News
SpaceX Super Heavy booster returns to launch pad after major repairs
SpaceX has returned its newest Super Heavy to Starbase’s orbital launch site (OLS) after rapidly repairing damage the booster suffered during its first round of testing.
Super Heavy Booster 7 (B7) left the High Bay it was assembled in for the first time on March 31st and rolled a few miles down the road to nearby Starship launch and test facilities on a set of self-propelled mobile transporters (SPMTs). On April 2nd, the roughly 67-meter-tall (~220 ft; 69m w/ Raptors) rocket was installed on top of Starbase’s lone orbital launch mount (OLM), setting the stage for crucial qualification testing.
The start of that process was exceptionally successful. On April 4th, after a smooth launch mount installation, SpaceX quickly filled Booster 7’s propellant tanks with a relatively benign cryogenic fluid (liquid nitrogen, liquid oxygen, or both) to simulate the thermal and mechanical characteristics of real flammable propellant. Despite the fact that the test marked the first time SpaceX had fully filled a Super Heavy prototype’s tanks, Booster 7 sailed through the ‘cryoproof’ without any obvious issue.
On April 8th, SpaceX moved Super Heavy B7 from the orbital launch mount to a structural test stand that had been installed and modified just a few hundred feet away in the weeks prior. This is where Booster 7’s near-perfect start to qualification testing took a bit of a turn. Booster 7 is only the third full-size Super Heavy prototype SpaceX has tested since July 2021. Like Booster 3 and Booster 4 before it, Booster 7 features some major design changes that ultimately make the prototype a pathfinder, necessitating extensive qualification testing.
To name just a few of the changes, Super Heavy B7 is the first booster fitted with a 33-engine puck and the first finished Starship prototype of any kind designed to use new Raptor V2 engines. With all 33 engines installed and operating a full thrust, Booster 7’s entire structure – and its aft thrust section especially – would be subjected to around 40% more thrust and stress than Booster 4, which indirectly completed structural testing with the help of a sacrificial test tank. Beyond differences in thrust and mechanical stress, Booster 7 is also the first Super Heavy to reach the test stand with secondary ‘header’ tanks meant to store landing propellant.
It’s unclear if those header tanks were fully filled and drained during Booster 7’s cryoproof, but they would not be quite as cooperative during a different kind of cryogenic testing on the structural test stand. The stand SpaceX modified specifically for Super Heavy B7 was outfitted with 13 hydraulic rams to simulate the full thrust of the booster’s central Raptor V2 engines – up to almost 3000 tons (~6.6M lbf) compared to Booster 4’s ~1700 tons (~3.7M lbf) with a smaller cluster of nine engines.
Implosion at the Structural Test Stand
After a few false starts and minor tests on the stand, Booster 7 finally managed some significant testing on April 14th. Judging by the rhythmic shattering of ice that built up on Super Heavy’s tanks, the test stand was able to simulate the thrust of Raptors to some degree and subject the booster to major mechanical stress that was felt from tip to tail. Within a few days, Booster 7 was removed from the test stand and returned to the high bay on April 18th. Around April 21st or 22nd, an image was leaked showing extensive damage inside Booster 7, confirming that the Super Heavy’s test campaign had been forced to end prematurely.

Right away, the damage shown in the photo hinted at an operational failure, meaning that mistakes made by the rocket’s operators may have been more to blame than a possible design flaw. The photo shows a short portion of B7’s liquid methane (LCH4) transfer tube that runs through the booster’s new liquid oxygen (LOx) header tank, which itself sits inside Super Heavy’s main LOx tank at the aft end of the rocket – a tube inside a small tank inside a large tank, in other words. Super Heavy’s LCH4 transfer tube generally does what it says, allowing methane to safely fly down through the main LOx tank and fuel up to 33 Raptor engines. At full thrust, that tube would need to supply around 20 tons (~45,000 lb) of methane per second.
However, on top of merely transferring methane through the oxygen tank, Booster 7 introduced a design change that allows some or all of that tube to change functions and become a header tank mid-flight. That would require a system of valves that could seal off the main LCH4 tank once it was emptied, turning the transfer tube into a sort of giant steel straw filled with enough LCH4 to fuel Super Heavy’s boost-back and landing burns.
