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SpaceX’s next Falcon Heavy launch and landing could be more than a year away
According to comments made by US Air Force officials prior to SpaceX’s latest Falcon Heavy launch, the payload assigned to the military’s first fully-certified Falcon Heavy has been swapped with another, although the mission’s late-2020 launch target remains relatively unchanged.
This new information comes on the heels of the June 25th launch of Space Test Program 2 (STP-2), SpaceX’s third successful Falcon Heavy mission and a huge milestone for the rocket’s future as a competitive option for US military launches. Perhaps most importantly, it confirms – barring a surprise launch contract or internal Starlink mission – that Falcon Heavy’s next (and fourth) launch is unlikely to occur until late next year, a gap of at least 15-17 months.
Announced roughly four months after Falcon Heavy’s inaugural February 2018 launch debut, the USAF contracted with SpaceX to launch the ~6350 kg (14,000 lb) AFSPC-52 satellite no earlier than (NET) September 2020. In February 2019, Department of Defense contract announcements revealed that SpaceX had been awarded three military launch contracts, two for the National Reconnaissance Office (NROL-85 & NROL-87) and one for the USAF (AFSPC-44), all tentatively scheduled to launch in 2021.
First reported by Spaceflight Now, Col. Robert Bongiovi – director of the launch enterprise systems directorate at the Air Force’s Space and Missile Systems Center (AFSMC) – recently indicated that AFSPC-44 – not AFSPC-52 – is now scheduled to be the US military’s first post-certification Falcon Heavy launch. 52 and 44 have essentially swapped spots, with AFSPC-44 moving forward to NET Q4 (fall) 2020 while AFSPC-52 has been delayed to NET Q2 (spring) 2021.
The trouble with launch gaps
Although Bongiovi did not explicitly state that AFSPC-44 will be SpaceX’s next Falcon Heavy launch, there are no publicly-disclosed missions set to launch on the rocket in the interim. That could theoretically change, especially if SpaceX has plans to launch the massive rocket in support of an internal Starlink mission or even something more exotic, but the loss of both Block 5 center core B1055 and B1057 means that the company will have to build an entirely new center core.
SpaceX’s Falcon Heavy lead times are far superior to competitor ULA’s Delta IV Heavy production line, but the process of manufacturing new center cores is still quite lengthy. Critically, Falcon Heavy Block 5 center cores require strengthened octawebs, custom interstages, and propellant tanks that are significantly thicker than those used on Falcon 9. For all intents and purposes, a center core is a totally different rocket relative to a Falcon 9 booster, the latter being SpaceX’s primary focus at the company’s assembly line-style Hawthorne factory. It’s theoretically possible for a dedicated Falcon Heavy center core build to be expedited or leapfrogged forward in the production queue, but most long-lead Falcon 9 booster hardware physically cannot be redirected to speed up center core production.
Unless SpaceX was already in the process of building a new center core prior B1057’s unsuccessful landing attempt, it’s safe to assume that the next custom Falcon Heavy booster is unlikely to be completed until early 2020, if not later. In theory, this means that Falcon Heavy could be dormant for no less than 16 months between STP-2 and its next launch. Traditionally, that sort of lengthy gap between launches has been frowned upon by NASA, ULA, and oversight groups like GAO. If a given rocket doesn’t launch for a year or more, it can potentially pose a risk to reliability and raise costs as its production and launch teams have no satisfactory way to fully preserve their technical expertise.
This can be compared to attempting to become an expert at a musical instrument while only having access to said instrument one or two months a year, essentially impossible. In fact, at one point, NASA hoped to require its Space Launch System (SLS) rocket be able to launch no less than once per year, partly motivated by a desire to mitigate some of the deterioration that can follow extremely low launch cadences. Years later, financial constraints and years upon years of delays and budget overruns have made such a cadence effectively impossible for SLS/Orion, but the fact remains that launching a rocket just once every 18-24 months is likely to inflate both costs and risks.
Thankfully, SpaceX’s Falcon Heavy could scarcely be more different than NASA’s SLS and the retired Space Shuttle it derives most of its hardware from. Even if all things are held equal and not flying a Falcon Heavy center core for 16+ months increases risk and cost, center cores are still heavily derived from Falcon 9 booster technology, including plumbing, avionics, attitude control thrusters, Merlin 1D engines, landing legs, and launch facilities.
