News
SpaceX wins new Falcon Heavy launch contract as rocket’s prospects stabilize
SpaceX has won a new Falcon Heavy launch contract from Swedish telecommunications company Ovzon, which hopes to procure a large geostationary communications satellite in time for launch in the fourth quarter of 2020.
Excluding two pending contracts, a consequence of the many years of delays suffered since SpaceX first began marketing the rocket, Ovzon’s commitment is now the fourth commercial contract secured by Falcon Heavy in 2019 and 2020, solidifying enough demand to sustain – on average – biannual launches over the next two or so years.
Ovzon signs agreement with SpaceX for first satellite launch – read the full release here: https://t.co/M9YWRCyp5L
In an important step towards growing our satellite service offering, Ovzon has entered into an agreement with SpaceX for launch of Ovzon’s first GEO satellite. pic.twitter.com/HfMfl9jnNV— Ovzon AB (@OvzonAB) October 16, 2018
Speaking at IAC 2018, SpaceX VP of Reliability Hans Koenigsmann was by no means wrong when he described the latent demand seen for Falcon Heavy launches, stating that “there aren’t too many customers for it”. Indeed, just three firm launch contracts over the next two years did not bode particularly well for Falcon Heavy as a competitive complement to SpaceX’s commercial launch business – without regular demand and assuming a competitive and fixed-price market, the cost of maintaining the infrastructure needed to build and fly a distinct launch vehicle will inevitably end up cannibalizing profitability or even the ability to break even.
For vehicles like ULA’s Delta IV Heavy, NASA’s SLS, or the late Space Shuttle, the unique capabilities offered by certain low-volume rockets or even just the risk of faltering can lead to situations where anchor customers will swallow huge cost premiums for the sake of simply preserving those capabilities. In non-competitive markets, it does not take much for nearly any capability to become essentially priceless. SpaceX, however, paid for Falcon Heavy’s development without seeking – and even actively turning down – most government development funding or guaranteed launch contracts.
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- Falcon Heavy ahead of its inaugural launch. (SpaceX)
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- The extraordinary might of Delta IV Heavy’s hydrolox-burning RS-68A engines, producing a combined 2.1 million pounds of thrust at liftoff. (Tom Cross)
A tough life for big birds
As such, Falcon Heavy’s utility and existence are in a far more precarious position than most rockets, owing to the fact that SpaceX would likely not hesitate to kill the vehicle if commercial demand rapidly withered to nothing, far from impossible with just three total launches contracted over a period of fewer than two years. Prior to the USAF announcing a new Falcon Heavy launch contract in June 2018, that number was just two secured launches. Combined with the USAF purchase, Ozvon’s new contract suggests that prospects for the super-heavy-lift rocket may be at least warm enough to sustain its useful existence.
SpaceX's Falcon Heavy manifest:
– Arabsat 6A (NET early 2019)
– STP-2 (NET 2019)
– AFSPC-52 (NET September 2020)
– Ovzon (NET Q4 2020)Pending confirmed payloads:
– Viasat
– Inmarsat— Michael Baylor (@MichaelBaylor_) October 16, 2018
There is also a decent chance that, once Falcon Heavy has proven itself with one or two real satellite launches, commercial launch customers will warm to its impressive capabilities. Most notably, Ozvon may have sided with Falcon Heavy solely because the powerful rocket can place its Ozvon-3 communications satellite directly into geostationary orbit (GEO), compared to the far more common process of launching the satellite roughly halfway there and letting it finish the journey on its own, known as geostationary transfer orbit (GTO) insertion.
There is undoubtedly significant commercial upside for geostationary communications satellites to arrive at their operational orbits as quickly as possible, rather than spending weeks or even months slowly making their way uphill from GTO. The cost of dedicated launches of Delta IV Heavy or Ariane 5 have far outweighed the benefits of earlier operability for as long as the rockets have been flying, though, and smaller and more affordable vehicles like Falcon 9, Atlas 5, or dual-manifested Ariane 5s simply aren’t powerful enough to launch traditionally-sized commsats directly to GEO.
