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SpaceX’s response to Crew Dragon explosion unfairly maligned by head of NASA
In a bizarre turn of events, NASA administrator Jim Bridenstine has offered harsh criticism of SpaceX’s response to Crew Dragon’s April 20th explosion, suffered just prior to a static fire test of its eight Super Draco abort engines.
The problem? The NASA administrator’s criticism explicitly contradicts multiple comments made by other NASA officials, the director of the entire Commercial Crew Program, and SpaceX itself. Lest all three of the above sources were either blatant lies or deeply incorrect, it appears that Bridenstine is – intentionally or accidentally – falsely maligning SpaceX and keeping the criticism entirely focused on just one of the two Commercial Crew partners. The reality is that his initial comments were misinterpreted, but an accurate interpretation is just as unflattering.
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Follow along as our team gives you their take on the biggest stories of the week.Ultimately, Bridenstine responded to a tweet by Ars Technica’s Eric Berger to correct the record, noting that the criticism was directed at his belief that SpaceX’s “communication with the public was not [good]”, while the company’s post-failure communication with NASA was actually just fine. In fact, according to Commercial Crew Program (CCP) Manager Kathy Lueders, NASA team members were quite literally in the control room during the pre-static fire explosion and the failure investigation began almost instantly.
A blog post and official update published by NASA on May 28th further confirms Lueders’ praise for the immediate SpaceX/NASA response that followed the failure.
“Following the test [failure], NASA and SpaceX immediately executed mishap plans established by the agency and company. SpaceX fully cleared the test site and followed all safety protocols. Early efforts focused on making the site safe, collecting data and developing a timeline of the anomaly, which did not result in any injuries. NASA assisted with the site inspection including the operation of drones and onsite vehicles.”
— NASA, May 28th, 2019
Why, then, are Bridenstine’s comments so bizarre and unfair?
A trip down memory lane
Back in mid-2018, Boeing’s Starliner spacecraft suffered a major setback (albeit not as catastrophic as Crew Dragon’s) when a static fire test ended with a valve failing to close, leaking incredibly toxic hydrazine fuel all over the test stand and throughout the service module that was test-fired. The failure reportedly delayed Boeing’s Starliner program months as a newer service module had to replace the contaminated article that was meant to support a critical 2019 pad-abort test preceding Starliner’s first crew launch.
According to anonymous sources that have spoken with reporters like Eric Berger and NASASpaceflight.com, the anomalous test occurred in late-June 2018, followed by no less than 20-30 days of complete silence from both Boeing and NASA. If Boeing told NASA, NASA certainly didn’t breathe a word of that knowledge to – in Bridenstine’s words – “the public (taxpayers)”. Prior to Mr. Berger breaking the news, Boeing ignored at least one private request for comment for several days before the author gave up and published the article, choosing to trust his source.
After the article was published, Boeing finally provided an official comment vaguely acknowledging the issue.
“We have been conducting a thorough investigation with assistance from our NASA and industry partners. We are confident we found the cause and are moving forward with corrective action. Flight safety and risk mitigation are why we conduct such rigorous testing, and anomalies are a natural part of any test program.”
— Boeing, July 21st, 2018 (T+~30 days)
SpaceX, for reference, offered an official media statement hours after Crew Dragon capsule C201 suffered a major failure during testing, acknowledging that an “anomaly” had occurred and that SpaceX and NASA were already working closely to investigate the accident. Less than two weeks after that, Vice President of Mission Assurance Hans Koenigsmann spent several minutes discussing Crew Dragon’s failure at a press conference, despite the fact that it was off topic in an event meant for a completely different mission (Cargo Dragon CRS-17).
“Earlier today, SpaceX conducted a series of engine tests on a Crew Dragon test vehicle on our test stand at Landing Zone 1 in Cape Canaveral, Florida. The initial tests completed successfully but the final test resulted in an anomaly on the test stand. Ensuring that our systems meet rigorous safety standards and detecting anomalies like this prior to flight are the main reasons why we test. Our teams are investigating and working closely with our NASA partners.”
— SpaceX, April 20th, 2019 (T+several hours)
Within ~40 days, NASA published an official update acknowledging Crew Dragon’s accident and the ongoing mishap investigation. Meanwhile, a full year after Starliner’s own major accident, NASA communications have effectively never once acknowledged it, while Boeing has been almost equally resistant to discussing or even acknowledging the problem and the delays it caused. On May 24th, NASA and Boeing announced that Starliner’s service module had passed important propulsion tests (essentially a repeat of the partially failed test in June 2018) – the anomaly that incurred months of delays and required a retest with a new service section was not mentioned once.
On April 3rd, NASA published a Commercial Crew schedule update that showed Boeing’s orbital Starliner launch debut (Orbital Flight Test, OFT) launching no earlier than August 2019, a delay of 4-5 months. In the article, NASA’s explanation (likely supplied in part by Boeing) bizarrely pointed the finger at ULA and the technicalities of Atlas V launch scheduling.
