Starliner suffered a major failure almost a year prior that likely forced the OFT service section to be redirected to a pad abort test.
Following SpaceX’s anomaly, the company (and NASA, via Kathy Lueders) have been open about the fact that it means the Crew Dragon meant for DM-2 – the first crewed test launch – would have to be redirected to Dragon’s in-flight abort (IFA) test, while the vehicle originally meant to fly the first certified astronaut launch (USCV-1) would be reassigned to DM-2. Thankfully, this practice can be a boon for minimizing delays caused by failures. Oddly, Boeing has not once acknowledged that it was likely forced to do the same thing with Starliner, albeit with the expendable service section instead of the spacecraft’s capsule section.
Again, although the slides of additional CCP presentations from advisory committee meetings have briefly acknowledged Starliner’s failure with vague mentions like “valve design corrective action granted” (Dec. 2018) and “Service Module Hot Fire testing resuming after new valves installed” (May 2019), NASA has yet to acknowledge the Service Module failure and its multi-month schedule impact.
So, if SpaceX’s moderately quiet but otherwise excellent communication of Crew Dragon’s explosion was unsatisfactory and worthy of pointed criticism straight from the head of NASA, the fact that Boeing and NASA have scarcely acknowledged a Starliner anomaly that caused months of delays must be downright infuriating, insulting, and utterly unacceptable. And yet… not one mention during Bridenstine’s bizarre criticism of SpaceX’s supposed communication issues.
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Tesla’s Cybercab battery design could make robotaxis even cheaper
Tesla built the Cybercab’s battery pack with spare room for a future switch to LFP.
Tesla built the Cybercab’s battery pack with empty space inside it on purpose, and the reason points to a cheaper robotaxi down the road.
Robert Sumpf, Tesla’s director of mechanical design engineering for battery modules and packs, said the extra room beside and beneath the Cybercab’s modules was left there so the company can move to lithium iron phosphate cells later. “So, we protected this pack to go to an even lower energy dense chemistry as we scale and need to bring LFP into the platform,” Sumpf said in a Cybercab deep dive with Munro Live.
The Cybercab runs on Tesla’s own 4680 cells with a nickel chemistry today. LFP cells store less energy for their size, so a straight swap would cut range. The reserved space lets Tesla add more LFP cells to make up the difference. In return, Tesla would get cells that cost less, run cooler and survive more charge cycles. LFP became the most used EV battery chemistry in the world last year.
Not all of that room was planned for a chemistry change. Lars Moravy, Tesla’s Vice President of Vehicle Engineering, said part of it exists because “we didn’t need as many batteries as we thought we did.” Tesla told Sandy Munro in early 2025 that it was targeting a Cybercab pack under 50 kWh with close to 300 miles of range.
The pack also breaks from the structural design Tesla used in some Model Y and Cybertruck builds. Instead of potting hundreds of cells into one block, the Cybercab uses four separate, individually sealed modules, so a bad module can be replaced without scrapping the whole pack. Sumpf was blunt about the older approach, giving the Model Y structural battery “a grade D” because it was hard to build and nearly impossible to repair. He estimated a fully structural pack gains about 10% more cell volume, but said “the issue is the service cost.”
That cost matters more for a car that rarely sits parked. Cybercab chief engineer Eric Earley said replacing an entire pack “before half a million miles is a killer on cost,” which is why remanufacturing and serviceability were built into the design from the start.
The same Munro Live tour produced Moravy’s admission that the Cybercab line at Giga Texas is now outpacing Robotaxi deployments, along with a look at the robotaxi’s unorthodox paint process. Tesla is aiming to deliver the first Cybercabs to outside customers by the end of 2026, though Elon Musk has said the vast majority will stay owned by Tesla and run as a transport service.
Sumpf did not give a date for an LFP version, name a cell supplier or say how a chemistry change would affect range. For now, the 4680 cars keep piling up: Texas DMV records from Tuesday list 544 Cybercabs authorized for Tesla’s Robotaxi fleet, more than the 507 Model Ys on the same roster for the first time.
United Airlines CEO Scott Kirby said that SpaceX’s Starlink satellite internet is its leading competitive advantage in the U.S. airline industry. However, in recent comments, while he described the service as “the biggest competitive advantage” the carrier currently holds, he also acknowledged that the edge is temporary.
“…everybody eventually is going to have high-speed low earth orbit internet connectivity. It’s going to be a must-have. We are going to have a few years of being the only airline that has it at scale, and that’s our mission,” Kirby said. Until everyone has it, United aims to capitalize on its head start by converting trial users into long-term loyal customers.
🚨 United CEO Scott Kirby calls Starlink “the biggest competitive advantage,” but says it’s temporary.
“I think it’s the biggest competitive advantage. And it’s temporary. Like it’s not, everybody eventually is going to have high speed low earth orbit internet connectivity. It’s going to be a must-have. But we are going to have a few years of being the only airline that has it at scale, and that’s our mission.”
“I think we’re going to convince customers that United is the best airline and we’re going to get customers to switch their loyalty, to get our credit card, switch their loyalty to United. Not because of Starlink. They’re going to try us for Starlink and they’re going to stay with all the other technology, and everything else is better, and the technology in particular is so much better than technology other, and it’s accelerating because we’ve got the right tech stack, and because we’re like, our gap is getting wider and wider with our technology every day.”