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- Falcon Heavy clears the top of the strongback in a spectacular fashion. Two of the rocket’s three manifested missions are now for the USAF. (Tom Cross)
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- Falcon Heavy’s stunning dual side booster recovery. (SpaceX)
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- SpaceX’s second Falcon Heavy launch will either be the USAF’s STP-2, a collection of smaller satellites, or Arabsat 6A, a large communications satellite. (USAF)
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- The communications satellite Arabsat-6A. (Lockheed Martin)
In that regard, Falcon Heavy launches could become a commercial game changer and a distinct competitive advantage for companies that select it. Now with at least four launch contracts secured over the next ~24 months, Falcon Heavy will have a much better chance at demonstrating its true capabilities, potentially enabling military-premium launch services (~$250m+) at commercial-premium prices (~$90-150m). If it performs as intended in its next few launches, expected sometime in H1 2019, Falcon Heavy will be a strong contender for at least five additional USAF contracts as well as certain NASA missions scheduled to launch in the 2020s.
Experience with Falcon Heavy may only be tangentially beneficial at best to SpaceX’s greater BFR ambitions, but commercially, competitively, and reliably operating a rocket as large as FH for customers like the USAF and NASA would go a long, long way towards solidifying SpaceX’s perception as a ULA-equivalent launch provider for roughly half the cost.
For prompt updates, on-the-ground perspectives, and unique glimpses of SpaceX’s rocket recovery fleet check out our brand new LaunchPad and LandingZone newsletters!
Elon Musk flew under the radar with his recent purchase of a $1 billion energy company, according to Federal Trade Commission (FTC) documents.
Transaction number 202612350 listed Tesla and SpaceX frontman Elon Musk as the acquiring party and CF APR Super Holdings LLC as the seller, with New APR Energy, LLC as the acquired entity. The deal, which closed without public announcement, came to light on May 14.
BREAKING: Elon Musk acquires Jacksonville power company APR Energy in a deal valued at more than $1,000,000,000.00.
— Polymarket Money (@PolymarketMoney) July 15, 2026
Analysts inferred the deal’s scale from minority stakeholder disclosures, including one report of a 5 percent interest sold for approximately $50.4 million. Fortress Investment Group had purchased APR’s assets in late 2024, rebranded the operation as New APR Energy, and subsequently transferred ownership to Musk.
APR Energy specializes in rapidly deployable power infrastructure. The company maintains one of the world’s largest fleets of mobile gas and diesel turbines, with more than 1.1 gigawatts of generation capacity. Its modular units, which are often trailer-mounted, enable turnkey installations ranging from 20 MW to over 500 MW.
APR provides full engineering, procurement, construction, operation, and maintenance services for behind-the-meter power plants, serving everything from data centers, utilities, and industrial clients.
The firm has expanded aggressively to meet surging demand, recently adding turbines and deploying over 100 MW for a major AI hyperscaler. Its solutions bridge critical gaps where grid interconnections face delays of two to five years, according to Yahoo.
The acquisition means something more for Musk. As he continues to expand projects in artificial intelligence, especially xAI, his AI venture, there is a greater need to supply energy-intensive supercomputing clusters, including the Colossus project, with what they need: reliable and high-capacity power.
Ownership of APR provides immediate access to flexible generation assets that can be deployed adjacent to data centers, reducing dependence on a strained infrastructure. It also complements Tesla’s energy storage business, so Musk will be able to pull from his own entities to address the rapid scaling demands of AI training and compute.
Tesla had a petition protesting a recall to fix a potential issue with 2017-2023 Model Y and Model 3 vehicles’ headlights was denied, as the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) disagreed with the company’s opinion of things.
The recall covers approximately 19,917 Model Y and Model 3 vehicles built from 2017 to 2023. Tesla initially submitted a noncompliance report for the headlights on these vehicles on March 15, 2024. Tesla then petitioned for an exemption from the fix, which violated FMVSS No. 108 (40 CFR 571.108), arguing that the “noncompliance is inconsequential as it relates to motor vehicle safety.
🚨 Tesla was denied a petition by the NHTSA to avoid a recall of 19,900 2017-2023 Model 3 and Model Y vehicles.