The damaged transfer tube in the leaked photo of Booster 7 doesn’t look that unlike what one might expect to see if they sucked through one end of a straw while blocking the other end, collapsing the center. Translated to the scale of Super Heavy, after an otherwise successful day of structural testing, SpaceX operators may have accidentally closed or opened the wrong valves while draining the booster’s transfer tube of liquid oxygen or nitrogen. As the heavy liquid drained from the tube, a lack of pressure equalization could have quickly drawn a vacuum and caused the tube to implode.
On April 29th, a SpaceX fan turned analyst published an analysis that convincingly pinpointed the moment Booster 7’s transfer tube collapsed. Simultaneously, because it showed that the transfer tube likely imploded during detanking, the analysis more or less confirmed the above speculation that the failure had been caused by a degree of operator error or poor test design. Of course, it’s possible that a hardware or software design flaw contributed to or caused the anomaly or that something like a pressure differential in the LOx header tank and LCH4 header tube could also explain the damage, but the accidental formation of a vacuum during detanking is arguably the simplest (obvious) explanation.
After the image of the internal damage leaked, the immediate consensus among fans and close followers was that Booster 7 was beyond repair. Instead, SpaceX appears to have proven those assumptions wrong and somehow managed to repair the upgraded Super Heavy to the point that it was worth testing again less than three weeks after returning to the high bay. On May 6th, B7 was rolled back to the launch site and installed, for the second time, on the orbital launch mount.
Prior to the failure, the general expectation was that SpaceX would begin installing Raptor V2 engines as soon as Booster 7 passed structural testing. It remains to be seen if SpaceX wants to repeat Booster 7’s cryoproof or structural testing to ensure that its quick repairs did the job before proceeding into static fire testing as previously planned. Nonetheless, hope lives on for the Super Heavy prototype and new test windows have been scheduled from 10am to 10pm on May 9th, 10th, and 11th.
News
Elon Musk secretly acquires $1B energy company to power the AI future
Elon Musk flew under the radar with his recent purchase of a $1 billion energy company, according to Federal Trade Commission (FTC) documents.
Transaction number 202612350 listed Tesla and SpaceX frontman Elon Musk as the acquiring party and CF APR Super Holdings LLC as the seller, with New APR Energy, LLC as the acquired entity. The deal, which closed without public announcement, came to light on May 14.
BREAKING: Elon Musk acquires Jacksonville power company APR Energy in a deal valued at more than $1,000,000,000.00.
— Polymarket Money (@PolymarketMoney) July 15, 2026
Analysts inferred the deal’s scale from minority stakeholder disclosures, including one report of a 5 percent interest sold for approximately $50.4 million. Fortress Investment Group had purchased APR’s assets in late 2024, rebranded the operation as New APR Energy, and subsequently transferred ownership to Musk.
APR Energy specializes in rapidly deployable power infrastructure. The company maintains one of the world’s largest fleets of mobile gas and diesel turbines, with more than 1.1 gigawatts of generation capacity. Its modular units, which are often trailer-mounted, enable turnkey installations ranging from 20 MW to over 500 MW.
APR provides full engineering, procurement, construction, operation, and maintenance services for behind-the-meter power plants, serving everything from data centers, utilities, and industrial clients.
The firm has expanded aggressively to meet surging demand, recently adding turbines and deploying over 100 MW for a major AI hyperscaler. Its solutions bridge critical gaps where grid interconnections face delays of two to five years, according to Yahoo.
The acquisition means something more for Musk. As he continues to expand projects in artificial intelligence, especially xAI, his AI venture, there is a greater need to supply energy-intensive supercomputing clusters, including the Colossus project, with what they need: reliable and high-capacity power.
Ownership of APR provides immediate access to flexible generation assets that can be deployed adjacent to data centers, reducing dependence on a strained infrastructure. It also complements Tesla’s energy storage business, so Musk will be able to pull from his own entities to address the rapid scaling demands of AI training and compute.
News
Tesla has to fix a big problem with its old headlights, NHTSA says
Tesla had a petition protesting a recall to fix a potential issue with 2017-2023 Model Y and Model 3 vehicles’ headlights was denied, as the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) disagreed with the company’s opinion of things.