In other words, NASA somehow managed to completely leave out the fact that Starliner suffered a major failure almost a year prior that likely forced the OFT service section to be redirected to a pad abort test.
Following SpaceX’s anomaly, the company (and NASA, via Kathy Lueders) have been open about the fact that it means the Crew Dragon meant for DM-2 – the first crewed test launch – would have to be redirected to Dragon’s in-flight abort (IFA) test, while the vehicle originally meant to fly the first certified astronaut launch (USCV-1) would be reassigned to DM-2. Thankfully, this practice can be a boon for minimizing delays caused by failures. Oddly, Boeing has not once acknowledged that it was likely forced to do the same thing with Starliner, albeit with the expendable service section instead of the spacecraft’s capsule section.
Again, although the slides of additional CCP presentations from advisory committee meetings have briefly acknowledged Starliner’s failure with vague mentions like “valve design corrective action granted” (Dec. 2018) and “Service Module Hot Fire testing resuming after new valves installed” (May 2019), NASA has yet to acknowledge the Service Module failure and its multi-month schedule impact.
So, if SpaceX’s moderately quiet but otherwise excellent communication of Crew Dragon’s explosion was unsatisfactory and worthy of pointed criticism straight from the head of NASA, the fact that Boeing and NASA have scarcely acknowledged a Starliner anomaly that caused months of delays must be downright infuriating, insulting, and utterly unacceptable. And yet… not one mention during Bridenstine’s bizarre criticism of SpaceX’s supposed communication issues.
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Investor's Corner
Tesla has a Cybercab problem nobody saw coming
Tesla’s Cybercab line now builds robotaxis faster than Tesla can deploy them, Lars Moravy says.
Tesla’s Cybercab line in Texas can now build the two seat robotaxi faster than the company can put it into service, according to Lars Moravy, Tesla’s Vice President of Vehicle Engineering. “We don’t run every day because the line can run so fast. It’s currently outpacing our deployments,” Moravy said in a new Cybercab deep dive from Munro Live. “So, it’s a bit of a race right now. Who’s going to go faster? Right now the manufacturing line’s ahead.”
Tesla’s official Robotaxi account shared a Cybercab analysis video on X on Monday, calling it a “Cybercab engineering deep dive.” Moravy’s comments go further than what he told analysts on the Q3 earnings call last week, when he said the Cybercab line’s listed capacity of more than 125,000 units a year undersells what it can actually run.
The tour shows where that speed comes from. Tesla’s unboxed process splits the Cybercab into front, rear, side and center modules that are built and tested on their own before they meet on a short final line. That final line has just 25 fully automated stations, which Tesla’s team estimated is a fifth to a tenth of what a Model Y needs. The full line is about 78% automated, the framing line is already at 100%, and the layout uses roughly 50% less floor space per vehicle. The stated goal is “100% automation in 10 second cycle time,” or one finished Cybercab every 10 seconds.
Tesla also deleted the paint shop. Only the side modules are coated, and the exterior panels get their color inside the molding machine. Engineers said the car is designed to run at least 500,000 miles, which matters for a vehicle that will spend most of its day carrying riders.
The battery got the same treatment. The Cybercab uses an 88S6P pack of 4680 cells in a steel enclosure, a first for Tesla, with each module potted separately so a single failed module can be swapped instead of the whole pack. Wireless battery management boards replace a wiring harness, and new contactors are fast enough to drop the pyro fuse entirely. Tesla’s battery director graded the pack an A minus, compared with a D for the Model Y structural pack and a B minus for Cybertruck. Up front, the drive unit runs an 11:1 gear ratio versus roughly 9:1 on most Teslas, since the Cybercab does not need a high top speed.
Cybercab engineering deep dive — Robotaxi (@robotaxi) October 26, 2026
The deployment side is now the bottleneck Moravy described. Tesla had more than 50 Cybercabs working the Formula 1 weekend in Austin, and Texas records show 463 Cybercabs registered. Tesla said on its earnings call that Cybercab service will launch in Dallas next month, and Moravy said the company is aiming to get Cybercabs to customers by the end of 2026. Every unit built so far has gone into Tesla’s own fleet since the line moved into volume production in April.
Munro Live also asked when it could get a Cybercab to tear down. Tesla’s answer: “Not yet.”
SpaceX’s Raptor engine family has steadily increased sea-level thrust while simultaneously reducing mass, turning iterative engineering gains into substantially higher performance for the Super Heavy booster. CEO Elon Musk shed more light on how powerful Raptor 4 will be, and it’s pretty crazy.
Raptor 1 delivered 185 metric tons of thrust at roughly 2,080 kilograms, while Raptor 2 raised that to 230 tons while cutting mass to about 1,630 kilograms. SpaceX data for Raptor 3 lists a target of 280 tons at 1,525 kilograms (with further reductions in associated vehicle hardware), while operational flight ratings have been cited near 250 tons.