The NHTSA found that the vehicles’ headlights may exceed maximum lighting levels. Tesla argued it was inconsequential and did not require a recall. pic.twitter.com/m8Jmm1teLL
— TESLARATI (@Teslarati) July 16, 2026
The NHTSA disagreed, stating that Tesla’s conclusion that the headlights do not increase any risk was not an opinion it shared. The agency said it disagreed with Tesla’s assumption that glare is not increased to surrounding traffic. This issue could be highlighted even more in certain weather conditions.
Tesla will be required to remedy the issue, the NHTSA ruled:
“In consideration of the foregoing, NHTSA has decided that Tesla has not met its burden of persuasion that the subject FMVSS No. 108 noncompliance is inconsequential to motor vehicle safety. Accordingly, Tesla’s petition is hereby denied, and Tesla is consequently obligated to provide notification of and free remedy for that noncompliance under 49 U.S.C. 30118 and 30120.”
The issue here appears to be the angle of the headlights and the brightness they emit during operation. The NHTSA report states that:
“Tesla’s headlamp supplier, Marelli Automotive Lighting, tested 25 right-hand and 25 left-hand lamps, and for this sample, found the maximum photometric intensity measured in the 10°U to 90°U and 90°L to 90°R zone was between 136.2 cd and 230.1 cd for the right-hand lamps and between 117.5 cd and 160.3 cd for the left-hand lamps. According to Tesla, these tests revealed that the photometric intensity of the right-hand and left-hand headlamp lower beam on the subject vehicles may measure as much as 230.1 cd in the 10°U to 90°U and 90°L to 90°R zone, exceeding the maximum photometric intensity by 105.1 cd. Additionally, Tesla states that a left-hand lamp tested by a Transport Canada recognized laboratory measured a maximum of 171.27 cd in the 10°U to 90°U and 90°L to 90°R zone. Despite these measurements exceeding the allowed photometric maximum of 125 cd, Tesla believes that the subject noncompliance is inconsequential to motor vehicle safety.”
Tesla also argued at some points that the headlights had not been deemed responsible for any complaints, accidents, or injuries related to the noncompliance.
Lifestyle
NTSB findings on fatal Tesla crash tell a very different story
The NTSB confirmed the driver, not Tesla’s FSD, caused the fatal Texas house crash.
The National Transportation Safety Board released preliminary findings Wednesday confirming that a Tesla driver, not the vehicle’s software, caused a fatal crash in Katy, Texas in June. The driver, 44-year-old Michael Butler, had engaged Full Self-Driving Supervised mode on Rose Hollow Lane, a residential street with a 30 mph speed limit, before manually overriding the system by pressing the accelerator pedal all the way to 100%. Data recovered from the 2025 Tesla Model 3 showed the vehicle was traveling over 70 miles per hour when it struck a home and killed 76-year-old Martha Avila, who was inside. Weather was clear, the road was dry, and it was daylight.
Texas man charged in fatal Tesla crash where he blamed Autopilot
Butler told authorities he had passed out at the wheel. But security camera footage obtained by the NTSB told a different story, and showed the car accelerating through an intersection before leaving the road entirely. Police also found that Butler’s phone had Google searches including the terms “Tesla FSD not aggressive enough 2026” and “Tesla FSD too timid,” raising serious questions about how he was using the system before the crash. Butler has since been charged with manslaughter. The victim’s family has filed a lawsuit against both Butler and Tesla, alleging negligence.
The NTSB findings aligned directly with what Tesla VP of AI Software Ashok Elluswamy had already stated publicly on X in the weeks after the crash, writing that “the driver manually overrode self-driving by pressing the accelerator all the way to 100%.” The data confirmed his account.
Yup. In this case, the driver manually overrode self-driving by pressing the accelerator all the way to 100% of the accel pedal in this residential area. They reached a speed of 73 mph during the crash, and had the accelerator pressed even after the crash.
— Ashok Elluswamy (@aelluswamy) June 22, 2026
Elon Musk secretly acquires $1B energy company to power the AI future
Tesla has to fix a big problem with its old headlights, NHTSA says