Furthermore, the center core is just one of five distinct assemblies that make up a given Falcon Heavy. Both side boosters are effectively Falcon 9 Block 5 boosters with nose cones instead of interstages and slight modifications to support booster attachment hardware, while the upper stage and payload fairing are the same for all Falcon launches. In other words, SpaceX’s workforce will continue to build, launch, land, and reuse dozens of Falcon 9 boosters – as well as upper stages payload fairings – between now and Falcon Heavy Flight 4, even if it’s NET Q4 2020. In a worst-case scenario, SpaceX production and launch staff will be unfamiliar and inexperienced with maybe 20% of Falcon Heavy – at least in a very rough sense. Even then, much of that unfamiliarity may still be tempered by the fact that Falcon Heavy center cores share a large amount of commonality with the Falcon 9 first stages SpaceX’s workforce will remain deeply familiar with.
Indeed, Falcon Heavy’s second launch has already demonstrated this to some extent, occurring without issue more than 14 months after the rocket’s inaugural launch. It seems that the only real loss incurred by a ~16-month delay between Flights 3 and 4 will be having to wait another year (or more) to witness Falcon Heavy’s next launch.
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Elon Musk
SpaceX Starship Flight 13 aborted at Zero and Musk just told us what broke
Four Raptor engines failed to ignite at T-zero, forcing SpaceX to scrub Starship Flight 13 Thursday.
SpaceX scrubbed the Starship Flight 13 launch attempt Thursday evening at the last possible moment, after four of the Super Heavy booster’s 33 Raptor 3 engines failed to ignite during the startup sequence. The 90-minute window had opened at 6:45 p.m. EDT from Starbase in Boca Chica, Texas, and the countdown had proceeded without issue all day, with more than 11.5 million pounds of liquid methane and liquid oxygen being fully loaded into the rocket before the automated abort triggered. SpaceX’s launch directors posted on X, “Standing down from today’s flight test attempt,” and shut down the livestream shortly after.
Musk confirmed the root cause within hours. “Some of the engines didn’t start, triggering an automatic launch abort,” he wrote on X. “To be confident of a good flight, 2 Raptors will be removed and replaced. Most probable launch timing is early next week.” SpaceX engineers began draining propellant tanks immediately and Booster 20 was rolled back to its hangar for inspection.
The timing adds a layer of significance that did not exist during any of the previous 12 Starship flights. This is the first time SpaceX has attempted to launch Starship since the company made its stock market debut in June, listing under ticker SPCX at $135 per share. Public investors are now watching every Starship outcome in real time, and a last-second abort carries more visibility than it would have six months ago.
Flight 13 was designed to be one of the most consequential tests in the program’s history. It was set to carry 20 Starlink V3 satellites, the first operational payload Starship has ever attempted to deploy. Six of those satellites carried external cameras to photograph Starship’s heat shield from the outside during flight, which would act as a self-inspection approach SpaceX has never attempted before. The mission also needed to complete a Raptor engine relight in space, a step SpaceX skipped on Flight 12 in May after losing an engine during ascent. That Flight 12 booster also flipped 90 degrees off course during its boostback burn when five engines failed to reignite.
SpaceX has not announced an official next launch date. Musk’s “early next week” window points to July 21 or 22 at the earliest, pending the engine swap and a return to the pad.
Elon Musk flew under the radar with his recent purchase of a $1 billion energy company, according to Federal Trade Commission (FTC) documents.
Transaction number 202612350 listed Tesla and SpaceX frontman Elon Musk as the acquiring party and CF APR Super Holdings LLC as the seller, with New APR Energy, LLC as the acquired entity. The deal, which closed without public announcement, came to light on May 14.
BREAKING: Elon Musk acquires Jacksonville power company APR Energy in a deal valued at more than $1,000,000,000.00.
— Polymarket Money (@PolymarketMoney) July 15, 2026
Analysts inferred the deal’s scale from minority stakeholder disclosures, including one report of a 5 percent interest sold for approximately $50.4 million. Fortress Investment Group had purchased APR’s assets in late 2024, rebranded the operation as New APR Energy, and subsequently transferred ownership to Musk.