The recall covers approximately 19,917 Model Y and Model 3 vehicles built from 2017 to 2023. Tesla initially submitted a noncompliance report for the headlights on these vehicles on March 15, 2024. Tesla then petitioned for an exemption from the fix, which violated FMVSS No. 108 (40 CFR 571.108), arguing that the “noncompliance is inconsequential as it relates to motor vehicle safety.
🚨 Tesla was denied a petition by the NHTSA to avoid a recall of 19,900 2017-2023 Model 3 and Model Y vehicles.
The NHTSA found that the vehicles’ headlights may exceed maximum lighting levels. Tesla argued it was inconsequential and did not require a recall. pic.twitter.com/m8Jmm1teLL
— TESLARATI (@Teslarati) July 16, 2026
The NHTSA disagreed, stating that Tesla’s conclusion that the headlights do not increase any risk was not an opinion it shared. The agency said it disagreed with Tesla’s assumption that glare is not increased to surrounding traffic. This issue could be highlighted even more in certain weather conditions.
Tesla will be required to remedy the issue, the NHTSA ruled:
“In consideration of the foregoing, NHTSA has decided that Tesla has not met its burden of persuasion that the subject FMVSS No. 108 noncompliance is inconsequential to motor vehicle safety. Accordingly, Tesla’s petition is hereby denied, and Tesla is consequently obligated to provide notification of and free remedy for that noncompliance under 49 U.S.C. 30118 and 30120.”
The issue here appears to be the angle of the headlights and the brightness they emit during operation. The NHTSA report states that:
“Tesla’s headlamp supplier, Marelli Automotive Lighting, tested 25 right-hand and 25 left-hand lamps, and for this sample, found the maximum photometric intensity measured in the 10°U to 90°U and 90°L to 90°R zone was between 136.2 cd and 230.1 cd for the right-hand lamps and between 117.5 cd and 160.3 cd for the left-hand lamps. According to Tesla, these tests revealed that the photometric intensity of the right-hand and left-hand headlamp lower beam on the subject vehicles may measure as much as 230.1 cd in the 10°U to 90°U and 90°L to 90°R zone, exceeding the maximum photometric intensity by 105.1 cd. Additionally, Tesla states that a left-hand lamp tested by a Transport Canada recognized laboratory measured a maximum of 171.27 cd in the 10°U to 90°U and 90°L to 90°R zone. Despite these measurements exceeding the allowed photometric maximum of 125 cd, Tesla believes that the subject noncompliance is inconsequential to motor vehicle safety.”
Tesla also argued at some points that the headlights had not been deemed responsible for any complaints, accidents, or injuries related to the noncompliance.
Lifestyle
NTSB findings on fatal Tesla crash tell a very different story
The NTSB confirmed the driver, not Tesla’s FSD, caused the fatal Texas house crash.
The National Transportation Safety Board released preliminary findings Wednesday confirming that a Tesla driver, not the vehicle’s software, caused a fatal crash in Katy, Texas in June. The driver, 44-year-old Michael Butler, had engaged Full Self-Driving Supervised mode on Rose Hollow Lane, a residential street with a 30 mph speed limit, before manually overriding the system by pressing the accelerator pedal all the way to 100%. Data recovered from the 2025 Tesla Model 3 showed the vehicle was traveling over 70 miles per hour when it struck a home and killed 76-year-old Martha Avila, who was inside. Weather was clear, the road was dry, and it was daylight.
Texas man charged in fatal Tesla crash where he blamed Autopilot
Butler told authorities he had passed out at the wheel. But security camera footage obtained by the NTSB told a different story, and showed the car accelerating through an intersection before leaving the road entirely. Police also found that Butler’s phone had Google searches including the terms “Tesla FSD not aggressive enough 2026” and “Tesla FSD too timid,” raising serious questions about how he was using the system before the crash. Butler has since been charged with manslaughter. The victim’s family has filed a lawsuit against both Butler and Tesla, alleging negligence.
The NTSB findings aligned directly with what Tesla VP of AI Software Ashok Elluswamy had already stated publicly on X in the weeks after the crash, writing that “the driver manually overrode self-driving by pressing the accelerator all the way to 100%.” The data confirmed his account.
Yup. In this case, the driver manually overrode self-driving by pressing the accelerator all the way to 100% of the accel pedal in this residential area. They reached a speed of 73 mph during the crash, and had the accelerator pressed even after the crash.
— Ashok Elluswamy (@aelluswamy) June 22, 2026