Next: LAX becomes United’s first 100% Starlink hub in the first half of next year, and the United app will show your Starlink odds for each flight. https://t.co/hToyFWaWj7
— TESLARATI (@Teslarati) October 27, 2026
United has moved faster than its rivals on Starlink installations. As of mid-to-late October 2026, the system was on roughly 43 percent of its fleet, with plans to reach 61 percent by year-end, 87 percent by June 2027, and full fleet coverage by the end of next year.
The airline already operates more Starlink-equipped flights than the rest of the U.S. industry combined. Los Angeles International Airport is scheduled to become United’s first 100 percent Starlink hub in the first half of 2027, and the carrier’s app will display the likelihood that any given flight has the service.
Kirby has pointed to early evidence that the offering influences booking decisions. Some passengers loyal to other airlines are already switching flights for Starlink connectivity, something the airline, along with American Airlines, has tried to leverage against competing airlines. Both companies used status-match programs, and some of those customers are pursuing company-specific credit cards, which signals an intent to stay.
Once onboard, these customers encounter the airline’s broader investments in aircraft, larger seat-back screens, oversized bins, connection tools, and a mobile app that Kirby says outperforms competitors. Wi-Fi satisfaction scores on Starlink-equipped planes have been reported to be nearly double those on aircraft with other systems.
Competitors are moving slowly to do the same. Southwest Airlines began installations in 2025 and expects to complete them soon. Delta is pursuing Amazon’s Leo system, while American expects to start Starlink work in early 2027 and has not yet detailed regional-fleet plans. This timeline gap gives United a multi-year window in which it remains the only major U.S. carrier offering Starlink at scale.
Kirby has framed the strategy as pressing that advantage while simultaneously widening gaps in other technology areas so that customers who try United for the Wi-Fi remain for the overall experience.
The approach reflects a calculated bet that superior in-flight connectivity can accelerate share gains and support longer-term financial targets, including a 10 percent pre-tax margin goal.
High-speed internet is particularly valued by premium and business travelers who can work or stream reliably. As low-Earth-orbit service becomes ubiquitous, the temporary nature of the pure connectivity edge means United’s retention will depend on whether its other product and operational improvements keep pace.
Tesla Cybercab skips the traditional paint shop entirely, marking an unorthodox process for coloring the fully autonomous vehicle. However, the decision was a smart one, as it slashed factory costs, floor space utilization, and complexity, since Tesla relied on specialized alloys and in-mold coloring.
Munro Live was given the opportunity to do a factory walkthrough with Tesla Vice President of Vehicle Engineering Lars Moravy, who explained and detailed how Cybercab production at Giga Texas eliminates one of the automotive manufacturing industry’s most expensive and space-hungry elements.
A conventional paint line can cost hundreds of millions of dollars and require a million man-hours to build. Moravy framed the choice around Tesla’s core rule: “Question the requirements: why do you need paint?”
🚨 Super cool quote from the Cybercab breakdown on the decision to avoid traditional paint:
“One of the most expensive parts of the factory is a paint line… a few hundred million dollars, a million man hours to build one… rule number one at Tesla, question the requirements. Why do you need paint?… the alloys we use in the castings… don’t oxidize and reduce strength over time.” -@larsmoravy
Model Y and Cybertruck bodies are fully coated and painted. On Cybercab, only the side pieces get the anti-corrosion dip coat, and there’s no paint shop at all, which helps cut factory floor space per car by about 50%.
— TESLARATI (@Teslarati) October 26, 2026
The structural answer lies in material selection. The aluminum alloys used in Cybercab’s front and rear castings do not oxidize and lose strength over time, the way many common automotive aluminum alloys do. Only the side modules, built around hot-stamped boron-steel door rings, receive an anti-corrosion e-coat, or dip coat. Front and rear modules skip coating altogether.
Model Y and Model 3 bodies, by contrast, are fully coated and painted.
Exterior colors come from the plastics shop, which Tesla engineers described as “our paint shop” for the Cybercab. Body panels are produced via reaction injection molding, referred to as RIM. Color is then mixed into a polyurethane resin at the mix head immediately before injection, so the panel emerges already colored with a Class-A surface.
Robots trim overflow to control sink marks and flow lines. The process avoids conventional spray-paint defects like orange peel and paint bleed. Scratches can still be repaired with compatible coatings that behave “basically like paint.” Because color is integral rather than a surface layer, shallow scratches do not expose a contrasting undercoat.
The secret behind Tesla’s Cybercab Gold goes well beyond just the color
Tesla has also explored related approaches, including in-mold lamination and painted films on stamped panels.
The manufacturing payoff is substantial because removing the paint shop, combined with the “unboxed” modular process that builds and tests front, rear, side, and center modules in parallel before a short final assembly, cuts factory floor space per vehicle by about 50 percent.
Final assembly itself uses only about 25 automated stations, far fewer than the typical Model Y line, and the overall line runs at about 78 percent automation, Moravy said. The approach also eliminates volatile organic compound emissions associated with traditional spray painting for these panels and shortens the coloring cycle from hours to minutes.
Cybercab’s paint strategy is clearly less about aesthetics than about systematically deleting capital-intensive, energy-heavy, and space-consuming steps once material science and process design make them unnecessary. It is a concrete example of Tesla applying first-principles questioning to one of the auto industry’s most entrenched factory requirements.
Tesla’s Cybercab battery design could make robotaxis even cheaper
Starlink is ‘biggest competitive advantage,’ but it’s temporary, United CEO says