APR Energy specializes in rapidly deployable power infrastructure. The company maintains one of the world’s largest fleets of mobile gas and diesel turbines, with more than 1.1 gigawatts of generation capacity. Its modular units, which are often trailer-mounted, enable turnkey installations ranging from 20 MW to over 500 MW.
APR provides full engineering, procurement, construction, operation, and maintenance services for behind-the-meter power plants, serving everything from data centers, utilities, and industrial clients.
The firm has expanded aggressively to meet surging demand, recently adding turbines and deploying over 100 MW for a major AI hyperscaler. Its solutions bridge critical gaps where grid interconnections face delays of two to five years, according to Yahoo.
The acquisition means something more for Musk. As he continues to expand projects in artificial intelligence, especially xAI, his AI venture, there is a greater need to supply energy-intensive supercomputing clusters, including the Colossus project, with what they need: reliable and high-capacity power.
Ownership of APR provides immediate access to flexible generation assets that can be deployed adjacent to data centers, reducing dependence on a strained infrastructure. It also complements Tesla’s energy storage business, so Musk will be able to pull from his own entities to address the rapid scaling demands of AI training and compute.
Tesla had a petition protesting a recall to fix a potential issue with 2017-2023 Model Y and Model 3 vehicles’ headlights was denied, as the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) disagreed with the company’s opinion of things.
The recall covers approximately 19,917 Model Y and Model 3 vehicles built from 2017 to 2023. Tesla initially submitted a noncompliance report for the headlights on these vehicles on March 15, 2024. Tesla then petitioned for an exemption from the fix, which violated FMVSS No. 108 (40 CFR 571.108), arguing that the “noncompliance is inconsequential as it relates to motor vehicle safety.
🚨 Tesla was denied a petition by the NHTSA to avoid a recall of 19,900 2017-2023 Model 3 and Model Y vehicles.
The NHTSA found that the vehicles’ headlights may exceed maximum lighting levels. Tesla argued it was inconsequential and did not require a recall. pic.twitter.com/m8Jmm1teLL
— TESLARATI (@Teslarati) July 16, 2026
The NHTSA disagreed, stating that Tesla’s conclusion that the headlights do not increase any risk was not an opinion it shared. The agency said it disagreed with Tesla’s assumption that glare is not increased to surrounding traffic. This issue could be highlighted even more in certain weather conditions.
Tesla will be required to remedy the issue, the NHTSA ruled:
“In consideration of the foregoing, NHTSA has decided that Tesla has not met its burden of persuasion that the subject FMVSS No. 108 noncompliance is inconsequential to motor vehicle safety. Accordingly, Tesla’s petition is hereby denied, and Tesla is consequently obligated to provide notification of and free remedy for that noncompliance under 49 U.S.C. 30118 and 30120.”
The issue here appears to be the angle of the headlights and the brightness they emit during operation. The NHTSA report states that:
“Tesla’s headlamp supplier, Marelli Automotive Lighting, tested 25 right-hand and 25 left-hand lamps, and for this sample, found the maximum photometric intensity measured in the 10°U to 90°U and 90°L to 90°R zone was between 136.2 cd and 230.1 cd for the right-hand lamps and between 117.5 cd and 160.3 cd for the left-hand lamps. According to Tesla, these tests revealed that the photometric intensity of the right-hand and left-hand headlamp lower beam on the subject vehicles may measure as much as 230.1 cd in the 10°U to 90°U and 90°L to 90°R zone, exceeding the maximum photometric intensity by 105.1 cd. Additionally, Tesla states that a left-hand lamp tested by a Transport Canada recognized laboratory measured a maximum of 171.27 cd in the 10°U to 90°U and 90°L to 90°R zone. Despite these measurements exceeding the allowed photometric maximum of 125 cd, Tesla believes that the subject noncompliance is inconsequential to motor vehicle safety.”
Tesla also argued at some points that the headlights had not been deemed responsible for any complaints, accidents, or injuries related to the noncompliance.
SpaceX Starship Flight 13 aborted at Zero and Musk just told us what broke
Elon Musk secretly acquires $1B energy company to power the AI future