This morning, Elon Musk stated that Raptor 4 is expected to reach 300 tons of sea-level thrust at roughly the same mass as Raptor 3. Across these versions, thrust has risen by more than 60 percent from the first engines while engine mass has fallen, producing a sharp improvement in thrust-to-weight ratio. This is a true testament to how great SpaceX engineering has been:
🚀 Elon says Raptor 4 will make 300 tons of thrust at sea level at roughly the same mass as Raptor 3.
How far Raptor has come:
Raptor 1: 185 tf, 2,080 kg
Raptor 2: 230 tf, 1,630 kg
Raptor 3: 250 tf, 1,525 kg
Raptor 4: 300 tf33 on Super Heavy = ~9,900 tf, nearly 3x Saturn V https://t.co/HQDswZhyvL
— TESLARATI (@Teslarati) October 26, 2026
With 33 engines on SuperHeavy, the jump from earlier versions to a 300-ton Raptor 4 would produce roughly 9,900 metric tons of total liftoff thrust, nearly three times the Saturn V’s approximately 3,400 metric tons from its five F-1 engines.
This is not just a larger number on a data sheet, either, as sea-level thrust is the force available the moment the vehicle leaves the pad. This is when it is heaviest and still deep in Earth’s gravity well and dense atmosphere.
Higher levels of sea-level thrust directly improves the initial thrust-to-weight ratio of the full stack. A higher ratio produces faster acceleration off the pad, which shortens the time the rocket has to spend fighting gravity, and gravity losses during the first minute or two of the flight are a major drain on total available delta-v. Every second shaved off of that early climb preserves more propellant energy for reaching orbital velocity or for carrying extra payload.
Because Super Heavy’s engine count is constrained by vehicle diameter and packing density, increasing thrust per engine is the most straightforward way to raise total liftoff performance without redesigning the booster structure or design.
The same-mass target for Raptor 4 is equally important. Holding engine mass roughly constant while raising thrust improves the engine’s own thrust-to-weight ratio and reduces the structural and propellant mass fraction that must be carried solely to support the engines.
Earlier Raptor iterations also simplified or eliminated extensive vehicle-side hardware such as heat shields. These gains compound: more force for less installed mass leaves additional capacity for propellant, payload, or operational margins such as engine-out capability.
For Starship’s architecture, the practical effects are large. Greater liftoff thrust supports heavier vehicles, larger propellant loads, and higher payloads to low Earth orbit, figures SpaceX has targeted in the 100-plus-ton reusable range. That capacity underpins orbital refueling, lunar missions, and eventual Mars cargo and crew flights.
Continued growth in sea-level thrust therefore tightens the gap between theoretical rocket performance and the high flight rates and reusability needed to make large-scale space transport practical.
Tesla has expanded its Tesla Assisted Driving (TAD) suite to its tenth European country, as Latvia joined a growing list of European Union member states authorizing the company’s advanced driver assistance technology.
Tesla Europe announced this morning that the system is now approved in Latvia, with a software rollout to begin soon.
The approval and rollout follow recognition of a provisional European type approval originally granted by the Netherlands’ RDW authority on April 10.
🚨 Latvia has just received approval for Tesla Full Self-Driving (Supervised)
This is the 10th country in the EU to gain approval:
1. Netherlands — 10 April 2026 (original RDW approval)
2. Lithuania — 20 May 2026
3. Estonia — 29 May 2026
4. Denmark — 9 June 2026
5. Belgium — 10 June 2026
6. Slovenia — 7 September 2026
7. Czechia — 21 September 2026
8. Croatia — 29 September 2026
9. Slovakia — 16 October 2026— TESLARATI (@Teslarati) October 26, 2026
Latvia’s Road Traffic Safety Directorate (CSDD) evaluated the Dutch documentation, coordinated with the other national authorities, and reviewed updates from Tesla. These included tightened limits on speed offsets, automatic resets of any manual speed adjustments after each trip, and stronger driver monitoring.
In Europe, the feature is marketed as Tesla Assisted Driving after a recent rule change that labeled the name “Full Self-Driving” as misleading.
The system remains an SAE Level 2 driver assistance tool, not unsupervised autonomy. It can control speed, steering, braking, lane changes, and intersections while following a navigation route. Drivers need not keep their hands on the wheel at all times, yet they must continuously monitor the road and be prepared to intervene immediately.
The sequence of EU recognitions began with the Netherlands in April and continued through Lithuania, Estonia, Denmark, Belgium, Slovenia, Czechia, Croatia, and Slovakia. Most have relied on mutual recognition of the single Dutch provisional approval rather than independent national testing.
These national clearances do not yet constitute bloc-wide authorization. An EU-wide decision requires a qualified majority in the Technical Committee on Motor Vehicles: at least 15 of 27 member states representing 65 percent of the EU population. Larger markets, like Germany, France, and Italy, remain under review, and a vote is expected this December.
However, for Latvian Tesla owners with compatible vehicles and software, the imminent rollout expands access to the supervised system while underscoring that attentive human oversight remains essential.
Tesla has a Cybercab problem nobody saw coming
How SpaceX Is raising Raptor’s sea-level thrust while holding engine mass steady
